

HISTORY
OF THE
WORLD
WAR
FRANK H. SIMONDS

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HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR





THE SPIRIT OF FRANCE

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

FRANK H. SIMONDS

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
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FRANK H. SIMONDS

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TO MY WIFE

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR



PREFACE

The World War, entering its thirty-fourth month, as these lines are written, has had three distinct phases, both on the military side and on the larger and more significant human side. The three military phases are supplied by the Marne campaign and its immediate consequences; the Russian campaign, with its Balkan episode and its Verdun ending; the Allied offensive in the west, which began at the Somme in July, 1916, and is still proceeding before Arras and along the old Aisne battlefield.

In the Marne campaign Germany sought a complete triumph by a swift and terrible thrust at France, the only one of her foes then in any sense prepared for war. Her thrust was parried at the Marne and permanently blocked at the Yser and at Ypres. Thereafter she had to turn east and restore the failing fortunes of Austria and protect her own imperilled marches.

In the Russian campaign Germany sought to dispose of Russia, as she had endeavoured to dispose of France in the Marne campaign. Immediate success escaped her in this field. Despite terrible defeats and long retreats, Russian resistance was not broken, although the Russian Revolution, now the main factor on the eastern front and unmistakably a consequence of Russian defeat,

gives to the German campaign of 1915 a value that was not perceived at the time. What the permanent value will be remains problematical. But as she had to turn east, with her western task incomplete in 1914, Germany had, after a brief and glorious campaign on behalf of her Turkish ally, to return west in February, 1916, and seek at Verdun what she had not attained on the Marne. Her failure there cost her the initiative and condemned her to the defensive.

The campaign which opened at the Somme is still proceeding. Since they began their attack on July 1, 1916, the Allies have steadily, if only slowly, pushed the Germans back and the recent victory of Arras demonstrates that the British army has at last reached a high state of efficiency, while there are signs, far from conclusive to be sure, of a decline in German morale. At all events, the Germans remain on the defensive and the end of this third phase has not come.

Looking now to the broader horizon, it will be perceived that here, too, there are three aspects. In its inception, in the first months of battle, the conflict still seemed to men, not alone of neutral nations but of involved nations, one more war, greater and more terrible than all past wars, but a war comparable to them in origin and purpose.

But as the struggle progressed, it brought more and more clearly to the eyes of men of all nations, save those of Central Europe, the truth that the German attack was something more than a bid for world power; comparable with that of France under Napoleon or Louis XIV, of Spain under Charles V. It became clear that Germany was not attacking armies or nations alone, but also the whole fabric of our common civilization and all the precepts and doctrines of humanity, which represent the slow progress upward from barbarism.



The invasion of Belgium shocked the whole world. The crimes committed by German soldiers in Belgium and northern France, crimes not belonging to the order of excesses incident to war, but crimes ordered by commanding officers for the deliberate purpose of terrifying a helpless population and disarming men by the brutality practised upon women and children, these slowly but surely inclined the balance of neutral opinion against Germany. At first these brutal and bestial crimes only gave new heart and new determination to the nations directly assailed, but in the end they earned for Germany the condemnation of neutral nations the world over.

In its third phase there came, together with the growing anger and detestation of German violence and the clearer perception of the danger of Germanism to all civilization, the recognition that the war was, after all, one more stand of autocracy against democracy, that in its essence the German thing, already become abominable in the sight of all the non-German world, was the final expression of militarism, which had its origin in caste and Crown; that the "Superman" was only the old tyrant in a new disguise.

In this stage we have seen the Russian Revolution and the entrance of our own country into the war. The clearest definition of the war, as it is now seen everywhere save in the Central Empires, has been supplied by the President of the United States in that document which determined in fact, if not technically, American enlistment.

In succeeding volumes I shall endeavour to set forth the development of this world verdict upon German purposes and German methods. In the present volume, I have sought merely to outline the events preceding the war and the first campaigns in the struggle. Not until the first phase was completed had the real character of German menace been established, save in the minds of the French and Belgians on whose soil German armies had written their history of shame. Not until the war had entered its second phase was there apparent that spirit which was to dominate the councils and arm the spirit of the nations allied against Germany. Not until that hour was it to take on, consciously, in the minds of millions, the character of a crusade, a concerted defence of civilization against a new barbarism, which combined the science of the head with barbarism of the heart, the weapons of the Twentieth Century with the spirit of Attila.

And, conversely, when the war did take on this new character it became something different from all wars of which we have trustworthy record—a war fought not for territorial gain or battlefield success, but a war fought between two ideas, two conceptions of life, of civilization, of humanity; two faiths, of which there can be room for but one in this world, since each is utterly destructive of the other.

Tardily, perhaps, but completely in the end, we in America, far removed as we are from the European world, have perceived the issues of the war. Instinctively the mass of men and women, the plain people of the United States, like those of Britain and France, have prevailed over the wisdom of politicians and the doubts of statesmen. Late, but not too late, the nation which had Lexington and Concord in its own history, recognized that neutrality was impossible when a new battle for democracy was going forward. And almost at the same moment there has been heard, broken as yet and uncertainly, a new voice in Germany, repeating something of the words that now fill the world outside of the Central



Empires Whatever be the outcome of the war, at least it is certain now that even German things will never be again what they were when Prussian militarism crushed Belgium under an iron heel and German necessity thrust its bayonet through international good faith and common humanity.

My acknowledgments are due both to the French and to the British Governments and General Staffs for the courtesy which permitted me to visit their armies and their battlefields, among others the Marne, Nancy, Champagne, and the Somme, escorted by officers who explained the actions, and for the kindness and frankness with which they supplied all information at their disposal. To the interest of the President of France I owe my opportunity to visit Verdun and to meet General Petain during the great battle, and to Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig I am indebted for the chance to see the British army and to meet its Commander-in-Chief just before the battle of Arras and to look eastward from Mont St. Eloi at Vimy Ridge, soon to fall to Canadian valour. Nor should I fail to acknowledge here my gratitude to General Dubois, Governor of Verdun, who twice welcomed me to his ruined city and permitted me to visit Fort de Vaux, newly reconquered from the German Crown Prince.

On one other point I desire to make an explanation; the absence of any discussion of naval operations from my narrative is not due to any failure on my part to appreciate the greatness or the importance of the work performed by the fleets, and in an overwhelming majority of cases by the British fleet, but to the fact that it was agreed at the outset that the history of the naval operations of the war should be written for a later volume. The subject is of too great importance to be crowded in the space at my disposal in this volume.

In the years that have followed the outbreak of the war, during which I have been writing steadily about its progress, I have made too many mistakes and been too frequently in error not to appreciate the limitations of the present volume. It represents merely an effort to interpret fairly and to an American audience the earlier incidents in the world struggle, hitherto mainly explained to Americans by commentators belonging to nations already at war who have reviewed the campaigns from the perspectives of belligerents, and have naturally paid small attention to the point of view of the citizens of a nation separated by its history, by its long neutrality, and by the expanse of the ocean from the conflict.

In so far as I have been able, I have striven to make this book an American comment upon a world war, and no one can be more conscious than am I of its limitations.

Frank H. Simonds.

Upper Montclair, New Jersey,
May 1, 1917.



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INTRODUCTION

By ALBERT SHAW

The records of what we call "civilization" are largely devoted to a series f periods or historical epochs, marked by such intensity of action and such rofound changes that the effects have a permanent bearing. Such effects n their turn become causes, and bring about still further events and changes. t is indeed true that in the more uneventful stretches of historic time there are lent forces and influences always at work, and that these are recognized by tudents of national life or of world history as things necessary to be under- tood. But such influences and forces often operate obscurely, and are not stimated at their full value until they have become revealed in the light of tartling events in some new period of intense action.

Thus, in the background of the upheavals that produced the American and rench revolutions, are to be found the new movements in navigation and trade ue to the discovery and colonization of undeveloped parts of the world. And lso, in the background, lies the breakdown of feudalism, with the spread of he new doctrines of human rights and of political liberty. The economic nd political changes following that intense period at the end of the Eigh- eenth and the beginning of the Nineteenth century have been so extensive n their areas, and so vast in their statistical aggregates, that they almost affle analysis and computation.

Out of that intense period there emerged the typical representative de- nocracy that was destined within a century or more to become the prevailing orm of political association among men. There emerged from that period the nodern ideals of local, national, and international life, as swayed by the in- elligence of the masses. "Public opinion" became a recognized institution, so hat its necessary instruments—the right of public assembly and the liberty of he press—were safeguarded in constitutions and laws. Invention and dis- overy also became recognized agents of social progress; and through these gents, within a century, the civilized nations had achieved an economic eman- ipation that was giving to the many what had been available to the privileged ew alone in the Eighteenth Century.

It has been true, however, of all historical progress, that conflicting influ- nces are always present and that forward movements must fight their way, ometimes suffering retardation and temporary defeat. The leading minds f the American and French revolutions had a conception not merely of the ights of man as related to the government and growth of separate nations, but

they also had in mind the establishment of universal peace through a federation of states or nations, and through a subjection of purely national ambitions to the larger and better aims of civilization as a whole. It was hoped and believed that these great conceptions might be realized through their strong appeal to the growing intelligence of mankind.

It was thought that the masses of men, acquiring enough education to read and think and take part in the government of communities and states, would firmly renounce so barbaric a thing as the use of force in the settlement of differences between nations. It was believed that those ideas and methods which had triumphed in the establishment of the United States would in due time have the effect of democratizing and unifying the peoples of Europe. Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and other Americans believed that the Western Hemisphere should, in so far as possible, keep aloof and develop the principles of democracy and confederation until Europe, influenced by American success, might also adopt full democratic methods in the government of states and nations, and might substitute some form of confederation for the military alliances and the "balance of power" principle that must inevitably lead to periodic wars.

Unfortunately, however, several great forces of human progress that were stimulated in that period of revolutions set forth upon their careers at unequal rates of movement. Universal education, as one of these forces, intensified devotion to the language, the history, the ideals, and the aspirations of particular nations. Thus national unity and progress became a passionate object of endeavour—in Germany, for instance, then in Italy, then in Russia, and in many of the smaller principalities and racial or political entities. Hungary had evolved an intense national consciousness, Poland had awakened, Bohemia had begun to demand a distinctive future, and the people of the Balkan regions in particular had experienced an almost unprecedented evolution of political and racial ambition.

This exaggerated nationalism could be ascribed above all else to the facts and the methods of universal education. The rapid forming of the reading and writing habit within a period of two or three generations was certain to promote nationalism and strengthen language barriers, and thus for a time at least to weaken the larger cause of unity and harmony among nations.

Furthermore, the great forces of invention and scientific discovery that were set at work were producing many consequences that could not have been foreseen. In some decades they encouraged vast migrations, while in others they produced conditions that checked the export of men and promoted the export of commodities. These discoveries abolished epidemics and resulted in the total increase of the population of civilized countries by from one hundred per cent. to two hundred per cent. in a very short period. The application of

cience to industry had enabled this expanding population to produce vastly ncreased supplies of the necessities and luxuries of life.

In the industrialized nations which possessed or could secure supplies of ron and coal, and which could make and use machinery while having the tech- ical ability to produce cloths of cotton, wool, silk, and linen on a large scale, he output of manufactured articles increased in something like a geometrical atio. But, on the other hand, the production of articles of food necessary o sustain the industrial population went forward at an arithmetical rate, or ven more slowly. The inevitable consequence of these two major facts in ne conditions of Europe's economic production was an enormous growth of oreign trade. Regions that less than a hundred years ago had been almost holly agricultural, except for the local and household industries that had sup- lied shelter, clothing, and the ordinary utensils and implements, had now ecome so transformed that more than three-quarters of the people were ngaged in commerce and manufactures.

The products of their industry were sold throughout the world, and the uestion of markets had become vital. They were obliged to study the cus- oms and the wants of Asia and Africa, as well as of North and South America nd the various parts of Europe, and to awaken new wants and help form new abits and customs, for the sake of enlarged markets. They were obliged in eturn to import vast supplies of raw material to feed their factories, and in- reasing quantities of food materials from the temperate zones and the tropics, o provide the workers with bread and meat, fruits and spices, tea, coffee, and ocoa.

This had necessitated a correspondingly large increase in the tonnage of nerchant shipping. It had transformed the new nationalism that had re- ulted from popular education into a nationalism of trade rivalry that extended o the remote parts of the earth. The growth of overseas commerce, and the ncrease in the number and importance of merchant ships, made the freedom f the ocean highways a matter of anxious concern to governments. The octrine of naval expansion and power was proclaimed and justified on the round of commercial necessity.

Let us take the growth of Germany as an illustration. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, what is now the German Empire had a population of less han 25,000,000. A hundred years later, at the outbreak of the Great War of 914, this population had grown to nearly 70,000,000. As recently as the ranco-Prussian War of 1870-'71, the German population was only a little nore than 40,000,000. At that time German industry was not highly devel- ped as compared with that of England or France. But it became the policy f the new German Empire to promote scientific and technical education and o stimulate the growth of German manufactures of all kinds. The success of his policy was so great that Germany became increasingly able to compete

everywhere with the manufactures of other countries. German migration to America practically ceased because there was ample employment in the home country. This meant, in simple terms, that besides an average increase in the standards of living and the conditions of German communities, which absorbed much of the new production of goods, there had come to be a population of many millions on German soil who were dependent in normal times upon trade with the outside world.

What was so true of Germany, was in greater or less measure true of other industrial nations. That is to say, an increasing percentage of their population was engaged in the production of articles which required international markets in contrast with domestic markets.

The period of discovery, in the Sixteenth Century and later, had been followed by the growth of commercial or trading empires, notably those of Spain, England, France, Portugal, and Holland. One of the aims of the revolutionary period of the Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries had been to break up these empires and create a series of democracies. Thus the United States was created out of great strips of British, French, and Spanish commercial domain. The Latin-American republics in due time deprived Spain and Portugal of most of their acquisitions of the earlier period. Great Britain, as an island nation, and as the earliest of the countries to attain modern industrial development and large export trade, had been driven to the policy of naval supremacy. This unwavering devotion to the idea of a vastly superior navy, conjoined with Great Britain's acceptance of the principle of colonial self-government and democracy, had been effective in keeping the British Empire from falling apart, and in adding greatly to its extent when Africa came to be subdivided among the European powers.

Great Britain, after the American Revolution, gave up the old idea of the commercial or trading empire, which meant the exploiting of colonies to their own detriment and to the exclusion of the trade of other countries. England in due time gave to her own colonies full liberty of commerce and industry; and she also opened her home trade and the trade of her colonies to the competing trade of her European rivals. Nevertheless, the industries and commerce of England doubtless derived a certain measure of advantage from the political relations between the mother country and the outlying parts of the empire.

This position of the British Empire, viewed with just and temperate judgment, did not greatly menace the peace and harmony of the world, and it did not obstruct either the process of democratic evolution or that of the internationalization of trade and commerce. But it made the British Empire so ubiquitous, as it were—so omnipresent at every point of international rivalry or of local transition—that the danger of serious clash with other growing empires was illustrated by one incident after another. Thus, for a period of

years there was misunderstanding between England and Russia, because of Russia's vast territorial expansions in Central Asia that seemed to threaten England's control of India. There were differences between England and France, over respective spheres of influence in Africa.

II

Precisely as England's historic position had compelled her to adhere to the policy of naval supremacy, so Germany's historic position in the heart of Europe had led her to the maintenance of a policy of militarism. The conception of a nation which could at will turn all its energies and forces from the pursuits of peace to the achievement of victory in war has been entertained intelligently by a certain number of minds in many different countries. But Germany is the only modern country which has so ordered her affairs as to be the stronger for war by reason of every access of strength for the pursuits of peace. It would be useless for us to consider whether Germany originally adopted the military ideal through fear of powerful neighbours and the need of self-defence, or whether the German race is inherently militant and aggressive. It had usually been thought that the Germans were naturally peace-loving and contented, and the world had been disposed to praise them greatly for their educational and scientific progress and their many contributions to culture and civilization.

After the unification of Germany, following the war with France and the smaller wars of the Bismarckian period, there came the rapid growth of industry and commerce to which I have referred. Germany began to assume the rôle of the leading power within the European system. France strove for recuperation and formed an alliance with Russia. Germany secured Austria and Italy as allies, but relied mainly upon her own military prowess for protection against the Gallo-Slavic combination. In a country like England, military ideals were obsolete, and the army was considered as an emergency police force, somewhat necessary but an expensive adjunct of government. The island boundaries of the United Kingdom were fixed by Nature, and were not to be changed. The relations of the United Kingdom with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, were increasingly those of mutual helpfulness and voluntary coöperation. The future of India was to be determined by the developing capacity of the Indian peoples for mutual tolerance and for maintaining just and beneficent political institutions. Speaking generally, the British people conceived of their empire as a thing in harmony with world progress, and not as a thing that was blocking the rightful progress of any other nation or race.

But if the British Empire on its part was a finished affair, subject to peaceful decentralization through the growth of the oversea dominions, it was quite otherwise with the German Empire. The British army was a small, profes-

sionalized body of soldiers. "Tommy Atkins," the English private, was in no sense a civilian or an ordinary citizen. But the German army was in an almost complete sense the nation itself. There was an exception, however, which was fraught with a danger that even yet is not wholly understood. This exception lay in the great body of highly trained German officers. These army officers were soldiers and not civilians. Their training for every grade and rank of commissioned military service was serious, intense, extremely intelligent.

This permanent military caste was imbued with the doctrine of sheer force for the advancement of a nation's ends; and the progress and dominance of the nation was for them the supreme ethical law. Comprised within this great body of permanent trained officers was a vast system or mechanism for training all the young men of the nation, as they reached the suitable age, to serve the country as soldiers. The system was carefully adjusted to promote rather than injure the industrial and commercial advancement of the nation. The well-educated young men could be returned to civil life within a year, while intensive training for two or three years made the country bumpkin or the village boy a more valuable civilian than he otherwise would have been. Thus while German militarism employed this twofold system, one for the development of the great body of professional officers, and the other for the disciplining of young civilians, there were also the specialized groups under the Army General Staff, such as the engineering and technical groups and those concerned with international military intelligence. Through these specialists all the progress of Germany and of other countries in mechanical, electrical, and chemical engineering was so adapted as to be available for military purposes.

At the time of the Franco-Prussian War, the population of Germany and France was almost equal, being about 40,000,000 each. That of the United Kingdom was somewhat more than 30,000,000. In a period of forty years following that war, the population of France had remained almost unchanged, while the British Islands had surpassed France and contained about 45,000,000 inhabitants. Germany, on her part, had increased in numbers to a total somewhat less than 70,000,000. German industry, meanwhile, had made a far more rapid relative development than had the population, so that Germany was not only able to throw the nation quickly upon a war footing with 10,000,000 trained men under arms, but her great workshops could supply vast quantities of guns and munitions, while her chemical industries could provide new kinds of explosives and war materials, and her railroads, which had been built from the strategic as well as the commercial standpoint, were ready to serve ends and objects that had been carefully planned in advance.

France, Russia, Italy, and Austria were also on the basis of general military training and service; but in no other country were the collective resources of the nation so readily convertible into terms of immediate military efficiency as

in Germany. There were relatively few men in Europe, and still fewer in America, who could understand in advance what this convertibility of national power into terms of immediate military efficiency might mean in case of the sudden outbreak of a general war. It was not until the recent great war in Europe was nearly three years old that there came to be any wide understanding of the nature and extent of Germany's stupendous superiority at the outset in national efficiency for war.

This adaptability of the nation's resources of men and of industry to the purposes of war had been created, in the first instance, because of Germany's historical position amidst the conflicting tribes and races of Europe. Russia occupied vast territories, her population was soon to reach the 200,000,000 mark, she also had a system of general military service and a large body of professional officers, but her industrial resources were comparatively undeveloped. While Russia was dreaming her Pan-Slavic dream, Germany was looking forward to what she deemed her inevitable conflict with the Franco-Russian alliance. France also was highly militarized, but the Germans, weighing all military resources in the aggregate, regarded their own efficiency as at least twice as great as that of the French.

Thus as Germany grew in a sense of military primacy, her body of professional officers also grew in the conviction that a blow should be struck before Russian resources of science and industry should develop enough to enable Russia to maintain large armies over considerable periods of time. Furthermore, as Germany's foreign commerce increased, her ambitions expanded and she began to conceive of her destinies as something more than those of leadership within the continent of Europe. England, with 45,000,000 people in the home islands, controlled a vast empire in all continents and in all seas. Germany, with 70,000,000, was now outstripping England in quantity and variety of industrial products and was rapidly contesting England's primacy in merchant marine. Germany began to demand her "place in the sun." As her sense of military and commercial power increased, her national pride assumed aggressive and arrogant forms. Although Germany accused John Bull of a traditional arrogance, the facts show that in the main there was a surprising readiness on England's part to recognize Germany's progress and to admit German merchants everywhere on equal terms.

Fear, rather than arrogance, however, is at the root of much discord and conflict between nations as between individuals. Germany feared that the vast merchant fleet needful to carry her expanding commerce might at some critical time suffer unless protected by a great navy. England, on the other hand, feared lest Germany, already dominant on land by reason of her superior army, might at some juncture destroy the British Empire if to Germany's military machine there was also added the power of a German navy approaching that of England in extent. Thus Britain was led to lay aside all differences

with France and then with Russia, and to arrange for the combined use of the English and French fleets, while England also began to construct new warships and to revolutionize the world's navies in size and character.

III

Thus the modern world, as set upon its course by the mental and physical forces culminating in the American and French revolutions, had made vast progress in different kinds and degrees, and these different kinds of progress had been accelerated at very different rates of speed. The European masses had within a century been transformed from illiterate serfs and yokels to a body of more than four hundred millions of people who could read and write, take some part in government, and entertain with dangerous prejudices as well as with enthusiastic devotion those concepts making up what we call "patriotism." Several hundred million people who had never read at all were suddenly reading newspapers and bringing collective pressure to bear upon public policies. They were evolving great states like Germany and Italy out of fragmentary entities, and they were fusing populations into large, aspiring nationalities. They were doing all this within the circumscriptions of many different languages; and with mistaken ideas as to race origins and the historic background of European peoples. Thus the spirit of nationalism could but become excessive and therefore dangerous.

Furthermore, the population of the world within a brief period had increased from an estimated one thousand millions to an estimated one thousand five hundred millions, the relative increase being greatest in the highly civilized and industrialized countries, France being the only exception. Not only had population increased in the total, but it had shifted in its groupings from rural pursuits to those of industrialized towns and cities. The population movements had been accompanied by ever more intensified forms of industry, with an immense advancement in the earning power of the average man when expressed in terms of the comforts, conveniences, and luxuries of life. And such altered conditions within national boundaries had of necessity been accompanied by almost incomprehensible increases in the volume and variety of international commerce, necessitating the multiplication of merchant ships. These changes—wrought within the period of a century—were the most stupendous, both in kind and in degree, that had come about during any century within the recorded history of the human race.

The growth of international commerce had created countless ties and relationships across the boundary lines of states. Science and education had found many ways to communicate and to coöperate. But whereas there had been developing a network of voluntary association and intercourse among the peoples of different nations, there had been a failure to secure the harmony and coöperation of governments, which was the one thing supremely needful. The

powerful nations had intensified the danger arising from unregulated nationalism by entering belatedly upon an unwise policy of imperialism in rivalry with one another. If two great nations like the United States and Great Britain, possessing a common language and many other bonds of unity and agreement, had at times found it hard to avoid conflict and to reconcile differences arising from policies of expansion or empire or trade, how much harder must it have been for Russia and Austria-Hungary to avoid conflict and reconcile differences when, in addition to national separateness of languages and tradition, there were added the rivalries of imperial policy between two great governments each of which was seeking overlordship of the lands that had once constituted European Turkey.

The Turkish Empire at the time of its greatest extent had held in subjection various lands and nationalities of southeastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. The forces of progress that became so accelerated with the revolutionary period at the end of the Eighteenth Century came to the aid of the western nations as against the decayed despotism of Turkey. Greece, Serbia, Roumania, and Bulgaria emerged as European peoples and began to struggle for boundaries, for seaports, for future security, as their people became intelligent and infused with an intense spirit of national ambition.

Inevitably Turkish authority was superseded in Egypt and the Barbary States, through the commercial and colonizing energy of the western European powers. Germany and Austria-Hungary were increasingly convinced that in the further disintegration of the old Turkish Empire they must be recognized in an exceptional way and must be allowed by Russia, Great Britain, and France to acquire an undisputed influence from the Adriatic to the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf.

Not only was Turkey collapsing, but Persia had become subject to the commercial energy and political influence of the European empires, Russia and England having substituted spheres of Persian influence for what at one time had seemed a dangerous competition. Germany's capacity, meanwhile, for taking a large part in the commercial and economic development of the world, was increasing more rapidly than that of any other European nation. With this growth of capacity, as I have already explained, came the increasing need of markets. German advance agents saw in the undeveloped regions of Asiatic Turkey, and beyond, a great opportunity for obtaining many products and materials needed in Germany, with the prospective opportunity of developing in those regions a large and permanent market for German wares. The Bagdad Railroad was projected as a part of a much larger scheme.

In furtherance of this larger ambition for an economic and political confederation extending from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, German diplomatic and military influence had for a long time been at work in Constantinople to gain a dominating place in the councils of the Turkish Government.

The alliance with Austria-Hungary was a necessary part of the great project. It was further needful for Germany that Austrian rather than Russian influences should guide the destinies of the smaller Balkan states which lay between the Teutonic empires and the Turkish domains.

The importance of the Balkan and Turkish struggles of recent years, and of the bitter feud between Austria and Serbia over the annexation of Bosnia by the Vienna government, can only be understood when one has in mind the great projects upon which German policy was embarked. Austria had made a bitter enemy of Serbia when she had destroyed that dream of a "greater Serbia" which required Bosnia and a part of the Adriatic coast for its principal fulfillment. The assassination of the heir to the Hapsburg throne gave Austria her pretext for an attack that was expected to secure control of necessary river and rail routes to Turkey. Russia, on the other hand, saw her dream of control at Constantinople endangered, together with her plans for further "peaceful penetration" of Persia and of the Turkish provinces south of the Black Sea.

Germany was prepared to support Austria to the utmost, while Russia felt herself compelled to take the field on behalf of Serbia. It was fully realized by Germany that France must support Russia. It was not believed in Germany that Great Britain would be involved, and it was expected that Italy would remain neutral while perhaps rendering a certain amount of moral aid to her allies, Germany and Austria. The British on their part had not foreseen the danger, and were quite unprepared. The critical condition of the Irish question rendered it the more certain from Germany's standpoint that England could not bring military aid to France. Russia had entered upon large plans of military preparation, but these were not to culminate for two or three years. Germany, on the other hand, had immensely increased and strengthened her war machine several years before.

From the German standpoint, the fateful hour had arrived. Germany had full equipment for at least five times as large an army as Russia could at once supply with arms and munitions. Austria-Hungary might be regarded as almost, if not quite, able to cope with Russia, while Germany, moving swiftly against France, could bring the entire war to an end within a few weeks—probably by October and certainly before Christmas, 1914.

The boundary-line between Germany and France was barely two hundred miles long, extending from Belgium to Switzerland along the border of Alsace-Lorraine. This stretch of boundary was strongly fortified on both sides. The easiest way to France from the southern parts of Germany and from Austria was through the edge of Switzerland. The easiest way to France from central and northern Germany was across Belgium. But Belgium had, for the greater part of a century, been under the protection of a solemn guarantee of neutrality signed in successive treaties, Germany, France, and Great Britain being parties

to the agreement. France was not prepared for an attack by way of Belgium; and the German law of "military necessity" prescribed an attack upon your enemy by the path which your enemy has left unguarded, despite treaties.

In choosing this path, Germany failed to understand the Belgians themselves. It was expected that they would protest, but it was not expected that they could make war. Germany had expected to use Belgian railways and highways so swiftly as to make it certain that there could be no advance of the French forces to make formidable resistance until the German armies were moving upon Paris. Belgium was to be fully indemnified and rewarded for having suffered under duress the passage of the German forces.

An even greater mistake of calculation was Germany's confidence in the inability of the government and people of Great Britain to drop the Irish question and unite in supporting a declaration of war. Belgium's resistance had delayed the movement of the great German war machine, and had given the French time to save Paris while the Russians were invading East Prussia. The British, meanwhile, were coming resolutely to the aid of the French army; and what was to have been a short war was inevitably changed to a long one. What was to have been a single brilliant campaign, with peace terms based upon unqualified victory, had been of necessity transformed into a supreme struggle of years, destined to involve the whole world for reasons not so much of sheer material force as of moral conviction.

IV

In these introductory observations, I am not anticipating the great narrative that will be found so well related by Mr. Simonds in the chapters and volumes that are herewith presented. I am dealing, rather, with some of the underlying causes of the conflict and with some of the principles involved as bearing not only upon the conditions that I have already endeavoured to describe, but also upon the further progress of human society. It was not at first so clearly a war of principles. Opposing doctrines were not so sharply in conflict as to be clearly seen through all the complicated factors that had entered into the struggle in such fashion as to confuse the underlying issues. Gradually it was seen that this was a war to bring harmony into the world on principles of justice and freedom, and to create an organization of the world's public opinion that should be stronger for peace and order than any single empire or alliance could be for attaining its ends through military power.

The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had been harsh and peremptory beyond all modern precedents. Its principal objects and aims were unquestionably supported at Berlin, regardless of the details. The thing intended was to bring Serbia under the sway of the allied Teutonic powers. Not only must Austria's annexation of Bosnia no longer be questioned, but Serbia herself must become a vassal state, or ultimately a portion of a South-Slav member of

the Austro-Hungarian confederation. If the terms of the ultimatum had been accepted in full, Serbia would have yielded up certain attributes of independence and sovereignty that Austrian and German policy would never have allowed her to recover. Her answer had to be made very quickly by the terms of the ultimatum. She must yield without resistance, or she must make a stand for her own distinct future and for the rights of small nationalities.

If Serbia had yielded, the pretexts for an immediate war would have been removed; the projects of political and economic assimilation throughout the Balkans and Turkey would have been pressed forward by the Teutonic Empires and tremendous preparations would have been made on both sides for the great postponed European war, that should determine whether Russian or German influences were to become predominant in southeastern Europe and western Asia.

If under England's leadership the issues between Austria and Serbia could have been referred to the Hague Tribunal for settlement, the immediate peace might have been preserved. Furthermore, it was the hope of the friends of peace throughout the world that with every postponement of war the influences and forces that were trying to build up international methods for preventing conflict would gain strength, so that the truce maintained by the "balance of power" might by degrees become transformed into an assured and constructive peace based upon world organization.

This desired transition, however, was not destined to come about. Even the non-aggressive nations were reluctant to trust their destinies to an untried kind of world union for peace-keeping and common humanitarian ends. They were living in a world that had been transformed by modern science, industry, commerce, and education, while dangerously obsolete in its political structure.

Germany had not become formidable through her martial spirit and prowess alone, nor alone through her expansion of industry at home and of trade abroad. Her power had been developed through the marvellous union of these two things. With the growth of her power, her world ambition had become more far-reaching and more daring. And she had come to believe that she was being deprived by other ambitious nations and races of opportunities in the world justly commensurate with her extraordinary attainments in education, science, industry, and social order.

Nations and races that had believed they could make better use of lands, resources, and facilities, than others in possession, have in all recorded time persuaded themselves that they are justified in using power to attain their ends, believing that ultimate results will give historic vindication. Thus the European colonists dispossessed the aboriginal races of North and South America. And thus the European governments have partitioned Africa among themselves, while at times menacing the integrity of China and laying hands upon whatsoever portions of Asia they could secure by one means or another.

Germany's belated arrival as an aspirant for world empire was attended with the highest degree of moral and physical preparation for the unrestrained use of force in the attainment of objects that the world had known in recent times. Only two remedies for this condition were possible; and neither could be applied quickly or peaceably. One possible remedy lay within the German nation itself, and this could have come about only by a social revolution.

The vast military machine was not to be rendered meekly subordinate to a civilian society led by Social Democrats like Liebknecht. The army and navy—that is to say, the immense body of professional officers—had joined hands with the great captains of industry and of commerce to gain control of the German mind and to shape German policy. The older publicists of Germany were forgotten. The universities and technical schools were now controlled by the exponents of the new doctrines of German destiny and supremacy. German nationalism had grown into German imperialism; and the idea of leadership in central Europe had expanded to the principle of leadership throughout the world. There was no counteracting sentiment in Germany of sufficient strength to bring about a rejection of these views and policies.

The other remedy, outside of Germany, was almost equally impossible. Nationalism had also been assertive in other lands; and imperialism had infected national policy elsewhere than in Germany, even if in lesser degrees.

The doctrines and policies of Mr. Cecil Rhodes, who believed profoundly in the value to backward regions of British regulation and British justice, have been discussed throughout His Majesty's realms with entire freedom and candour. It is enough to say that the South African War and the annexation of the two small Boer Republics, taken together with Mr. Chamberlain's plans for imperial federation involving preferential tariffs, had a great influence upon the German mind.

As a sequel to the Boer War, there came the Union of South Africa, with a constitution of the most liberal kind under which the Boers were given every opportunity for self-determined progress that reasonable men could desire. No finer tributes, whether in action or in word, have ever been paid by defeated leaders to their conquerors than those that the Boer generals Botha and Smuts have paid during the recent war period in which they have rendered such conspicuous service to the British cause.

Germany could not, or would not, understand. Through a long term of years, Mr. Campbell-Bannerman as Premier, then Mr. Asquith, and at length Mr. Lloyd-George himself, with Foreign Ministers like Sir Edward Grey, had represented an England that stood for democracy at home and abroad and that held out the olive branch to all nations—not the least to Germany—in the desire for a world of harmony along lines of justice, progress, and good understanding.

I might continue with further allusions to the growth in colonial empire

of the French Republic, so bitterly resented by Germany and so much contributing to that crystallization of German policy that I have already characterized. Within the volumes to which these observations of mine are introductory, will be found a chapter explaining the growth of the greater France in Asia and Africa and its status at the outbreak of the war of 1914. I might also allude to the process of Russification that had been sweeping over vast areas in central Asia, extending southward through Persia and Mesopotamia, and embracing Mongolia and much of Manchuria. A conspectus of the growth of the Russian Empire as it stood in 1914 will also be given for convenient reference in these volumes. It is enough for me to remark that Russia's power to acquire political control over Asiatic regions and to assimilate Asiatic peoples had aroused the attention of all intelligent observers, and had led Germany and Austria to look forward with no little anxiety to a time when Russia's ability to put twenty million or thirty million men in the field might be attended by a corresponding ability to equip such vast armies with the necessary arms and munitions, and to maintain them on southern and western fighting fronts.

The example of the United States in expelling Spain from Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, and in acquiring the Hawaiian Islands, had been used in Germany in a manner that wholly failed to recognize the motives, methods, and objects of the American people. Germany had regarded the United States as, like herself, one of the newer industrial nations, with an inevitable tendency toward economic and political expansion. Germany, on her own part, had desired to acquire the Philippines, and had looked forward to obtaining bases in the West Indies and colonies, perchance, on the mainland of South America.

Democracy in America, like democracy in England, was fully able to check imperialism and to transform the doctrines of possession and exploitation into those of guardianship and tutelage. American sentiment had become almost too eager to cut the Philippines adrift. The efforts of the United States to create a system of education in the Philippines, to reform agriculture, to establish security and justice in the daily affairs of life, to train the people in local self-government, and to give them political institutions for permanent insular self-rule, had been remarkably successful.

But Germany could only see that the United States was attaining a position of larger influence and scope in the outer world, at a time when the southern and western parts of the American republic, together with Alaska, still afforded ample opportunity for the growth of population and the development of resources. Germany, with a greatly restricted home area, was second to the United States alone in the volume of her industry, and ahead of the United States in some forms of manufacture and commerce. Furthermore, Germany had seen the United States fortify as well as construct the

Panama Canal, acquiring dominant influence in Central America and the Caribbean Sea, while England had been constantly strengthening her naval and political authority along the Suez route, in the Red Sea, in Egypt, and in Persia.

V

Such was the world in which Germany felt it necessary to make her way, first by an unexampled training of her people and development of her industry and commerce, and second by devising a wholly unexampled convertibility of human and industrial resources into the instrumentalities of war. Democratic transformation from within was impossible under these conditions. Was it possible, on the other hand, for the democracies of England, America, and France to have taken Germany so freely and generously into a partnership for developing the resources and trade of the world—while restricting land and sea armaments and organizing the nations for peace—as to have won the great victory for civilization? The essential factors of progress characterizing the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries had been international, and therefore indivisible by political boundaries. Could the rivalries of the nations have been modified, and the dangers of nationalism gradually reduced and removed, if America, Great Britain, and France had set more consistent examples? I believe the records will show that each of these three great countries had actually endeavoured to do full justice to Germany in every respect.

Mighty as the economic progress of the world has been through the application of steam and electricity to industry, the discoveries of chemistry, and the use of railroads and steamships, by far the greater advancement has come about through intellectual and spiritual changes. Serfs have been made into freemen. Margins of leisure have been earned for countless millions by the increase of abundance and the gradual extinction of poverty. The press, based upon the universal practice of reading and writing and the growth of public opinion, has intensified the nationalistic sentiment because it has made of the local idiom or vernacular the chief agency of enlightenment and progress.

In such a period of awakened nationalism and race consciousness, the principal safeguard against dangerous and devastating conflicts lay in the application to actual life everywhere of the doctrines of liberty and democracy. When freedom and equality had been established among the inhabitants of a given locality, and among the peoples using a common tongue and inhabiting a national area, it became increasingly probable that a democracy thus grounded in the doctrine of human rights would not maintain a governmental policy that looked toward the permanent subjection of other races or peoples. Unfortunately, governmental autocracy had survived up to the outbreak of the war of 1914, to a far greater degree in some countries and empires than in others. In this obvious historical fact lies the answer to the question I have proposed.

The great conflict seemed inevitable, in order that its reactions might bring about a much larger development of democracy within certain countries, while hastening the revision of imperial policies as regards certain other countries that were already democratic in many essential aspects. Germany had been disappointed in the recent diplomacy that had helped to shape the course of things in Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to the Mediterranean. She had not been appeased by the political development, during the previous twenty years, of affairs in the Pacific and the South Seas, nor of affairs in the Western Hemisphere. The course of events in central Asia and in the Far East had not encouraged her to believe that as against Russia, Japan, England, and France she could very rapidly gain a position of superiority.

Thus she became forced by the logic of facts to encourage Russia's ambitions in the Far East, in order to divert Russian energy from southeastern Europe and Turkey. While continuing as rapidly as possible to build a fleet that might in some juncture enable her to try issues with Great Britain, Germany became more fully convinced that her immediate future must be devoted to strengthening her relations with her ally, Austria-Hungary, and to obtaining economic and political ascendancy throughout the Turkish Empire. Thus it became her immediate object to consolidate her power on inner lines, penetrating Asia by railways, and building up an empire that should not be dependent for its maintenance upon the security of navigation.

The precipitation of world war through the attack upon Serbia might have produced a more profound shock everywhere if its success had not been delayed by the exertions of the Serbians themselves and the swift mobilization of Russia. If Germany had not become so completely the victim of her own doctrine of power and of success through any means to attain ends, she would not have tried to reach Paris by way of Belgium. If she had been faithful to her joint guarantees of Belgian neutrality, and had merely resisted French invasion along the Alsace-Lorraine boundary, while using her supreme initiative to help Austria against Serbia and Russia, the immediate course of history would have been greatly changed. It is at least possible that England may have entered the conflict too late. It would seem that Austrian policy must have prevailed in Serbia and the Balkans. Russia could not have stood out against Germany; Italy could not have become involved in the war; France could hardly have sustained such temporary advances as she might have made in Alsace-Lorraine.

But the major conflict would have been merely postponed. France, Russia, and England would have been obliged to make enlarged military and naval preparations. Italy would have been compelled to reconsider her associations, and would probably have severed her connection with the Teutonic Empires and joined the Anglo-French entente. Germany felt that her chances were better in 1914 than in a postponed world struggle. She knew the exact status

of every army and navy in the world. The only thing she did not understand was the spirit and temper of the small nations with their own intense nationalism, and of the large democracies with their determination to have a world of safety and peace.

VI

Germany's trampling upon the treaty that had guaranteed Belgium's immunity from war was destined to become the keynote of the world struggle. Those who saw deepest into the situation perceived at once that if the right of Belgium to live at peace and determine her own destiny were not supported successfully, there could remain no real security for any other nation, however large and wealthy, unless it should henceforth espouse militarism as completely as Germany had done.

Why, then, did not the whole world arise at once in stern protest on behalf of Belgium? Why did not all neutrals join in an ultimatum to Germany? The answer is not difficult. The situation seemed to be wholly European. America, the most powerful of neutrals, had always endeavoured to keep aloof from struggles relating to the balance of power in Europe. Furthermore, the processes as provided for in advance seemed to be sufficient for the crisis. Russia and France were already fighting Germany, and England, as the remaining guarantor of Belgium, had immediately entered the struggle. At a later period it became clear enough that all neutrals might well have made protest, and might indeed well have contributed of their men and their resources to help Belgium and to vindicate the rights of neutral states in time of war. But events had moved swiftly, and there was no voice of great authority in the neutral world that was raised in potent leadership. Russia, under the Grand Duke Nicholas, seemed surprisingly efficient, while the battle of the Marne was regarded in England and France, and throughout the neutral world, as unquestionably the decisive action of the war, which must culminate in Germany's humiliation and in the fixing of terms of peace in the near future.

There was, indeed, the growth of a strong opinion against Germany because of her methods. She had permitted, probably instigated, the attack upon Serbia. She had violated the rights of Belgium. Though not organized for united action or for common expression, there was such a thing as the public opinion of the civilized world. And the verdict of this public opinion was against Germany for her choice of the path through Belgium. Belgium might, indeed, have made formal protest, declining to match her puny strength against Germany's armed hosts; and she might have accepted the proffered payments for incidental damage. But such acceptance would have made her the permanent vassal of Germany in case the war had not ended in complete German defeat. And if Germany had been defeated Belgium would have become either

a vassal of France or an outpost of England, or both. Furthermore, if Belgium had merely protested and then yielded, the future of Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark would have been imperilled.

Belgium's heroic resistance was made for the liberties of all those smaller states that had through generations of national life vindicated their right to exist and to be treated with respect. Holland and Switzerland armed themselves for defense, but they, too, in the opening campaigns, regarded the strength of the great powers arrayed against Germany as sufficient, especially after Italy had entered the war; and so they remained neutral until at length their positions had become increasingly difficult and it had become too late for them to assume belligerency. Germany's disregard of neutral rights, as shown by her attack upon Belgium, had cost her the support of the world's enlightened sentiment.

She brought herself under further condemnation by her ruthless methods in warfare. The nature of her conquest and occupation of Belgium will form the subject of a chapter or two supplemental to Mr. Simonds's main narrative in these volumes. The progress of civilization had gradually evolved many rules of conduct and relationship affecting both times of peace and times of war, that had come to be embodied in what we call international law. Such rules had been sanctioned by faithful observance in many cases constituting established precedents; and they had also been further strengthened by being written into a great number of treaties and agreements accepted by all nations. To limit the ravages of war, rules had been made regarding the treatment of the inhabitants of occupied districts. Other rules had related to the care of the wounded and to the services of medical relief. There were rules for the protection of unfortified places and of non-combatant people against needless injury of persons and property.

VII

War could not be otherwise than terrible and ruthless; yet it was believed that civilized nations were ready to confine its worst direct ravages to combatants and fortifications. It was believed that prisoners of war, civilians in conquered areas, non-combatant persons on the highways of the sea, the agents of mercy relieving the wounded and maintaining ambulance and hospital services, would henceforth be treated with scrupulous regard for accepted international rules. Again Germany illustrated the danger to the modern world of an unrestricted appeal to force for the attainment of national ambition, by a disregard, in many instances, of the humane code which German publicists themselves in times past had helped to formulate.

It is not my purpose to speak in any detail of atrocities charged against Germany in her treatment of the populations of Belgium and northern France, nor of the vandalism proved against her as respects monuments of architecture

and the private property of civilized peoples. This subject also will be duly presented in these volumes. Nor is it my purpose here to make an indictment of Germany for her terrifying air raids upon peaceful places in England, or for her other shocking violations of international law in her methods of warfare. My object is to show that, quite regardless of the temptation or the provocation, the ruthlessness and frightfulness of Germany's warfare alarmed and aroused the entire civilized world. In degree at least this was proving itself to be wholly unlike any other war. Civilization was assaulted in the use of methods that all civilized nations had solemnly agreed not to employ.

These forbidden methods employed by Germany to wear out her opponents and turn a threatened defeat into a deadlock or a partial victory, found their climax not—as had at first been expected—in the use of the Zeppelin aircraft, but in the use of submarines against the world's merchant shipping. England had entered the war with a vast navy, but with a very small army. She had used her navy to drive German merchant shipping from the seas and to "bottle up" the German navy itself in the German harbours. Quickly gaining full control of the ocean highways of trade, England, with the consent and assistance of France, determined to make the largest possible use against Germany of the means at her command. Germany was carrying on a vast commerce in all the ports of the world. And her own ports were visited by thousands of neutral ships.

Though England was not prepared for war with large land forces, her navy was ready and it was decided by the British Government that Germany must derive no military benefit from imports by way of the high seas. So far as contraband articles were concerned, there was no question of Britain's right to interfere with neutral traffic for Germany's benefit. There arose, however, certain questions of construction as regards the application of the principles of contraband to food and materials alleged to be for civilian use. There also arose questions regarding the principles and methods of blockade. For a considerable time the United States Government, in diplomatic notes exchanged with Great Britain, took the ground that the Orders in Council went beyond the bounds of international law as previously recognized. Great Britain, however, held firmly and resolutely to her positions, and the United States took no steps beyond the filing of legal arguments which might have a certain bearing upon the subsequent settlement of claims. Fundamentally, Germany had adopted the methods of an outlaw on land and of a pirate at sea, and Great Britain made her appeal to the common opinion of mankind.

It is true that Germany's submarine policy purported to be one of reprisal. The sinking of the *Lusitania*, with hundreds of women and children on board, was one of the most abhorrent crimes in all the annals of warfare. Such an

act bore no relation to anything that could have been recognized in international law as within the sphere of retaliation. As a result of the diplomatic controversy that ensued, Germany changed her submarine methods, and the United States postponed belligerent action. But subsequent events indicated that Germany had temporarily modified her submarine policy chiefly because she had found that it was not sufficiently effective. In the first place, she did not wish America drawn into the war; and, in the second place, she desired to build a great many more submarines in order ultimately to make victorious use of that dastardly weapon. When subsequently she resumed her U-boat ravages on a great scale and with results that for a time were gravely menacing, the United States was compelled to enter the war. Furthermore, the perspectives had wholly changed. The magnitude of Germany's preparations had become more evident. It was seen that the neutrals also had been in real danger, and that the British navy had represented the principles of justice and security on the oceans. Under these conditions, the arguments regarding the earlier British Orders in Council as affecting the rights of neutrals lost their interest and importance as pertaining to the major facts of the war, and remained merely as a part of the historical record for students of maritime international law.

The Germans had counted upon a short war, and after two years they became intensely anxious for a negotiated peace that would have left them with their military strength intact and with some very substantial gains especially in the completeness of their domination over the Balkans and Turkey. The Allies were not willing to consider any such compromises, and an attempt on President Wilson's part to bring about an end of hostilities by mediation proved to be unavailing. It was plain that the opposing views could not be reconciled.

With a vastly increased fleet of standard-built and improved submarines, to which new boats were being added weekly, Germany decided to resume her unrestricted attack upon commerce, and declared a blockade zone around the British islands and the Mediterranean coasts of France and Italy. It was hoped in vain by Americans that Germany would modify this announced policy before putting it into effect. But our prompt breaking off of diplomatic relations, as a first step, led to no results. Germany did not believe that the United States, in the status of a belligerent, could render the Allies any greater aid than she was already rendering them in sending them munitions and supplies. Germany believed that if she could greatly check this flow of supplies to England and France, by a new submarine campaign of tenfold greater efficiency than the campaign of two years before, she might hope to frighten neutral ships away from the British coasts and to terrorize England into a willingness to enter a peace conference in the course of the summer of 1917.

This determination on Germany's part, interpreted logically, seemed to be

equivalent to the fixing of a status of belligerency as between Germany and the United States. President Willson so regarded it and declared himself to that effect in a message to Congress on April 2. Four days later America's transition from neutrality to belligerency had been accomplished.

Meanwhile, the war itself had steadily progressed from its earlier character and objects, to a struggle in which the security and the future of all nations, in all parts of the world, were clearly concerned. Two or three years had not sufficed to transform equivalent numbers of people in other industrial countries into military organizations capable of withstanding the superb war machine of Germany. And while the Allied nations were trying to prepare themselves, Germany's previous preparation was shown to have put her enemies at a deadly disadvantage. If Germany could not win a clear and decided victory, neither could France and England, except by unspeakable sacrifices and with ever-increasing aid and support from the rest of the world.

This situation had become intensified in its dangers, through the failure of Russia to meet the early expectations of France and Great Britain. Germany understood the Russian situation far better than did Russia's allies. There were dynastic and political influences in Russia relatively favorable to Germany, and in any case opposed to a prolonged war. At a time when Russia's vigorous action was most needed, on the east front, to support the predominance that France and England were gaining on the line extending across France from Flanders to Switzerland, Russia had virtually ceased to fight. Many causes that for a time will remain obscure were operating in Russia to bring about stupendous changes. Revolutionary movements that had been arrested after the war with Japan now began to assert themselves in new forms. The world was startled by the news that Petrograd was in the control of a revolution which the army had joined, that the Czar had been forced to abdicate, and that a provisional government was in temporary authority.

It was the paralysis of Russia for all immediate aid in the prosecution of the war against Germany, taken in conjunction with the submarine issue, that compelled the United States to enter the war. The history of the submarine issue was such as to lead the United States, on behalf of all neutrals, to take part in a war for the upholding of civilization. The failure of Russia to develop strength in what had been her own war against the Teutonic Powers was changing the issues, so that the world was entering upon a war for democratic freedom. Not to have supported France and the British Empire might have made possible a series of swift disasters by reason of which America would have become deeply involved in the near future. This would have meant extreme danger to the United States, with almost no military preparation to meet such danger, and with no strong friends capable of lending a helping hand.

America entered the war primarily to defend herself in a situation in which

her rights were involved and her future was becoming seriously endangered. She also entered it in support of the rights of neutrals, which had been increasingly menaced from the very beginnings of the conflict. In doing this she was the champion of all neutrals, and was without qualification entitled to their sympathy, and to such measure of their physical support as they were in position to render. The welfare of the world required prompt sacrifice upon the part of the United States, in the interest of all self-governing nations, and ultimately in the interest of Germany herself.

The nature and extent of the part that America was to play in the war could not be known at the moment when the fact of war was accepted. Great Britain and France had been making very large purchases of military and general supplies in the United States, and it was immediately arranged to furnish material aid in the form of large financial credits, thus making it possible to marshal American resources of food, steel, copper, and all sorts of products for the support of the armies that were already in the field.

The American Navy, though not as large as that of Germany and far smaller than that of Great Britain, was of the very best quality; and it was sent at once to support the Allies in the deadly struggle against the German submarines. Army enlargement by volunteer methods soon gave way to a draft system that ultimately registered—inclusive of those already enrolled as members of the army and navy—about twenty-five million names. Armies were organized and trained with surprising rapidity in great camps, and about three months after war was declared American troops began to arrive in Europe.

Meanwhile the Russian Revolution, from which at first the Allies had hoped to derive military benefit, had degenerated into socialistic anarchy; and Germany had secured control of great areas formerly belonging to Russia, sweeping from Finland to the Black and Caspian seas and including also the conquest of Rumania. Great masses of German troops had been released from the eastern front for the culminating struggle in France. British and French losses through 1917 had been heavier than Americans had known; and the season had ended with a great reverse to the Italian army that had been fighting Austria. American forces were steadily accumulating in France, with a view to giving assistance when the campaign of 1918 should open.

An unprecedented attack upon the British lines in March and April, 1918, followed by a series of offensive movements, represented the high-water mark of German military power. The Channel Ports were threatened, and Paris was subjected to greater peril than at any time since the battle of the Marne in 1914. Under these circumstances the Government and people of the United States arose in a supreme effort to help meet the crisis. The Allies united their forces under the leadership of Marshal Foch; ships were chartered from

the ends of the earth, principally from the British merchant marine; American troops began to cross the sea through submarine-infested waters at the rate of 300,000 a month; Britain, France, and Italy took fresh courage as America supplied the needed reserves.

And so the tide was turned, and the culmination came with surprising rapidity. The surrender of Bulgaria was inevitably followed by the collapse and withdrawal of Turkey. Then came the disintegration of Austria and the acceptance of an armistice by the authorities of Austria-Hungary that gave the Allies every advantage for a flank attack upon Germany. Meanwhile, the British, French, and American armies had for several months been fighting a continuous battle—the greatest in world history—which ended in complete victory with the signing of the armistice of November 11, and the abdication of the German Emperor.

Not only had the aggressor who had staked everything on the assertion of force been humbled and subdued, but the larger principles at stake, involving the liberties of all peoples, had been fully vindicated. The peace that was assured by the signing of the armistice was avowedly conditioned upon a series of noble principles and specific aims that President Wilson had set forth, and that the Allied governments in conference at Versailles had made their own. It was agreed that the common efforts of the Allies and America were to result in the forming of a society of nations that would protect each self-governing people in the exercise of its rightful liberties, and would end, for this century at least, the menace of militarism and autocracy.

VIII

Thus our history of the war, of which Mr. Frank H. Simonds is the author—being supported by many other contributors who write upon various topics and episodes—recognizes the conflict as in many respects the greatest turning point in human history. Histories of this war will be written, we may believe, from time to time in the future, and men will be writing them a thousand years hence. Posterity will have its own perspectives and make its own estimates. But contemporaries may also make valuable surveys, of which posterity will gladly avail itself. Events have crowded one another with such bewildering and tumultuous speed that even now the best-informed minds require a careful and winnowed narrative in order to hold in mind the events of each half-year beginning with the last half of the year 1914.

Of the current writers upon the war as it progressed, no one in America had attained such eminence as Mr. Frank H. Simonds. Besides his constant newspaper interpretations of the military and political aspects of the war from day to day or from week to week, he had become even more widely known through his extended monthly installments of current war history which he contributed to the American *Review of Reviews*. He had not been content

with passing judgments upon military movements or events, based upon the limited information available at the time, but he insisted upon revising his own opinions as more complete knowledge could aid in forming truer estimates. He did not hesitate, at risk and hardship, to visit the scenes of war more than once, where he studied afresh the greatest battles which dwarf in magnitude those of former wars.

This history of the war, which is to be carried through a series of volumes of which the present is the opening one, is in no sense a re-publication or revision of any of Mr. Simonds's previous writings. It is, rather, a completely new presentation, upon a scale of its own, based upon fresh first-hand study, together with the official reports and the various writings of many experts and observers. He has had the advantage of intimate conversations with military leaders at the French and British fronts, as well as with governmental authorities at Paris, London, Washington, and elsewhere.

Through his lifetime Mr. Simonds has been a student of political and military history, with a remarkable aptitude for physical geography and for topographical conditions as affecting military campaigns. He had studied the Balkan wars by personal visitation, so that when the attack on Serbia was made in 1914 he was already possessed of exceptional knowledge of the complex conditions in southeastern Europe. He had long been a close student of the military history of the Civil War in the United States, as well as of the Napoleonic campaigns, and his acquaintance with the wars of the Bismarckian period and with Russo-Japanese military and political affairs, had all contributed to his preparation for an intense and continuous study of this greatest of wars, from its first movements in the summer of 1914. The intelligence and the brilliancy of his work were immediately recognized, and the public's confidence in it has steadily increased.

Thus I may express the assured belief that the history of the great war as presented in Mr. Simonds's graphic pages will prove not only a valuable aid to present-day readers, but will have a permanent place in the historical libraries, to be consulted for many decades to come. Mr. Simonds is not merely a military historian, but he has also a profound appreciation of the moral issues that are involved in the struggles between nations and in the political problems of empires and democracies. His plans for the full work, of which this is the initial volume, propose to carry the reader through the military campaigns to the broadening aspects of the struggle as it involved the world at large, until finally there had arrived the period of settlement and reconstruction.

Each volume will be supplemented by the briefer work of many special contributors, and will be embellished with numerous photographic illustrations. Already the inquiring reader must turn to books for an analysis and an interpretation, as well as for a narrative account of the earlier period of the war.

Since there is manifest need of such books, it is desirable that the reader should be able to secure the help and guidance of those students and writers who are the best trained and the most competent. By an almost unanimous consensus of opinion, such students and writers would accord Mr. Simonds not only an honoured place but the very first place among them all.

PART ONE

HISTORY OF THE WORLD WAR

BY

FRANK H. SIMONDS

CHAPTER ONE

EUROPE BETWEEN 1871 AND 1904

I

THE FIRST YEARS

The full generation that lay between the signing of the Treaty of Frankfort and the crisis of Tangier was marked by no very clear and definite march of events. Between the Revolutions of 1848 and the close of the Franco-Prussian War, Europe had lived through a long series of wars, not comparable in magnitude or sacrifice to the Napoleonic and Revolutionary struggles, but sufficiently considerable to satiate the people of the various nations and reconcile the statesmen to pacific policies. Germany, during the years of Bismarck, pursued a moderate course. His greatest concern was to preserve and strengthen the great structure he had reared. If the swift rise of France from defeat led him to a minatory gesture in 1875, he heeded the warnings that came from London and Petrograd. Throughout his period of power he skilfully managed to keep the door to the Russian capital open, and while he detested the British, he never sought to challenge them upon the water.

To be sure, the Russo-Turkish War and the settlement of the Congress of Berlin led to an inevitable estrangement with Russia. Germany, having to choose between Russia and Austria, decided for the Hapsburg, and the Congress of Berlin, by destroying the Treaty of San Stefano, deprived Russia of the fruits of her Turkish triumph, and by putting the Austro-Hungarian Empire, through Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the road to Saloniki, thus made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. But in Bismarck's time this alliance was never a threat to German interests nor to German supremacy on the Continent, for Russia was in no mind to undertake the destruction of the Treaty of Frankfort to satisfy her French ally, while France was not willing to invite another invasion to replace the Crescent by the Cross at St. Sophia.

In 1881, Bismarck, by clever manipulation, thrust France into Tunis and effectively aided by Crispi, the inveterate foe of France, was able to harvest from Italian anger the entrance of the Italian Kingdom into the Austro-German Alliance, thus creating the Triple Alliance, which was too strong to be challenged by France and Russia, and, as a defensive alliance, served as the corner-stone of European peace until the middle of the first decade of the Twentieth Century.

Great Britain, moreover, inclined rather to the German than to the Franco-Russian group. Her foreign policy was still in the Beaconsfield era. She regarded Russia as her true enemy. She had joined Austria in vetoing the Treaty of San Stefano, as she had persuaded France to join her in the Crimea. Friction between Russia and Britain on the frontiers of the Indian Empire, with France all over the world where colonial enterprises were clashing, contributed to keep alive animosities born of the Crimean and Napoleonic wars. Thus, while nominally pursuing that policy, known in its day as "splendid isolation," Great Britain actually inclined toward the Germans and, while Germany under Bismarck pursued a clearly pacific course, British policy was markedly pro-German.

France, recovering materially from her terrible defeat with an alacrity that alarmed her conqueror, found herself for the time isolated in Europe. Slowly the hope of a reconquest of the "Lost Provinces" weakened in the eyes of the older generation while the newer generation found its attention and its energies consumed in the domestic strife between the Republic and its enemies, in the struggle with Boulangerism, in the battle with the Church, and in that grotesque episode which was the Dreyfus Case. It would not be fair to say that the memory of Alsace-Lorraine was banished from the French mind, but it is true that even Frenchmen believed it had disappeared in the mournful and ignoble years of the nineties. While German population increased by millions, that of France stood still, until France found herself distanced by her great rival and no longer able to match army corps with army corps on the open frontier of the Vosges. For France the years

between Frankfort and Tangier were years recalling the equally unhappy age of Louis XV. And in both periods there were not lacking those who foretold the disappearance of France as a great nation and spoke with ready conviction of the decadence of the French race, forgetting how frequently in past centuries the flame of French genius had grown dim, only to burst forth with new brilliance and dazzle the world with its radiance. And in this time not only did the desire for peace increase with each year in the hearts of the French people, but a too-eager acceptance of the illusions of pacifism and internationalism left the nation well nigh defenceless, when the crisis of Tangier brought France within two steps of war.

In the closing quarter of the Nineteenth Century, too, the Great Powers, with the exception of Germany and Austria, turned their eyes beyond Europe and laboured to construct great colonial empires. France spread her colours from Algiers to the Congo. Tunis, the Sahara, Senegal, the regions of the Upper Niger, the shores of Lake Chad, and the vast area between the Congo-Ubangi and the Atlantic were occupied. Madagascar was conquered. Indo-China was expanded into a colony greater than France in area.

Britain on her part kept pace with France in Africa, extended her Indian Empire, expanded her commercial and political influence in China, pushed France out of Egypt, and carried her conquests up the Nile until Cecil Rhodes' dream of a British "all-red route" from the Cape to Cairo was all but realized.

Russia on her side turned from the disappointments of the Dardanelles to the still unrestricted possibilities eastward to the Pacific and southward to warm water at Port Arthur. Siberia began to rival the American Far West in resources and opportunity and Russia seemed destined to achieve at the expense of the Chinese what she had missed in the estates of the Osmanli.

Even Italy, still struggling with the terrible problems of poverty and misery, also embarked upon the colonial enterprise, only to find disaster in Abyssinia and military disgrace at Adowa. Little Belgium, through the efforts of her able if unscrupulous monarch, acquired the

vast empire of the Congo Free State and took rank with the Great Powers in possessions beyond the seas.

II. A NEW KAISER AND A NEW POLICY

In all this time Germany alone stood still. Great as Bismarck had been as the creator of the German Empire, he lacked the vision to grasp the new horizons. While he remained in power, he gave only contemptuous attention to the colonial ambitions within his own country. He welcomed the concentration of French energy upon colonial expansion because it promised the gradual extinction of the Alsace-Lorraine question. He skilfully turned every opportunity to account in bringing the French and the British into collision. Nor was he less contented to see Russia, forgetful of Constantinople and the Balkans, fixing her eyes upon Vladivostok and Port Arthur.

More than all else, perhaps, this failure of Bismarck contributed to the great catastrophe that he did not live to see. A new Germany was rising, a Germany he neither understood nor recognized. The whole fabric of German life was being made over and Germany was rapidly transforming herself into a great commercial nation, into a factory nation, into a nation whose organization, whose resources in minerals, made her a rival of Great Britain; whose merchant marine was growing by leaps and bounds and carrying the German flag into every sea and every port. This new Germany felt it unjust, immoral, that she, alone of the great nations, she, who had become in fact the most powerful nation on the European continent, should be without her colonies, without lands to which Germans could carry their language and their national faith, colonies which might serve as the markets for German manufactures and the plantations on which could be grown the raw materials needed by German industry.

And it was this Germany that William II represented when at last he came to the throne, speedily "dropped the pilot," and took from Bismarck's control the direction of the policies of an Empire which had been the Iron Chancellor's creation and for long years an instrument in his hands. In his anxiety to preserve what he had brought into being,

Bismarck had withheld Germany from the world competition in colonial expansion, he had submitted to the naval supremacy of Britain, he had smiled upon the Russian adventures in the Far East, he had uttered no protest when Great Britain had added new empires to her vast realms. And the world upon which William II looked when power at last came to him, was a world already parcelled out, with but few and unattractive patches bearing the colour of the German Empire.

In the mind of the new Emperor it was clear from the outset that the real barrier to German development, to rightful German expansion, to the acquisition of that place in the sun that soon appeared in all German patriotic phrase, was Britain. It was Britain who held the fairest spots upon the face of the earth, so far as colonial considerations were concerned. It was British sea power that dominated the trade routes. Moreover, British arms protected the sinking power of Portugal, closed Morocco because it faced Gibraltar, was presently to join with France in an agreement that should bestow upon the Republic this rich and promising colonial field of Morocco, was to conquer the Boer Republics toward which German eyes had been turned, was to lend its support to an American admiral in Manila Bay, when German thoughts turned toward the expiring colonial empire of Spain.

Unless Germany possessed a great fleet, she must be contented to accept British dictation abroad. The dictation was not aggressive, the world had endured British supremacy at sea for nearly a century without too much protest or too great discomfort. But the cardinal doctrine of British policy for centuries had been that the British fleet should be supreme and there was no inclination in London, no matter what party ruled in Westminster, to permit an equal on the blue water.

The decision of the Kaiser, summed up in the famous phrase, "Our future lies upon the sea," involved an ultimate challenge to Britain. No one can read the pages of British history from the days of the Spanish Armada to the not-less-splendid moment of Trafalgar, without recognizing this fact. Indeed the development of steam transport and the change in the character of British industry had made it inevitable that Britain would starve, unless she were able at all times to keep

the seas open and insure the inward flow to her ports of the food for her dense population.

III. ENGLAND AND FRANCE DRAW NEAR

In the same fashion this challenge made it inevitable that in the end Britain should join the Franco-Russian group, as in her long history she had ever joined the weaker powers who made head against that Continental nation which at the moment crossed her path and challenged her supremacy.

Germany could believe, did believe up to the fatal moment in August, 1914, that Britain would be beguiled into staying out of that European war which was necessary to clear Germany's flanks, to dispose of a France still mindful of Alsace-Lorraine and certain to take advantage of German complications with other powers; the war that was necessary to send the Slav back behind the Niemen and the Bug, no longer a rival of Austria in the Balkans or a peril to Germany in East Prussia and Posen. But this was to mistake the genius which underlies the stupidity of the Anglo-Saxon in world affairs. For if Britain has always muddled her affairs in times of peace and in the opening hours of conflict, her instinct has saved her invariably.

In the early years of his reign William II seems to have cherished the notion that he could deal with France and Russia without war. Following the policy of Bismarck he encouraged the Russian to embark in the Japanese War. The earlier years of his reign are marked by a series of clumsy but no less sincere efforts to bridge the chasm that the Treaty of Frankfort had opened between France and Germany. But for this chasm there was but one bridge and this he could not take; Germany would not surrender Alsace-Lorraine, even at the behest of its young Kaiser, and no such idea ever entered the imperial mind.

Such hope as the Emperor may have entertained of winning France, of making her his ally against Britain, perished with the wholly unexpected termination of Anglo-French bickerings that followed Fashoda. When Kitchener, after his successful campaign to Khartum, and Colonel Marchand, after his memorable journey across Africa from the Congo

to the Nile, met at the miserable little village of Fashoda, two great imperial dreams came into collision. A century and a half before France and Britain had met on the Ohio, and the whole story of Nineteenth Century Anglo-French colonial enterprise is a marvellous repetition of the American episode. In Africa as in America, too, French explorers had out-distanced British.

There was a moment in 1898 when it seemed inevitable that France and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France bowed. The French Foreign Minister, Hanotaux, went into retirement, as his successor Delcassé was to go after Tangier, seven years later. Kitchener prevailed and Marchand retreated. When these two soldiers met again, they met as allies on the hills of Artois, Marchand wearing the stars of a French general and Kitchener the master of Britain's military establishment.

Oddly enough Fashoda left no permanent scar. France had to decide between England and Germany. She chose to remain faithful to Alsace-Lorraine. Britain on her part, having at last perceived the solid foundation of French colonial conception, already beginning to feel almost subconsciously the challenge of German sea power, held out a hand to France. More than all else, Edward VII, when he came to the throne, animated as he was by a real affection for the French, opened the way, by his skill and tact, for that Anglo-French Entente, which was to threaten the whole edifice of German hope.

Thus, when the momentary bitterness had passed away, France and Britain proceeded to the adjustment of all their world-wide quarrels. There was a wholesale liquidation of claims and counterclaims, culminating in the famous agreement of 1904 by which France recognized British supremacy in Egypt, and Britain withdrew her half-century-old veto to French expansion in Morocco. Not since the Hundred Years War had Anglo-French relations been placed on so friendly a basis and henceforth French and British policies were to converge until a friendship expanded into a virtual alliance and a virtual alliance into an actual union in the presence of a common foe.

All of this was not the work of a moment. When the Boer War came

there were not a few Frenchmen who openly expressed their hatred for Britain and their sympathy with the Africander Republics. To the very eve of the Great War there were influential Frenchmen who still nourished the ancient grudge against "perfidious Albion," as there were Britons who preserved the immemorial distrust of the "fickle Gaul." But, for all this, Fashoda was a landmark in European history, and the Anglo-French settlement that resulted carried with it the promise of the world conflict that followed the 1904 agreement by a short decade.

IV. THE CONVENTION OF 1904

The Anglo-French arrangement of 1904 was a heavy and well-nigh fatal blow to the policy of the German Emperor. With perfect accuracy he foresaw that it was the first step in the inevitable drawing together of France and Britain. Quite naturally he and the German nation as well saw in it the deliberate purpose of Britain to return to the old policy of balancing the Continental nations against one another and throwing her decisive influence on the side opposing her immediate rival. From this hour German teachers and German publicists were to speak with growing bitterness of the "iron ring" that was being forged about the Fatherland and the cult of hatred of Great Britain was to take on untold and unsuspected expansion.

In an Anglo-French understanding, limited as it was at the outset to a liquidation of lawsuits, to a settlement of wholly personal claims, Germany beheld the British nation taking its stand behind the French and giving its tremendous influence to encourage the French desire to destroy the Treaty of Frankfort and regain the "Lost Provinces."

And with this date there disappears the German policy of placating France which had long held sway in Berlin and had moved the Kaiser to innumerable gestures, which had been coldly rejected by the French or suffered to pass unnoticed. Out of this arrangement grew the German conviction that one more war with France was necessary and that there could be no realization of the dream of a German "place in the sun" until the ever-enduring French resentment was disposed of by a war, which should relegate France to the rank of a second-class nation

and leave her too weak ever to cross German purposes again. By force Germany was to try once more to separate France and Britain, without, in fact, arriving at war, but the failure of Tangier was to confirm the conviction born of the Anglo-French arrangement, and in it were the seeds of all that wrath which was to come.

CHAPTER TWO

FROM TANGIER TO ARMAGEDDON

I

TANGIER, THE FIRST GESTURE

The Moroccan Crisis of 1905 was the first clear warning of what was to come. It put forces squarely in opposition which were to meet again and again thereafter in similar conflict until there was no longer the smallest chance of preserving world peace. It was to open a new era in European history, the end of which no man can now see. It preceded the general conflict by less than ten years and it foreshadowed it with such clarity that those who come hereafter will marvel at the blindness that was subsequently displayed in many nations.

The Anglo-French Entente of 1904, while nominally a business arrangement between two nations, in fact undermined the whole structure of German policy. German challenge to British sea power was taking shape, but German policy contemplated the separation of Britain from the rest of Europe and gave its best effort to encouraging the bitterness between Paris and London and between Petrograd and London. A complete settlement between France and Britain foreshadowed a similar liquidation between Britain and Russia, which did come in due time, and beyond this it held out the menace of something more, of a possible alliance between these three Great Powers.

Was this in the minds of the British and French ministers who signed the treaty of 1904? Subliminally perhaps. Delcassé was a frank foe of Germany. British foreign policy was in Tory hands and the Government and the Crown alike felt the reality of the growing German challenge. More than any Englishman of his time Edward VII feared the German danger, and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. In the German mind, it was his policy that led to the Triple Entente. In the German mind, he con-

ceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany, to unite Britain with France and Russia, to keep Germany from the realization of her dreams. Many years may not solve this problem, and it seems inevitable that Germans will read history one way and the rest of the world another. It does seem clear, however, that Lord Lansdowne, who held the Foreign Office, was mindful of the German challenge; it does seem patent that Delcassé saw in an understanding with Britain the possibility of a concentration of French energies toward national regeneration and defence. But underneath all lies the solid fact that the original challenge had been delivered by Germany to British sea power. Germany was free to seek her future on the sea, but Britain was bound, in the nature of things, to meet such a challenge as she best could.

At the moment it was announced, the Anglo-French agreement made no great noise in Europe. Delcassé did not communicate it directly to the German Government, a fatal blunder, as it now seems, but he informed the German Ambassador at Paris, who notified his Government, and Berlin gave no sign of disapproval, even gave an apparent assent. The agreement itself, while insuring ultimate French political supremacy in the Shereefian Empire, guaranteed the "open door" for all, and thus for German quite as much as British trade.

But Germany was only waiting. For the first time since the Treaty of Frankfort an international agreement of great importance—concerning her but slightly, to be sure—had been made without regard to her. This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow that had been struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles.

In the opening weeks of 1905 Germany spoke. Russia had been defeated at Mukden, her prestige was gone and her military reputation had crumbled. France stood alone, notoriously ill-prepared for war. Not even with British help could she hope to make head against the German army, and there was yet no certainty that Britain would go to war to help France. Accordingly the Kaiser landed in Tangier and suddenly proclaimed the integrity of Morocco. He thrust a German sword

through the Anglo-French agreement and Europe came to the first grave crisis of the century.

For days European peace seemed shattered. Germany demanded that the question of Morocco should be reopened, that it should be submitted to a council of nations. Delcassé refused. In the end France yielded, a weak and terrified ministry bowed. Delcassé went into exile, a council was summoned to meet at Algeciras, and Bülow, the German Chancellor, became a prince, in token of his sovereign's appreciation of this "shining triumph."

II. ALGECIRAS—A GERMAN DEFEAT

But if this incident was a "crowning humiliation" for France, and the going of Delcassé the greatest sorrow France had known since Sedan, Germany lost at Algeciras almost all she had hoped to win. In this conference Britain stood solidly behind the French. Russia was not less loyal to her ally, while Italy displayed a lack of sympathy with her German ally which roused bitterest recrimination in Berlin and was the first authentic sign of the crumbling of the edifice of Bismarck. Germany and Austria stood alone, the Moroccan question was dealt with in a fashion that insured new troubles, but in effect, the predominant influence of France in Morocco received the seal of approval of Europe and the door to German participation in Moroccan estates, which the Anglo-French agreement had closed, was not reopened.

Germany had humiliated France and angered Britain. She had thrust her sword into the balance against European peace, but it had not prevailed. She had not separated France from England. She had brought the two nations more closely together. Russia, already humiliated by defeats in the East, bore with ill-concealed resentment the effort of the Kaiser to take advantage of temporary weakness in Russian armies. Italy turned from Germany and Austria to France and Britain to make arrangements for the realization of her own Mediterranean ambitions.

All this the Germans clearly perceived, all this was gall and wormwood to the Kaiser. He had hoped to separate France from Britain but he had, in fact, brought them closer together. He had hoped to show a

mastery of a European council comparable to that of Bismarck in the Congress of Berlin but, save for Austria, he had been without friends in the council, a majority of which had been frankly hostile. It was Britain and not Germany that actually prevailed at Algeciras, and there was no mistaking the fact that Britain was even more willing than France to risk a deliberate rebuff to Germany, even if it should carry with it an appeal to arms.

Hence for Germany there was a new grievance against Britain, a new accentuation of Anglophobic sentiment, a new looking forward to "the day" which was becoming uppermost in German minds and hearts, the day when the British obstacle to German hope should be removed by a victory. But there were reasons why wise statesmanship should have perceived the facts that were now disclosed. Germany had feared that she would find herself faced by a triple alliance, she had made one gesture of war and all three were disclosed united against her. Unless she believed herself strong enough to face all three in arms, her course was marked out by Bismarck's successful policy of separating Austria and France and dealing with the former in 1866 and the latter in 1870. Instead, the German policy tended fatally to unite three possible foes and transform into allies, united against Germany, three nations widely separated up to the moment of Tangier.

For France, Tangier was a memorable incident. It marks the beginning of that new French spirit which was to blaze forth at the Marne and at Verdun and fill the world with the glory of French courage and patriotism. It was the beginning of the reconstruction of France, politically, spiritually, nationally. The French perceived the danger, the threat, the menace of German policy. They perceived that it had become a question of the future existence of France, and to such a threat France responded as she had to the menace of all Europe in the days of the Revolution.

III. AFTER TANGIER—THE NEW FRANCE

If French politicians still fettered French preparation, if French organization was still inferior to German, if France went to war in 1914

lacking in much, still there could be no comparison with 1905, when France must have fallen at the first blow. And what was all-important, the French mind was mobilized with the first call. France was saved by Tangier, although ten years were to pass before even the French would realize the fact of their deliverance.

With the British it was far different. The Tory ministry, which negotiated the Anglo-French convention, went out of power shortly. The Liberal Government that came into office turned the attention of the nation to domestic problems and in the bitterness of class war and Irish disputes the international situation passed from the minds of the British people. They forgot Germany, the Empire, the outside world; they devoted their energies and their attention to domestic differences, and they gave only impatient hearing to the few voices like that of Lord Roberts, which from time to time warned them of the danger that was Germany. Yet at the moment that they refused to recognize the outside peril the British ministers declined to renounce the policy from which flowed the danger. Faithful to the tradition of their race, they clung to the idea that Britain should be supreme at sea, and if, for a few years, they permitted British construction to fall perilously low by comparison with Germany, they changed their policy in time. And they accepted the legacy of friendship with France, they accepted the Moroccan commitment of Lansdowne, they remained steadily resolved to surrender nothing of British Empire or British influence to Germany, and only such a surrender could have conceivably appeased Germans.

In all this there was a fatal paradox. Pretending or even believing that Germany was friendly, the Liberal and Radical majority continued to follow a course which gave Germany no promise of a realization of her dreams. But against the danger that this policy brought they took no adequate step and members of the Government like Haldane continued to call Germany their "spiritual home" and make frequent visits to Berlin, after all real hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals.

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES



Copyright, 1895, by Henry Graves & Co. *From a painting by Stanley Berkeley*

NAPOLEON'S CUIRASSIERS AT WATERLOO

Waterloo (June 18, 1815) marked the overthrow of Napoleon's ambition to dominate Europe. Germany was the next nation to cherish the dream of world dominion

THE RISE OF GERMANY

BISMARCK



By permission of the Berlin Photographic Co.

THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

I. The Battle of Königgratz or Sadowa was an important step in the building of the German Empire. It was the decisive battle in the Seven Weeks' War (1866), where 220,000 Prussians defeated 205,000 Austrians. This victory assured to Prussia a leading position in the German political affairs



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THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

II. Napoleon Third's Capitulation at Sedan (1870) marked another important advance in the building of the German Empire. It was the first of the series of French surrenders in the Franco-Prussian War and cost the Emperor his throne. At once came the proclamation of the Third Republic in France. The Peace of Frankfort concluded the war five months later. Alsace-Lorraine was ceded by France to the German Empire, and Prussia in Germany became stronger than ever.

Prince Bismarck is seated at the table facing the defeated French Generals. Von Moltke, the victorious Prussian general, stands with his hand on the table. He was the uncle of the Count Von Moltke who was the German Chief of Staff at the opening of the World War in 1914.



By permission of the Berlin Photographic Co.

THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE


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THE BUILDING OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

III. William I, the present Kaiser's grandfather, was proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles a few weeks before the close of the Franco-Prussian War. This marked another step in the unification of Germany, under the leadership of Prussia. (It is of interest to note that the lesser German states have never acknowledged the Kings of Prussia as *Emperors of Germany*. They can be correctly spoken of only as *German Emperors*.)

In the picture Bismarck stands, at the height of his success, close to the first step of the throne.



THE MAN WHO BUILT THE GERMAN EMPIRE

Prince Bismarck, the Germans' "Iron Chancellor," had a large part in the building of the German Empire and the creation of the Triple Alliance, in the days of the present Kaiser's father and grandfather. He did not realize the need for colonial expansion, otherwise Germany might have secured her "place in the Sun" while the other Powers were securing theirs. But Germany came into the colonial field too late to get her share peacefully. This was one deep-lying cause of the World War.



BISMARCK AS THE GREATEST STATESMAN IN EUROPE

The Congress of Berlin was convened in 1878 at the invitation of Bismarck to settle the affairs of the always troublesome Balkan States. Austria, France, Italy, England, Russia, Turkey and of course Germany—the chief contestants in the World War—were all represented. The most influential members of the conference were Prince Gortchakoff, Count Andrassy, Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, M. Waddington, Count Corti, and Caratheodori, some of whom will be recognized in the picture. Bismarck was chosen President and is shown welcoming the delegates.



By permission of Manzi Joy and Co.

From the painting by A. de Neuville

"THE DEFENCE OF THE LONGBOYEAU GATE," DURING THE SIEGE OF PARIS, 1870-'71



FOUR GENERATIONS OF HOHENZOLLERNS

William I is seated; Frederick III, his son, who married a daughter of Queen Victoria, stands at his right; the present emperor, William II, Frederick's son, stands at his grandfather's left; the present Crown Prince, now active as a general in the field, is an infant in his great-grandfather's lap.



WILHELM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

This portrait was taken a year or two after his accession to the throne, which occurred in 1888, when he was twenty-nine years of age.

And the people of Britain, lulled to sleep by their rulers, their passions stirred by home problems and domestic debates, gave no heed to European matters. Thus it was that when at last the whole fabric of the British Empire was in deadly peril, the British population was totally oblivious to the truth, and Liberal journals could tell their readers that the conflict which was breaking in the first days of August, 1914, was without importance for Britain.

IV. THE END OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

For France, for Russia, for Germany, for Italy, Tangier is a landmark; its meaning was promptly made a part of the sum of human knowledge of millions in these countries, henceforth it gave shape to the policies and impulse to the purposes of the patriots of these nations. Frenchman, Russian, and German, alike, perceived in it the sign of an inevitable war, but the Briton saw nothing. From Tangier to the day when Belgium was invaded, British understanding of international conditions and British influence in the world declined until Germany could believe that the British had forgotten her challenge to British sea power and in July, 1914, could hope for a few brief hours that Britain would remain neutral at Armageddon.

Finally, and this is of prime importance, with the Algeciras Conference there expired the legend of a concert of Europe. Henceforth there were two groups of Great Powers and these groups naturally and inevitably tended to take opposite sides on every question of international importance that arose until their hostility paralyzed their influence and enabled the small Balkan States to unchain the tempest, by their attack upon Turkey in 1912.

After Tangier, too, it was plain that the understanding between France, Britain, and Russia marched steadily toward an alliance in fact if not in terms; an alliance which, by accident or design, found common ground in resistance to German policies. On the other hand, at Algeciras, Italy manifested patent weariness of the Triple Alliance, and her course thereafter was away from Berlin and Vienna and toward Paris and London. This course was to bring her into opposition with

Vienna over Tripoli and the Balkans and ultimately into alliance with the foes of the Central Powers.

The Tangier incident therefore early forecast a time when Italy would change sides, and this would leave Austria and Germany actually outnumbered and outweighed in European councils and abolish that real supremacy on the Continent which Bismarck had earned for Germany and preserved to the hour when he surrendered his office to the young Kaiser. With their larger ambitions wholly unrealized, Germans could foresee a time when they would be powerless to attain their visions of a Germany proportioned upon their own conception of her true stature.

And between Algeciras and Armageddon, Germany marched steadily from disappointment to disappointment, while the whole edifice of her power began to crack; not alone through the disaffection of Italy but through the perils which the rise of a Slav state in the Balkans, under Russian inspiration, brought to her one faithful ally, brought to Austria, half of whose population was Slav.

Thus, one may say accurately that the ten years that followed Tangier were but dominated by the consequences of this fatal episode. Henceforth the whole stream of European history flowed between circumscribed banks toward the inevitable cataract, which was the World War. Once it had entered these banks, the course was inescapable and the destination, however hidden from the view of those who sailed the stream, was ineluctable.

V. BOSNIA—THE SECOND GESTURE

Berlin had perceived with utter clarity that the entente between Britain and France would inevitably bring Russia and her ancient enemy into better relations. A Russian statesman had, indeed, remarked on the morrow of the Anglo-French convention, quoting from a Russian proverb: "The friends of my friend are my friends." Such a change would have the profoundest consequences in international relations, for the antagonism of Britain, which had again and again barred the Russian way to Constantinople, and British apprehensions

for the safety of the northern frontiers of India menaced by Russian advance, had been pivots on which German policy had turned for years.

And in 1907, Britain and Russia signed a document which in all respects recalled the Anglo-French compact of three years before. The questions that had divided the two nations, above all the question of Persia, were solved by a mutually satisfactory partition of Persia into zones. Britain and Russia, as it were, struck hands in compromise over half a century of differences, and behind the things agreed was the suggestion that, in due course, British opposition to Russian possession at Constantinople would vanish.

Again German answer was tardy, but unmistakable. This time Austria spoke, but the words were recognized as German. The Young Turk Revolution had now come to shake the crumbling foundations of Osmanli power. Europe stood amazed while a new and professedly Liberal Party seized the reins of power in Constantinople and first tied the hands of Abdul Hamid, and, when he plotted against it, threw him into prison, stripped him of his power, and put a Sultan of their own choosing in his place.

For the moment there was a promise of progress, of a renewed and reformed Turkey, and in that moment the various subject races of the Turk—the Greek, the Bulgar, and the Armenian—shared in the efforts of the Young Turks while even the faithful Albanians deserted their friend the deposed Sultan. But the Young Turk cherished grandiose dreams of a restoration, not of the Turkey that remained, by internal reform, but even more strongly the dream of a restoration of the Turkey of the past by the reconquest of the lost provinces of Bulgaria, of Serbia, of Bosnia, and Herzegovina which had passed to the protection of the Hapsburgs at the Congress of Berlin.

Seizing this pretext Austria in 1908 proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia, while Ferdinand of Bulgaria proclaimed himself Czar of Bulgaria, thenceforth beyond even the nominal sovereignty of the Turk. The results of this annexation were tremendous. Austria had many claims upon Bosnia, no colonial effort in European history had been more successful on the material side. She had brought civilization,

industrial development, railroads, and highways to one of the least advanced communities in the world. But by virtue of the mandate of the Congress of Berlin her rule was unquestioned and the fiction of an occupation had become only a fiction; to translate it into a legal as well as a nominal possession was to change nothing, but to bring instant difficulties.

The Turkish protest was of no moment. But Serbia, now become in fact the ward and protégé of Petrograd as she had been of Vienna in the days of the Obrenovitches, saw the extinction of her dream of a restored Serbia, which should include the 2,000,000 Serbs who lived in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, moved by her Serbian interests, protested vehemently against the transformation of the agreement of the Congress of Berlin into a "scrap of paper." France and Britain supported Russia. Italy stirred uneasily, for she had no interest in seeing Austria advance southward along the Adriatic or toward Saloniki. In all this Austria was a rival, not an ally.

At the critical moment there came from Berlin another gesture like to that of the Kaiser at Tangier, but directed this time at Russia and not France. Once more Germany thrust her sword into the balance, and once more the governments of Paris, London, and Petrograd had to decide between war and surrender. And as France had been helpless in 1905, Russia, still suffering from her Japanese defeats, could not venture to risk a war with Germany. Nor did France or Britain at this moment manifest any strong enthusiasm for carrying their championship of Russia's protest to the firing line.

Russia therefore bowed, as France had bowed, but the time was to come when Petrograd would say, when the Czar himself was to be reported as saying: "We have stood this thing long enough." Russia accepted her humiliation in the spirit in which France had accepted hers. Henceforth the eyes of Russia turned toward Europe, toward the Balkans; the German gesture at Tangier had recalled France from Africa to Europe, the Bosnian affair recalled Slav thoughts from Asia to the Balkans.

Viewed at the moment, Bosnia was a shining success for German

diplomacy. But if for the moment the Triple Alliance seemed mighty and the Triple Entente a broken reed, Bosnia, like Tangier, had consequences which were unforeseen to the German statesmen who provoked the trial of strength, consequences which abolished the profits of the play. Above all, the blow did not permanently break the connection between Russia, Britain, and France, which alone could have counted for a clear success.

On the contrary, it did weaken still further Italian attachment to the Triple Alliance, as it stimulated Italian apprehension of Austrian ambitions in the Balkans and along the Albanian shore of the Adriatic. From this was presently to flow the Italian attack upon Turkey, while the expression of opinion in Rome, consequent upon the Bosnian incident, disclosed how rapidly the Triple Alliance was weakening, so far as the Italian partner was concerned.

VI. AGADIR—THE THIRD AND LAST TIME

Before Italy stirred, however, there was one more great crisis—the last before the coming of the general war—in which the two groups of powers were ranged against each other. After Algeciras, Moroccan affairs had gone from bad to worse; anarchy had spread and extended. This anarchy had brought French troops to preserve the lives and properties of Frenchmen in Casablanca and along the Algerian frontier. In 1909 there had been a separate treaty between France and Germany, which was accepted for the moment as eliminating the question of Morocco. But there had been subsequent delay on the French part in carrying out terms, that Germany had insisted upon, for joint commercial activity in German Kamerun and French Congo.

In 1911, accordingly, Germany reasserted her liberty; Morocco, as Prince Bülow had said after Algeciras, was a bell which Germany could strike whenever she desired to call anything to French attention. In 1911 French troops had gone to Fez, called there by the revolt of the Moroccans. The expedition may or may not have been necessary. The stay of the French troops may have been prolonged. These were but incidents. The fact was that Morocco was no longer capable of

saving itself, the integrity proclaimed by the Kaiser at Tangier and reasserted at Algeciras had become an empty fiction.

In this situation and recognizing that French possession of Morocco was now become inevitable and that "Tunisification" would shortly close the Shereefian Empire to German desires unless Germany acted, the Kaiser suddenly sent the notorious *Panther* to Agadir, thus serving notice upon France and upon Europe that he purposed to share in the division of the Moroccan estate. At the same moment Berlin journals were filled with the promise of "*West Marokko deutsch*," and colored maps appeared assigning to the Kaiser the Moroccan provinces from the mouth of the Sebu to the Wady Dra.

Once more a European war seemed inevitable. Conversations between French and German ministers made no progress. The "sword-rattling" at Berlin was ominous. Presently the fact began to leak out that Germany was demanding from France "compensation" for French possession in Morocco, compensation amounting to most if not all of French colonial estates in Central Africa. Meantime British influence and British official actions tended more and more to take the form of solid support of France.

The situation was made the graver because suddenly a new spirit manifested itself in France. The Caillaux Ministry had given evidence of bowing before Germany, as the earlier ministry had sacrificed Delcassé in 1905. But now the French people suddenly spoke. There was a swift and unmistakable reassertion of the old spirit of France, a firm determination to make no further surrender, even though the alternative should be war. Caillaux fell. A ministry made up of all the greater men of France, headed by Raymond Poincaré and containing Delcassé, came into power. France in 1911 had marched far from the days of 1905.

Then in London, Lloyd George, speaking for the Liberal Government at a public banquet, uttered words that could not be mistaken, and were not. He gave the assurance to the world that the Liberal and Radical Government controlling British destinies did not purpose to permit British interests to be sacrificed or to allow Britain to be ignored. The words were of little consequence, the effect of the words was amaz-

ing. After a slight pause Germany changed her course, the Moroccan dispute was settled by the mutual cessions of territory in Central Africa by France and Germany. By the exchange France lost a hundred thousand square miles of Congo territory, but she acquired title to Morocco and placed her title beyond the reach of further German dispute.

VII. A GERMAN DISASTER

Agadir was, then, a defeat for Germany that approximated a disaster. Here was no superficial success as at Tangier, here was no temporary accession of prestige as after Bosnia. Germany had laid claim to a share in Morocco, having in 1905 bestowed her protection upon the Sultan. Her people had come to believe that there was in Morocco a chance for German colonial development and a new "place in the sun." But German power had yielded to British threat and French firmness all that had been won at Algeciras, so far as Morocco was concerned, and all that had been acquired in prestige through the Bosnian episode. Germany had now acquired a few thousand square miles of Congo swamps; France, "decadent" France, had annexed an empire, and her possession had been insured by British interference. Agadir was to the Germans as complete a disaster and national humiliation as Tangier had been to the French.

To the Kaiser was ascribed the surrender to Britain. Never in his reign had he known such unpopular hours, and even his son joined the ranks of his critics. There persists a legend that, at the critical moment, he summoned the financiers of Germany and asked if they were ready. Their negative response inclined his decision to peace, so the story runs. But if this be only legend, there is solid fact enough to show that his whole nation blamed him for his course. Looking to the future it was plain that never again could William II safely run the risk of thwarting the will of his countrymen, even to preserve European peace, and the aftermath of Agadir was in many minds, when the crisis of late July, 1914, placed in William's hands the destinies of Europe.

After Agadir the real hope of European peace vanished; Germany turned feverishly to prepare. France presently returned to the three-

year law, to meet new German levies, and Germany responded with a *levée en masse*, not to raise recruits but to raise money to meet the needs of a war chest. Neither in France nor Russia was the future misread. After Tangier many Frenchmen and some Russians may still have preserved the hope of avoiding war. After Agadir there was no hope. Only Britain again misread the truth and lapsed back into her domestic quarrels, having by her brief intervention brought humiliation to the proudest sovereign and disappointment to the most ambitious people on the surface of the earth.

For Berlin, for Petrograd, for Paris, the question now became—"When?" Men looked to the future wonderingly, conscious that a storm was soon to break, and seeking to discover in the passing clouds some sure sign of the approach of the whirlwind. Read the French Yellow Book, published after the war began, and this state of mind is disclosed beyond all cavil—disclosed as the state of mind of those directing the fortunes of France, of Russia, and of Germany. So fixed was this belief that when the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was uttered in July, 1914, men of all three nations simply said: "So *it* has come at last!"

The Agadir crisis was followed promptly by the Italian attack upon Turkey. Italy had found, in German activity on the west coast of Morocco, a hint that there might be a subsequent voyage of the *Panther* to the Tripolitan coast. She had found, in the German demand for "compensation" from France for French expansion in Morocco, a warrant for demanding a compensation to match Austrian annexation of Bosnia. She had found in the disorder created by the Young Turk régime, in the disarray of Turkish military force, that opportunity to which she had long looked forward. Finally, her consent to French and British bargains in the Mediterranean had been purchased by their assent to her own plan.

But the attack upon Turkey was an attack upon a nation which in Berlin was looked upon as an ally. Austrian sensibilities were instantly provoked by Italian naval operations in the Adriatic and, in fact, Italy was charged in Vienna and Berlin with being faithless

to her allies and having attacked the solidarity of the alliance of the Central Powers, to which, in fact, if not in theory, Turkey adhered. Bernhardi could write in this very year that Germany ought to have attacked Italy, when Italy assailed the Turk and the complete collapse of the Triple Alliance was foreshadowed. Here was a new blow to the edifice of German influence.

After the Tripolitan War had dragged on for many more months without bringing much of glory to Italian arms, although Italian troops slowly occupied the towns of the African coast, Turkey suddenly surrendered, and the Treaty of Lausanne gave Tripoli to Italy. Turkish surrender was due to the coming of a new storm, which was in its turn to add still more to the anxiety of Austro-German statesmen, and a new peril to Austro-German—and above all to German—policy.

VIII. THE FIRST BALKAN WAR

Turkish difficulties and defeats had now raised other hopes. The Balkan States, long looking forward to the liberation of their Christian brothers beyond their own frontiers and properly alarmed by the programme of the Young Turks, seized the moment to unite in an alliance against a common foe. To the amazement of Europe, the Greek and the Bulgar put aside a hatred of a thousand years, the Bulgar and the Serb compromised their Macedonian rivalries, and all three turned to attack the Osmanli.

Until the discord between the two great groups of powers had paralyzed Europe, such an alliance would have been powerless before the mandate of the Concert of Europe. But there was no concert, and neither group cared to invite the hostility of this new alliance, so closely balanced were the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. One group, influenced by Russia, who had helped to form the Balkan Alliance, hoped for its success; the other, stirred by their own ambitions in the Balkans, hoped and expected Turkish victory.

But the Turk was swiftly and decisively beaten. The Bulgars defeated the main Turkish army at Lule Burgas, invested Adrianople, and reached the base of the peninsula on which Constantinople stands.

The Serb avenged Kosovo at Kumanova, took Uskup, completed his victory before Monastir, and flowed down the Vardar Valley toward Saloniki, upon which Greek and Bulgarian troops were converging. Even Greece, wiping out the disgrace of the earlier Turkish War, defeated the Turkish armies before her and seized Saloniki, the prize of the Near East, and at the same time sent her troops into Albania and conquered all northern Epirus, investing Janina as the Bulgars had invested Adrianople. Here then was an end of Turkish empire in Europe. The real contest was over in as brief a time as that in which Germany had vanquished France in 1870. The prize had been won and the only question was the division of it. Now at last Europe interfered. Repulsed at the Chatalja, the outward lines of Constantinople, the Bulgar was served with notice that he would not be permitted to hold the city, even if he took it. Then Serb, Bulgar, and Greek were bidden to come to London and put their case before the Concert of Europe at last reëstablished. To this conference the small States came, and it was to prove their ruin. Only Greece refused to discontinue her military operations, while Bulgaria declined to permit the revictualing of Adrianople.

IX. THE CONFERENCE OF LONDON

At this conference the aims of the Central Powers were at last disclosed. The Balkan Alliance had been a blow to their whole purpose. If it lasted it would bar the way to Austro-German expansion toward the East; it would erect a strong Serbia on the flank of Austria, a Serbia responsive to Russian influence and ambitious to reclaim the millions of southern Slavs remaining under Hapsburg rule. Italy looked with frank disapprobation upon Greek progress northward to Avlona and the Skumbi, and Italy and Austria agreed in opposing Slav expansion southward from the Montenegrin boundary to the new Greek frontier.

Wherefore Austria served notice that there must be a free Albania. On the surface the claim was fair. Albanians inhabited all the region from the environs of Janina to Scutari, and there was patent desire on the part of the Albanians to be free, not to be the subjects of a Greek or Slavic sovereign. But the true Austrian purpose had no concern with the

wishes of the Albanians. Her desire was to break up the Balkan League. If Serbia were denied the right to reach the sea, through northern Albania, then it was inevitable that Serbia would seek compensation in the Vardar Valley. Such compensation would be at the expense of Bulgaria, for although Bulgaria and Serbia had signed a treaty partitioning Macedonia before they went to war, Serbia and not Bulgaria had conquered and held all of Macedonia and could remunerate herself as she saw fit.

The comedy of Albania long occupied the representatives of the Great Powers of Europe. Germany cleverly made Sir Edward Grey the "honest broker" of the conference and used his ignorance of the Near Eastern situation to destroy the Balkan League. He was permitted to accommodate the differences between Austria and Russia over the future boundaries between the Serb and the Albanian. There were mutual concessions made with great show of good will, although it was of more than passing consequence that the peace of Europe hung on the disposition of Ipek and Jakova, wretched Albanian villages unknown to most of the millions who would have been called to arms had the Conference of London ended in war.

Without regard to the mandate of Europe, Bulgaria burst impetuously from the conference and returned to her work, which was the capture of Adrianople. This done, she bowed to the decision of London and agreed to accept the frontier drawn from Midia to the Gulf of Enos, while Greece consented to give up northern Epirus, and Serbia and Montenegro resigned Scutari and Durazzo. But now it was necessary to settle the division of conquered territory between the three victors. Serbia and Greece had agreed. But deprived of northern Albania, through Sir Edward Grey's Albanian operation, Serbia insisted that she be permitted to hold Macedonia west of the Vardar, while Greece insisted upon keeping Saloniki, although agreeing to surrender Kavala and northern Epirus.

X. THE SECOND BALKAN WAR

Bulgaria, driven by Austrian influence, declined all compromise, insisted that she should have all that her treaty with Serbia had assured

her, and maintained troops in Saloniki as a sign of her determination to possess this city also. To all appeals of Russia she remained deaf. To all dictates of caution imposed by the alliance of Serbia and Greece she turned a deaf ear. Even Roumanian warnings, combined with the demand for "compensation" about Silistria, left her obdurate. Her heart was set upon Macedonia and she refused to barter.

Finally in the closing days of June, 1913, a great Bulgarian army in Macedonia attacked the Serbs, standing behind the Bregalnitza, won a temporary advantage, but was presently forced to retreat, while a Greek advance from Saloniki and a Hellenic success at Kilkis compelled the rapid retirement of the Bulgars from all Macedonia. A Roumanian army now entered northern Bulgaria, while the Turk reoccupied Thrace and regained Adrianople. Bulgaria's ruin was complete. She had heeded Austrian advice and Austria shared in her misfortune. Austrian purpose to destroy the Balkan League had prevailed, thanks to Sir Edward Grey, but it had raised up a dangerous Serbia, it had enhanced not weakened Russian influence in the Balkans, and it had shaken the ties that had bound the Roumanian to the Austrian for a generation. The Roumanian troops which had invaded Bulgaria had openly proclaimed that they were following through Bulgaria the road which led to Transylvania and Bukowina.

The Treaty of Bukharest confirmed the Bulgarian defeat. Serbia acquired all of Macedonia and emerged from her trials a state equal in area and importance to that Sardinia which had with French help driven the Austrian out of Italy. Greece acquired all of the coast from her ancient frontier to the Mesta, including both Kavala and Saloniki. Roumania took a province from Bulgaria, and the Turk made good his claim to his Thracian districts. After two bloody wars and terrible sacrifices, Bulgaria was able to show only a small strip of land between the Rhodopians and the Ægean; Macedonia was lost, and the dream of the hegemony of the Balkans had gone temporarily to dust and ashes.

But the worst aspect of the Balkan settlement was the menace that it carried to European peace, through the inevitable rivalries of Austria and Serbia. Ever since the change of dynasties had given Petrograd

and not Vienna control at Belgrad, the relations between Serbia and Austria had been bad. Time and again Austria had bullied and mistreated her small neighbour. The annexation of Bosnia had been as heavy a blow to the Serb as the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany had been to the Frenchman. By refusing to permit Serbia to gain a window on the sea, Austria had renewed all Serbian resentment.

XI. BUKHAREST AND AFTER

Now, from Bukharest, Serbia emerged a considerable state; in the eyes of her own soldiers and citizens she was a real military power and the easy victories of her armies over Turk and Bulgar were taken as a promise of future success over the Austrian. Beyond the Drina and the Save were four million Serbs and two million Croats, toward whom Serbians now looked as the Italians of the Sardinian Kingdom had looked toward their brethren of the Milanese and the Kingdom of Naples. Nor was there any mistaking the similar stirring of race sympathy within the Hapsburg domains.

Worst of all, it was plain that Russia would henceforth regard Serbia as a ward, and never, unless under threat of war, permit Austria to strike the little Slav state. The growth and glory of a free Serbia might shake the very foundations of the Hapsburg empire with its millions of Slavs, uneasily bearing the German and Magyar yokes, but backed by Russia, Serbia was bound to endure as a menace to Austria as far as Austrian statesmen could see. Austria had challenged Russia in the Bosnia time; Russia had temporarily bowed, but the real answer came when Russia appeared at London, after the First Balkan War, to support the claims of the Serbs, and after Bukharest gave her protection to the new and strong Serbia, which not alone closed the Hapsburg pathway to the Ægean, but dreamed of extending the renaissance of the southern Slav to Fiume and to Triest, depriving German and Magyar alike of a window on the sea, from which they had excluded the Serb.

The Treaty of Bukharest placed Austria-Hungary in jeopardy. It had hardly been promulgated when Austria sought the permission of her Italian ally to attack Serbia. Italy, as Giolitti later confessed,

declined. But the Austrian suggestion leaves no doubt as to the Austrian purpose. The blow that was suspended in 1913 was to fall in 1914; it could no longer be permanently prevented, after Serbia had made good her place in the sun and Austrian diplomacy had proven bankrupt in the Balkan wars.

Unhappily the question between Austria and Russia over Serbia could no longer be regarded as one concerning them alone. Tangier, Agadir, and the intervening Bosnian episode had transformed Europe into two camps. A dispute between two nations, each belonging to a different group, became instantly the cause for difference between the two groups. Germany had twice challenged France and Britain, and her challenge had contributed to binding them still more closely together. The Anglo-French friendship had expanded to include Russia, the ally of France. And this relation between Russia, France, and Britain had barred the road to German colonial expansion at Tangier and Agadir, it had endeavoured to thwart Austrian purpose in the Balkans in the Bosnian time, and it had, in fact, appeared as a potential force at the Conference at London, if it had never been forced to declare its solidarity, because no test question was pressed to an issue.

Such, in sum, was the transformation that Europe had undergone in less than ten years. Such had been the inexorable consequences of the Kaiser's determination to challenge British sea power and his subsequent determination to prevent Britain from drawing close to Russia and to France. Britain had met his challenge on the water. She had drawn close to France and to Russia until a war was to show that she stood with them absolutely. The play of ten years had all turned against the German. His influence in Europe had been undermined; the safety of his Austrian partner had been compromised; the loyalty of his Italian ally had been weakened and, as it turned out, destroyed; and all this had happened to a Germany, every year growing stronger in all that makes a nation strong and possessing an army unequalled in Europe, unexcelled in history. In the minds of every German the shadow of Britain had crossed the path of rightful Teutonic expansion, and a Germany that felt she could win her rightful place in the sun by

the sword felt also that, in the preceding ten years, she had not only failed to win it, but had actually lost it by reliance upon peaceful methods.

This was the Germany that spoke in July, 1914, less than a year later. The Treaty of Bukharest, in restoring peace in the Balkans, had doomed the peace of the world.

CHAPTER THREE

THE TWELVE DAYS

I

THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE

The Treaty of Bukharest was signed on August 10, 1913. Such reservations as to its provisions as may have been cherished in Petrograd, Vienna, and Rome, were abolished when the Kaiser—by a gesture, memorable thereafter—conveyed to his brother-in-law, the King of Greece, his recognition that the terms of this settlement were definitive. And for ten months Europe settled back after two years of the acutest apprehension. On the surface all was calm, although the subsequent admissions of Giolitti have informed us that the ink was not dry on the document of Bukharest when Vienna began to sound Rome on the possibility of an attack upon Serbia. Rome was unresponsive and this bad moment passed.

But on June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his morganatic wife were assassinated in the streets of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crime was committed by a man of Serbian race, but a resident of Bosnia and a subject of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The deed was an abhorrent one and if no evidence that the world has yet been able to submit to any impartial jury has fixed upon the Serbian Crown or the Serbian Government any complicity in the murder, still the crime itself was manifestly the outgrowth of the agitation of the Pan-Serbs, who aimed at extending the domain of King Peter from the Drina to the Adriatic and from Cattaro to Fiume. It was a logical and unmistakable consequence of the Serbian propaganda for racial unity, which had been permitted in Belgrad and not unkindly observed from Petrograd.

There were some days when Europe waited in the keenest anxiety for a sign from Vienna. But no sign appeared and slowly, yet in the

BACKGROUND OF THE WAR IN PICTURES



KAISER GREETS KAISER


Germany and Austria, the two faithful members of the Triple Alliance, salute each other in the persons of their sovereigns, Wilhelm and Franz Joseph.

THE TWO KAISERS
DROPPING THE PILOT
GROWTH OF THE ENTENTE
THE CRIME OF SERAJEVO




DROPPING THE PILOT—TENNIEL'S FAMOUS CARTOON

A clash was inevitable between two such masterful natures as those of William II and Bismarck. The ideas of the old man had been principally confined to building and buttressing the strength, first of Prussia, then of Germany, within her own borders. The young man, of broader vision, looked beyond the seas and sought in other lands for Germany's place in the sun. Bismarck was retired in 1890, two years after William's accession



M. DELCASSÉ, FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER IN 1904

He and Lord Lansdowne negotiated the extremely important Anglo-French Agreement without consulting Germany. "This was a long and dismal descent from the days of the Congress of Berlin, when Bismarck, acting for Germany, had presided at the council of nations. This was the heaviest blow struck at German prestige since the Empire had been proclaimed at Versailles."



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
LORD LANSDOWNE

Lord Lansdowne was the British Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1904, and he is called "the father of the Anglo-French Agreement." On Black Sunday, during the fateful Twelve Days in August, 1914, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith, declaring in no uncertain terms that "*France must not be deserted*".



TWO STAUNCH FRIENDS AND PROMOTERS OF THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

President Fallieres of France, and King Edward VII of England—father of the present King and uncle of the Kaiser. "More than any man of his time Edward VII feared the German danger and more than any man he contributed to resolving the difficulties between France and his own country. Many Germans believed he conceived a plan to build a circle of steel about Germany"





GENERAL KITCHENER AND COLONEL MARCHAND—THE PRINCIPALS IN THE FASHODA INCIDENT

Six years before the Anglo-French Agreement, British and French plans for colonial expansion came into conflict when Kitchener and Marchand met at Fashoda on the frontier of the British and French spheres in Africa. "It seemed inevitable that France and Britain were to fight one more war. But the crisis passed. France bowed." These two soldiers were to meet once again, sixteen years later, this time as allies on the Plain of Artois.



[Photograph by Paul Thompson

CZAR NICHOLAS AND PRESIDENT POINCARE

This picture is evidence of a political friendship warmly cherished between the Powers to the east and west Germany. Even while the diplomatic interchanges of the Twelve Days (in August, 1914) were in progress, Presider Poincare of France was returning from a visit to the Russian Czar.



THE KAISER WITH A FORMER FRIEND—ALBERT OF BELGIUM

The Kaiser in former years took such delight in visiting other monarchs that he was sometimes criticized at hor as a gad-about and received the nickname of *Der Reise Kaiser*—the traveling Kaiser. He has justified his wanderin in the following terms. "On my travels I design not only to make myself acquainted with foreign countries and i stitutions, and to foster friendly relations with neighboring rulers, but these journeys, which have often been misi terpreted, have high value in enabling me to observe home affairs from a distance and submit them to a quiet examir tion".





LORD ROBERTS AND LORD HALDANE

One vainly urged preparedness, the other minimized the danger and called Germany his "spiritual home," even after all hope of an accommodation of Anglo-German rivalry had passed. "The voice of Lord Roberts calling for adequate military preparation awakened only sneers from Liberals and Radicals."



Photograph by Brown Brothers



Photograph by International News Servic

ARCHDUKE FRANCIS FERDINAND (HEIR TO THE AUSTRIAN THRONE)—
WITH HIS MORGANATIC WIFE

Both were killed by an assassin's bomb at Sarajevo, Bosnia, June 28, 1914



THE ARREST OF THE ASSASSIN

Austria asserted that his act was inspired by the Pan-Slavic propaganda in Serbia and declared war. Russia sto
behind Serbia. Germany stood behind Austria. Then came Armageddon.

end completely, the crime slipped from the headlines of the newspapers and the minds of the public. On the surface, European politics seemed in the most tranquil state in the long and troubled decade that had passed. A British fleet visited Kiel; the French President set out for Petrograd; there was not a ripple on the surface of the diplomatic waters. This was, however, only the calm before the storm. On July 23d Austria sent to Serbia the most formidable ultimatum that one state had ever addressed to another.

The ultimatum itself—in addition to prescribing rules and regulations with reference to anti-Austrian propaganda and propagandists in Serbia; in addition to calling for the disbanding of patriotic societies with aims inimical to Austria and the punishment of their leaders, who were also servants of the Crown in the army and in the civil service—demanded that Austrian officials should be associated with the Serbian in the carrying out of the tasks that were set. To this ultimatum there was added a time-limit of forty-eight hours.

Here, then, on July 23d, was a new crisis, graver than the three that had preceded, because, instead of abstract questions of territory and commerce, there were now raised the concrete questions of national honour and dynastic interest which were involved in the crime of Serajevo. Ostensibly seeking to punish agitators, whose activities had led to the killing of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian thrones; ostensibly aiming to put an end to an agitation injurious to Austrian safety, the Government of Vienna had, in fact, challenged Russia, the avowed protector of Serbia.

If Russia did not now step forward to defend Serbia it was plain that the kingdom would fall under the weight of Austrian arms, or if it bowed to Austrian demands would pass actually, if not nominally, under the influence of Vienna. If Russia stood aside and permitted this to happen, then her own prestige in the Balkans and among the Slav peoples of Europe was gone. It was Bosnia over again, but Bosnia with a new and still-more-disturbing set of complexities, for in annexing Bosnia Austria had only transformed the name under which she exercised authority in Bosnia, but now she would transform the actual condition under which Serbia lived from independence to servitude.

And if Russia did step forward to protect Serbia, then she, by this act, asserted that she claimed the right to exercise an actual protection over Serbia; she claimed the right to speak for Serbia; she extended Russian influence and Russian power to the very shores of the Danube, and from Belgrad, as from the Galician frontier, threatened the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. If Austrian will prevailed, Serbia would become a Hapsburg appendage, but not less clear, once the issue was raised, was the fact that if Russia intervened and prevailed, Austrian safety was compromised and her prestige destroyed.

II. THE AUSTRIAN CASE

Stripped of all detail the fact was that Serbia, if not through direct governmental action at least by general popular agitation and with the benevolent blindness of the government, had plotted to undermine Austrian unity. To be sure the movement had its origin in the fact that Austria contained some million of Slavs, who were Serb by race, and perhaps desired to become subjects of King Peter. It was a situation on all fours with that which existed in Italy, before the Austrian war with France. But, whatever the moral title of a nation to its own territories and subjects, no nation can permit itself to be destroyed by outside intrigue and no nation will voluntarily surrender provinces and citizens.

When France undertook to assist in the liberation of northern Italy from Hapsburg rule, war resulted, as it was bound to result. If Russia now asserted on behalf of Serbia the same doctrine that Napoleon III had practised with regard to Sardinia, Austria would have to fight. The only difference was that Austria now raised the issue herself. She did not raise the issue until the heir to the Hapsburg throne had been murdered, although she had proposed to raise it ten months before the crime; but, having raised it, her own safety, her own integrity, her own existence as a Great Power were at stake.

And if one look squarely at the facts, there is little question that she was bound to raise the issue, because this Pan-Slav agitation was destroying the very foundations of her national existence. The right

of ten million Germans and as many Magyars to rule twenty-five million Slavs may be questioned on the moral side, but the legal and international right of a nation to preserve itself cannot be questioned, save on the basis of some law higher than that recognized by nations in their common intercourse.

Austrian treatment of the Slavs within her boundaries, and her treatment of the neighbouring Slav states, had been brutal and stupid. She had gained their hatred and she had deserved it. She had sought in the Balkan wars to thwart their growth and her policy had gone bankrupt. But if her mistakes had gained her deserved hatred, and her failures had enabled the very state that hated her most to menace her existence, it was not less true that she was bound to defend her existence and her unity.

In the minds of many, Serbia has come to share the glory of Belgium and to occupy the niche of a martyr quite as completely. But the idea is fallacious. Belgium threatened no one, plotted injury to no one of her neighbours, permitted no propaganda of sedition which menaced the security and order of either France or Germany, for example, to be conducted from within her boundaries. Serbia did all these things. She did them as Sardinia carried on the *risorgimento;* she did them in the name and in the fact of patriotism; she sought to liberate and unite the mass of her race, but this liberation was predicated on the collapse of Austria.

If there had been no crime at Serajevo, it was inevitable that Austria would presently take the sword against Serbia, because only by taking the sword could she defend herself. But it was equally inevitable that Russia, bound by race and religion to the Serbs, animated as she had always been by the keenest race sympathy for her fellow Slavs, would defend Serbia, who had become her soldier on the Danube, her ally against Austria's dreams of an advance to the Ægean. Actually Serbia was only a detail in the rivalry between Romanoff and Hapsburg, which was several centuries old.

Bismarck himself had hesitated in making an alliance with Austria, because he foresaw that this meant to inherit the rivalry between the

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two nations in the Balkans. His influence at Vienna had sufficed to keep peace, but his support of Austria at the Congress of Berlin had made a Franco-Russian alliance inevitable. For the moment, for his own time, he had met this by expanding his alliance to include Italy, by keeping on friendly terms with Britain, and by executing a "treaty of reassurance" with Russia. But it had needed the skill of Bismarck to keep the balance true and the successors of Bismarck had neither his skill nor his resources. Italy and Austria were natural enemies and he had made them allies, Russia and Austria were natural rivals and he had kept them at peace with each other. But less than two decades after he laid down the reins, natural tendencies had overcome fortuitous circumstances.

The peril of the Balkan situation was no longer the peril of a war between Austria and Russia, or between Austria and Germany on the one hand and France and Russia on the other, with Italy a possible ally of the Central Powers. The challenge of the Kaiser to Britain had brought Britain back to the Continent. France herself would have hesitated in the early nineties to fight on the Serbian issue for her Russian ally. But the French spirit had undergone a new birth since Tangier and Agadir.

Since the war came, volumes have been published devoted simply to proving upon which of the several nations the responsibility for the conflict rests and to demonstrating that one or the other of the nations, during the fateful twelve days before the storm broke in its full fury, actually desired war, or served the cause of peace more loyally, than its neighbours.

Yet it seems probable that, in the long time hereafter, those details will be forgotten by the historian, who will perceive that the twelve days were of little meaning, that they marked a period after real hope of peace had expired, that the whole system under which Europe had lived for so long had been destroyed, and that the statesmen who laboured so frantically in the closing hours were actually as impotent as medicine men who hurl incantations and invoke charms to check the approach of a cyclone.

III. SIR EDWARD GREY

In the Albanian time Europe had permitted Sir Edward Grey to act as its agent. He had passed from one group to the other, persuading Russia to resign Scutari to the new Kingdom of Albania, wheedling Austria into consenting that Dibra should be Serbian. Austria and Italy for once were agreed, both seeking to preserve from Serb and Greek alike that Albania each hoped to inherit. Neither Russia nor Germany was in a state of readiness for war, and France was, as she continued through the critical days of 1914, willing to serve the cause of peace to her limit, provided it did not interfere with her duty as an ally of Russia.

When the Serbian crisis came, Sir Edward Grey—still under the influence of his success over Albania, still convinced that he had to deal with a question that could be adjusted as the Albanian had been—began that earnest and industrious campaign to preserve the peace of the world, which remains the admiration of the Briton—and the target of the German. From first to last he had, in this campaign, the support of the French and the Italian statesmen; he had the assent of Russia to all the propositions which he made; but never, to the closing hour, does he seem to have grasped the fact that he was in the presence of a question which could not be settled by discussion about the green table, since it involved the safety of Austria and the honour of Russia.

The whole burden of Sir Edward Grey's words, messages, explanations, discloses his conviction that to preserve the peace of Europe it was necessary to persuade Austria to withdraw her ultimatum, to suspend her action against Serbia, to consent to submit to the Concert of Europe the question between Serbia and herself, which was the question of her own integrity aggravated by the new problem raised by the murder of the Archduke.

In the very nature of things Russia was prepared to consent to any arrangement that spared Serbia, but any arrangement that spared Serbia and submitted the Austro-Serbian question to the Concert of Europe vindicated Russia's assertion of a right to protect Serbia and

was bound to constitute a moral victory for Russia and a new blow to Austrian safety. Nor could Austria, remembering the experience of Germany at Algeciras, anticipate a victory in any new international gathering.

To Germany Sir Edward Grey continued to address appeals to intervene to restrain Austrian action. Conceivably it had been Germany who had moved Austria to action, to the despatch of the ultimatum, but of this there is as yet no sufficing proof. Unmistakably it lay within the power of the German Government by a word, by a gesture, to deprive Austria of the assurance German support gave. But this would have been in fact a desertion of her one faithful ally at the moment of deadly peril, and it would have foreshadowed the collapse of the Austro-German Alliance, if it had not been but the prelude to the collapse of the Dual Monarchy, already shaken by Slav intrigue within and without.

Unless Russia abandoned her championship of Serbia, or Austria consented to recall her ultimatum and leave to Europe the task of disciplining her little neighbour—a task beyond the capacity of the fragile Concert—war was bound to follow. And there never was any chance that either Austria or Russia would surrender. When Sir Edward Grey asked Germany to restrain Austria, Germany with perfect justice retorted by asking Sir Edward Grey to restrain Russia. Always the British Minister seems to have been obsessed with the immediate present, always the action of Austria in issuing the ultimatum seems to arouse his indignation and awaken his protest, but to the fatal chain of events that had made Serbia a deadly peril to Austrian existence he gave no thought.

Actually he accomplished nothing for good or for evil, actually he sought peace by suggesting temporary devices that were of no value and could be of no avail in the presence of the storm that was rising. When the storm broke he found himself without a policy, so far as his own Government was concerned, but bound by honour, if not by treaty, to stand with France and with Russia. Nor was he alone bound by honour. He had failed beyond all forgiveness, together with his as-



LORD ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR

As the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had been almost silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. An old and broken man he had gone to France at the moment of the crisis, to cheer on his well-loved Indian troops. Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it

sociates, in not warning the British people of the danger that had for ten years been growing, but he now saw with utmost clarity that a Germany victorious over France would be a Germany which Britain could not resist and could not expect would refrain from attack.

German invasion of Belgium saved Sir Edward Grey, it saved England, because it supplied a moral issue and a moral impulse which served to enlist British effort until the nation at last perceived the material interests, the national existence, that were at stake. But if the successor of Bismarck will hereafter have to answer to his own people and in history for having involved Germany in a war against three great nations at once, the successor of Pitt and Beaconsfield will be indicted for having brought Britain to the edge of Armageddon without permitting the British people to suspect that their life and their Empire were in jeopardy.

Having entered into an arrangement with France, by which the French fleet was to guard British interests in the Mediterranean while the British fleet concentrated against the German menace in the North Sea, Sir Edward Grey could not desert France at the opening of the war, even if there were no written alliance. But if the British people had not been aroused by the invasion of Belgium it may be questioned whether Sir Edward Grey could have persuaded his Government to make good its obligations or his fellow countrymen to honour their Government's commitments.

It is difficult to find any warrant in Sir Edward's course for the storm of abuse that Germans have directed at him as a monster of bad faith, but equally difficult is the task for one, writing with such facts as are now at hand, to escape the belief that he acted with a blindness and a fatuity almost passing human comprehension. His party associates had kept Britain blind to the truth of world affairs for a decade, and when the storm arrived there was lacking any national understanding which could give force to the decisions of a Minister, at last aware of the deadly peril of his country. He knew England must stand with France to save her own life, but until Germany invaded Belgium, he was destitute of any resource by which he could reveal to his fellow countrymen the imminence and the magnitude of their peril.

Those who saw Sir Edward in the closing hours, when the World War had become inescapable, think of him as one who revealed in every word and act the emotion of a man who had seen the hope and the work of a lifetime gone suddenly to dust and ashes. He had believed that a settlement with Germany, which would lay forever the peril of what was now to occur, was possible. In the Bosnia time, in the Agadir crisis, at the Conference of London, he had not only striven to avoid war, but had found cause for hope that, since war had been avoided on these three occasions, the cloud that had hung over Europe so long might be finally dissipated.

His optimism had led him far afield. It had persuaded him to sacrifice the Balkan Alliance at the Conference of London, when he accepted the Austro-German programme for Albania. It was to cost his own country dearly in the first years of the war, which found her unprepared, because a Liberal Government, under Sir Edward's influence, had turned a deaf ear to all the warnings of those who saw Europe as it was and not through the golden haze of lofty but insubstantial dreams of world peace. Yet complete as had been his failure, absolute as had been his misreading of the essential facts of his own time, when he occupied a post of honour and responsibility, no one could doubt the sincerity of his purposes or the tragedy, the personal tragedy, that came with the destruction of all his lifework.

IV. THE AUSTRIAN ULTIMATUM

The Austrian ultimatum was despatched to Serbia on July 23d, and it carried a time-limit of forty-eight hours. When it was sent, the President of France, with the important members of the French Cabinet, were on the sea, returning from Russia. The Irish crisis in Britain seemed to be about to end in civil war. The Kaiser was in Norwegian waters. There was no Russian ambassador in Vienna. The Caillaux trial was dominating French attention and a French senator, speaking in his place, had just called attention to grave defects in French military organization.

In only one detail—but this a vitally important one—did chance

favour the Triple Entente. The British fleet had been mobilized for its annual manœuvres shortly before the crisis came and, on a hint from Italy, received in the third week of July, demobilization was postponed. Thus British sea power was on a war footing at the crucial moment. If Germany had ever planned a raid on British shores in the first days of an Anglo-German conflict, as British naval authorities believe—such a dash as the Japanese made at Port Arthur in the opening hours of the Russo-Japanese War—the scheme was frustrated by the accidental posture of British fleets and the timely Italian hint.

On Friday, July 24th, Austria informed Russia that she did not have any intention to annex Serbian territory, and Russia replied by asking an extension of the time-limit attached to the ultimatum to Serbia. This was refused by Austria on Saturday, the day on which Russia issued her first warning note, published in the Petrograd press, an official assurance that Russia would not remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, which, through its Crown Prince, now acting as Regent, had appealed to the Czar on the preceding day.

On this same day, Saturday, July 25th, just within the time-limit, Serbia sent a reply to Austria, which contained a surrender on most points and an agreement to submit the rest to arbitration. Austria forthwith declared the Serbian response to be unsatisfactory and withdrew her minister from Belgrad.

On Sunday, July 26th, Sir Edward Grey began his task of accommodating the world crisis. He suggested that the case between Russia and Austria be left to the mediation of the four Great Powers not directly concerned, acting through their ambassadors in Vienna and Petrograd. These nations were, of course, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Russia, having first suggested conversations directly between Vienna and Petrograd, a suggestion subsequently rejected by Austria, accepted Sir Edward's proposal but Germany rejected it on the next day.

On Monday, July 27th, when Germany had rejected his proposal, Sir Edward invited the German Government to present a formula of mediation of its own. This elicited no response from Berlin, because

Germany had already on July 25th invited France and Great Britain to restrain Russia, that is, to urge Russia to stand aside and permit Austria to punish Serbia. This proposal, described by the Germans as "localization" of the disturbance, was rejected both by France and by Great Britain.

A collapse of all preliminary efforts of Sir Edward follows the declaration of war upon Serbia, by Austria, on Tuesday, July 28th, as fighting commenced forthwith. Meantime the Kaiser, having returned from Norway on Sunday night, now addressed his first message to the Czar urging him to permit Austria to discipline Serbia. To this the Czar responded the next day by urging that the whole matter be submitted to The Hague, a suggestion never answered by the Kaiser.

Meantime the question of mobilization had become acute. Austria had been partially mobilizing against Serbia, and as early as July 25th the Russian Council had considered partial mobilization against Austria, at the same time informing the German Government that there was no hostile meaning for Germany in the approaching mobilization.

Now on the 29th, Germany for the first time began to sound Great Britain on the possibility of British neutrality if war should come. Her proposals were promptly rejected by Sir Edward Grey.

By Friday, July 30th, general Russian mobilization was proclaimed, but at the eleventh hour Sir Edward Grey suggested that the operations of Austria against Serbia should be recognized as a punitive expedition and that Austria, having reached a point within Serbian territory fixed by agreement, should permit her future course to be submitted to a conference of Powers. Austria assented to a portion of this suggestion and for the first time manifested a decided change in spirit. Russia agreed.

But on July 31st Germany addressed an ultimatum to Russia demanding that Russia desist from her mobilization within twelve hours. This was naturally ignored by Russia and on Saturday, August 1st, Germany declared war upon Russia. A general war now became inevitable and the only question that remained was as to the course of Britain and Italy.

V. GERMANY'S COURSE

In all this period it is quite clear that the British and German statesmen, alike, pursued a course aimed, ostensibly and probably honestly, at averting a general war. But Germany insisted that the war could only be averted by action of Britain and France in restraining Russia from intervening in the quarrel between Serbia and Austria, while Britain insisted that Austria should be compelled, by her German ally, to submit her dispute with Serbia to a European conference and asked Germany to restrain Austria.

Such purposes were irreconcilable from the start and failed as they were bound to fail unless one of the two great nations involved was prepared to yield everything, as France had yielded at Tangier, and Russia in the Bosnia time. Action by the German Emperor, in the sense requested by Sir Edward Grey, would have brought down upon him far more criticism at home than had beaten upon him in the Agadir time. Peace was no longer to be preserved by a compromise between the two groups of nations; the sole chance of avoiding war from July 23d onward was by the surrender of one of the groups and this, possible in 1905 and 1909, was unthinkable in 1914.

Germany's course prior to the outbreak of the war, her relation to the efforts to preserve peace made by Sir Edward Grey, has suffered naturally from the odium that justly attaches to the manner in which she acted, once the conflict had begun, both in invading Belgium and in the manner in which she conducted operations on Belgian and French soil, as well as on the high seas. This was inevitable if not entirely logical. But certainly she was as fully entitled to support Austria as was France to support Russia. France never considered demanding that Russia should abandon Serbia, and it was equally unreasonable to expect Germany to compel Austria to refrain from abolishing the Serbian menace, once Austria had so admirable an issue as the assassination of the Archduke furnished.

The fact that Germany alone was ready when the war came has contributed to creating the conviction that she alone wished it. It is

unmistakable that for twenty years she had proclaimed her purpose, through her acts, to modify the *status quo;* she had challenged Britain on the sea, she had assailed France through Morocco, and backed Austria against Russia. Her teachers and soldiers had proclaimed that only through a victorious war could Germany attain her rightful place in the sun. This was strange doctrine in the Twentieth Century, but familiar doctrine in the preceding centuries that had seen the rise of France and Britain. What is essential is that it be recognized that millions of Germans held this doctrine. It was a doctrine that Europe had resisted over years when Napoleon applied it, when Louis XIV asserted it, when Charles V employed it. Europe was bound to oppose it now, but in the larger view of history it will doubtless take its place beside the other efforts of great races to revive the Roman tradition and use their superior organization and unity to dominate a continent.

That Germany actually procured the war, in the critical days of July, is as yet a mere unsupported allegation; that her whole course since the present Kaiser came to the throne had made the war inevitable, is hardly to be mistaken. That the language of her teachers and her scholars, the words of her Emperor, and the frequent utterances of her official spokesmen had ended by convincing the statesmen and several of the peoples of Europe that Germany was seeking world power—thereby bringing together nations whose unity, once achieved, threatened her interests, her legitimate interests, perhaps all her hopes and ambitions—certainly, is manifest.

But in all this the incidents of the days preceding the war are of minor consequence. We may see and believe that the war was the inevitable consequence of the new visions and purposes of the German people, but it is difficult not to see and to believe that the actual occasion of the outbreak was accidental and that the decision for war rather than surrender had already been reached, not by one but by all nations before Sir Edward Grey undertook to perform that task at which Mrs. Partington had failed with equal honour to herself.

VI. BRITAIN AND GERMANY

Something less than a hundred hours separate the German declaration of war upon Russia from the British declaration despatched to Germany after midnight on August 4th. In this time the real drama concerns only Britain and Germany, for Italy in due course proclaimed her neutrality while France affirmed her fidelity to her Russian ally.

In these momentous hours the whole play of German diplomacy was to keep Britain out of the conflict, for reasons too obvious to need mention. And it should be remarked that not only did Germany have good reason to believe that she would succeed, but also that she came desperately near to accomplishing her purpose, as will be disclosed when the history of what took place in London on August 2d at last sees the light of day.

Sir Edward Grey's rôle in this period is also plain. He knew that, not because of Belgium, not because of sympathy for Albert's kingdom or responsibility for its integrity, not because of unwritten but potent claims of honour binding Britain to France, must his country enter the war. Now at last he perceived that it had become a matter of life or death for his own nation and that a German victory and the destruction of France would leave Germany an enemy greater than Napoleon had been, and more menacing than any foe England had known in her long history. Unmistakably his course was to find the cause on which his nation could enter, just as Germany sought to abolish all causes.

In this situation Sir Edward's position was excessively difficult. The Cabinet in which he sat was by no means resolved to fight. Some of its members were frankly opposed to standing with France; others were, to say the least, doubtful. Strong Liberal newspapers, on which the majority party relied for support, openly proclaimed that there was no reason for British participation. The country at large had no inkling of the actual European situation and, thanks to Liberal-Radical rule for nearly a decade, had been taught to regard all discussion of the German menace as without other warrant than domestic political exigency might supply. In the critical hour Britain was asleep and Sir Edward's

associates divided as to their duty and paralyzed by the lack of any popular emotion which might supply a warrant for Governmental action.

From this terrible dilemma Germany rescued Sir Edward by her decision to strike at France through Belgium. But no one can read the various documents without feeling that for him Belgium was a pretext rather than a policy. The right and the duty of Britain to defend Belgium were manifest, but it was always as essential to British interest and policy that France should be saved and only a sacrifice of British safety could have resulted, if Sir Edward, lacking the Belgian issue, had been unable to find some other on which he could bring his nation to the point of war. Nor is it less plain that the moment France was involved in the war, the commitments of the British Government in the matter of the fleets bound Britain to stand by the Republic, no matter what course Germany should take—short of guaranteeing to respect the integrity of France, her colonies and her coasts, and to refrain from attacking France.

This was clearly perceived by Lord Lansdowne, who had negotiated the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 and, on the "black Sunday," when British Liberalism stood aghast and shaken before the abyss, he joined with Mr. Balfour in a letter to Mr. Asquith affirming the belief, which was the opinion of the whole Tory party, that France could not be deserted. Conceivably this was the decisive gesture. But it was not until the invasion of Belgium became a fact that there was the suggestion of a resolved policy disclosed in the words or the actions of Sir Edward or his associates.

It remains now, rapidly to summarize the events of the closing days from August 1st, the date of the German declaration of war upon Russia, until the expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum addressed to Berlin.

Meantime it should be recalled that Germany, in addition to declaring war upon Russia, had demanded of France information as to what the French attitude would be; had been informed that France would follow the course dictated by her own interests; and that in due

course she declared war upon the French Republic on August 3d, alleging certain acts by French aviators over German soil that were too ridiculous to obtain even passing credence.

VII. SIR EDWARD'S DILEMMA

On July 24th, following the Austrian ultimatum by twenty-four hours, Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked the British Ambassador in Petrograd to use his influence to have Britain declare that she would stand with France and Russia. The conviction of Russian officials, held consistently by Russian and French diplomacy alike, was that the sole hope for peace was to be found in the chance that Germany would not care to fight if she knew she would have Britain in the field. This view was steadily rejected by Sir Edward Grey, who on July 25th informed the British Ambassador at Petrograd that Great Britain could give no assurance as public sentiment would not warrant a decision to participate in a war over Serbia.

This attitude endured right down to the time of the German declaration of war upon Russia. On July 30th the President of the French Republic made an appeal to the British Ambassador in Paris and on July 31st he addressed a letter directly to King George, asking for an assurance of British support. Both applications were rejected. But it is fair to say for Sir Edward that at the same time he spoke with far more explicitness to Germany, and as early as July 29th warned the German Ambassador in London that he must not mistake the pacific tone of British diplomacy for any assurance that Britain would stay out. This warning was totally ignored in Berlin, where the ruling statesmen pinned their faith to the weakness of British foreign policy and the division in the British Cabinet.

On this same day the German Government made a clear bid for British neutrality by offering to respect Dutch neutrality, to guarantee Belgian integrity and independence, provided Belgium did not stand out against Germany, and to give assurance not to annex French territory in Europe if the war turned in Germany's favour. But Germany thus tacitly declined to promise not to violate Belgian neutrality or to give

any pledge not to annex French colonies after the war. This was the "shameful" proposal to quote Sir Edward Grey, which was rejected upon July 30th.

On this same day, too, the French Ambassador in London reminded the British Government of letters exchanged by France and Britain in 1912, after the Agadir crisis, which provided that, if the peace of Europe should be endangered, the two nations should proceed to a discussion of what they proposed to do. Actually this meant a discussion of combined land and sea operations. Still Sir Edward remained unresponsive and King George, on Friday, July 31st, could give only the vaguest of reassuring words to the appeal made to him directly by the President of the French Republic.

And yet on this same day, the situation began to clear, for on this day Sir Edward Grey addressed to France and to Germany an identic note asking their purposes with regard to Belgian neutrality. By the Treaty of 1839, reaffirmed by that of 1870, Britain had declared her purpose to defend the neutrality of Belgium, an engagement made also by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. France promptly agreed to respect Belgian neutrality, but the British Ambassador at Berlin was unable to get any response. The next day the German Ambassador inquired in London whether a German pledge to respect the neutrality of Belgium would insure British neutrality. Sir Edward Grey declined such a bargain at once.

But on August 1st a new problem arose. By virtue of an arrangement made long before 1914, and probably after Agadir, French fleets had taken over the British task in the Mediterranean that the British might concentrate their fleets in the North Sea. The French Atlantic coast was therefore undefended. Wherefore Sir Edward Grey was moved on this day to give to the French Ambassador a promise to ask the Cabinet, which met that afternoon, to agree that if the German fleet undertook to attack the coasts of France, the British fleet would intervene. This assurance was given by the British Cabinet and the French were informed of it on August 2d.

On August 3d Germany on her part agreed to refrain from an

THE TWELVE DAYS (AUGUST 4-16, 1914)



KING PETER OF SERBIA

In the Twentieth Century, one does not expect to see a king, clad in velvet and ermine, riding through the streets of his capital on a snow-white steed, with his golden crown upon his head. But King Peter is quite the old-fashioned, fairy-book monarch. In December, 1914, when his troops were about to begin their successful effort to retake Belgrade, he rode along the front of his line and harangued them, even as their chiefs of remoter centuries were accustomed to do.

PORTRAITS OF PERSONS THEN PROMINENT



WILLIAM II, GERMAN EMPEROR

"The Soldier and the army," he said in 1891, "not parliamentary majorities and decisions, have welded together the German Empire. My confidence is in the army." In 1900, he added, "If one wishes to decide something in this world, it is not the pen alone that will do it if unsupported by the power of the sword." And in 1906, "My first and last care is for my fighting forces on land and sea."



THE LATE EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA HUNGARY

When he came to the throne in 1848, more than one revolution was in progress in his dominions. During his reign his army was badly beaten by the Germans and there was much dissension among the many races over which he ruled. His domestic troubles were numerous and heartrending. They included the assassination of his wife and the suicide of his son. Yet he lived on through a record-breaking reign of almost seventy years, and died leaving his people engulfed in the greatest disaster of history.



THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE



THE RULERS OF THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

M. Raymond Poincaré, President of France, hurried back to France from Petrograd during the fateful Twelve
s in 1914 and set to work on diplomatic correspondence with England. On July 30th, he made an appeal to the
ish Ambassador in Paris, and the following day addressed a letter directly to King George asking for an assurance
ritish support. Both applications were rejected. England refused to commit herself till she was sure that Ger-
y was to invade Belgium, and that the Belgians meant to resist.



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TO PROVIDE THE SINEWS OF WAR

The Finance Ministers of the Triple Entente meet to discuss ways and means. On the left is M. Bark, representing Russia; in the centre, M. Ribot, representing France —in 1917 he became French Premier; on the right, Lloyd-George, then England's Chancellor of the Exchequer and later, Prime Minister.

attack upon France by sea, if Britain would remain neutral, but declined to give any commitment as to Belgium. This occasioned no surprise because on the previous day Germany had informed the Belgian Government of its intention, provoked by alleged French activities, to enter Belgian territory and to advance up the Meuse Valley to attack France.

On this same day Belgium addressed an appeal to Britain for diplomatic support and Sir Edward Grey told the Belgian Minister that a German invasion would mean war with Great Britain. France offered Belgium five army corps, which were declined. But the British assurance sent to Belgium arrived only on the morning of the 4th of August, when the German invasion of Belgium had begun.

VIII. BELGIUM DECIDES TO FIGHT

On Monday, August 3d, Belgium reached its heroic decision to defend its own neutrality and responded to the brutal German ultimatum with a declaration of purpose, contained in moderate language, which will remain memorable. In declaring that she purposed to defend her soil against German violation she asserted that she had at all times been equally prepared to defend herself against France or Britain and thus demolished the whole German edifice of allegation, that France was planning to attack Germany through Belgium.

Sir Edward Grey was getting on firm ground now. An invasion of Belgium, unless Belgium were willing to defend herself, might still have left his Cabinet cold, but once Belgium had made up her mind to fight he was assured that there would be little more hanging back in England.

August 4th is the last day. King Albert, now in the presence of actual invasion, appealed to Great Britain, Russia, and France to help him defend his country. Great Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany, which expired at midnight, demanding that satisfactory assurances be furnished of German determination to respect Belgian neutrality.

Notable on this last day, also, was the speech of the German Chancellor in which he told his countrymen and the world that Germany was in "a state of necessity" which "knew no law," and had therefore invaded Belgium. It is in this speech, too, that he made the frank

admission that the invasion of Belgium was in violation of the rules of international law. He went further and openly conceded that what was being done was "a wrong that we will try to make good again as soon as our military ends have been reached. When one is threatened as we are, and all is at stake, he can only think of how he can hack his way through."

When the public indignation of the world had become manifest, the German Government endeavoured to find post-mortem warrant for its course in Belgium by the "discovery" of documents in Brussels alleged to disclose a conspiracy of Belgium with Britain and France. Such devices were as futile as the efforts to find excuse for a declaration of war upon France in imaginary aeroplane raids by French craft dropping bombs over German cities. Whatever effect they may have had upon German opinion, these fictions have long been dismissed by neutral publics, which have accepted as final the blunt, brutal, but at least honest words of the German Chancellor spoken at the moment when the decision had been made.

Not less memorable is the incident that marked the final interview between the British Ambassador and the German Chancellor. To Sir Edward Goschen, calling to take his leave of the Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg made his famous inquiry as to the purpose of Great Britain to make war upon Germany merely for the sake of "a scrap of paper." The "scrap of paper" was the British guarantee of the integrity of Belgium, contained in the Treaty of 1839 and reaffirmed in the document of 1870. The full extent of German surprise, apprehension, and anger, provoked by the decision of Great Britain, was revealed in this interview for the first time.

Meantime, as Von Jagow had already told the British Ambassador, the invasion of Belgium had become an accomplished fact and there could be no drawing back for Germany. Accordingly, with expiration of the time-limit of the British ultimatum at midnight on August 4th, Great Britain declared war upon Germany. Thus the triple Entente in the presence of the fact of war became a triple alliance at the precise moment when the Triple Alliance was facing the defection of Italy, who promptly

announced that the terms of her alliance with Austria and Germany, which were for action in a defensive war only, did not require her to participate in a war which she considered aggressive on their part, and that she therefore proclaimed her neutrality. This prompt declaration of Italian neutrality was of incalculable military advantage to France, since it automatically released for service on the German frontier several army corps stationed along the Alps.

August 4, 1914, therefore, marks the complete ruin of the whole edifice that Bismarck had erected; his alliance had collapsed; the union of all the rivals of Germany, which he had feared and in his life time prevented, had come to pass. All of this, too, German statesmen might have perceived would inevitably occur, had they been guided by British tradition rather than contemporary British policy. Such, across the centuries, had been the unfailing answer of Britain to a challenge to her supremacy at sea.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GERMAN ATTACK

I

THE TWO STRATEGICAL CONCEPTIONS

From the morrow of the Franco-Prussian War the German General Staff, like the French, had been engaged in formulating the plans by which they would act in the next war. With the lapse of years it had come to be accepted as inevitable that the superior organization and the largely increased population of Germany, together with her central position, would enable her to take the offensive at the outset of operations. The alliance of France with Russia and of Germany with Austria and Italy had broadened the scope of the plans without changing the essential fact that Germany would have the initiative. And as Italy yearly moved farther away from her partners, her assistance was presently eliminated as a factor both by Germany and her enemies.

Having the offensive, the German problem was to decide whether to attack France, leaving to Austria, reinforced by a few German covering troops in East Prussia and Posen, the task of containing Russia until France was disposed of, or to detain France at the strongly fortified and easily defensible Alsace-Lorraine frontier, and level the main blow at Russia. The decision was made for the attack upon France. Since it failed, and perhaps before, the alternative has been strongly advocated, but it is easy to understand and accept the reasons that controlled the decision for France.

These reasons were various. As to Russia it was recognized that her mobilization would be slow, it was known that in organization and equipment her troops were inferior to the German. But it was equally notorious that Russian strategy did not include an immediate offensive; that the Russian plans for mobilization were to be carried out behind the Bug and far east of Warsaw; that Russian strategy, in fact, rested upon

the conception, enduring from the Napoleonic Era, of a retreat, without decisive engagement, into the vast regions to the east, where Napoleon's army had perished, where roads were few, transport difficult, and the machinery of the German army would work at the least advantage. Finally, this meant not a quick decision but a long delay; it meant also, in a war opening in August, that Germany would meet winter on the road to Moscow or Petrograd.

Speed, too, was the very essence of German strategy. Napoleon had been defeated in the Waterloo campaign in less than a week after he took the field. Six weeks had sufficed to dispose of Austria in 1866, and the decisive battles of the Franco-Prussian War were not divided by a longer span from the date of mobilization. German finance, the whole nature of Germany's economic fabric, was not adjusted to a long war. What was to be sought was a quick decision. This might also serve to keep Britain out of the war as a French defeat might lead Russia to abandon the struggle, when Paris had fallen.

A quick decision could only be obtained in the west, but such a decision there might be expected to settle the war. At all events, the French army beaten and flung back behind the Loire, Paris and northern France conquered, the Germans could send their best troops east and rely upon reserves to meet the French efforts, while the costs of the war would already be saddled upon a France which would no longer be able to avoid paying the huge indemnity Germany had reckoned on in her calculations before the war.

All German calculations had arrived at the same point that France could be crushed within six weeks after the war broke out, that in this time Russian activities would not become too serious for Austria to deal with alone, or aided by a few German corps in the north. But the success or failure of the German strategy would be measured by the success or failure of the German army in bringing France to a decisive battle early in the second month of the war, destroying the French field armies in that battle and, thanks to the German heavy artillery, taking Paris and all the barrier fortresses from Luxemburg to Switzerland.

Unhappily for Germany, the question of Belgium was involved by

reason of the manner in which French strategy, in the years following the great French disaster of the Franco-Prussian War, had undertaken to guard against the blow German strategy was preparing.

II. THE BELGIAN PROBLEM

Recognizing the growing superiority of Germany in numbers, France had sought to meet this by the erection on her eastern frontier of a splendid system of forts, based upon the four great fortresses of Verdun, Toul, Épinal, and Belfort and buttressed by many other detached forts connecting the larger strongholds. Actually a wall of steel—with but one gap, southwest of Nancy—opposed itself to German advance across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier.

Given German superiority in heavy artillery, these forts were likely to fall, but defended by the whole field army of France, they would in all probability hold out far beyond the six weeks' period and knowing as we now know, that trench war was bound to come, there is no escape from the conclusion that the decision of the German General Staff against attempting to force this barrier, given their time limitation, was wise.

There was, then, only the road through Belgium, since the Swiss route was unsuitable for use by great masses of men and Switzerland had an army far more formidable than the Belgian. The decision, therefore, was for the Belgian route and it was made many years before the war. The proof of this is found in the strategic railroads built to the Belgian frontier and signalled by military writers as early as 1909. Well-built double-track lines led through the comparative wilderness of the eastern Ardennes and ended exactly on the Belgian frontier. They had no commercial value and served no peaceful purpose. But they did enable Germany to mobilize vast masses, far more rapidly than any one suspected would be the case, squarely on the Belgian frontier.

Once across the Ardennes, the road by the Meuse and Sambre valleys led straight into the plains of northern France. This road was not barred by any French forts. The sole obstacles were the Belgian fortresses of Liége and Namur, both out of date, both unprovided with modern equipment, and both lacking in subsidiary defences. Germany

reckoned, wisely, as the event showed, that these would prove no considerable obstacle and would fall to her great howitzers with a minimum of delay. As for the Belgian army, German High Command could hope that it would not intervene. But if it did, it was too small and too poorly organized to offer serious resistance. The event proved this to be true.



WHY THE GERMANS WENT THROUGH BELGIUM

"A wall of steel, with but one gap, southwest of Nancy, opposed itself to German advance across the whole extent of Franco-German frontier."

With the political aspects, as well as the moral problems, involved in the invasion of Belgium, German High Command did not concern itself. It could hope again, that Britain, like Belgium, would not interfere with the march of Teutonic hosts against France by the Belgian road. It could believe that, even if Britain entered the war, she would not

send her scanty army to the Continent in time to intervene (another calculation almost justified by the event). But it was satisfied that even if this should take place, it still possessed a margin of superiority in numbers and material, which would insure the victory, even at the very worst.

It is impossible not to believe that German High Command overbore German diplomacy in the matter of Belgian neutrality, and that the soldier imposed his will upon the statesman. The conviction of the soldier was that, using Belgium as a highway, he could destroy France in the time at his disposal and that no other method would avail. He came so near to absolute success that it is impossible to criticize his decision, on the military side.

Here then, in brief, is the whole German strategical conception for the first thrust of the war. It was broken at the Battle of the Marne, but it was not until after the battles of Flanders had made the western deadlock absolute that it was finally abandoned. It supplies the clue to all of the first phase of the war. In this conception all was foreseen except the possibility of a French retreat without a decisive battle, until the conditions of contest should have turned against the Germans and the balance of numbers, rightly reckoned certain to be heavily with the invader at the outset, should be partially restored.

III. FRENCH STRATEGY

French High Command had based its course upon the lessons of 1870. It knew the purpose of Germany to risk all on a single throw and seek a decisive victory in the opening weeks. It knew that Germany might come through Belgium, but it could never be certain of this and it was compelled to base its initial concentration upon the more probable objective of German attack, which remained the eastern frontier. But it had made its plans to meet the Belgian thrust. What it could not foresee was the number of troops Germany would send through Belgium, the rapidity with which Belgian forts would fall, and the extraordinary mobility of German troops, due to the unexpected use of motor transport.

It was understood between France and Russia that if the German blow was directed at France, Russian troops would enter East Prussia in the third week of the war, as they did. It was believed that this would compel the Germans to return east and weaken their armies in France before the decisive battle. The terrible defeat of the Russians at Tannenberg partially wrecked this hope, but the Russian victories in Galicia ultimately compelled the Germans to give over their efforts in the west and go to the rescue of their Austrian ally.

It was the hope of the French, by taking the offensive in Lorraine and Alsace, as well as in the Ardennes, if the Germans came through Belgium, to win such successes as to imperil the German armies in the north and force them to return to the Rhine to defend their own country. This hope expired in the heavy defeats of the French at Morhange and Neufchâteau in the first three weeks of the war. It was the hope of the French, if they were beaten in these opening contests, to stand on their own frontiers, before Nancy, behind the Meuse from Verdun to Charleville and thence to Lille and break the fury of the German assault on lines long foreseen. This hope was realized absolutely before Nancy, momentarily behind the Meuse, but fell when the Germans succeeded in sending unexpected masses far west and overwhelming the British. It was the further hope of the French, if all these plans failed, that it would be possible to make a successful stand behind the Aisne, the Oise, and the Somme. But the collapse of the British and the unforeseen rapidity of Kluck's advance defeated this hope also.

But beneath all these conceptions lay the fundamental purpose not to risk the fate of the whole French field force until the chances of victory were unmistakable. There was to be no repetition of the blunders of 1870, the defeat of French armies in detail, the isolation of Bazaine, the sacrifice of MacMahon to political and dynastic considerations. French High Command was even prepared to evacuate Paris, if necessary, but it did not mean to risk a decisive battle, while the odds were against it. This was the conception that dominated the whole French campaign and led to the supreme victory of the Marne, which wrecked

the whole German strategy and obtained a tactical triumph on the battlefield as well.

Thus, while the various French armies suffered local defeats, none was ever routed, none was ever captured, and all retained their form from the beginning to the end of the campaign. This purpose, and not the local reverses suffered by the French in the opening days of the war, explains the great retreat, which at the moment seemed to the world the promise of French ruin and long deluded the German commanders into believing that they had achieved the purpose for which they were acting. But for the Russian disaster at Tannenberg, the whole French fundamental conception might have prevailed, and after the Marne the Germans might have been compelled to go back to their own frontier, because of the Russian pressure in East Prussia and along the lower Vistula.

The second phase of the war came with the German attack upon Russia in May, 1915. At this time Germany definitely adopted the plan of crushing Russia, while holding France and Britain in the west. She was able to do this because, with all her successes, Russia had not quite succeeded in performing her part of the Franco-Russian plan; she had not been able to invade East Prussia and make good her hold there. But to understand the first months of the war, it is simply necessary to see the rival plans working out, to observe Germany endeavouring to crush France while holding back Russia, with Austrian aid; France seeking to avoid disaster and strike back at the favourable moment; Russia trying to take advantage of the despatch of German troops to the west and sweep through East Prussia to the Vistula, while defeating Austrian troops in Galicia and Volhynia.

Having been defeated at the Marne, Germany was able, by reason of her heavy artillery and machine guns, instruments that she had expected to win for her the decisive battle, to take a defensive position in France and hold it, but she never was able again to win any considerable ground on the offensive, even in her tremendous Verdun drive in 1916, and she was unable to prevent her western foes from ultimately passing to the offensive. All her conceptions for forty years had been of a swift,

tremendous thrust, a colossal battle, and a victory that should settle the fate of France for the period of the war, probably forever. When the decision at the Marne was made absolute in Flanders, the whole character of the war and the nature of the outcome were changed. That is the reason why, in the minds of military writers, the Battle of the Marne remains the most important incident in the first two years of the war.

Tannenberg was only less important than the Marne, since it brought about the ruin of the original Franco-Russian conception, gave Germany the necessary time to make good her hold in France and to make her final effort in Flanders. Russian pressure in the east ultimately became effective, precisely as French and Russian General Staffs had expected, but it became effective in November, instead of September, in Galicia, not in East Prussia. When it became effective Germany had to abandon her western campaign, turn her attention to the east, undertake a number of more or less limited efforts, and at last organize her great drive against Russia, which began in late April, 1915.

If Joffre had been defeated at the Marne the whole German plan would have succeeded precisely as Germany had calculated. If Hindenburg had been defeated at Tannenberg, the whole German plan would have collapsed as French and Russian strategy had expected. But Tannenberg was relatively a small affair, and Russia's losses, although large, were insignificant compared with her main strength. Hence she was able to keep on with Galicia and ultimately to force Germany to abandon the west. On the other hand, the whole German plan was defeated at the Marne because the bulk of German military strength was used there.

CHAPTER FIVE

BELGIAN DEFENCE AND FRENCH OFFENCE

I

LIÉGE

In the event of an attack coming from Germany, the main reliance of Belgian defence was the fortress of Liége, situated some twenty miles west of the German frontier, commanding the crossings of the Meuse River and the railroad coming from the Rhine at Cologne to Brussels and Antwerp, the great trunk line from Germany.

Liége was surrounded by twelve isolated forts, the work of the celebrated Brialmont. It had ranked in its day as one of the finest of European fortresses, but it had been allowed to fall into disrepair and no effort had been made, as in the case of the French fortresses of Verdun and Belfort, to strengthen its works as the improvement in heavy artillery became pronounced. These forts were isolated and they were neither connected by any field works nor had there been any care taken to keep their field of fire free by forbidding the construction of buildings.

The forts had permanent garrisons of trained artillerymen, but the city itself was without any sufficient garrison and it had been calculated that it would take 75,000 men to defend its wide circle. Still it was the general expectation of Europe that Liége, however insufficient as a permanent barrier to German advance, would serve as a sufficient obstacle to permit the arrival of French and British troops to the west of the town and their junction with the Belgian field army. This army, actually in process of reconstruction, had been organized and trained with the idea that it would take its position west of Liége, behind the Geete River, its right resting on Namur, its left upon the Diemer at Diest. Here it was expected that it would be able, thanks to the resistance of Liége, to hold a solid front and prevent the overflow of German masses into the plain east of Louvain until aid came.

Belgian mobilization was ordered on August 1st; it was completed by August 6th. Something more than one hundred thousand men, the field army of the nation, were then concentrated behind the Geete. The King took command, establishing his headquarters at Louvain.

Meantime, there had been very striking developments. On August 4th, twelve regiments of German cavalry had crossed the frontier from the direction of Aix-la-Chapelle; moved rapidly west to the Meuse, which they reached at Visé, just south of the Dutch frontier and north of Liége; forced the crossing of the river, driving in a weak Belgian force, which recoiled upon Liége; and thus gained the west bank of the Meuse.

On August 5th the Tenth German Army Corps under Emmich reached the front of the eastern forts of Liége, demanded permission to pass unopposed and, this permission being refused, undertook to take the town by assault, seeking to penetrate between the forts.

At this time the whole 3d Division of the Belgian field army, and two brigades of the 4th, occupied the ground between the forts and, supported by their fire, successfully repulsed the German attacks through the days of August 5th and 6th. On this latter day, however, the arrival of masses of German troops, which began to cross the river above and below, threatened to cut off the retreat of the field forces and General Leman, the commander of Liége, ordered these to retire upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. This retreat was successfully conducted.

On August 7th the German infantry penetrated between the forts, occupied the city and the citadel, but were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire until German and Austrian heavy guns were brought up, but under this attack they crumbled almost instantaneously. The last fort fell, accepting the Belgian official report, on August 16th, but the German reports place it much earlier. Actually, as an obstacle to German advance, Liége lost its importance by August 10th and the city itself was in German hands on the 7th.

As German mobilization and concentration were hardly completed before August 12th, and the great advance did not begin until several days later, it may be fairly said that Liége, despite the common belief

at the time, actually did not delay the Germans materially. It gave a great moral impulse to French and British peoples, it earned a place in history through the devotion of its defenders. It was, however, taken with no great loss, in spite of contemporary reports. But it was not taken by a *coup-de-main* as the Germans had hoped.

II. BELGIAN "BATTLES"

Meantime the Belgian field army, having completed its concentration, was standing behind the Geete between Diest and Namur, that is between the Meuse and the Diemer. Against it there now began to beat the first waves of German advance, the screen of cavalry, which preceded the advance of the infantry. On August 12th there was a very sharp skirmish at Haelen, in which German cavalry were handsomely repulsed. This "battle" filled the press of the world at the time, and, with the grotesque reports of the resistance at Liége, then current, gave a totally inaccurate impression of what was happening.

From August 12th to August 18th this skirmishing continued, the Belgian army keeping its position. Its expectation was that the French and British troops would arrive in time to make possible the defence of Belgium on the line of the Geete, or at the least on the lines of the Dyle, famous in the wars of Louis XIV, one flank resting on Antwerp, the centre covering Brussels, and the line continued through Namur and prolonged by French troops behind the Meuse to the forts of Givet in France. On August 15th the first German attack upon the line of the Meuse south of Namur at Dinant had been repulsed by French troops, which had just entered the town.

On the morning of August 18th, however, the King of the Belgians at last realized that the French and British would not arrive in time. At that moment he was faced by six German corps—three advancing from the Meuse, having crossed north of Liége; three from the south, which had forced the passage of the river at Huy. These were the advance corps of the armies of Kluck and Bülow respectively. Behind them five more corps were known to be advancing. To face more than 500,000 Germans (eleven corps), the Belgians had about 100,000, the

value of two big corps. At this moment the British were just detraining near Maubeuge, and the French army, which was to act with the Belgians, was just south of Philippeville, on the edge of French territory.

It was useless to wait longer. Belgian resistance had been prolonged to the last moment and, unless the army was now to be uselessly sacrificed, a retreat was inevitable. Accordingly, on the morning of August 18th, King Albert ordered a retirement upon the fortified camp of Antwerp, which had been constructed with the idea of serving as a place of asylum for the entire field army of Belgium in just such an emergency as had now arrived. The retreat was made good on August 19th, and on August 20th, the entire army, less a division detached to Namur, was inside the Antwerp defences.

Meantime, the German army, now beginning to display that mobility which was due to an enormous train of motor transport, moved rapidly forward, occupied Louvain on August 19th, entered Brussels on August 20th, and then, turning half left, started for France. This was the army of Kluck. On the same day that Louvain was occupied the advance guards of Bülow appeared before Namur, which was defended by a weak division of Belgians, who, four days later, were to receive as a reinforcement two battalions of French troops. These arrived just in time to retire, thus doing precisely what Winston Churchill's British detachments were to do in the case of Antwerp, less than two months later.

Namur, like Antwerp and Liége, was defended by a circle of detached forts, which were, however, in much worse condition than those of either of the other fortress towns. Against these forts the Germans now brought up the heavy artillery which had demolished the forts of Liége. The bombardment began on August 21st, the day after Brussels fell; by the next day most of the forts were in ruins. The following day the situation was hopeless and almost all the forts had been silenced. Accordingly the garrison, some 12,000 Belgians, together with the French who had come so tardily, slipped out, just avoiding envelopment, and retreated south. August 23d, then, saw the occupation of Namur, which had been the corner-stone of the whole Anglo-French strategy

in the Belgian campaign. Two days later the last fort fell, but by this time the war had gone south into France.

The fall of Liége was far more prompt than Allied commanders had expected, but it did not gravely injure their plans. It did prevent a junction between the Anglo-French and the Belgian armies, if such a junction was ever contemplated. But this is not certain, for there were grave dangers apparent in any campaign in eastern Belgium. The collapse of Namur, under two days' bombardment on the other hand, was not only unexpected, but turned out to be a real disaster, which was the prelude to many that were now to follow.

III. THE MORAL VALUE

Such, briefly, is the story of the Belgian campaign, which lasted from August 4th to August 18th, the date when the Belgian army retired from the pathway of German advance. Belgian resistance continued at Namur for five more days. Actually the Belgian army was only able to hold back the cavalry screen of German advance for the days before the infantry had concentrated and began its great drive. When this began, the Belgian army had no choice but to get out of the way.

There were no engagements of any size during the whole period; there was no battle, and the forts of Liége and Namur fell as the Germans had calculated they would fall. In so far as they had reckoned on Belgian submission the Germans had been disappointed, but otherwise their plans had worked exactly as they expected them to work; they had brushed the Belgian army out of the way in a minimum of time and with inconsiderable losses. Having now contained the Belgian field army in Antwerp, they turned south for the drive at Paris, August 20th, the date of the occupation of Brussels, marking the turn of Kluck.

The surprises of this brief Belgian campaign were supplied by the efficacy of German heavy artillery and the number of troops the Germans had been able to mobilize and send through Belgium. Miscalculation on the first point had wrecked any Allied plan to join the Belgian field army on the Geete or the Dyle. Miscalculation as to the

BELGIUM "THE COCKPIT OF EUROPE" IN PICTURES



ALBERT OF BELGIUM (BORN 1875, ACCEDED TO THRONE, 1909

The fighting king of "the Cockpit of Europe" is so old-fashioned that he led his army in person and asked no better fate than to share the hardships and dangers of his soldiers. His democratic attitude toward his soldiers he himself has attributed in part to his observation of the late James J. Hill's attitude toward his railroad employees—for King Albert, before his accession to the throne, paid a long visit to the United States, spending a large part of the time studying American railroading as Mr. Hill's guest.



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BELGIAN CAVALRY



Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE SHOT FROM A GERMAN 42-CENTIMETRE GUN PUT THIS BELGIAN FORT OUT OF COMMISSION

Students of German strategy assert that the Germans long ago decided to strike quickly at France through Belgium when "The Day" should come. The French frontier was strongly fortified. Switzerland was a difficult country and strongly defended. There remained—Belgium, dangerously peaceful and prosperous, like the United States. Her little army and her forts were easily reducible by the terrible German guns.



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BELGIAN BATTERY ON THE MARCH



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WAR ENTHUSIASTS IN BRUSSELS

Shouting, flag-waving crowds in the cities of Belgium enthusiastically voiced their approval of the Government's decision to resist the violation of Belgian territory. And the little Belgian army, in full realization that the day of fairy-tales was past, set itself to play the rôle of Jack, against the German Giant.



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BELGIAN SOLDIERS AT REST DURING A LULL IN THE FIGHTING

Germans under Emmich arrived before Liége on August 5, 1914. For two days of almost incessant fighting General Lehman with the third Division of the Belgian army maintained his defence of the city. Then fresh masses of German troops arrived and to save his exhausted soldiers Lehman retired upon the main Belgian army concentrated behind the Geete. The Germans occupied the city on the 7th, but the nearby forts held out against them for several days.



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A typical Belgian soldier



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General Lehman, defender of Liége



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Awaiting the Uhlans








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THE INVASION OF BELGIUM, EPITOMIZED IN PICTURES

The German hordes invaded the land which was open, flat, sea-girt, seeming to invite the invader.

The little Belgian army stood its ground as long as possible, resisting to the limit of its strength.

But it was all of no avail and the Germans marched into Brussels, the capital city, on August 20th, seventeen s after crossing the border.



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RUINED TOWN HALL AT YPRES

About the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres for more than a month raged one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of the war; fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.



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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

I. General Von Bissing, military governor of Belgium, is here shown in consultation with his staff. He is the man with the heavy moustache who stands with the knuckles of both hands resting on the map, upon which the attention of all is concentrated. (He died at his post in Belgium in March, 1917).



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BELGIUM UNDER GERMAN RULE

II. Even the civil governors of Belgium, here shown, have a decidedly military appearance. Nearly all are in uniform, booted and spurred. His Excellency Von Sandt, head of the Commission, is at the end of the table leaning slightly forward, with eyes cast down.

second factor was shortly to lead to heavy defeats at Mons and Charleroi. Nor were German numbers in Belgium to be measured solely by the ten corps of Bülow and Kluck (an eleventh was detached to watch the Belgians in Antwerp). Still a third army, composed of three Saxon corps under Hausen, coming west through the Ardennes and aiming at the Meuse crossings south of Namur, notably at Dinant, was to surprise the Allies completely and further contribute to the destruction of all their plans. By August 21st hardly less than 700,000 German troops had crossed Belgium and were approaching the French frontier. In addition there were the army of the Grand Duke of Würtemberg, five corps strong, which was in the Belgian Ardennes north of Sedan, and the army of the Crown Prince, also containing five corps that had passed through Luxemburg and was just breaking into France about Longwy. Twenty-three corps were then employed by the Germans—aside from two cavalry corps, a corps left in Belgium, and twenty-one were to come on the battlefield of the Marne. Eight additional corps were presently identified in Alsace-Lorraine.

Even the briefest military summary of the Belgian episode cannot, however, completely ignore the moral value. The Belgians had failed, as did the Spartans at Thermopylæ. A dwarf had met a giant, and, as invariably happens outside of fairy tales, the dwarf had been beaten. Yet the decision of Belgium to resist, transformed the character of the whole war in the minds of the nations which were now fighting Germany; it contributed materially to influencing Italian sentiment; it gave form and colour to the world conflict, and it had an influence which cannot be measured either by the paltry numbers or the insignificant skirmishes, the very names of which were forgotten in a few days by a world that was to see a Battle of the Marne within a fortnight after Namur fell.

Had Belgium failed to resist German invasion, the whole significance of the German decision to disregard the Treaty of 1839 would have been lost. As it was, Belgium became in a very real sense the issue of the war, and popular sympathy in neutral countries all over the world was lost to Germany at the outset of the conflict. This would have been of

minor consequence had Germany been able to win that decisive victory which alone could justify the invasion of Belgium even in her own eyes. But when the decision of the Marne turned against her and the war became not a short and swift triumph but a long and terrible agony, the Belgian incident was a heavy and a permanent handicap.

No one who was alive in the August days, when Belgian resistance began, and dwelt outside of German or Austrian frontiers, will ever forget the instant and enduring impression that Belgian heroism created, and nowhere more than in America was the Belgian incident destructive of German hopes of sympathy and even of more practical assistance in her tremendous struggle. But for Belgium it is not difficult to believe that American neutrality would have taken a very different character, and it is far from improbable that the Allies would have failed to find in America that source of munitions which was to contribute so much to save them from disaster in the first two years of the war.

IV. FRENCH BEGINNINGS—MÜHLHAUSEN

Of a necessity, French mobilization was based upon the assumption that Germany would attack from Alsace-Lorraine. Modifications to follow the disclosure of a purpose to use Belgium had long been prepared. But it was not only a question whether the Germans would pass through Belgium at all; there was also the question as to whether they would make the main or even a considerable attack from this direction. There could be no way of knowing about this in advance. Accordingly the French had always assigned five army corps to act between the Meuse and the Sambre and relied upon the British expeditionary army to supply the balance needed to hold the line in this region should the Germans come this way. Presumably they also relied upon the Belgian army.

French mobilization proceeded with extreme regularity. The great masses of men were equipped and concentrated within the time set. There was nothing of the disorder and confusion of 1870, although a lack of guns and of equipment was presently signalled, when it came to reserves. The French mobilization was slower than the German, of which

it fell far short in the numbers it prepared for the first shock, but it was an eminently successful operation.

Meantime, while mobilization was proceeding, the French undertook their first thrust. A large garrison had been maintained in peace times in the fortress of Belfort, commanding the gap between the Vosges and Switzerland. This garrison, reinforced by the first troops mobilized, stepped out and over the frontier on August 7th, the day the Germans penetrated Liége. The next day it had reached Altkirch and defeated a German force. On August 9th it entered Mühlhausen, next to Strassburg the largest city of Alsace-Lorraine. This success thrilled France and was accepted as proof of the approaching deliverance of the "Lost Provinces."

But on the night of August 9th a surprise attack by the Germans turned the French out of Mühlhausen, which was retaken after desperate street fighting. In this first operation French commanders began to display faults which were to prove expensive a little later. New forces had now to be sent to Alsace; General Pau took command, succeeding the general that had failed. By August 19th the French were back in Mühlhausen, while other detachments were overflowing from all the Vosges crests and approaching the Rhine. Unhappily for the French this campaign was to come to a sudden end, because of the first real disaster not far away.

V. MORHANGE—THE FIRST DISASTER

In all the military discussion which preceded the present war it was fully recognized that the first great clash between the French and German troops, in the next struggle, would come east of Nancy and along the frontier which had been created by the Treaty of Frankfort. No forts, on either side of the line, barred this natural gateway between the valleys of the Rhine and the Moselle. Nancy itself was but eleven miles from the frontier. North of this gateway the forts of Metz and Thionville in Germany, the Verdun-Toul barrier in France, closed the way; south, the Vosges and the forts of Épinal forbade any general operation, as far as the Belfort gap. But here in a fairly open country it was

believed that the first, and perhaps the decisive, battle of the war would be fought.

French mobilization and concentration were here completed behind the Moselle and the Meurthe, while the covering troops occupied their regular post upon the considerable mass of hills, known as the Grand-Couronne of Nancy, just across the Meurthe, and extending north almost to Pont-à-Mousson. Despite a few early skirmishes at the frontier, the Germans seem to have made no especial effort even to disturb the French concentration.

But about August 12th there came the first official announcement of French operations. These seemed to push steadily forward; by August 13th there was a French success across the German frontier. In the week that followed, the movement swelled into something approaching a real invasion. By August 19th, the day Mühlhausen was reoccupied, the French had passed the line of the Metz-Strassburg railroad and were in Saarburg, Dieuze, and Delme, fifteen or twenty miles from the frontier. This was the high-water mark.

On August 20th the French army at last came in contact with the main German force, the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria, while a second German army, that of Heeringen, was signalled west of Strassburg and north of the Donon Mountain. These two armies faced respectively the armies of Castelnau and Dubail. They seem to have waited for the French attack upon positions carefully selected and prepared.

The battle which followed, named Morhange by the French and Metz by the Germans, is noteworthy, apart from its local value, as revealing the type of engagement in all the first days of the war. The French, advancing to attack, displaying much impetuosity and some lack of discipline, came suddenly under the fire of the heavy German artillery—field artillery, not the sort of gun that had already levelled the forts of Liége.

This heavy artillery outranged the French field gun, the famous "75," and, unsupported by any artillery, the French infantry were beaten upon by a storm of shells, fired from a distance and by an unseen

foe. They were also held up by barbwire entanglements and trenches. After a brief engagement a French corps—the Fifteenth, of Marseilles—broke and fled. Its rout compromised the whole army although the Twentieth Corps—the famous Iron Corps, commanded by Foch, who here won his first laurels—now, and in the subsequent retreat, performed miracles. At the same time the Germans passed to the attack. The end of the invasion of Lorraine had come.

In the next days the French retirement was rapid; some thousands of prisoners, some guns, and several flags were left in the German possession. By August 23d the Germans were well within French territory, they had occupied Lunéville, pressed beyond to Gerbéviller, were at the edge of the Grand-Couronne, hardly eight miles from Nancy. They had now got about as far into French territory as the French had been in German territory at the Battle of Morhange. But this was another high-water mark.

With great rapidity the French troops, which had retaken Mühlhausen, were drawn out of Alsace and brought back to the Nancy front. They were put into action, while many French batteries were massed on the Saffais plateau, a few miles south of Nancy. The German advance was halted, and the French, passing to the offensive, pushed the Germans back materially.

Thus the German victory of Morhange was without real consequence. It was a severe defeat for the French and wrecked their offensive. But the defeated troops were able to rally and save Nancy. In the opening days of September and during the time of the Battle of the Marne a new German attack on this front was beaten down, and the French, although weakened by the transfer of several corps to the Marne, were still able first to repulse a new and heavier attack and later to take the offensive and push the Germans back to the frontier. There a deadlock ensued which endured right through the next two years. But after September, 1914, the Nancy front became inactive.

Morhange was the first considerable Franco-German battle since the War of 1870. It was a real defeat for the French and, taken with the defeats that followed, it unpleasantly suggested Wörth and the earlier

débâcle. But the French rally showed, as German official reports later conceded, that French armies were not like those of forty-four years before.


VI. NEUFCHÂTEAU AND CHARLEROI

At the moment when the Battle of Morhange was opening, two more French armies, north of Verdun, on a front from Luxemburg to the point where the Meuse quits France, were also taking the offensive. These were the armies of Ruffey, north of Verdun, and of De Langle de Cary, north of Sedan. A day after the defeat of Morhange these armies were heavily beaten in the same fashion. In the difficult region of the Ardennes they came suddenly in contact with armies of the German Crown Prince near Virton, south of Arlon and of the Duke of Würtemberg north of Neufchâteau. Once more the German heavy artillery triumphed, and the French, caught before barbwire entanglements, deprived of all artillery support, were repulsed in disorder, lost flags and guns, and surrendered the offensive.

Having won the encounter, the German troops now pressed forward. The French retired, first behind the Othain and the Semois and then behind the Meuse. Their retreat was more orderly than that of their fellows at Morhange. Behind the Semois and the Othain they were able to inflict heavy losses on the Germans and subsequently made good their position behind the Meuse, as Castelnau's troops had made good theirs before Nancy. Henceforth the retirements of these two armies—Ruffey's which passed to the command of Sarrail shortly, and De Langle de Cary's—were never seriously shaken. They shared in the general retreat because they were compelled to keep their alignment with the other armies. But as late as August 28th they inflicted heavy losses on the Germans, who were attempting to cross the Meuse all the way from Sedan to Dun.

These two opening engagements were French defeats and they contributed to raising German hopes and expectations, but the really decisive action was elsewhere. It was in the triangle between the Meuse and the Sambre and westward about Mons that the real blow was now

about to fall. Against this triangle, in which four French regular corps and some divisions of reserves and African troops were standing, their left prolonged by the British army, thirteen German corps, the armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen, were now striking, having already disposed of the Belgian field army.



THE FIRST BATTLES, AUGUST 15TH-23D, 1914

A–Belgians B–British C–Lanzerac D–De Langle de Cary E–Ruffey F–Castelnau G–Dubail H–Pau

On August 22d, two days after Morhange and one day after Neufchâteau, the French army commanded by Lanzerac, holding the crossings of the Sambre about Charleroi, was suddenly attacked by Bülow. A terrific battle followed. There was street fighting of the most desperate character, ground was taken and lost, the losses on both sides were

very heavy, and by night the French had been pushed back across the Sambre and the Germans held the river crossings. Lanzerac had lost the day but he was still capable of renewing the conflict. Unhappily at this time he learned that Namur was about to fall and that the army of Hausen, three corps strong and hitherto unsuspected, had forced the crossing of the Meuse at Dinant and was advancing across his rear, seeking to cut his line of retreat to France.

A retreat was inevitable and the French drew back rapidly until their flanks rested upon the forts at Givet and Maubeuge. By the next day all danger of envelopment was over, but the superior numbers of the enemy necessitated further retreat. The following day the misfortunes that had overtaken the British involved the Lanzerac army, soon to pass to the command of Franchet d'Esperey, and it was unable to stand again until it had reached the Oise. There, on August 30th, it inflicted a heavy check upon the Prussian Guard at Guise. But by this time its retreat, due to the British situation, had involved the armies of De Langle and Ruffey, which were compelled to leave the Meuse and retire south.

By August 23d, then, four French armies had been defeated on Belgian or German soil and driven back into French territory. Two had suffered something like routs at Morhange and at Neufchâteau; a third had lost a considerable battle at Charleroi but had left the field in order; all would soon be restored to fighting shape. The time had promptly passed when there was a chance that the first German victories would have decisive results. Already a new French army, under Foch, was ready to enter the line at the north between De Langle and Lanzerac.

To understand what followed, it is of prime importance to recognize that all the French armies were by August 30th in shape to attack again, and from the Oise to the Meuse north of Verdun the French line was intact. Only by grasping this fact is it possible to understand how the French, after another week of retreat, were able suddenly to pass to the offensive and win the decisive Battle of the Marne

VII. BRITISH DISASTER

In his original conception, it seems clear that Joffre had intended to hold the army of Lanzerac and the British at the French frontier facing Belgium until the magnitude of the German blow through Belgium could be measured. During this time he relied upon his armies to the east, and particularly the army operating from Nancy into Lorraine, to deal heavy blows that might compel the Germans to draw back troops from Belgium to reinforce their armies in Alsace and Lorraine. In this plan the British and Lanzerac's armies would have stood from the Scheldt to the Meuse resting upon Valenciennes, Maubeuge, and Givet.

Yielding to the appeals of the Belgians, and apparently to the urgings of French politicians, however, Joffre changed his plan and sent Lanzerac and the British northward to Charleroi and Mons just before the defeat of his Lorraine army ended all chance of lessening the force of the German blow coming from Belgium. This change in plan led to the subsequent disasters, for it threw two small armies, still imperfectly concentrated and amounting to barely seven corps, against the mass of Germans, thirteen corps strong. We are bound to conclude, too, that Joffre had no conception as to the numbers the Germans would send through Belgium or as to the rapidity of their movement, thanks to motor transport.

These miscalculations, together with an error not yet explained, were now to bring the British to the edge of ruin. On Sunday, August 23d, the British army, two corps strong, perhaps 80,000 men, took their positions behind a canal, extending their front from the Scheldt at Condé to a point of junction with Lanzerac north of the Sambre near Binche. Mons was the centre of their position. Here they were attacked, before they had time to entrench, by masses of German troops whose approach seems to have been almost totally unexpected.

The battle which followed was severe, but never reached a decisive point. At some places the British retired to straighten their line, and German heavy artillery caused material but not excessive losses. All the afternoon the British held on; there was nothing to suggest that they were facing a foe overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and not the

smallest hint that they were threatened with envelopment on their left flank. At this moment the British army was at the extreme west or left of the whole Allied front, extending from Switzerland right up to Condé. West of Condé to Lille the British believed their flank was covered by French reserves.

But about five o'clock in the afternoon Field-Marshal French suddenly received a despatch from Joffre informing him that Namur had fallen, that the Lanzerac army had been in full retreat for many hours, and that there were in front of the British not two corps, as they had thought, but four, while a fifth was now swinging round their left flank, which they had believed was covered by French reserves, and was striking for their rear.

Why the message came so late, what had become of the French reserves toward Lille, why the British had not been informed earlier of the retreat of Lanzerac, why their own observation corps had failed to discover the size of the German army, these are questions that must wait until the end of the war for answer. But with this despatch the veil is lifted from German purpose. It was now plain that Kluck, who had been at Brussels on August 20th, had swung west and south; that with 300,000 troops he was now rushing forward in a desperate effort to get around the end of the whole Allied line, interpose between it and Paris, and produce a Sedan, tenfold magnified.

In his front, now, he had less than 80,000 British troops. His fifth corps—four were facing the British—had passed through Tournai and was moving toward Cambrai, while a vast horde of German cavalry were driving through northwestern France spreading panic and disorder and reaching for the British line of communications with the Channel. August 23d, the day after Charleroi, two days after Neufchâteau and three days after Morhange, is the day the campaign entered its decisive stage.

On this day we see very clearly that unless the British army can get away, unless its retreat can be effected and its left flank covered, Kluck will interpose between Paris and all the Allied armies. And Kluck is to play the decisive part in the German plan. Not until two weeks later, when he comes to grief in the opening phase of the Battle of the Marne,

is he to lose the advantage gained through his appearance in an overwhelmingly superior force on the extreme flank of the Allied armies.

VIII. THE GREAT RETREAT

In the presence of an impending calamity, Field-Marshal French displayed that slowness of action which so long marred British operations in the war. Not for many hours did he actually begin his retreat; hours that were precious were lost; and lost, nearly brought ruin. By seven o'clock the next night, however, his army was back in France with its right resting on the forts of Maubeuge and the centre at Bavay. At this point French recognized the peril that confronted him. It was plain that the Germans were endeavouring to drive him in on Maubeuge, as Bazaine had been driven in on Metz in 1870. This would mean the ultimate capture of his army and would uncover the flank of all the French armies to the east. Accordingly, despite the weariness of his troops, French ordered the retreat to be continued through the night.

Now begins that period of terrible suffering for the British army, which tried the temper of the veterans, resulted in the loss of many prisoners and some guns but in the escape of the army. On the night of August 25th the two corps were widely separated: one was south of Cambrai to the west, and the other at Landrecies to the east. Here the First Corps, about Landrecies, was beaten upon by a terrific night attack, which it managed to repulse. But the troops were becoming totally exhausted. August 26th was "the most critical day of all." The burden was borne by the Second Corps, Smith-Dorrien's, reinforced now by a fresh division just arrived. Ordered to resume the retreat at daybreak, Smith-Dorrien found it impossible and was compelled to fight until three o'clock in the afternoon before he could break off the engagement, which was fought about the town of Le Cateau but better known as the Battle of Cambrai. On this day an appeal for help made to Sordet, of the French cavalry, could not be answered, and the Second Corps stood alone, for the First Corps was still too far away to render any assistance.

But late in the afternoon the Germans, on their side, began to show

weariness. Smith-Dorrien was able to get his troops on the road. All through the night and through the next day and night the retreat continued, but the crisis was passed. August 28th, the British were back at the Oise from Noyon to La Fère and a new French army had come up on their left, the Army of Maunoury, sent by Joffre after he had measured the extent of the German thrust through Belgium. Five days of fighting and marching, day and night, separated Mons from the British arrival at the Oise, but the army that reached the Oise was no longer in shape for the battle that Joffre was planning. It was not, in fact, to regain its confidence or its cohesion until after the Battle of the Marne. Nor was it able, in that struggle, to perform the allotted task. Yet it is difficult to believe that any, save a veteran army of professional soldiers, could have endured these five terrible days and lived.

In this whole period it was the pluck and the endurance of the individual soldiers that saved the day. Just detrained, these men had suddenly been flung into a battle, their own corner of which was bigger than Waterloo, and their immediate enemy's numbers surpassed, three times over, those Napoleon brought on to his last battlefield.

While they were still holding their ground at Mons, the British were forced to retreat because the defeat of the French army at Charleroi had left the British to the west "in air." Magnificently supported by the French army of Lanzerac on their right at Guise, they were not supported by French cavalry on their immediate left until the critical day of Cambrai-Le Cateau had passed.

At the time, British public opinion, misled by grotesque reports published in British newspapers and fired by the enthusiasm of having a fighting army on the Continent for the first time in sixty years—for the first time in a century one might say, for the Crimea hardly counted in popular imagination—fired by the undoubted rapidity and efficiency of British mobilization and transport, gave the British army in the retreat and at the Marne a rôle which it did not play. Not only was the Marne a French battle, but the greatest blow struck at the Germans in the retreat was struck at Guise and not at Le Cateau, and by the French and not the British. In point of fact the real glory of the British

army in the opening months was earned at Ypres, where it died, as few armies ever have died. But no praise can be too high for the manner in which the private soldiers met a great and utterly unforeseen crisis.

It is essential to point, here, the difference between the situation of the British army on August 28th and that of the French armies at its right and left. All these latter were not only intact but in a condition to take the offensive. Two fresh armies, those of Foch and Maunoury, had come up in the centre and at the left. Joffre had now been able to correct the errors of his early concentration and to meet the unforeseen German concentration. But the necessarily precipitate retreat of the British had opened a gap in his line. This and the condition of the British army now combined to compel him to take the great decision, which led directly to the Battle of the Marne.

IX. JOFFRE'S LAST PLAN

In all his disappointments Joffre had never surrendered the idea of taking the offensive at the right moment. He never conceived the opening reverses as anything but incidental, while German High Command wrongly interpreted them as evidences of complete collapse. Having been beaten at all points in his first attack, Joffre was prepared to fight again at the frontier. This became impossible when the size of Kluck's army was disclosed. By August 30th Joffre was again ready to attack along the lines of the Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne. He did attack at Guise and north of Rethel, winning a pretty little success at the former place.

But at this point he had to face the question of risking the decisive battle, with the British exhausted and in retreat far south of the Somme. He chose still to retreat, calling back his victorious troops from Guise; but the decision was not due to the early defeats the French had suffered, it was due to the collapse of the British, incident to the unforeseen strength of the armies that the Germans had sent through Belgium, the failure of French reserves to cover their flank, and the undreamed-of rapidity with which Kluck, thanks to motor transport, had pushed his advance south from Mons to the Somme.

On August 30th Joffre knew that Russian armies were in East Prussia and Galicia; he could calculate that Russian success inside of German territory would promptly compel the Germans to draw back troops from his front. This calculation was to be wrecked on the next day, when the Germans began the conflict at Tannenberg which was to destroy Russian pressure in Prussia. Believing that Russia would be able to fulfil her part, Joffre could afford to wait, even if waiting necessitated further retreat. But by August 30th all his armies were restored to fighting condition, had indeed been reorganized and strengthened, while Sarrail and D'Esperey had replaced Ruffey and Lanzerac.

Between August 20th, the date of Morhange, and August 30th, Joffre had, then, rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use. On the latter date he still found the opportunity lacking, hence he ordered a new retreat, but with fixed limits and with the clear purpose to attack again with only a brief delay. He had now escaped any great disaster, he knew his foe's plans, and he had the resources to prepare his own answer.

By September 1st the whole French line from Verdun to the Somme is in retreat, Maunoury's army is to come back on the entrenched line of Paris, Sarrail's is to swing in until one flank rests on Verdun, the other on the Ornain west of Bar-le-Duc, the remaining armies are to draw back south of the Marne, with the Seine as their southernmost limit of retreat. Meantime more troops are to be brought west from the Lorraine front. When this new concentration is complete, the French will have overcome all the handicaps imposed upon them by the size of German armies sent through Belgium and will have survived the initial defeats with only incidental losses. The morale of the French armies will not be impaired, their ammunition will be renewed, and the Germans will now begin to show the strain of their long, forced marches and begin to outrun both their ammunition and their heavy guns.

To understand the French strategy it is essential to remember that the French Commander-in-Chief necessarily kept in mind the events of 1870. Then the first battles had resulted in heavy defeats for the French armies. But following them these armies had been separated, Bazaine

had been shut up in Metz, and MacMahon, driven by political pressure, had led his army to the disaster of Sedan. In 1914 the initial defeats had come, all the offensive plans had been wrecked, but the central idea of preserving the cohesion of all the armies and preventing isolation or envelopment had been rigidly adhered to from the outset.



THE SITUATION OF THE FRENCH AND GERMAN ARMIES ON AUGUST 30, 1914
Between August 20th, the date of Morhange, and August 30th, Joffre had rearranged his armies, restored their cohesion, prepared the instrument he was to use

On the battlefield, French commanders showed themselves gravely inferior to German in the opening engagements, but French High Command was never shaken by the first reverses, never provoked into premature offensives, never permitted political pressure to drive it to risk a decisive engagement under unfavourable conditions. And by September

1st the advantage passed sharply to the French side; it was the German strategy that now began to break down. If the French Commander was totally deceived as to the magnitude of the German thrust through Belgium and as to the efficacy of German heavy artillery, the German General Staff was utterly misled as to the condition of French armies after the first battles and soon permitted itself to be led into a fatally defective position and thus lost the decisive battle for which it had been planning for over forty years.

CHAPTER SIX

THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

I

SEPTEMBER 5

On September 5, 1914, at noon, a French battery of "75's" leaving the village of Iverny, something less than twenty miles due east of Paris and less than five from Meaux, suddenly came under the fire of a German battery on the Monthyon-Penchard hills, a little to the east. The captain was killed and the battery made a hasty retreat. These were the first shots fired in the Battle of the Marne. The next four days saw the greatest battle of modern history, fought by far more than two million men over a front of not less than one hundred and fifty miles—from the environs of Paris to the forts of Verdun.

In this battle, a German army, which had moved from victory to victory, whose marching flank had passed from Liége through Brussels almost to the gates of Paris, was turned back, compelled to retreat, on one flank not less than seventy miles, leaving behind it guns, flags, and prisoners. More than this, the decisive battle, for which German military men had been preparing for forty years, was lost; the promise of a swift, short, and irresistible blow, which the violation of Belgian neutrality held out, was vitiated; the offensive was lost, and a beaten army was compelled to dig itself into trenches from which it would be able to make no considerable advance during the next two years of the war.

This is what the French call the "Miracle of the Marne." While it was going forward, no detailed accounts were possible. After it was completed, the great events that followed robbed it of public interest. I shall endeavour to set forth briefly the story of the decisive phases of this battle as it was told to me on the battlefields by French officers, a year and a half later, or as it is disclosed in the writings of French military critics unhappily little translated as yet.

To understand the course of this gigantic struggle it is necessary first to dismiss the familiar legend that the French armies, which won the battle—the British contribution was insignificant—were ever routed. The battle was not the sudden rally of thousands and hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who had been for days fleeing before a victorious enemy. It was the result of a clear, cool, and deliberate plan, and it was in obedience to this plan that the several French armies, together with the small British force which fought at the Marne, had been drawn back from the frontier to the field of the conflict.

The sole purpose of French strategy in the opening days of the war had been to keep these armies intact until the direction and nature of the main German thrust were disclosed. Incident to this plan, and not for political or sentimental reasons, as was asserted at the time, Joffre had undertaken several minor offensives, in Alsace, in Lorraine, and in Belgian Luxemburg. These had resulted in the defeats of Morhange, Neufchâteau, and the useless victory, after initial defeat, about Mühlhausen.


All the armies engaged in these battles had retired to their earlier positions and made good their lines, repulsing all attacks. But the French army sent north toward Belgium, together with the British expeditionary force, had been beaten upon by an unexpectedly large German mass coming in three armies through Belgium. The French army had suffered defeat at Charleroi and had retreated in good order; the British army had almost found destruction, because upon it the full force of the German blow had fallen.

All this was clear to Joffre in the first days of the last week of August. The Germans, having the initiative, had elected to send a huge mass of troops through Belgium, and the troops were not discovered in full numbers until they had reached and passed the Franco-Belgian frontier.

But starting about August 25th, Joffre set himself to the task of matching his troops against the Germans, of reconcentrating his armies until he should have equal or superior numbers at the decisive point; he was never to have equal numbers at all points. While this reconcentration was going on he always foresaw a new French offensive.

About September 1st it looked as if the moment had arrived. He

had assembled two new armies, one in the centre and one on the left, on the flank of the British, thus abolishing the peril that Kluck's army had had for him after Mons. On the line of the Somme, the Oise, and the Aisne, from Amiens to Verdun, the French armies were ready, but unhappily the British army, having suffered disproportionately, had



THE GERMAN ADVANCE TO THE MARNE

I–Kluck
II–Bülow
III–Hausen
IV–Würtemberg
V–The Crown Prince
VI–The Bavarians
VII–Heeringen

retreated too far. Therefore, despite local advantage in several conflicts, notably at Guise, Joffre determined on a new retreat. When this was accomplished, his line would rest at either end on Paris and Verdun. His centre would curve south almost to the Seine. From this point he planned to attack the Germans.

This retreat, which began about September 1st and ended by September 4th, placed the Germans in a difficult dilemma. In retreating south of Paris, Joffre offered Kluck, on the German right, the chance to attack the city. It was a tempting bait, but Kluck wisely refused it. Such an operation would consume too much time and would require weakening the line elsewhere to get necessary numbers. But, having refused it, Kluck had no choice—since he was compelled to keep in touch with Bülow—but to turn southeastward and march straight across the face of the forts of Paris. His objective was the left wing of the French field armies; the purpose of the whole German host was, of course, to smash the field forces of France.

II. KLUCK TURNS SOUTHEAST


Kluck's turn southeast was safe only if there was but a small garrison in Paris. If there was an army, then, when his front had got south of Paris, his flank and rear would be open to attack from this direction and he would be in exactly the position that the British had been in at Mons and at Cambrai. And as the British were on the end of the whole Anglo-French line from the Vosges, west, and it was thus exposed, so the whole German line would now be exposed.

We now touch on the first of the two determining circumstances of the Battle of the Marne, which in French history are known as the Battle of the Ourcq and of La Fère-Champenoise, respectively. Kluck, in common with all German generals, seems to have been satisfied that the opening conflicts of the war had been decisive; he seems to have been sure that he had before him only beaten troops, and he had no suspicion of the fact that Joffre had concentrated before Paris a new and strong army, that of Maunoury, which was now prepared to strike on his flank as he had struck on the Anglo-French flank from Mons to the Oise.

It was in the evening of September 3d that General Gallieni, commanding the Paris camp, learned from his observers that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast from Senlis toward Meaux and the crossings of the Marne. He communicated

the fact to Joffre by telephone, and on the next day there was arranged the plan which precipitated the Battle of the Marne. The credit for this plan is still disputed by partisans of the two generals. It was on the day following (September 5th) that Joffre published his famous order announcing that the moment to attack had come, thanks to the blunders of the enemy; that failure would not be forgiven, and troops that could not advance must die on their positions.

Actually, it was planned that the Maunoury army, emerging from the intrenched camp of Paris and moving due east, should attack the small flank guards which Kluck had left facing Paris; drive them east across the Ourcq River, which runs from the north down into the Marne above Meaux; and, passing the Ourcq, cut across the rear both of Kluck's and Bülow's armies. The mass of Kluck's army was far south of the Marne, in front of the British and the Fifth French Army, under Franchet d'Esperey. A very good parallel for Maunoury's blow, as planned, is that delivered by "Stonewall" Jackson on Hooker's right at Chancellorsville.



KLUCK'S CIRCLE

About Sept. 1st, at Senlis, Kluck began to move eastward away from Paris. On Sept. 5th the van of his army was south of the Marne beyond Coulommiers. At that time his rear and flank guard just north of Meaux was attacked by Maunoury coming from Paris. Kluck then drew back the mass of his troops in a complete circle north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq. On Sept. 9th, following the reverse of Hausen, he began his retreat upon Soissons

To the British was assigned precisely the rôle that Napoleon assigned to Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Field-Marshal French's army was expected to engage and hold Kluck's army while Maunoury struck its flank and rear. Kluck had two corps south of the Marne facing the British, in addition to cavalry; the British had three corps facing the Kluck army, and on its right the line was prolonged by General Conneau's cavalry to the left of D'Esperey.

III. BRITISH FAILURE

In this particular mission the British failed exactly as did Grouchy, and the consequence of their failure was the escape of Kluck and the restriction of the extent of the Allied victory. The failure long remained unknown to the British public, which was early informed and generally believed that the British had won the Battle of the Marne and saved France. The fact was quite different. Not only were the British not actively engaged at the Marne, but had they been able to do that which had been hoped, if not expected of them, Kluck might have been destroyed and the Battle of the Marne might have been as immediately conclusive as Waterloo.

The story of the British failure is simply told. On September 4th Generals Gallieni and Maunoury went by automobile to Field-Marshal French's headquarters at Melun. They asked the British commander to change front and attack the two corps of Kluck's army facing him; this attack was requested for the following day, September 5th. At the same time Maunoury was to attack the flank and rear guards of Kluck along the Ourcq. Such an operation would crush Kluck in the closing blades of a scissors-like movement. Here was the major strategy of the Marne.

But Field-Marshal French declared that he could not get ready to attack in less than forty-eight hours. He did not get ready and as a result Kluck drew his two corps out of the front of the British, put them in against Maunoury, totally wrecking the whole strategic conception of the French High Command and coming within the narrowest margin of destroying the Maunoury army under the walls of Paris.



MARSHAL FOCH

This is the man whose tremendous thrust routed the Prussian Guard at the Battle of the Marne. Launched at exactly the right moment it went through the Guard "as a knife goes through cheese," routed the whole army of Hausen, and earned for Foch, Joffre's verbal decoration as "the first strategist in Europe." A few weeks later, through his generalship and the help of the flower of the British Army, Foch's troops won the terrible struggle that we call Ypres. There is a legend that this time he won commendation from Lord Roberts who, after studying his plans, is said to have remarked to officers of his staff, "You have a great general." His appointment as Generalissimo of the Allied forces marked the beginning of their final forward drive to victory.

All that was left in front of the British was a cavalry screen, but this sufficed to hold up the British advance. Field-Marshal French's army did not get across the Marne until September 9th, and the British left, whose aid was most desired, did not get across the river in time to help Maunoury at all.

Thus to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. On this point the British and French commentators of any authority are completely in agreement. Here is the end of the legend that the British saved anything at the Marne; the sole question must be whether what was lost by reason of their failure was unavoidably lost. Could French have moved more swiftly? Did he let the supreme opportunity of the war slip through his fingers? Unmistakably this is the view of the French military commentators and to this view British military criticism now points clearly.


Field-Marshal French's apologists insist that Maunoury struck too soon and that the responsibility for the failure was his and not the British commander's. But will such a defence hold? We know now that the decisive blow in the battle was struck by Foch on September 9th and at La Fère-Champenoise. We know that it was struck when his army was in a critical condition and that it succeeded only because Maunoury's attack, opened on September 5th, had just produced that dislocation in the German lines which opened the gap through which Foch penetrated.

We may say without hesitation, then, that Maunoury did not attack prematurely. He attacked at the moment fixed by Joffre, who was surveying the whole battlefield of which Field-Marshal French saw but one corner, and he attacked because Joffre perceived that the hour had come beyond which it was dangerous to wait. What happened on September 9th, prior to the moment Foch seized the chance to save himself and France, completely demonstrated the correctness of Joffre's view.

This would show that Maunoury's attack was not premature, but it would not prove that Field-Marshal French was tardy, or "over cautious" to use the severe words of one British commentator. But,

unfortunately for French, his whole record is against him. He delayed at Mons; he procrastinated in the retreat, notably at the moment of Guise, under conditions that had tragic consequences for one French commander; he was late in sending up supports at Neuve-Chapelle and Loos. All these delays were fatal to success at the moment, and the cumulative effect of them led to his retirement from the command of the British army in France.

On his own record, supported as it is by a wealth of testimony with




BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 5TH

A–Maunoury	D–Foch	I–Kluck	IV–Würtemberg
B–British	E–De Langle de Cary	II–Bülow	V–Crown Prince
C–Franchet d'Esperey	F–Sarrail	III–Hausen	

Note—The small black and white square above Meaux represents the Fourth Reserve Corps left by Kluck to cover his flank


respect to his actions during the Battle of the Marne—when he continued to appeal to the hard-pressed Maunoury to send him reinforcements, after he had permitted all of Kluck's army but a cavalry screen to escape from his front and attack Maunoury—it is difficult to escape the conviction that Field-Marshal French failed to rise to the greatest opportunity of the war, either because he did not perceive it or lacked the necessary energy and initiative.

At all events, as to the main fact there can be no doubt. The British



BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 8TH

Armies distinguished by same symbols as on previous map. The small square north of the British represents the cavalry corps



BATTLE OF THE MARNE, SEPT. 9TH

Armies distinguished as above. The arrow shows attack by Foch's Forty-second Division which won the Battle of La Fère-Champenoise

were never seriously engaged at the Battle of the Marne and did not make any material contribution to the French victory. Field-Marshal French failed as completely here as did Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Grouchy's failure cost his Emperor a throne; French's failure did not have anything like so grave consequences, but it did deprive France of the maximum of possible profit from a magnificently conceived stroke, and it almost infallibly saved the army of Kluck from destruction.

IV. THE BATTLE OF THE OURCQ

On September 5th Maunoury's army was on the move, one half advancing straight against Kluck's flank guard, the Fourth Reserve Corps, the other circling round from the north and aiming at the flank and rear of that corps. Maunoury had considerably less than 100,000 men at the outset; his army was doubled as the engagement proceeded, but it was made up of very heterogeneous elements, Algerian and Moroccan troops, reservists, and only a few first-line units. It had before it on September 5th not many more than 40,000 Germans.

The battlefield of the Ourcq is a broad, level plateau, stretching north from the Marne and ending on the east abruptly, where it falls down into the deep Ourcq Valley. To the eye it seems perfectly level, save for two wooded hills, a few miles east of Meaux, the hills of Monthyon and Penchard. It is cut by several brooks, contains a number of small villages, but is without walls, hedges, or anything that would offer great obstruction to troops, or artillery fire. Several large farm buildings, recalling the Château of Hougoumont at Waterloo, played a similar rôle in the battle.

In the afternoon of September 5th this army of Maunoury advanced and came in contact with the German troops on the hills of Monthyon and Penchard. These hills were taken in the evening hours. By the morning of September 6th the Germans were recoiling toward the very edge of the plateau, with the Ourcq Valley at their backs. A number of villages were taken by storm, notably Barcy and Étrépilly, and the French from the north were able to threaten a flanking movement

which promised to turn the Fourth Reserve Corps out of their position.

But now comes the change. Kluck seems to have appreciated the full extent of the peril incredibly swiftly. By September 6th he was drawing his troops from the front of the British. Actually he was able to withdraw first the Second (active) Corps and then the Fourth (active) Corps, leaving only cavalry under Marwitz to hold the British. With these troops he counter-attacked Maunoury, threw him back materially on September 8th, and on the next day bent the northern flank of the French army back until it stood at right angles to the rest of the line, and on this day seemed destined to drive Maunoury back into Paris. On the night of September 9-10, the Paris garrison stood to arms and Maunoury's troops waited anxiously for daybreak, still with orders to attack, but expecting to be attacked and destroyed. After three and a half days of fighting they were at the end of their strength.

When daylight came on September 10th the Germans were gone. For Kluck the retreat to the Aisne had begun, but it was not a retreat due to his own defeat. The first blow of the French had been parried; the failure of the British to retain even one corps of Kluck's army before them, their extreme slowness of movement, had permitted Kluck to reconcentrate his army, escape from the vicious position in which he stood when battle began, had enabled him to throw back Maunoury's army, insure his retreat, and to come within an ace of winning a decisive battle.

V. LA FÈRE-CHAMPENOISE

If it had failed in its chief purpose, still the effect of Maunoury's attack had been to dislocate not only Kluck's army, but that of Bülow to the east, the army which had won Charleroi and now faced the Fifth French Army along the Grand Morin, south of Montmirail and east to the marshes of St. Gond. This army drew back to keep its alignment with Kluck, heavily pursued and fighting many minor engagements right across the battlefields of the famous Napoleonic campaign of 1814. Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Champaubert woke from a century of

peace to new carnage. But the fight between D'Esperey and Bülow was not to the finish, because Bülow was steadily compelled to retire to keep his contact with Kluck. Hence this part of the whole Battle of the Marne is of relatively minor importance. Had Kluck attacked Paris, D'Esperey's army might have played another and decisive rôle, for Joffre had also prepared for this consequence.

To the east of D'Esperey was the army of Foch, which now played the decisive part. This army stood, at first, with its advance guards on the north side of the famous marshes of St. Gond, a strange swamp full of stagnant ponds and crossed by only a few highways. This was a considerable military obstacle. Behind it ran a line of hills, north of the town of Sézanne and dropping away to the southeast, looking down on La Fère-Champenoise from the Plateau of Euvy and losing themselves in the monotonous plain of the Camp de Mailly.

When Maunoury's attack compelled the immediate retreat of Kluck's troops south of the Marne and the ultimate retrogression of Bülow, the German High Command resolved to seek victory by a redoubled pressure upon Foch, who held the French centre. In a word, the Germans undertook to break the French line, the whole line from Paris to Verdun, and to break it at the exact centre, which was where Foch stood. Foch was heavily outnumbered, and although he began, on September 7th, a brave offensive, he was steadily driven south and suffered great losses. The fighting here was the most sanguinary of the whole engagement, and there are ten thousand graves in the little town of La Fère-Champenoise alone.

Nor was this the worst. Not only was Foch driven south, but his right or eastern flank was driven very far south, until his army, instead of facing north, faced nearly east, and a wide gap began to open in the whole French line between Foch and the French army of De Langle de Cary to the east.

September 9th is here, as at the Ourcq, the decisive day. On this day Franchet d'Esperey, having cleared Bülow from the banks of the Petit Morin and finding his Tenth Corps freed by Bülow's withdrawal to the northwest, toward Kluck, lends this corps to Foch, and it now begins to act on the western flank of the German centre.

This aid assures the safety of Foch's western flank and he now withdraws his 42d Division from this flank, transports it eastward to Linthes, and very late in the afternoon suddenly launches it in a terrific drive at the Prussian Guard between the marshes of St. Gond and La Fère-Champenoise.

At this point the German line has been thinned as a result first of the withdrawal of Bülow toward Kluck and secondly in consequence of the eagerness of the Germans to press their advantage to the south, where they were at the point of piercing the whole French line about Gourgançon. These two movements, going on at the same moment, stretch the lines of the Prussian Guard—which is charged with preserving the contact between Bülow's army on the west and Hausen's in the centre facing Foch—as an elastic is stretched by pulling both ends. The 42d Division goes through the Guard as a knife cuts through cheese, as the French afterward explained; it throws the Saxons in and about La Fère-Champenoise into disorder which becomes a rout, for Foch at the same moment launches a general attack.

This tremendous thrust earned for Foch Joffre's verbal decoration as "the first strategist in Europe." It routed the Prussian Guard, which lost most of its artillery; it crumpled up the flank of the two Saxon corps; it routed the entire army of Hausen, who was forthwith retired in disgrace. It resulted in the wild retreat of the whole Hausen army as well as that of the Prussian Guard. Here, and only here, was there anything approaching a great battlefield triumph. Bülow had retired with little or no disorder; Kluck had retrieved his earlier reverses, and, at the moment when Foch struck his blow, was winning the Battle of the Ourcq.

But the retirement of Kluck and Bülow and the disaster which had overtaken the German centre, under Hausen, together decided the fate of the battle. It was on the receipt of news of this disaster that Kluck started his rapid retreat to the Aisne; that Bülow at last gave over his effort to regain control of the north bank of the Marne, which he had too hastily abandoned; and from Paris to Vitry-le-François the German armies all took the homeward roads.

VI. DE LANGLE DE CARY AND SARRAIL

It remains very briefly to mention the incidents to the east. Here, behind the Ornain, the army of De Langle de Cary stood for three days rigidly on the defensive, beating off German attacks made by the army of Würtemberg on a front from Vitry-le-François to Revigny. More physical destruction was done here than anywhere along the battle-field, and the ruins of Sermaize supply evidence of the wanton fury of the Bavarians. But like the battles around Montmirail, these contests were without issue, because the decision at La Fère-Champenoise ultimately compelled the Bavarians to retire.

As for the army of Sarrail, standing from Revigny north to Souilly, where it touched the positions held by the garrison of Verdun, it resisted all attacks of the army of the Crown Prince, operating east of the Argonne, to penetrate its front and isolate Verdun. It had a bad moment when its rear was threatened along the Meuse at Forts Tryon and Liouville by a drive coming from Metz, but the garrisons of these forts held out until aid came, and the destruction of the bridges of the Meuse proved sufficient to bar the Germans.

For the armies of Kluck, Bülow, and Hausen the day of September 9th was decisive, and as early as September 6th the first two were in partial retreat. But both the Würtemberg army and that of the Crown Prince held on for several days more and retired in good order in the end, when the recoil of the armies to the west made their retreat necessary to keep the alignment. Of the five German armies only those of Kluck and Hausen actually put forth their whole strength, and of these only that of Hausen was decisively beaten. Of the French armies, only those of Maunoury and Foch were engaged to the limit, and Maunoury failed to accomplish his purpose because he did not get the help from the British that was expected.

Had the plan conceived by Joffre or Gallieni, or by both together, been realized, the Germans would have suffered a decisive defeat and would have been unable to remain in France. Had Hausen been able to break the French centre, even after Maunoury's attack and the

retreat of Kluck and Bülow, the Battle of the Marne would have ended in a decisive victory for the Germans and the French army would have been cut in two, one fragment driven in on Paris, the other on the barrier fortresses to the east.

There was a time when it was generally believed that the Battle of the Marne was won by the operations near Paris, and there is a legend of a victory won by the transport of troops through Paris in taxicabs. The troops were transported in taxis, but they arrived not in time to win the Battle of the Marne, but only in time to save the Battle of the Ourcq. Equally fallacious is the story of the British part in the battle. The British were never actively engaged in the battle at all; they never had anything but rearguards to deal with, and these rearguards held them up until the chance for a supreme success had totally disappeared.

It is open to question whether Foch would have been able to deal his decisive blow if Maunoury's thrust had not compelled the retirement of Bülow, by making Kluck draw his corps north of the Marne and west of the Ourcq, thus dislocating the whole German front. But it is not open to question that the blow of Foch was decisive. It was delivered by a beaten army almost at the last gasp, an army which had been recoiling under pressure for three days and had suffered losses that amounted to extermination in the case of some of its units. American army officers who visited the battlefield before the bodies had been removed will some day supply conclusive evidence of the bitterness of the conflict as measured by the carnage.

VII. THE CONSEQUENCES

No estimate of total losses, of prisoners, of booty, has ever been published. But it seems conservative to estimate that of the 2,250,000 men engaged between Verdun and Paris there were more than 300,000 killed or wounded. The French loss was not less than the German; it may have been more, for the French in many fields did the attacking. Certainly between the opening of the campaign and the end of the German retreat after the Marne the French losses exceeded the German

—the losses in killed and wounded—while the total of prisoners taken by the Germans in the various fortified positions, Maubeuge, Longwy, etc., were very much greater.

It is reasonably certain that the Germans outnumbered the French on the battlefield, but owing to faults of German concentration and deploying the French certainly got much more out of their inferior numbers, while the Germans seem to have handled their masses badly and to have suffered from an excess of numbers at certain unimportant points.

The consequences of the battle were wholly misunderstood at first by both the French and the Germans. The French believed that they had won a victory which would turn the Germans out of France. The Germans believed that they had merely suffered a minor reverse and that after a new concentration they would be able to take the offensive again and renew their bid for a decision. Both illusions perished at the Aisne. Here the Germans were able to repulse the French and dig in, but on their side they never were able to get on their feet and advance again.

Actually the Battle of the Marne broke the German offensive, wrecked their whole strategy, which was to bring the French to a decisive battle in the first six weeks of the war, win that battle, and put the French out of the war. They advanced to the Marne seeking a second Sedan, and the French there won an Antietam. All the original German conceptions were definitely defeated in this battle; they were compelled to retreat, to give over the offensive, to accept a long war. But, save for the Prussian Guard and the Saxons of Hausen, they were nowhere routed, and they were able within a week after the decisive day of the Marne, September 9th, to halt the Allies along the Aisne, establish their front unbroken from the Aisne to the Meuse, and even to undertake a new attack. But this failed almost instantly.

It is essential—as has been said before and cannot be said too often—to keep in mind, in examining the Battle of the Marne, the story of the opening weeks of the Franco-Prussian War. The two conflicts began in much the same way. In both cases German mobilization put more troops and better-equipped troops into the field. In both cases all the

NOVEL PHASES OF MODERN WARFARE SHOWN IN PICTURES



A HIDDEN AND DEFENDED MACHINE GUN

Except for the noise, which resembles a pneumatic rivetting machine, this gun gives the enemy no indication of its whereabouts. It fires through a painted net curtain.



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THE "AGENT DE LIAISON"

This French soldier's official designation is as sinister as his appearance. He is an *agent de liaison*. It is a relief to know that this means simply telephone operator. He wears his mask as a protection against poison-gas bombs. A hand grenade is in the pouch suspended from his belt.






Photograph by Paul Thompson

"POISON GAS" IN THE WAR

The upper picture shows the cylindrical containers from which the poison gas emanates. The Austrians left n behind when the Russians drove them from this position. Trenches have to be dug sometimes when gas-bombs shells are exploding close at hand. These British "Tommies" are wearing respirators as a protection against onous fumes.




MACHINE-GUN POSITION IN THE OPEN

Where guns and men are protected only by small dugouts and shell-craters—conditions which obtain during an advance



PERISCOPE AND METAL HELMET

The French soldiers soon bowed to grim necessity and gave up the blue tunics and red trousers endeared to them by a romantic and glorious tradition. These entrenched *poilus* are sensibly making themselves as safe and comfortable as they can. Clad in serviceable and inconspicuous "horizon" blue uniforms with metal helmets, one man is trying a pot-shot with his rifle, which is equipped with a periscope so that he need expose himself no more than is necessary, while his comrade is solacing himself with a glance at his favorite Paris newspaper.



THIS IS THE RESULT WHEN A FOREST BECOMES A BATTLEFIELD



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BUCKLER, HAND-GRENADE AND HELM

History repeats itself in war as in other human relationships In 1913 the world thought the day of warriors with eel helmets and shields had passed forever. But here is one very much alive. He is a grenadier, too, in the original ense of the term, for he stands ready to throw a hand-grenade in the face of his enemy.








Photograph by the International News Service

BARBED WIRE ENTANGLEMENTS

Barbed wire has been used in the World War on an unprecedented scale. These troops (*upper picture*) are advancing upon an abandoned fort by the side of a formidable entanglement which has been firmly anchored by stout posts. The French have invented a gun (*lower picture*) which fires into the midst of the wire entanglement a hook attached to a cable. The hook is then hauled back, supposedly bringing with it large masses of the wire.







THE GASOLINE ENGINE

The gasoline engine has greatly increased the mobility of modern troops. The lower picture shows a little British fortress that can be moved at the rate of twenty-five or thirty miles an hour, wherever there is a decent road. The upper and middle pictures show one method the Germans have adopted for increasing the mobility of their artillery. The armoured car affords protection to the gun-crew while in transit to the point at which they are needed. Arrived on the ground the car's armour is removed (as shown in the centre picture and the gun cleared for action in two or three minutes.



WORK AND PLAY AT THE FRONT

These French gunners (*upper picture*) are working to excellent purpose in a dugout carefully concealed from the air-scouts of the enemy.

This seems a strange place for a candy-shop, yet it is doing a big business. The Young Men's Christian Association maintains many little booths like this, just back of the firing line. The soldier's small change is apt to burn a hole in his pocket, and he highly appreciates such opportunities to get rid of it in exchange for sweets and other little luxuries.

opening battles were won by the Germans. But at this point the parallel stops short. Instead of Mars-la-Tour and Sedan, with their fatal terminations, you have an orderly retreat of all French armies until a new concentration permits a fresh offensive, and when this happens you have a German retreat followed by a German rally, which ends in a deadlock and more than three years of trench war.

This, after all, is the "Miracle of the Marne." The German High Command said: "We have more men, better guns, better troops; we will violate the neutrality of Belgium, turn the French fortresses and, arriving in the plains of northern France, we will destroy the French armies, take Paris, and then turn east and dispose of Russia. We shall win the war in six weeks and take Paris in seven. We shall hold France to ransom and dispose of the French danger for all time."

Not one detail of this grandiose plan was realized. Not one detail has been realized after three years of war. We all see that if France had failed, Russia would have been conquered, and even the British Empire would have come to the edge of ruin. But France did not fail. She won her greatest victory in a wonderful history with but the least possible support from Britain; she saved herself, Britain and Russia, and after the Marne the war had new horizons and different possibilities. Thus in every sense the Battle of the Marne was one of the few truly decisive battles in all human history, a battle whose consequences, though we may not yet accurately measure them, seem, at the distance of nearly three years, incomparably greater than on the day when the world first learned that the German invasion would not reach Paris.

VIII. THE SECOND BATTLE OF NANCY

During the whole of the first week of September, ending before the Battle of the Marne reached its decisive stage, another contest was going forward on the front which had been successfully maintained by the French after their defeat at Morhange. Coördinating their movements with those of the armies to the west, eight German corps under the Crown Prince of Bavaria and General Heeringen, in the decisive hours, acting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself, undertook to cut their way

through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Épinal and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies fighting from Verdun to Paris.

Had this drive succeeded, the decision of the Marne would have been reversed, and German strategy would have triumphed despite the checks elsewhere. It did not succeed, because, although his armies were heavily depleted to reinforce armies to the west, General de Castelnau was able to repulse all attacks in fighting which was unquestionably the most costly to the Germans in the whole period of the war preceding the struggles in Flanders. Unfortunately the larger issues at the Marne, the proximity of the western battlefield to Paris, have served to obscure these operations. Thus, precisely as the victory of Foch at La Fère-Champenoise is little known save to military men; although it did, in fact, decide the Marne, the success of De Castelnau, which permitted the victory of the Marne and held the whole eastern line of the French field armies, has, as yet, no place in current history.

When the German attack began, De Castelnau stood thus: his left or northern flank rested on the Moselle south of Pont-à-Mousson and on the Plateau of Ste. Geneviève, a gentle hill, which is the northern extremity of the Grand-Couronne. Thence it followed the Grand-Couronne, facing the little Seille River, to the Plateau d'Amance, at the southern end of the Grand-Couronne. Here the ground falls sharply and the French line passing through the Forest of Champenoux and a dozen little towns, scenes of desperate fighting, still unknown, crossed the Meurthe at the foot of the Plateau of Saffais-Belchamps, due south of Nancy, and extended along the ridge between the Meurthe and the Moselle, south toward the Vosges.

This was a position long ago surveyed as the final line of French resistance if the German attack came from Alsace-Lorraine. Every higher officer in France knew it. Here, if anywhere, the French could be expected to make a successful resistance—and they did.

The first attack came upon Ste. Geneviève. The Germans advanced south on both sides of the Moselle, took Pont-à-Mousson, entered the Forest of the Advance Guard, and opened a cross fire upon the French

at Ste. Geneviève. Despite orders to retire, the French, only a battalion strong, held on and repulsed massed attacks, after which the Germans left 4,000 bodies in the Bois de Facq. Finally, just as he was withdrawing in obedience to peremptory orders, the French Commander perceived that the Germans were also drawing out, whereupon he returned to his lines.

The second and main attack came at the other end of the Grand-Couronne on the edge of the Plateau d'Amance and through the large Forest of Champenoux. No more desperate fighting in the whole war has occurred than here. Heavily outnumbered, the French were driven back to the western edge of the forest; the Germans for a brief hour seized a small farm at the foot of the Plateau D'Amance but were driven out. Terrific fighting and enormous losses marked the engagements to the south, notably about the little village of Corbessaux. In front of the Plateau of Saffais-Belchamps the Germans were slaughtered in masses, attempting to cross the Meurthe.


A final attack, around Amance and the Forest of Champenoux—currently believed to have been made while the Kaiser, surrounded by his guard in white uniform, waited at Eply to enter Nancy—was rolled back. Before Foch had won his great struggle at La Fère-Champenoise, the drive through Lorraine was over and the Second Battle of Nancy had saved the eastern barrier to France. Afterward, as the Germans began to draw troops out of this line to meet the new situation in the west, the French pushed out, retook Pont-à-Mousson and Lunéville, and reëstablished their front along the frontier from the Vosges to Pont-à-Mousson.

The Second Battle of Nancy was a defensive battle to save the main French operation, westward at the Marne. It was really a vital phase of the Marne itself, the foundation on which Joffre built his whole strategy; it was probably bloodier than any fight at the Marne, and its relative value must be recognized to appreciate the whole picture of the Marne campaign. It was won by the army that had been defeated at Morhange, but by only a fraction of the force that fought in that disastrous engagement, for Joffre had long ago depleted it to supply troops for his

new armies and to reinforce the others, while the Battle of the Marne was still in progress.

IX. TANNENBERG

To complete the story of the Marne, it is necessary to recount now the disaster that overtook the Russian army, which had invaded East Prussia from Warsaw. In the general Franco-Russian plan, it was



FIRST RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA, CHECKED BY HINDENBURG AT TANNENBERG, AUG. 31, 1914

Two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Hindenburg defeated the Warsaw army decisively at Tannenberg and the other army then drew back

A–Rennenkampf B–Samsonoff

agreed that Russia should promptly invade East Prussia if Germany sent her masses through Belgium and against France. It was believed that such an operation would mean that Germany would have to leave her eastern front insecurely guarded and that a Russian inva-



HINDENBURG, VICTOR OF TANNENBERG

When the Russians surprised the Germans by their quick mobilization and invasion of East Prussia, in August, 1914, the German Emperor summoned General Hindenburg from retirement and gave him command in the region which he had made a life study. He concentrated most of his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims he massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost about 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, which made Hindenburg the idol of the German people.

sion would promptly force her to withdraw troops from France in advance of the decisive engagement.

Accordingly two Russian armies were at once sent into East Prussia, one from the Niemen front and the other north from Warsaw. Both won immediate and considerable successes, and the Germans on the day they reached Brussels learned that Russian armies were carrying the whole eastern frontier and advancing after victories at Gumbinnen and Insterburg, toward Königsberg and toward the east bank of the Vistula north of Thorn. Refugees fleeing before the storm were flowing into Berlin at the precise moment that French and Belgian exiles were reaching Paris.

So far the Allied plan had worked amazingly well and the promptness of Russian invasion had taken the Germans by surprise.

Now, however, the Emperor summoned Hindenburg from retirement and gave him command in the region which he had made a life study. Hindenburg acted promptly. Leaving only a screen of troops in front of the Russian army advancing from the east, he concentrated his forces about the Russian Warsaw army in the difficult swamp region he knew so well. Having drawn a net about his victims, he massed his heavy artillery and practically annihilated the Russian army, which lost more than 100,000 troops with guns and flags innumerable. This was the victory of Tannenberg, celebrated on Sedan Day by all Germany as a deliverance from deadly peril.

After Tannenberg, the other Russian army drew back safely and Hindenburg still lacked the numbers to press it hard, but he was able to clear German territory, and the mass of German armies in France were permitted to go forward to their decisive battle without fear for this eastern front. Half the Franco-Russian strategic conception had been wrecked. After the Marne the Germans would not be forced to face immediate peril in the east as well as the west. They could still concentrate their energies on retrieving the situation at the Aisne.

The French victory at the Marne and the great Russian triumph at Lemberg obscured the Allied mind and the mind of the neutral world as to the value of Tannenberg. It has not even now, outside of Ger-

many, received its just appraisal. Yet, to judge it rightly it is only necessary to consider what would have been the German situation if, at the moment the Marne had been lost, Russian troops had occupied all of Prussia east of the Vistula. This would have happened but for Tannenberg; it would have happened infallibly if the action of the two Russian armies had been properly coördinated, for their combined strength was far greater than Hindenburg's.

For this disaster Lemberg was no counterweight, because Germany and not Austria was the true enemy and German disaster might have ended the war. Had the Germans been driven behind the Lower Vistula all their later and successful campaigns would have been impossible and, taken with the collapse of Austria at Lemberg and the defeat of the Marne, the Central Powers would have found themselves at the close of the second month of war in a situation difficult in the extreme, if not well-nigh desperate.

All this was avoided by Hindenburg's amazing victory, one of the most complete in history and rivalling any Napoleonic combination in skill and effectiveness. More than all else this German victory at the other end of Europe robbed the Marne of its greatest possible fruits and condemned northern France to a German occupation which still persists. The victory on the eastern front enabled Germany to go forward to the Marne without hesitation; it did not enable her to win this battle, but after the retreat to the Aisne it permitted her to concentrate her energies and her resources in new attacks upon the west which did not terminate until the Battle of Flanders in mid-November.

Therefore, just as the Marne deprived Germany of any chance to get a quick decision on her main front, the disaster of Tannenberg deprived the Allies of any similar chance for a prompt victory. Later historians will certainly do fuller justice to the importance and service of Tannenberg to Germany. It was not the greatest German victory of the war, but certainly it was the most useful, and as such it can rank only second to the Marne in the first two years of the contest. It is hardly too much to say that it saved Germany almost as unmistakably as the Marne saved France.

CHAPTER SEVEN

DEADLOCK IN THE WEST

I

THE BATTLE OF THE AISNE

On the morrow of the victory of the Marne, French purpose is clear. A great strategic victory has been won, the whole German conception has been broken. All the German armies are in retreat. It is essential to pursue these armies; to turn the retreat into a rout, if possible; in any event, to prevent the Germans from taking root in France and from presently stepping out in a new general offensive, reopening the decision of the Marne. In all save the last of these purposes French strategy failed.

This failure, although materially affected by the condition of the French army after its long struggle and the disorganization of French cavalry, was due primarily to the fact that only one German army, and that the smallest, Hausen's, had actually been beaten on the battlefield. German armies had allowed themselves to be drawn into a hopelessly bad position; they had suffered heavy losses and, in the case of the Saxon army, a real rout; but they had, in the main, seen the danger in time; drawn themselves out of the trap with great skill and speed; and begun a retreat, which if rapid was, in the main, orderly, and successful. In justice to the British, it should be added that if their share in the Battle of the Marne was insignificant, their part in the pursuit was considerable and they not only did exceedingly well but, having recovered from the disorganization incident to their long retreat, came into this operation relatively fresh and thus in condition to do what would have been beyond the strength of their exhausted allies had they been unaided.

In this same time the purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France; reëstablish contact between the various armies separated by the movements of the battle; and then seek, in a new contest, to

win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne. The German official statements did not admit the loss of the Battle of the Marne. From September 3d to September 13th they preserved a complete silence on western operations. It is clear, too, that German High Command, even as late as September 25th, did not regard the Marne as the decisive action, and remained confident that a new battle would win whatever had been temporarily lost.

And in this time German High Command lost forever the chance to seize the French and Belgian seacoasts, which lay open to their occupation from the moment that they passed the Somme until their new efforts from the Oise to the Meuse had been checked. We shall see, a few weeks later, a frantic effort to repair this great error, when it was too late. For this blunder, together with rumoured mistakes in the Battle of the Marne not yet established, the younger and lesser Moltke was presently to lose his great position as master of the German General Staff, turning over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

German armies were able to realize many of the hopes and conceptions of their commanders in the weeks following the Marne. They did make good their position in France, behind the deep Aisne, resting on the hills from Noyon to the Craonne Plateau. They did restore contact between all their armies and they were able, within ten days after the decisive day of the Marne, to renew the offensive. But they were not able to reopen the decision of the Marne, because, while they were beginning a new offensive between Noyon and Verdun and striking a heavy blow south of Verdun, at St. Mihiel, French High Command opened a great turning movement, west of the Oise, which compelled the Germans to displace their armies, sending masses from Lorraine and Champagne to Picardy and Artois, and thus resigning their plans farther east.

All these operations, very complex when read in official bulletins and utterly confusing to the public at the time they took place, become perfectly simple if the main purposes are kept in mind. You have first the French and British pursuit, begun on September 10th. You have

next the complete check of this pursuit, after September 13th, when Kluck stands behind the Aisne, digs himself in and, reinforced by the troops and guns which are freed by the capture of Maubeuge on September 7th, stops Field-Marshal French, Maunoury, and D'Esperey. By



THE GERMAN RETREAT TO THE AISNE, SEPT. 10TH–15TH, 1914

The purpose of German strategy was to take a new position in France, reëstablish contact between the various armies, and then seek, in a new contest, to win that decisive battle which they had lost at the Marne

September 18th Kluck is able to take the offensive and drive the British and French out of some of the ground they have taken north of the Aisne.

Meantime to the east, Bülow, Einem (who succeeds Hausen), Würtemberg, and the Crown Prince, have retired slowly, save for the

Saxons, who disappear soon as an army. The German line curves around Rheims and through the Argonne. By the third week in September, Bülow, who has held up Foch just outside of Rheims, attacks, takes the forts of Brimont and Nogent-l'Abbesse, bombards the cathedral at Rheims, but is checked. Würtemberg and the Crown Prince make a considerable advance west and east of the Argonne, but are stopped in turn. Troops from Metz make a sudden and successful attack upon the barrier forts south of Verdun, and take St. Mihiel.

No one of these three attacks had immediately important military consequences, yet all three are of permanent interest—that of Bülow, because of the bombardment of the Cathedral of Rheims, which had a greater moral effect upon the French nation than anything but the victory of the Marne; that of the Crown Prince because, taken together with the operations about St. Mihiel, it had a very great value in a later phase of the war, when the Germans attacked Verdun.

The Crown Prince was checked after a few days. But he got forward sufficiently on the road along which he had recently retreated to occupy the town of Varennes, and from this and other points was able, with his heavy artillery, to cut the Paris-Verdun railroad by indirect fire. Even more complete was the success to the south, where the Germans, by taking Fort Camp des Romains and occupying the west bank of the Meuse, facing St. Mihiel, were able to cut the Commercy-Verdun line. There was a moment when it seemed possible that they might actually penetrate through the breach they had opened in the French barrier and join hands with the Crown Prince. This danger passed; Verdun was not enveloped, but it was left practically without rail communication with the rest of France, a circumstance which contributed gravely to its danger when the Germans returned to the attack in February, 1916.

About September 20th Joffre, now assured that he cannot break the German lines, which have become a wall of trenches from the Vosges to the Oise, begins to send troops to work around the German right, which does not extend west of the Oise. These troops come east from Amiens and aim at St. Quentin and the whole network of railroads on

which the German armies depend for their supplies. So confident are the French of the success of this thrust that at this time Millerand, the French Minister of War, forecasts the immediate retirement of the Germans from France, and London has a rumour that Kluck has surrendered.


Nothing like this happens. Instead, the Germans begin to answer the French flanking operation by bringing troops of their own from their main front and putting them in west of the Oise. These troops very quickly put an end to the first French flanking operation; they retake Péronne, Roye, Lassigny, and win an action at Bapaume, establishing in this sector that front which will endure up to the time of the great Battle of the Somme in the summer of 1916.

II. THE RACE TO THE SEA

But Joffre sticks to his plan. He has brought De Castelnau from Lorraine with much of the army which had defended Nancy. Oddly enough the army of De Castelnau, which has long faced the army of Rupprecht of Bavaria east of the Moselle, arrives west of the Oise just in time to meet the same German army. A general dislocation of French and German armies is going forward, General Mand'huy, brought from the Aisne and put in command of a new army, encounters Bülow, brought over from before Rheims. Finally the Grand Duke of Würtemberg arrives from the Argonne and faces Foch but recently commanding the army which had reconquered Rheims.

And with this general dislocation the German hope of resuming the offensive between the Oise and the Moselle expires. The campaign enters the second phase. The front from Noyon to Nancy becomes relatively unimportant and the deadlock of trench war along this line becomes absolute. Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure. Joffre puts De Castelnau in about Roye and he encounters Rupprecht of Bavaria. He puts Mand'huy in and he meets Bülow

east of Arras. He puts Foch in and Foch encounters, not merely Würtemberg come from the Argonne but Besseler, striking south, when the Antwerp episode is completed. Even Field-Marshal French, quitting his trenches near Soissons, will presently arrive at Ypres.



THE RACE TO THE SEA

Now the field of operations is between the Oise and the sea, and the centre of conflict mounts day by day to the north. The French and the Germans are exactly in the situation of two boys building rival towers out of blocks and each trying to build the higher structure

The French strategy begins to reveal itself. As the French line mounts to the north it points first toward Lille, lost in the first hours of the invasion and subsequently retaken, then toward Antwerp, where the Belgian army still stands, with a line of retreat open to the south, on the west bank of the Scheldt.

What this means the German High Command at last perceives. It can no longer continue its effort to advance between the Oise and the Meuse, it has been compelled to draw off troops in Lorraine and Champagne to meet the new thrust in Picardy and Artois. Already the active front has mounted into Flanders. Unless a change comes promptly the French line will extend until it reaches Belgium, joins with the Belgian front behind the Scheldt, and not only will there ensue a trench deadlock from Holland to Switzerland, but the Germans will be permanently excluded from the Belgian seacoast. If such a deadlock ensues, then there is an end to all hope—and already this hope is becoming remote—of a quick decision over France, and a short war.

There remains in late September only a gap forty miles wide between the French lines in position from Lille southward and the Channel. Unless German troops can penetrate this gap and come south, sweeping behind the Channel ports of Calais and Boulogne, the whole western campaign will have ended in a stalemate and the French, British, and Belgians will hold an unbroken line from Antwerp to Belfort.

Hence in the latter half of September begins the new and final German concentration. German strategy has now three purposes: to take Antwerp and capture the Belgian army, thus preventing a junction of the Belgians with their allies; to move south through the gap between Lille and the Channel, taking the Channel ports and finally, if possible, thus regaining the initiative; to reopen the decision of the Marne and win a real victory north of Amiens. Even if this last object is not realized the Germans can hope to shorten their front by establishing their western flank on the sea near the mouth of the Somme and at the same time complete the occupation of northern France and that seacoast which would be the logical base for operations against Britain. And for the German people this last phase is summed up by the word "Calais," as the earlier drive was comprehended in the magic term "Paris."

For clarity and convenience we may regard the Battle of the Aisne as covering all the operations between Soissons and St. Mihiel in the

time in which the Germans endeavoured to regain the initiative and advance over the ground they had covered on the road to the Marne. We may regard the "Race to the Sea" as describing the complicated operations following the effort of the French to outflank the Germans between the Oise and the Channel, which resulted in extending the deadlock of trench warfare at right angles to the old front nearly as far north as the city of Lille.

Then comes the German effort to destroy the Belgian army in Antwerp and drive south through the open gap between Lille and the sea, which results in the capture of Antwerp and the advance south as far as the Yser and Ypres, the occupation of most of the Belgian seacoast, and finally the bloody defeats at the Yser and Ypres, where the French and British close the last gap in the line from the sea to Switzerland and thus checkmate German strategy.

In capturing Antwerp the Germans won a moral not a military victory, since the Belgian army escaped. But the occupation of the Belgian seacoast was a considerable material advantage and it was due primarily to the fatal interposition of Winston Churchill, who made his celebrated entrance into Antwerp after King Albert and the French General Staff had agreed upon an evacuation, inevitable by reason of German progress through the Belgian defences. Yielding to the importunities of Churchill, King Albert delayed his evacuation for two days. When he did leave he lost a whole division, crowded into Dutch territory by the Germans; his army was disorganized by its pressed retreat; it was no longer possible to hold the line of the Scheldt; and the Germans were not only able to take Ostend and the Belgian seacoast, but also to seize Lille, the greatest manufacturing city of northern France, which they still hold after two years and a half.

Only by a narrow margin did the intervention of Churchill miss causing the capture of King Albert's whole army and a great Allied disaster. Never was there a better example of the folly of political interference with military operations, no single blunder in the whole opening days of the war was more costly to the Allies than this grotesque venture of a British Cabinet Minister into the realms of higher strategy.

III. ANTWERP

It was the Siege of Antwerp which supplied the single unmistakable circumstance of the October fighting and on the human side the only dramatic incident in a war which had now become a bewildering tangle of operations obscure to the contemporary observer and without immediately apparent result. From the attack on Liége to the Battle of the Aisne the world had looked eagerly for a Sedan or a Waterloo. But in October it was plain that the time for Sedans and Waterloos was passing.

Thus it was that the first shots of the German cannon before Antwerp on September 29th instantly drew the attention of the world to an action which was easily comprehensible, and already promised to be promptly decisive. More than this, there was in the final stand of Belgian patriotism an appeal to American admiration, lacking in all else in a war between rival cultures, ambitions, races. For a nation whose own history began at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defence of liberty by the few against the many at the cost of life, of all that men could hold dear, was a moving spectacle. For Americans there was bound to be in the final tragedy of the Belgians a claim on sympathy. Already to the neutral eyes beyond the Atlantic the Belgian resistance had taken on the character of that of Holland to Spain, of the Greeks to the Persians.

On the military side the German attack upon Antwerp was easily explicable. German attempts to force a short road into northern France by taking Verdun had failed. West of the Oise and the Scheldt the Allied advance was pushing north toward Antwerp. If the Allies and the Belgians should join hands, German hold on Belgium would be precarious, for Antwerp was now like the citadel of a captured fortress, which still held out. But far more serious was the fact that such a junction would close the last open gap on the western front and rob Germany of her only remaining chance not merely to reverse the decision of the Marne, but also to reach the Channel and the North Sea, facing the British coast.

Already Belgian resistance had contributed seriously to impeding German plans. In the days when every German soldier was needed in France, an army corps had to be kept in Belgium to protect the German lines of communication and contain the Belgian field army in Antwerp. At the moment of the Battle of Charleroi the Belgian army had made a sortie, in the course of which it had almost reached Louvain. The destruction of this city followed this fighting, and was an act of reprisal by the Germans, who ruthlessly executed many men and women. This deed promptly filled the civilized world with horror and awakened protest in all lands. Again, at the Battle of the Marne, a second Belgian sortie had detained troops which were starting south and held them until the critical days of the retreat to the Aisne were passed.

To rid themselves of this annoyance, to clear their flanks, to prepare the way for a final attack to the south, the Germans now resolved to have done with King Albert and his gallant little army. The closing days of September, therefore, saw Belgium approaching her final agony.

In all military history of the future the capture of Antwerp must necessarily be a landmark. Here, briefly, terribly, the superiority of the gun over the fort, of the mechanic over the engineer, was demonstrated. Aside from Paris, there was no city believed to be as strongly fortified as Antwerp, and the fate of Antwerp gave a new value to the French for the recent deliverance of Paris. Unlike Paris, however, its position on the neutralized Scheldt and near the Dutch frontier prevented complete investment. Along its southern front, ten miles distant, the Nèthe flowed through deep marshes, forming a natural moat, strengthened by forts once held to be impregnable.

Before these forts, in trenches long ago prepared, stood the whole Belgian field army, reinforced in its last days by British marines. All that the art of the engineer, all that the courage of brave men fighting with their backs to the wall could contribute to making a fortress impregnable, were to be found in the ancient Flemish city.

Yet before the German artillery, Antwerp's defences crumbled with incredible rapidity. What the 42-centimetre gun and the Austrian "305" had accomplished at Liége, at Namur, at Maubeuge, but hith-

"ST. GEORGE FOR ENGLAND!"

FRANCE AND ENGLAND STAND TOGETHER




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BRITISH HIGHLANDERS LANDING AT BOULOGNE

"VIVE LA RÉPUBLIQUE!"





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GENERAL JOFFRE

GENERAL GALLIENI

General Joffre commanded the French during the first seventeen months of the war, was then retired as Marshal of France, and in April, 1917, came to America as a member of the French War Commission. He was the idol of the soldiers who spoke of him affectionately as "Grand-papa" and "Our Joffre." His ringing message to the army before the Battle of the Marne will long be remembered: "Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come; let each man die in his place, rather than fall back."

General Gallieni was the defender of Paris. On the evening of September 3d, he learned from his observers that Kluck's army had begun to turn away from Paris and was marching southeast toward Meaux and the Marne. He telephoned this news to Joffre and the next day the plan for the Battle of the Marne was arranged.



Photograph by Paul Thompson

THREE FRENCH GENERALS

These generals were all active during the first year of the war. "Grand-papa Joffre" stands in a characteristic attitude with field-glasses "mobilized." At Joffre's right and left are Castelnau and Pau. All three are good-naturedly quizzing the orderly who stands at attention while the man at the extreme left enjoys seeing his comrade "on the carpet."



LORD KITCHENER AND SIR JOHN FRENCH

There were persistent rumors of differences between Lord Kitchener, British Secretary of State for War, and Sir John French, Commander of the British Expeditionary Army. General French was relieved of his command six months before Lord Kitchener's tragic death at sea, June 5, 1916.

The British believed for some time that their help enabled the French to win the Battle of the Marne. But to all intents and purposes the British were not engaged in the Marne at all. When Joffre asked for instant action, Field Marshal French replied that he needed forty-eight hours in which to get ready. He failed to rise to the greatest opportunity of the War, either because he did not perceive it or because he lacked the necessary energy and initiative. That is the verdict of French criticism and British students of the war are being driven to the same conclusion.



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GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG AND GENERAL SIR HORACE LOCKWOOD SMITH-DORRIEN

Sir Douglas Haig succeeded Sir John French in command of the British forces in France. He is a more active man than his predecessor and nearly ten years younger, having been born in 1861. Throughout his military career he has been concerned chiefly with cavalry, and he possesses all the cavalryman's traditional fire and dash.

General Smith-Dorrien commanded the Second Corps of the British Army during the terrible days of the retreat which preceded the Marne.



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FRENCH ARMY JOINS BELGIANS

The advance guard of the French Army on their way to join the Belgians.
French marines welcomed by the residents of Ghent.



British Artillery in a Rearguard Action in Belgium.



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When the British Marines disembarked at Ostend they received a rousing welcome from the Belgians.



BRITISH ARTILLERY IN ACTION

When the average British soldier actually gets to work he is happy. Even life in the trenches then becomes "a little bit of all right," as he expresses it.



Copyright by the American Press Association

THE PRINCE OF WALES WITH HIS REGIMENT

The Prince has seen service abroad and many anecdotes are current illustrative of his good-humor and democratic ways.



Photograph by Paul Thompson

ON THE MARNE FRONT

These men are constructing a series of caves—called "Robinson Crusoes" in military slang.



Photograph by the International News Service

FRENCH DRAGOONS WITH CAPTIVE UHLANS


This is what happened to some of the German Uhlans, who figured so prominently in newspaper headlines during the first days of the War. They were captured by French dragoons who have seized their caps to send off as souvenirs to French wives and sweethearts. General Joffre afterwards forbade this practise by an explicit command couched in very severe terms.



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THE ADVANCE OF FRENCH MACHINE GUNNERS AND RIFLEMEN

Some types of machine guns may be carried by one man. Others are carried piecemeal by two or more. In this case the second man has the gun itself on his shoulder while the third man follows with the tripod.



Copyright by Lavoy

A BIG FRENCH GUN ON THE RAILROAD AT VERDUN

The big German 42-centimetre guns seemed in the early days of the War to be irresistible and incomparable. But with the appearance of such creations as this the French artillery regained its traditional superiority.



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TWO REMARKABLE AIRPLANE PHOTOGRAPHS ON THE FRENCH FRONT

(*Above*). The devastated city of Clermont, in the Argonne region. It was burned by the Germans at the Battle of the Marne. Roofless ruined walls are all that remain in the foreground. Up the road toward the top of the picture a cluster of buildings is seen which must have been just beyond the zone of fire.

(*Below.*) The French aviation camp near Verdun. One can plainly see the hangars with the insect-like war-planes in front of them. Behind the hangars motor trucks are parked, and behind these are tents, the living quarters of the aviators.

erto behind a veil, they now did in the full sight of the whole world. In less than a week these forts which had been pronounced impregnable were heaps of dust and ashes, and German troops had forced the river defences and the field trenches, driving the Belgians before them. By October 7th the Krupp shells were falling about the noble tower of the Antwerp Cathedral. The city and the suburbs were breaking out in flames. The end was in sight.

The next day the field army of Belgium, commanded by its still-undaunted King, crossed the Scheldt on pontoons, moved west along the Dutch frontier, accompanied by the British contingent, and made good its escape to join the Allied armies, still moving up from the south, although 20,000 Belgians forced across the Dutch frontier were disarmed and interned. Meanwhile, by every ship, train, road, thousands of refugees, fleeing from the shells that were falling in Antwerp, flowed out to Holland, to England, to France. A new migration of a people had begun.

The end came on October 9th, when the city surrendered, the remaining Belgian forces escaping to Holland and there laying down the arms they had wielded so valiantly. Not a city, but a nation, had fallen. For England only less than for Belgium, the fall of Antwerp had been a terrible blow. The "pistol pointed at the heart of England," as Napoleon had described the city, was now in the hands of William II.

With the fall of Antwerp and that of Ostend, which promptly followed on October 15th, British public opinion at last recognized that a new Napoleonic war, with the same issues and many of the same circumstances, was before them. British observers already foretold accurately the launching of German submarines and German Zeppelins from Zeebrugge. A new Napoleon had reached the Channel. Once more it was for the British people to watch the narrow strip of sea as they had a century before. But now it was necessary also to watch the skies for that new engine which had added so much to the terror of war.

IV. THE BATTLES OF FLANDERS

In late October there opened between La Bassée and the sea the most deadly campaign the war had yet seen. For the next six weeks, on

a front of barely forty miles, some hundreds of thousands of men struggled by day and by night for the possession of a score of villages lying straight across the pathway of the new German advance, between the Lys and the mouth of the Yser. When it had ended, in part through the exhaustion of both combatants, the Germans had gained a few parcels of territory, a few wrecked villages, but in the main the line stood as it had stood in the opening hours of the conflict, despite the fact that the German Emperor had come himself to spur on his brave but beaten soldiers and that the whole German nation had set its heart upon Calais.

The purpose of the German strategy was plain. Antwerp taken, Ostend captured, there was an apparent opportunity to sweep down the coast past Calais and Boulogne; to seize Dunkirk, the last French fortress in the north; to take root on the eastern shore of the Straits of Dover; to bring by canal and river the submarines, already so fatal to British warships, to threaten England with invasion as Napoleon had threatened it; to menace London by Zeppelin fleets; by heavy artillery and mines, to close the Straits of Dover and leave the port of London as dead as that of Hamburg. Underlying all these magnificent details, too, was the dominant determination to regain the offensive, to take up again the road to France.

Once Antwerp fell, the army corps released from this operation drove south upon the heels of the retreating Belgians. From every corner of the German Empire garrisons and artillery were gathered up for a supreme thrust, a thrust through France but in part aimed at England, the nation now become the object of the concentrated hatred and wrath of all Germany.

Not less rapid was the concentration of the Allies. Coming north across the French frontier, French regular troops, British forces withdrawn from the Aisne in early October, Sikhs, Ghurkas, all the Indian contingent now to have their baptism of fire, Senegalese and Moroccan riflemen, Turcos and Légionnaires—finally the retreating remnant of the Belgians reinforced by French and British divisions—gathered around the sleepy little Flemish town of Ypres, on the shores of the North Sea at Nieuport, and behind the Yser River and the canal that

joined it to the Lys, to meet the storm. And once more the post of honour and danger fell to Foch under whose supreme command the Britons and the Belgians, as well as the French, fought.

A more admirable country for defence than the Yser front it is difficult to imagine. Eastward from the dunes stretched an intricate maze of river, canal, and ditch—much of the land subject to inundation, once the sluices were open; all of it certain to become a swamp when the first storms of winter began. On this front a dozen large and small villages and hundreds of little stone farmhouses offered cover. Trenches dug to-day might be flooded to-morrow; artillery dragged within range over level fields one day might be submerged and bemired the next.

Such was the country between the Yser and the sea. Here and about Ypres for more than a month there continued, with slight interruption, one of the most intricate, confused, and indescribable conflicts in all the history of war, fought by men of more races, religions, colours, and nationalities than any battlefield in western Europe had known since the onrush of the soldiers of Islam was halted on the field of Tours. Asia, Africa, and even America and Australia shared in the glory and the slaughter.

The first blow fell along the seacoast south of Ostend, fell upon the remnant of Belgian forces, led by their intrepid King standing behind the Yser River at Nieuport, where it enters the sea. Here for days the Belgians maintained an unequal combat. At the critical moment a British fleet took station beyond the dunes and with its heavy artillery beat down the German advance, after a slaughter which was terrible.

Halted here, the Germans moved inland and came on again about Dixmude, half way between Ypres and Nieuport. Here once more they made progress until the Belgians in their despair opened the sluices and the water flowed over fertile fields carrying ruin with it, turning the whole country into a lake, drowning the invaders in numbers, creating an obstacle impassable for the present, repeating the exploit of the Dutch in their glorious fight against Alva.

Eastward from Dixmude, which presently, after the most desperate of struggles and after changing hands many times, remained with the

Germans—who were halted in its ruin by the ever-memorable resistance of the famous Fusiliers Marins, the "Golden Lads" of Brittany—the attack was directed at Ypres. Here the British stood. Here the Kaiser's wish was gratified and the troops of England met the gallant Bavarians; but they did not succumb. At points the line bent back. Such real gains as were made, were made by the Germans, but the line held. Day and night the slaughter went on. Trenches, hills, farmhouses were taken and retaken. Villages and towns were transformed into heaps of ashes.

To add to the horror autumn began, and sleet and rain, finally snow, fell, transforming the whole country into a swamp. In the inextricable tangle of roads, buildings, and ruined towns, the bodies of men lay unburied for days. The streams and ditches were choked with the human wreckage. All semblance of strategy vanished.

Tactical considerations were subordinated to the simple, single purpose of an advance by the mere weight of numbers. It became not a struggle based on the application of modern theories, but a death grapple between thousands and hundreds of thousands of men, transformed by suffering, by deprivation, by the misery of the autumn storms, to mere animals, clad in clothes reduced to rags or undiscoverable beneath the outward layers of mud.

Again and again more losses, frightful attrition, seemed to bring the German effort to a standstill. Yet always in a few hours or days new thousands returned to the charge. Always, too, they came forward fearlessly, a song upon their lips. Regiments of youths took the place of the older men of the first line, but the boys were not less brave than the men, the recruits than the veterans.

V. CHECKMATE

Such were the battles of Flanders, the Battle of the Yser, won by the Belgians and the French, the Battle of Ypres won by the British and the French. Never was a race more closely run. Never was victory nearer to the Germans than in the early days of November. The jerry-built dyke that Joffre had stretched across the last open gap on his


front barely held. On November 15th, when the last effort of the Prussian Guard failed, the British Expeditionary Army had become almost a memory and its losses had passed anything in British history. At Ypres fifty thousand British were killed, wounded, or captured—a third of the whole Expeditionary Army. On the same field the French lost seventy thousand and the Belgians twenty thousand. As for the German loss, it certainly passed a quarter of a million.

Memorable, hereafter, will be the fact that as the last German attacks before Ypres were failing, there died within the British lines the one British soldier who had foreseen what was now happening, whose words had been greeted with sneers, whose voice had almost been silenced by the cheap and empty optimism of Liberal and Radical politicians. Come to France at the moment of the crisis, come to cheer his well-loved Indian troops, now fighting bravely on the western line, Lord Roberts died on the eve of a great victory, which saved his own country from the worst he had feared for it. Worth repeating, too, is the legend, credited to De Souza, that having studied the maps, having examined the plans and preparations of the French general, who held supreme command over British and French troops alike, Lord Roberts said to staff officers of Foch: "You have a great general."

At Ypres the British troops did all that was expected of them, and more could not be expected of any troops. "Wipers" of the English "Tommy" deserves a place beside Waterloo and Blenheim in British military history. Yet here, as elsewhere, it was the British soldier who shone, for the generalship was French and the victory was won through the genius of that general who had delivered the decisive thrust at the Marne. And for Foch the supreme test came in the midnight hours of a day in which his son and son-in-law had died on the field of honour.

But however close the race, the decision was absolute. The whole German conception of a swift, terrible, decisive thrust at France had ended in the bloody shambles of the Yser and Ypres. Not a French army had been destroyed, not a French army had been captured. The great battle that was to come six weeks after the declaration of war

had come; it had been a French victory, not a Waterloo or a Sedan, but a victory compelling a general German retreat dislocating their whole strategic conception. After that retreat it had never been possible to regain the offensive and renew the bid for a decision. Each separate



DEADLOCK IN THE WEST, NOV. 15, 1914

November 15th sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. Behind her trench lines Germany held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger part of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France was in no position to take the initiative, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of a considerable offensive

offensive effort from St. Mihiel to Nieuport had been beaten down almost where it had started.

Save for Russian defeat at Tannenberg, the defeat at the Marne might have necessitated a retreat to the Rhine. Hindenburg's victory

had given Germany two more months in the west. She had used them up and now the eastern situation had become critical. Russian pressure in East Prussia had not recalled German corps from the Marne or before the Marne. But Russian victories in Galicia, the disasters that had overtaken Austria and seemed to forecast her collapse, the crisis in Hindenburg's campaign in Poland cried out for attention.

November 15th, then, sees the end of the effort that began on August 5th before Liége. In that time Germany had overrun Belgium and occupied more than 8,000 square miles of France and devastated much more; she had approached Paris, and on September 5th its suburbs were visible where her armies stood, but, within sight of the prize, she had been compelled to recoil, and from that hour until the end in Flanders, her strategy had conformed to Joffre's and her purposes had all wrecked in conflict with his will.

Behind her trench lines Germany now held most of the industrial regions of France and the larger share of French machinery and minerals. All Belgium, save one tiny morsel, was in her hands. France, after her terrific struggle, was in no shape to take the offensive, and almost two years were to pass before Britain could put sufficient forces in the trenches to permit the beginning of considerable offensive. Germany's prevision in the matter of heavy artillery and machine guns gave her armies a real and long-enduring advantage in trench war.

But the other side of the picture was unmistakable. Germany had staked all on a quick decision; she had become involved in a long war. She had planned to dispose of her enemies in detail, destroying first French military establishments and then Russian; she had failed to destroy France, and Russian armies were now pounding down to the Carpathians.

Despite her manifest gains and her brilliant preliminary victories, Germany had, then, lost the first round of the war. She had lost it at the Marne and all her desperate struggles from the Marne to the Yser had availed her nothing. Now at last she must go east and deal with Russia; new horizons and new victories beckoned; but while she turned her face east, Britain and France, behind the dyke they had erected in the west,

began to gather up their strength for a renewal of their offensive in a future which was far more distant than they could dream.

With the close of the fighting about Ypres the western battle falls to the level of a deadlock, which endured until March, 1917, with no material change in the battle fronts.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE EASTERN FIELD

I

RUSSIAN AND GERMAN PURPOSES

With the failure of the German effort at Ypres, the western field loses its importance for more than a year and a quarter. It is not until the colossal bid for Verdun in February, 1916, that the events on the French and Belgian front take on that importance which they had in the opening days of the war. It is, of course, true that long before the battles of Flanders in October and November the eastern field had been the scene of many terrific engagements, and of campaigns whose relation to those in the west is not patent, yet, for the purpose of narration, it is simpler to deal first with the western operations right through the Battle of the Marne until the decision there had been made absolute in Flanders, and then examine in detail the eastern operations from the morning of hostilities.

These operations were seen only confusedly and understood but little in the early days of conflict. There is lacking still and will remain wanting for many years, perhaps, that complete detail which we already possess in the case of the French operations in the west. But it is possible to perceive, upon the least scientific study, that from the opening days of the eastern struggle until the German victory at the Dunajec transformed the whole eastern situation, two very clear and well-defined plans were working out.

In the last days of August, acting in strict conformity with a prearranged plan made by the French and Russian General Staffs, two Russian armies were sent into East Prussia, where one found disaster at Tannenberg and the other was compelled to fall back to the frontier and assume a defensive posture. Despite subsequent ventures, leading directly to a second disaster, the Battle of the Masurian Lakes, the

East Prussian field was thenceforth of secondary interest and importance.

On the other hand, concomitant with the Russian defeat at Tannenberg was the first of the two great Russian victories about Lemberg, which exercised a permanent influence upon the eastern campaign down to the Battle of the Dunajec. In these battles about Lemberg the military establishment of Austria was temporarily wrecked and Russian strategy henceforth was concentrated upon the effort to make absolute the consequences of the early victories, to enforce the decision of Lemberg, and put Austria out of the war.

This purpose led to the steady pressure upon Austria on the Galician front, to the advance to the San, to the suburbs of Cracow, and finally, when further progress in this direction was proven impossible, to the gigantic campaign in the Carpathians, which aimed at passing the crests of this range and pouring down into the Hungarian Plain. In the course of the effort many battles, most of them Russian victories, were fought, and the great fortress of Przemysl, with a huge garrison, was captured. The disaster at the Dunajec occurred while the fighting in the Carpathians was still going in the Russian favour, but it is nevertheless true that Russia had failed to achieve her main purpose, when she was forced to give it over.

By contrast with the Russian campaign and purpose, the German efforts in the east were directed at preventing Russia from crushing Austria. These efforts were not originally or mainly confined to supporting Austria in Galicia; rather the Germans undertook, by a campaign of their own, to compel Russia to turn her attention away from Austria and give the Austrians time, under German direction, to get on their feet again. In addition, the German plan had the local object to take Warsaw, seize the west bank of the Vistula River, one of the most serious military obstacles in Europe, and thus insure their own eastern front.

When they began their operations in Poland in October, at the moment they were also attacking Antwerp and preparing for their final effort to break the decision of the Marne, the Germans had only small

effectives, and their advance to the outskirts of Warsaw suggests Early's dash for Washington in 1864, designed primarily to shake Grant's grip on Petersburg and Richmond. Even if they did not get Warsaw, which was a gamble, the Germans expected, justly, to compel the Russians to send troops from Galicia and thus give Austria respite. In this they were entirely successful.

The second drive, begun in November and leading promptly to the terrible Battle of Lodz, was a more serious undertaking. This time the Germans not only expected to relieve the pressure on the Austrians but also to get Warsaw. Temporarily they helped the Austrians, but they failed wholly in the attempt to get Warsaw, and the Austrians were soon in danger again.

November saw, in the west, the final surrender of the German purpose to abolish the decision of the Marne. This was given over, not because it was proven hopeless—in fact, the Germans were almost at the point of victory when they stopped at Ypres—but because it was no longer safe to attempt to deal with their eastern front with the slender effectives which they had there. Up to this moment the Russian campaign had not materially affected the western. It had drawn two Austrian corps out of Alsace at the perilous moment of the Marne, but it had not compelled the Germans to withdraw troops from the western front. On the contrary, they had sent at least six new corps to Belgium for the Ypres and Yser battles.

Had the Russians won at Tannenberg their pressure would have begun to affect the Germans in the west before the Battle of the Marne. When the Russians failed, the Germans were able to go right ahead with their western campaign until November. But at this point the Battle of Lemberg began to have consequences, which the Battle of Tannenberg would have had, had it been a Russian victory. With her western campaign unwon, Germany had to go east in November. So far, the Franco-Russian strategy had prevailed over the German, but the result had been reached so tardily that German armies in the west had been able to dig in on French and Belgian soil from the Vosges to the sea.

After Lodz, Germany turns east and gives her main attention to the Russian front. When she began in November, it is clear that her High Command expected to take Warsaw and beat down the Russian danger before spring, using several corps borrowed from the western front, which had now fallen to the level of trench war. Her High Command obviously had expected to return to the west in the spring and try again to abolish that Marne decision, always weighing upon Germany, because if this decision were to stand, time would be allowed Britain to arm, equip, and munition her millions.

Once Germany did turn east she began a tremendous effort. In December, in January, and in February there are terrific attacks on the whole Polish front facing Warsaw and one great attempt to get to Warsaw and behind Warsaw from East Prussia. But all these fail. The February failure establishes the fact that Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west and new Russian victories in Galicia make it clear that the Germans' effort to relieve Austria by her campaign for Warsaw has failed.

Sometime in February at the latest, Germany discovers that it will not be possible to shake Russia off in time to go back west and renew her effort to get France, still her main foe, out of the war in the spring and summer of 1915. Instead, it is clear that Austria must be kept in the war by a major effort directed against Russia. It is then become essential, since Russia must be attacked, that the blow shall be sufficiently heavy to put Russia out of the war altogether and leave German hands free to deal with France, reinforced by Britain, before Britain has reached the point in her preparation where she will be strong enough to lend France the necessary aid.

Here is the genesis of the great German campaign of the summer of 1916, which begins in Galicia and ends far in Russian territory. With this campaign we are not concerned now. But what it is necessary to recognize is that Russia succeeded in defending Warsaw and holding back Germany, while beating in upon Austria, just long enough to prevent Germany from returning to the western field in 1915. In doing this she gave France and Britain fifteen months to prepare. The ser-

vice was invaluable. In performing it, Russia invited that German attack which brought her to the edge of ruin. But she, also, escaped.

Here, then, is the whole story of the eastern campaign in the period which we are now to examine. In this time Russia is crowding more and more steadily in upon stricken Austria, pushing her back from Lemberg, from the San; coming close up to Cracow and then, checked here, turning toward the Carpathians and struggling up and in places over summits. And in the same time Germany is attempting, with ever-diminishing success, to compel Russia to let up on Austria by attacking Russia in Poland. German pressure is great enough to rob Russia's blow of just that weight which would have made it completely decisive, but it fails to divert Russian attention sufficiently. So at last we come to the decision to spend the summer in the east and direct the main blow in the spring and summer against the eastern enemy.

While all this is happening in the eastern field, Great Britain and France are making every effort to get their military forces into shape to take the pressure off their Russian ally in the spring. But the task is far too great and too long for the British. More than a year is to pass after the Battle of the Dunajec before Britain can be armed or munitioned; France, after the sacrifices of the Marne, is not strong enough, alone, to break the German lines in the west. The failure of all the French and British efforts from Alsace to Flanders supplies the German High Command with proof that their campaign against Russia can be pushed in the spring without danger to their western front. It is the failure of Allied efforts in the west straight through the winter, that makes the Russian burden so great, and it is the failure in the spring that precipitates the catastrophe of the Dunajec.

II. TURKEY'S ENTRANCE

The whole course of the eastern operations was affected and Russian disaster finally achieved through the intervention of Turkey on the side of the Central Powers. In the days when Antwerp had fallen and Warsaw seemed on the point of yielding to Hindenburg, the Turk suddenly put his sword at the service of the two Kaisers. Conceivably this

Turkish decision could not have been prevented either by Allied diplomacy or Allied naval action, but the event is the first in a long series of reverses for Allied statesmanship and High Command in the Near East, which changed the whole course of the war in its second year.

The military effect of Turkey's decision was not measured by the new front it opened on the Russian Caucasus or the British lines at Suez. Turkish military operations were neither fortunate nor influential, aside from the defence of Gallipoli. But when Turkey entered the war, Russia was automatically cut off from the outer world for many months by winter on the north and by Turkish forts at the Bosporus. The result was that her munitionment was gravely affected. Before spring she had exhausted all her stocks of ammunition, and when the German blow came in April she was almost without heavy shells. This was the prime cause of all the subsequent reverses. This was Turkey's real service to her allies and her terrible revenge upon her hereditary enemy.

The political causes of Turkey's entrance are not hard to fathom. With the rapprochement of Russia and Britain, the latter resigned, in fact if not by formal engagement, her long-standing rôle of the defender of the Turk. It was well understood in Stamboul, as elsewhere, that the Persian bargain between Russia and Sir Edward Grey had an implied consent to eventual Russian possession at the Straits. Under the stress of circumstances, because British title to the Suez Canal had been made absolute by the French withdrawal from Egyptian ambitions—a part of the 1904 bargain—Constantinople lost its old value for the British, England resigned her position as the first friend of the Sultan, and the Kaiser instantly and eagerly replaced his rival at the Golden Horn.

When the Balkan States attacked Turkey, Germany and Austria hoped for their defeat. Britain and her Russian and French friends hoped for their victory, and Russia and France contributed materially to training and munitioning the armies that won at Lule Burgas, Kumanovo, and Yenidze-Vardar. It was, too, by virtue of an understanding with France, Russia, and Great Britain, that Italy attacked Turkey and took Tripoli.

No Turkish statesman could mistake the fact that France and Britain had abandoned the policy which produced the Crimean War and the abrogation of the Treaty of San Stefano. No Turkish statesman could misunderstand the evidence that proved that Russia would never again have to resign Czarigrad at British behest. So far as London, Paris, and for that matter Rome, were concerned, Russia was free to take Constantinople. Therefore a victory of Russia and her allies in the war that had now broken out meant a Russian attack upon Turkey, with the consent of Russia's allies.

Turkey could have no illusion as to German ambitions. An Osmanli Empire administered by Prussian officials was as hateful to the Turk as a lost Constantinople, but this peril, if patent, was not immediate; he could hope that the outcome of the war would leave the enemies of Germany strong enough to prevent this, even though they were defeated. He could hope that the turn of events might save him as it had saved him for so many decades. But the Russian danger was immediate, unmistakable, carried with it a death sentence for him.

Actually the Turkish decision was procured by the intervention of two German warships, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, which were caught in the western Mediterranean at the moment of the declaration of war and fled via Palermo to the Dardanelles, escaping the whole French and British fleets. Had British and French warships followed them up the Straits, sunk them under the very eyes of the Turkish Government, the course of events might have been altered and the worst of Allied disasters avoided. But Allied purpose had not yet reached this point; Allied admirals lacked the courage of Nelson in the case of Copenhagen.

With the safe arrival of these ships, Turkey was lost to the enemies of Germany. Aided by their presence, Enver Pasha was able to throw his government into the hands of the Germans. More than this, these same ships, at last issuing forth from the Bosporus and attacking Russian ports and shipping, provoked that Russian declaration of war which placed Turkey definitely on the side of the Central Powers. Count d'Erlon's blundering march and countermarch in the Waterloo

campaign was only one degree more disastrous to his Emperor than was this failure of British naval officers to the Allied cause—French ships were then engaged in covering the transport of French troops from Morocco and Algeria to France—to the whole Allied cause in the spring and summer of 1915.

GLIMPSES OF THE SQUADRONS OF THE AIR




AMERICANS WHO FLEW FOR FRANCE

This picture shows some of the members of the Escadrille Lafayette, an organization made up of American aviators. From left to right: Lieutenant de Laage de Mieux (the French instructor), Johnson, Rumsey, McConnell, Thaw, Lufbery, Rockwell, Masson, Prince, and Hall. Within a short time after this photograph was taken, McConnell, Rockwell, and Prince, had been killed in action.



THE DREADNOUGHT OF THE AIR

The huge Brequet air cruiser, used for bombardment purposes and carrying machine guns as well as racks for launching bombs.



THE BATTLE CRUISER OF THE AIR

The new model Nieuport fighting machine mounts at great speed, rising to 7,000 feet in six minutes, and flies as high as 20,000 feet. The machine gun is mounted on the hood and shoots through the rapidly revolving propeller.



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THE WAR IN THE AIR

This giant Zeppelin was brought down in the suburbs of London by anti-aircraft guns. The envelope burned up ut the gondola was barely scorched. The whole incident afforded the British an excellent opportunity for studying ne secrets of German Zeppelin construction. The upper picture shows a German dirigible intact.





WOMEN VOLUNTEERS FOR THE FRENCH AËRIAL SERVICE



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This picture reminds one of the photographs of the crater-pitted face of the moon. But in reality it is an aviator's photograph of a modern battlefield. The numerous spots are the craters made by shell-explosions. The heavy lines drawn with mathematical precision are fortifications; and the lighter lines, more or less wavering, are the trenches

SOLDIERS FROM ALL THE SEVEN SEAS



A PAIR OF ABLE-BODIED ZOUAVES FROM THE GOLD COAST OF AFRICA

Decent Europeans at the front were often hard put to it, to explain the horrors of war to half-civilized men like these, who were familiar with such scenes among savage men and beasts in the African jungles. But as missionaries had assured them that such behaviour was abhorred by civilized men, they were much puzzled by the "frightfulness" rampant in France and Belgium.



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TURCOS

In this war of many nations, men and costumes of all sorts were to be met with. This picture shows a group of French Turcos from Algeria, solicitous as to the manner of preparation of their midday coffee.




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CANADIAN TROOPS

A large proportion of the sparse population of Canada crossed the sea to fight for the mother country. With them went many Americans. After a period of training in England the Canadians and the Americans stood shoulder to shoulder in the trenches in France.







A TRUE WORLD WAR

From all quarters of the globe men come together to resist aggression by the Hohenzollern and the Hapsburg. Never before in the history of the world—not even in the Crusades—were men of such diverse and wide-scattered races banded together in a common cause. Here are Cossacks from Russia, Sikhs from India, and English Colonials from New South Wales.



A SENEGALESE INFANTRYMAN



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ANNAMESE SOLDIERS



MEN OF ASIA AND AFRICA

Few realize that there were troops of Mongolian race on the battlegrounds of Europe. The Japanese have taken a hand only upon the sea and at Kiao Chau. But here (*upper picture*) is a column of soldiery from French Cochin-China marching to their camp near Versailles. The lower picture shows a French Senegalese battalion going forward into action in the great Somme offensive.

CHAPTER NINE

THE BATTLE OF LEMBERG

I

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION

Russian mobilization, for which the preliminary orders were given as early as July 25th, was conditioned upon circumstances of Russia's western frontier. Here Poland projects, like a fist against a pillow, to use a familiar figure, deep into the block of Teutonic territories. Thus Russian armies operating about Warsaw or to the west of Warsaw would be fatally exposed to German or Austrian attacks coming south out of East Prussia or north out of Galicia, which touches the longitude of Brest-Litovsk, more than a hundred miles east of Warsaw.

This situation Russia was in the process of remedying when the war broke out. North of Warsaw from the Vistula, at the point where the Bug enters it, to the Niemen, the Russians had stretched a line of forts, beginning at Novogeorgievsk and ending at Kovno on the Niemen. This was the famous Bobr-Narew-Niemen barrier, but it derived its main strength not from fortifications but from the swamps and from the rivers that give it the name it bears. Westward, Warsaw had once been guarded by forts, but these had been demolished and Russian armies had planned, when the scheme of fortifications was complete, to stand before Warsaw, on the Blonie line, a system of field fortifications suggesting the Chatalja lines. Thence southward the Vistula supplied an admirable defensive position being in itself a serious military obstacle, a broad deep river with high wooded banks.

But Russian preparation had only begun, and south of the Vistula, from Ivangorod to the Volhynian province, there was a gap, between Lublin and Cholm, through which Austrian armies could advance upon Brest-Litovsk, operating far in the rear of Warsaw and behind the line of the Vistula. Until this gap had been closed, all positions to the west-

ward were gravely imperilled. And it is worth noting that the German advance to Warsaw, when it came, was successful because of this gap.


In this posture Russia was compelled to mobilize behind the Bug instead of the Vistula, using the Niemen and the three fortresses of the Volhynian triangle, Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, to guard her flanks. Only covering troops were left in Warsaw, and it was not until the strength of German numbers going west and the weakness of the army left in the east were disclosed, that Russia began her forward movement in Poland, the first positive evidence of which was the army pushed north out of Warsaw to the disastrous Battle of Tannenberg.

It seems now unquestioned that Russian mobilization, slow as it was because of the vastness of Russian area and the paucity of Russian railroads, took both the Germans and the Austrians by surprise and later led them to make angry charges about Russian preparations before the Serbian crisis. But this is a debate for the future. What is clear is that, by the middle of August, Russian armies were beginning to move. This movement was in two distinct areas. Two armies, one from the Niemen and one from the Vistula at Warsaw, pushed into East Prussia, met with considerable success in the third and fourth weeks of August, and were then brought to a dead halt by the disaster at Tannenberg, which destroyed one of the armies and eventually forced the retirement of the other.

The second group of armies was the more considerable and did not number less than a million, at least twice the strength of the other two armies combined. This group was divided into three armies commanded by Ivanoff, Russky, and Brusiloff, names that were to become famous in the history of the war. Ivanoff's army was based upon Brest-Litovsk and by the middle of August was moving south covering Lublin and the gap that opened toward Brest-Litovsk. His mission was to hold any Austrian invasion south of Lublin, but the main thrust was to be made by the other armies.

Russky's army came west along the Kiev-Lemberg railroad, having Kiev as its base, and advanced directly upon Lemberg, crossing the Galician frontier about Brody in the fourth week of August. Brusiloff

brought his army up along the Odessa-Lemberg railroad, taking the field only when it became clear that Roumania intended to remain neutral. The original mission of this army was to protect Odessa and southwestern Russia from Roumanian attack, if Roumania remained faithful to her alliance with Austria and Germany. The release of this army actually made the victory of Lemberg possible and in this way Roumania



THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE ON ALL FRONTS, SEPT. 1ST, 1914

I–Rennenkampf
II–Samsonoff
III–Ivanoff
IV–Russky
V–Brusiloff

served her old allies an evil turn quite comparable with that served them by Italy, when her proclamation of neutrality released French troops to fight at the Marne. Brusiloff crossed the frontier near Tarnopol, also east of Lemberg, and advanced toward this city, his flank along the Dniester. His junction with Russky was completed before the battle began and his part in the first engagement was decisive.

II. AUSTRIA'S PLANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany was disposing of France. At the very outset it is plain that the High Command of the Dual Alliance fatally underestimated the speed and the force of the Russian blow. Thus Germany borrowed two of the best Austrian corps for her western drive and was putting them into operation in Alsace when Austrian disaster came. In addition, three or four more corps had been sent south to deal with Serbia. This latter army was far too small to fight an offensive campaign with the well-equipped and well-trained veterans of King Peter and suffered immediate and terrible disaster at the Jedar, while Russia was still just beginning to get across the frontier into Galicia, a full week before Tannenberg, and about the time of Charleroi.

It may be doubted whether Austria actually put in the field against Russia many more than 600,000 troops at the outset. In any event, she was outnumbered by at least two to one. She further invited disaster by dividing her armies. One (Auffenberg's) she stationed across Galicia from north to south, east of and covering Lemberg; its right or southern flank rested on Halicz on the Dniester, its northern flank was behind the Bug, and its centre behind the Zlota Lipa, on high ground. This position was excellent and it had been protected by well-constructed field works, but it was far too extended for the number of troops Austria had available.

The second Austrian army (Dankl's), leaving railhead at the San, moved straight north into the Lublin gap, aiming at Brest-Litovsk and having for its ultimate purpose to compel the Russians to evacuate War-

saw and all of Poland. This was an exceedingly ambitious thrust, it was entirely beyond the capacity of the army and the generals that first undertook it, but it did actually succeed less than a year later, and its success demonstrated the weakness of the Russian position and the wisdom of the original Russian strategic conception, which called for an evacuation of all the territory west of the Bug.

It will be noted that neither the Russians nor the Austro-Germans, in the opening days, undertook any operations in that part of Poland west of Warsaw. The Germans lacked the numbers for any such operation; the Russians were stopped by the concentration of Austrian armies opposite Lublin, which had a deadly menace for any army west of Warsaw. It is only after the German thrust at Warsaw, made possible by Tannenberg, had been undertaken and failed, that Russia ventures into this area, resigning the Galician field for the moment, and then she comes within a hairsbreadth of a crushing defeat at Lodz and makes no further effort in this field, standing stolidly on the defensive.

The opening of the last week in August, then, sees these two major efforts on foot. Russia is advancing with her two armies along the Kiev and on the Odessa railroads and standing firm with her Third Army about Lublin; Austria is holding one army before Lemberg and sending the other north into Volhynia and actually approaching Lublin, its presence already signalled by Austrian reports of victories about Krasnik. We may calculate that the Austrian armies are outnumbered about two to one and that as the armies before Lemberg begin the battle, the Austrians have learned that the Serbians have just won a sweeping victory at the Jedar and that Austrian invasion of Serbia has been abandoned.

Meantime, to complete the eastern picture, one Russian army is approaching Königsberg, having won a battle at Gumbinnen, and a second is approaching Allenstein in East Prussia, while Hindenburg is already preparing his amazing counterthrust. In the west Namur has fallen, the French have been beaten at Morhange and Charleroi, and all the Allied armies are beginning the great retreat which Berlin and Vienna interpret to be the collapse of French military power.

III. LEMBERG


The First Battle of Lemberg lasted not less than eight days. In its earlier stages it began along the Zlota Lipa, but the Austrians presently retired to their main front behind the Gnila Lipa, their southern flank still at Halicz and their centre about Krasne, on the Brody-Lemberg railroad, where it is joined by the Tarnopol-Odessa railroad there left behind the Bug. All this ground was again to be fought over by Brusiloff's great offensive in June, 1916.

The fact that the Austrian resistance finally collapsed has somewhat misled the world as to the nature of the struggle. It was exceedingly severe and for many days the Russians, despite heavy losses, were able to make no progress. Finally Brusiloff broke through to the south toward the Dniester and about Halicz, which he took. This success imperilled the whole Austrian line and it retreated through and beyond Lemberg—which fell on the first days of September, just at Tannenberg time—and took its stand behind the chain of Grodek lakes, a few miles west of Lemberg, its left flank reaching and passing Rawaruska.

This time the decisive thrust is made by Russky. His numbers are so much superior to Auffenberg's that he is able to turn his flank, and the Austrian line swings at right angles around Rawaruska and runs east and west; Russky takes Rawaruska, breaks the whole centre of the Austrians and throws the entire force, shaken by its defeats before Lemberg, into an utter rout.

Meantime Ivanoff, having at first retired before Dankl and permitted him to follow deep into Russian territory and become separated from Auffenberg, turns and delivers a heavy blow. Dankl's army is now left in air, its southern flank exposed by the collapse of Auffenberg, and he is compelled to make a disorderly retreat, approximating a flight, back to and across the San, giving up Jaroslav and coming back behind the Wisloka and approaching Cracow. Auffenberg's army retires over the Carpathian passes into Hungary. Before the Austrian flight had at last paused the Russians announced that they had taken 250,000 prisoners, vast numbers of guns, and an enormous store of munitions and material.

In point of fact, Lemberg was one of the complete disasters of military history; it brought the Austrian war establishment to the edge of ruin and disclosed a fundamental weakness, which, despite German effort and temporary success in the summer campaign of 1915, could not be quite cured and was revealed afresh on the same ground in the campaign that opened the summer of 1916. Differences of race, the manifest lack of



THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA—BATTLE OF LEMBERG

A–Russky C–Ivanoff E–Dankl
B–Brusiloff D–Auffenberg

sympathy on the part of Slav contingents with their task of fighting Russians to please their German and Magyar masters, defective training and insufficient preparation, above all inadequate numbers for the task assigned, all these things combined to make Lemberg an Austrian disaster of first magnitude.

The immediate consequences were the loss of all of Galicia to the San, the advance of Russian troops beyond the San as far as the Wisloka, the investing of Przemysl, the passage of the Carpathians by Cossack raid-

ing parties, and the first arrival of the invader in the Hungarian Plain. Austrian troops had to be recalled from Alsace and from Serbia to retrieve the lost situation and the first demand was made upon Germany to come to the aid of her Austrian ally. By the battle Austria lost 20,000 square miles of territory; Lemberg, a city of more than 200,000 people; the great oil district of eastern Galicia. She lost also not less than half of her first-line troops, counting the Jedar casualties, and, in addition, material of war which could only slowly be replaced.

Austrian defeat at Lemberg coincided with German repulse and retreat at the Marne. But for the unhappy disaster at Tannenberg, the second week in September would have seen all the armies of the Central Powers in retreat or rout. Had Tannenberg not released Hindenburg's army, it would have been from the western armies that Germany would have had to draw corps to repair the Galician situation. She was not now compelled to do this, but the consequences of Lemberg were ultimately to put a term to western operations for a year and a half.

The decision at Lemberg did not endure so long as did that of the Marne; the Germans abolished it at the Dunajec in April. But while the decision stood, it continued to hamper and embarrass German effort. Russia was temporarily compelled to withdraw from the region west of the San, by the first German drive at Warsaw; after Lodz, she was still before Cracow, and it required a new effort in Poland to compel her to abandon her thrust for Cracow. Then she turned to the Carpathians, and the immediate demand of Hungary compelled Germany to send troops to guard Hungarian passes.

In the end Germany had to give over the attack upon Warsaw through Poland and turn her main attention to Galicia. When she did this she reversed the decision of Lemberg and promptly turned the Russians out of Galicia, but this was only in the last days of April, and the Russian victory had begun in the last days of August. Lemberg is, then, the second great Allied victory of the war, ranking immediately after the Marne. It gave the world its first evidence of the new character of Russian armies, demonstrated that the evils of the Japanese War had been remedied, and that Russian generalship was as good as German or

French. Disasters due to the failure of ammunition somewhat marred this new reputation, but in 1916, when munitions had been supplied, Russian armies began to win new victories of an impressive character.

It is fair to say that Lemberg and the Marne together demonstrated that Germany had terribly underestimated her Continental foes. Two years were to pass before she was to reform her estimate as to British troops. But by the middle of September she and her Austrian ally had fought three great battles, as she had planned, which should have decided the issue of the war, but two had been lost, and the third had only saved Germany from ruin and had not crushed France or Russia.

CHAPTER TEN

WARSAW

I

CONDITIONS OF THE FIRST BID


About October 1st the Russians had passed the San in Galicia and were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain. In the west the Siege of Antwerp was approaching its promptly decisive stage, and the German campaign to abolish the decision of the Marne by a final offensive through Flanders was taking final shape.

It was now necessary to aid the Austrians, but it was not possible to withdraw troops from the west, unless Germany was willing to accept a deadlock from Switzerland to the North Sea, and she was far from ready to do this. There remained the possibility of using the larger portion of the army of Hindenburg, which had won Tannenberg and pursued the second Russian army in East Prussia—that of Rennenkampf—from the very gates of Königsberg across the frontier. Gathering up the mass of this army and leaving the balance to retreat slowly before the Russians, the German General Staff might transport it rapidly, by those admirable strategic railroads which follow the frontier in a semicircle from East Prussia to Cracow; put it in at Lodz, which had fallen into German hands early in the war; call upon Austrian troops, returning from Serbia or from Alsace, and make a sudden drive at Warsaw.

If the drive achieved the maximum of success, Warsaw would be captured, together with Ivangorod to the south, the objective of the Austrian fraction of Hindenburg's army; Germany would, at a single thrust, win the west bank of the Vistula, an enormously strong military position. Behind this line she could hope to stand inexpugnably and

devote her efforts to preparing to renew the conflict in the west in the spring.

But if this maximum was not realized, there was a minimum that was assured, Russia had no troops of material consequence between Lodz and Warsaw: most of her military strength was now in Galicia



RUSSIAN INVASION OF GALICIA, ABOUT OCTOBER 1, 1914

The Russians were moving toward Cracow, the first investment of Przemysl had begun, and Cossacks were pouring through the still-unfortified passes of the Carpathians and penetrating the Hungarian Plain

pressing against the Austrians and moving toward Cracow. Unquestionably the first sign of a German thrust for Warsaw would compel the Russians to give over their Galician operations, draw out many corps and send them to save Warsaw, and thus dislocate their whole Galician concentration. When this began the Austrians could undertake a new offensive in Galicia, designed to crush the weakened Russian armies, and the danger to Cracow, as well as the menace to Hungary through the Carpathians, would be abolished.

This was the main purpose of the offensive toward Warsaw. Austria must be helped. The help she required could still be furnished without any draft upon the western lines, but such help would not be sufficient to win a decisive battle, if Russia made a prompt concentration. It could only get Warsaw if speed enabled the Germans to seize that strong position before Russian numbers could be brought up. It was a serious bid for Warsaw, but it was a bid begun with the full recognition that it had at best no more than half a chance of success.


In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with precisely the same purpose in view. It was possible that Early might get Washington. If he did, the success would be of enormous political and moral value; but even if he failed he was likely to compel Grant, hanging doggedly to his footing before Petersburg, to weaken his front to relieve Washington, and this would give Lee a respite. It might lead Grant to abandon his whole effort to get Richmond, from his position south of the James. Early failed, as did Hindenburg, because troops from the other front arrived in time. But unlike Lee's thrust, that of Hindenburg succeeded in dislocating the other enemy concentration, that in Galicia.

There was further, a political purpose in the German thrust. The attitude of the Poles toward the conflicting nations was obscure. It was possible and reasonable for the Germans to hope that the Poles, if a German invasion carried Warsaw, might turn from their Russian allegiance and become the allies of the invader, as they had in the Napoleonic time when they furnished the great Emperor with at least one marshal and some of his best and bravest troops. This German hope was not realized, partly because the failure to get Warsaw necessitated a retreat, in which Poland was laid in ashes by contending armies, but it was an important consideration in the German mind and it was a possibility recognized fully by the Russians.

II. AT THE GATES OF WARSAW

Under these circumstances and about October 1st, Hindenburg began his advance in two columns—one following the railroad east from Kalisz

to Warsaw; the other, mainly composed of Austrians, moving northeast along the railroad from Cracow to Ivangorod. Combined, these armies did not number six army corps, possibly there were but five; certainly their total strength was less than that of Kluck's army in the Marne campaign. These armies had something like a hundred miles to go; they had, when the advance began, practically no Russian



HINDENBURG'S FIRST CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW, OCT. 20, 1914

The German thrust for Warsaw diverted the Russians from their operations in Galicia. This was its main purpose. In the Civil War, Lee sent Early against Washington with a precisely similar object in view

troops before them, and they had reasonably good roads to follow. They began with the full expectation of taking Warsaw within the fortnight, and the news of the fall of Antwerp overtook them on the road and gave them new enthusiasm.

With little or no fighting, moving with almost incredible rapidity, these two armies advanced until, on October 14th, one army stood on the

outskirts of Warsaw, in the suburb of Prushkow, seven miles from the centre of the city, while the other had cleared the west bank of the Vistula before Ivangorod. At this moment German shells fell within the Polish capital, German aeroplanes bombed the city, there was a general exodus of the population, and the world believed that Warsaw was to share the fate of Antwerp. So sure did German victory now seem to the Turk that, under German pressure, Enver Pasha chose this moment to put his country into the conflict.

But Russian concentration was just prompt enough. While the Germans were in the suburbs of Warsaw, Siberian regiments pushed through the town and began to defend the outskirts. They were the advanced guards of eight corps, which came to Ivangorod and to Warsaw in the next few days. For a whole week there was sharp fighting before Warsaw, where Hindenburg stood checked but not convinced. But presently the Russian reinforcements crossed the Vistula about Ivangorod and north of Warsaw and came in on both flanks of the Hindenburg forces. October 21st Hindenburg broke off the engagement. He had never fought to the limit; he had stood before Warsaw long after the possibility of taking the town had passed, to preserve the threat as long as possible. His Austrian allies before Ivangorod had suffered severely; he had gotten off far more lightly.

Beginning October 21st, the first thrust at Warsaw transforms itself into a swift and orderly retreat, such as Frederick the Great taught Europe to expect from his Prussians, and in trim columns Hindenburg moved back to the frontier. As he retreated, the fact was disclosed that he had constructed fieldworks along his route, foreseeing retreat, and these gave his rearguards admirable protection. In this retreat he destroyed roads, railroads, bridges, actually abolishing most of the means of communication in Poland.

Meanwhile, in Galicia, the effect of the Warsaw drive had been exactly what had been hoped. The Russians had come out of the Carpathians and retired behind the San. The Austrians had rallied and taken the offensive, reaching and in spots passing the river. Przemysl had been relieved; there was a moment when the reconquest of Galicia

seemed to be within Austrian possibilities. But this moment passed. As the Germans retired from Warsaw the Russians in Galicia retook the offensive. This time, passing the San, they again—and as it turned out, finally—invested Przemysl and approached Cracow at the precise moment when the armies which had saved Warsaw and Ivangorod were coming southwest, and that of Ivangorod threatened Cracow from the north as the Galician army now threatened it from the east.


Thus the real benefit of Hindenburg's thrust was shortlived. By the time he had fallen back to the German and Austrian frontiers, his retreat was mainly toward the southwest, the Russian menace in Galicia had become even more serious than it had been when he started. He had but postponed the danger for a moment and he had now to deal with it in an aggravated form.

III. LODZ

We have now come to the moment when the western and eastern campaigns merge. Hindenburg is now compelled to make a second effort to relieve the Austrians in Galicia and save Cracow. He has still only very restricted numbers. The Germans are making their last desperate effort in Flanders; they have failed against the Belgians and French from Nieuport to Dixmude; they are attacking the British about Ypres, and the British are holding on doggedly while the French are striving to reinforce them. Unless the Germans can now break through in the west in a brief time, they will have to abandon the western effort and turn their attention eastward. The Russian pressure—which, in Allied plans, made before the war, should have become effective in the last days of August—is about to count in the last days of November.

For his second effort Hindenburg takes advantage again of the strategic railroads which run in a circle about the Russian frontier. In his drive at Warsaw he had used these railroads to move troops from East Prussia to Silesia. When he had failed at Warsaw he had retired southwest upon Cracow and Breslau, destroying Russian railroads as he retired. The Russian troops had followed him through Lodz and even

to the Silesian boundary. But, owing to the configuration of the territory, they were now farther from Warsaw than German troops at Thorn would be, and they had behind them only the ruined roads and railroads, which Hindenburg had wrecked.



HINDENBURG'S SECOND DRIVE FOR WARSAW

Hindenburg left only Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz, moved north to the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers, and there sent in several corps under Mackensen

MEN AND GUNS OF THE TWO KAISERS



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THE IMPERIAL GUARD PASSES IN REVIEW BEFORE EMPEROR WILLIAM

At the left of the Kaiser is General Lowenfeldt, and at the extreme right General Von Bülow.



GENERAL VON MOLTKE



GENERAL VON FALKENHAYN



GENERAL VON HEERINGEN



CROWN PRINCE RUPERT OF BAVARIA

General Von Moltke, nephew of the great Moltke of Bismarck's day was Chief of Staff at the outbreak of the World War. Because of his failure to seize and hold the French and Belgian seacoast when opportunity offered and because of rumored mistakes in the Battle of the Marne, Moltke lost his position and turned over his office to the Kaiser's favorite, Falkenhayn, whose star was to set before Verdun as Moltke's set on the road to Calais.

The armies of General Von Heeringen and Crown Prince Rupert of Bavaria met the French after they had penetrated German territory some fifteen or twenty miles, about a fortnight after the War began. The battle was an undoubted German victory. The French "75's" were outranged by the heavy German field artillery, and in three days the French were driven back across the border and the invasion of Lorraine was at an end.

A fortnight later, while the Battle of the Marne was on, these same generals fought another engagement on this same front—"the Second Battle of Nancy." They were opposed, as before, by the French general Castelnau. Their aim was to cut through the gap in the French barrier forts between Toul and Epinal and thus arrive on the flank and rear of all the French armies. Though fighting under the eyes of the Kaiser himself they were repulsed with great slaughter—else the Battle of the Marne might have ended very differently.





Photograph by Paul Thompson

GENERAL MACKENSEN

GENERAL LUDENDORFF





THE KAISER IN WARTIME

GENERAL VON KLUCK

General Mackensen, conqueror of the Russians under Dmitrieff at the Dunajec, in the spring of 1915. The trapped Roumanian army surrendered to him in December, 1916.

General Ludendorff, close associate of Hindenburg. He has been called "the brains of Hindenburg," and even the "real German dictator." His mastiff-like visage recalls the bull-dog countenance of Hindenburg and even more the resolute mask of the old "Iron Chancellor" Bismarck.

The Kaiser's wartime photographs betray the fact that he has aged greatly during the conflict. This shows him in his field uniform, with helmet covered so as to offer no glittering mark to sniping aviators. For all the dozens of gaudy uniforms in which he used to take so much delight, he has never been indiscreet enough to lead an army in person—except at manœuvres. He is said, however, to have waited "in shining armour" to take part in one or two triumphal entries which failed to come off.

General Von Kluck, about August 23d, made a desperate effort to "run around the end" of the Allied line, interposed between it and Paris and produce another Sedan. He did not quite succeed, and immediately found himself in a very dangerous position during the Battle of the Marne. Thanks to Sir John French's failure to rise to the occasion, Kluck was able by dint of desperate fighting against the gallant Maunoury to make good his retreat to the Aisne.



Photograph by Paul Thompson

ONE OF HINDENBURG'S THRUSTS AT WARSAW

There is plenty of room on this broad road for ammunition and supply trains to advance along with the infantry.



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AN INCIDENT DURING THE GERMAN EFFORT TO DRIVE THE RUSSIANS HOME FROM GALICIA

The German soldiers are coming out of the garrison church at Przemysl, after attending Sunday morning service. Few civilians are in the street and the shop-windows are tightly shuttered.



Copyright by Brown & Dawson

EFFECT OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT OF PRZEMYSL



GENERAL VON AUFFENBERG (Right)

The unlucky Austrian general from whom the Russians captured a quarter of a million prisoners at the Battle of Lemberg, one of the great disasters of military history which brought the Austrian war establishment to the verge of ruin.



Photograph by Paul Thompson

TYPICAL AUSTRIAN INFANTRYMEN

As is shown in another part of this book the Austri makes a good and courageous soldier. Men of ma diverse races fight under the colours of the Dual Monarc yet no dissension has appeared.



PARCELS FROM FRIENDS AT HOME ARRIVE TO CHEER GERMAN ARTILLERY OFFICERS BEFORE WARSAW



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THE AUSTRIANS

It was Austria's mission in Austro-German strategy to meet the main Russian thrust and parry it, while Germany disposing of France. But Austria was unable to carry out her part of the program, and when she had been de-ed by the Serbians at the Jedar and by the Russians at Lemberg, Germany was compelled to draw troops from western front to send to her rescue and thus lost her own chance for a quick victory over France


The upper picture shows some of the celebrated Rangers Corps guarding a road; the lower one, a group of officers ed before one of the guns used in bombarding Antwerp.



ONE OF THE SKODA HOWITZERS THAT REDUCED LIEGÉ

On August 7th, the German infantry penetrated between the forts before Liegé and occupied the city an citadel; but they were unable to take the forts. These maintained their fire till German and Austrian heavy guns brought forward. Under this attack the forts crumbled almost instantly. They were the work of the fa Brialmont, and supposed to be very strong. But they had been allowed to fall into disrepair and their reduction p to be child's play to the mighty new engines of destruction.

Accordingly Hindenburg left only the Austrians to deal with the advancing Russians on the front from Cracow to Kalisz and moved his mass right along the frontier north to Thorn and the gap between the Vistula and Warthe rivers and there sent in several corps under Mackensen, soon to earn world fame. These troops moved rapidly



THE BATTLE OF LODZ, DURING HINDENBURG'S SECOND CAMPAIGN FOR WARSAW

Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians, and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners

across the flank and rear of the Russians to the southeast, turned their flank and presently interposed between them and Warsaw, much as Kluck sought to interpose between the Anglo-French forces and Paris in the September campaign in the west.

Here, then, in the last days of November, while the Battle of Ypres is just ending, is the promise of a second Tannenberg, the capture of a large Russian army, and the ultimate fall of Warsaw. The position of

the Russian army is desperate, it would seem, because its northern flank is turned by the Germans, while it is assailed in front by more Germans, and the Austrians have advanced north from Cracow, threatening its southern flank. But the Russians escaped, showing again the same qualities which shone, even in disaster, in the Manchurian campaign.

At the moment when Russky, who commanded at Lodz, seemed lost, the Germans on his northern flank are involved by a thrust out from Warsaw and south from the Vistula made by troops brought down from East Prussia and out of the fortress garrisons. Two German corps are surrounded and Petrograd, long silent in the midst of disaster, suddenly claims a huge success. This does not happen. General von François, the German commander whose corps are trapped, manages to fight his way out, by exertions which the Russians frankly concede to have been "unbelievable." The Germans are helped by failures of Rennenkampf, who once more, as in the Tannenberg times, discloses tardiness and now goes into retirement.

But already the situation has compelled the Germans to borrow aid from the west. The end of the western campaign has come and the decision of the Marne stands. Troops hurried eastward soon turn the balance against the Russians and December 6th the Germans reënter Lodz after six weeks of the most sanguinary fighting the war in the east had yet seen. German official reports claim 100,000 Russian prisoners; the Russians claim material captures, but the actual effect of all the fighting has been, in the immediate area of conflict, to reproduce western conditions of deadlock, and the Polish front rapidly tends to descend into the same state of trench warfare that has obtained on the Aisne since the middle of September.

IV. THE THIRD BID FOR WARSAW

When in October the Russians began their advance from Warsaw, following Hindenburg toward Cracow, it seems clear that they temporarily renounced the Galician field as the main theatre of operations and put forth their full strength in Poland. After Lodz they again reverted to their old idea. Lodz demonstrated clearly that it would be impos-

sible to move west out of Poland. It was, in fact, as the Germans said in their official announcements at the time, a permanent check to Russian offensive toward Silesia and Posen.

On the other hand, while the first Hindenburg advance toward Warsaw had checked the Russian operations in Galicia and turned them into a retirement behind the San, the Lodz operation did not affect the Galician field and the Russians still continued to press on toward Cracow, after their Polish army had evacuated Lodz, and retired toward Lowicz and Skierniewice, covering Warsaw. A new effort was required to relieve the Galician situation. This new effort was made in Poland; in it we see, unmistakably, the contribution of troops brought from the west. The necessity for this operation was revealed in the severe defeat suffered by Austrian armies coming up out of the Carpathians and seeking to relieve Przemysl and redeem western Galicia.

Accordingly Hindenburg resumed his pressure in Poland; from the Lower Vistula south before Lodz he began a terrific frontal attack upon the Russians, employing the numbers he had now borrowed from the west. Under this pressure the Russians retired slowly, giving over Lowicz and Skierniewice and retiring upon Warsaw. They finally took their stand on the eastern banks of the Bzura and Rawka, little rivers which together stretch straight across the front of Warsaw from the Lower Vistula for many miles south. Below this system the Russians fortified the banks of the Pilitza and then of the Nida, which enters the Upper Vistula north of Tarnow.

The position was largely accidental. The Russians had intended to defend Warsaw from the Blonie lines, much nearer the city; the Bzura is more than twenty miles west of the Polish capital. But little by little they discovered that their lines held; they found that they had been driven into a defensible position, and they hung on. At the same time they drew back from before Cracow, north of the Vistula, standing behind the Nida, south of it behind the Dunajec. They had now entered the lines they were to hold from December until May between the Lower Vistula and the Carpathians, and until August before Warsaw.


The German attacks upon the Bzura-Rawka lines recalled the similar efforts in Flanders, at the Yser and before Ypres. German losses were exceedingly heavy; German gains were inconsiderable, a trench here, a farmhouse there. Meantime the weather had come to the rescue of Russia. An early and severe winter had destroyed Napoleon. The winter of 1914-1915 was one of the mildest in Polish history and the roads were turned into swamps. The superior mobility of the Germans was abolished as a factor and they were unable to use their heavy artillery because of the difficulties of transport. These conditions had materially affected the Lodz operation; they had an almost decisive influence now.

By January 1st the attempt to get Warsaw by frontal attack has failed. It will be resumed in January and February, combined with a thrust south from East Prussia, via Mlawa and along the railroad up which the Russians had marched to disaster in the Tannenberg time. But it will fail again, and this failure will be absolute. Meantime, the Russians will abandon their momentary plan to move west from Poland toward Breslau and through Galicia to Cracow. They will more and more direct their energies toward forcing the passes of the Carpathians and reaching the Hungarian Plain.

Well into February the Germans will continue their efforts to get Warsaw from the front and from the north. In all of this time they will content themselves with bolstering up Austrian defence in Galicia by more and more considerable reinforcement, and by a gradual taking over, first of High Command and then of the direction of the smaller units. It is not until the February attacks fail, and the Russian line before Warsaw is proven too strong to be broken, that Germany, in her turn, will go to Galicia and make her main effort in the field where, for many months, Russia has been steadily progressing.

January 1st, then, is a date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. From the Baltic to the Carpathians the line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed. There is a slight fluctuation in East Prussia; it will be February before the Germans,

having won the Battle of the Mazurian Lakes, can announce that East Prussia is freed from the invaders. But actually the decision has been reached, Warsaw cannot be taken from the north or from the west. Germany must make up her mind to this, and when she makes up her mind it will be too late to hope to resume the great western offensive in the spring.



DEADLOCK IN POLAND, DEC., 1914–MAY, 1915

January 1st is the date when it is possible to dismiss the Warsaw operation as actually terminated, despite subsequent efforts. The line begins to take the same stationary form that the western line has already assumed

Instead, there must be prepared a new eastern campaign and that campaign will have for its real purpose, not alone taking Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, not merely abolishing the threat of Austria, but destroying the military power of Russia and compelling a separate peace; in a word, adopting against Russia the strategy and purpose which failed against France at the Marne.

V. SERBIA TRIUMPHANT AGAIN

While the German advance from Lodz upon Warsaw was going forward, a fresh Austrian disaster attracted the attention of the world. As far back as the first days of November, Austria, hoping permanent relief from the German operations toward Lodz, had detached troops to dispose of the Serbian nuisance, which, since the victory of the Jedar, had injured Austrian prestige and imperilled Hapsburg power in all the Slav regions, but particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

And once more it was reserved for Serbia, prime cause of all the terrible world conflict, to give Europe a great surprise, the fourth in three brief years, and to win a shining and conspicuous triumph.

In 1913, at the outset of the First Balkan War—when Europe preserving the memory of Slivnitza, forecast Serbian defeat, and the invasion of Serbia by the Turks was prophesied by those most hopeful of Bulgarian victory—it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who proved irresistible, invincible, won back Old Serbia at Kumanovo, Macedonia at Monastir, and captured the Turkish Commander at Adrianople.

A few months later, when Austria had precipitated the Second Balkan War to destroy King Peter's nation, it was the Serb and not the Bulgar who again prevailed, and the Battle of Bregalnitza as completely shattered the legend of Bulgarian invincibility as the reverse of Mars-la-Tour had wrecked that of France. The victims of a breach of faith, attacked by night and without warning, without declaration of war, the Serbs rallied, took the offensive, sent the Bulgars in rout back over the Rhodopians and restored to Serbia the southern half of the empire of the great Dushan.

Finally, in the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period that culminated at the Marne. At the Jedar four Austrian army corps had been routed, Austrian prestige in the Balkans shattered, the first Slav triumph won in that long series which by December was to bring Austria to the lowest ebb in her history since the Hungarian Revolution.

On December 1st Serbia was once more in the presence of grave peril. The October drive of Germany had released several army corps of Austrians in Galicia and Poland, and these came south to complete the work of destroying the troops of King Peter, who had for months defended their frontiers. Before this overwhelming force the Serbs had retreated. All the corner of Serbia between the Save and the Drina was lost. Coming east from Bosnia the Austrian right approached Belgrad, which for four months had defied daily bombardment; the centre



SERBIAN BATTLEFIELDS

I—The Jedar, August, 1914. In the opening month of the World War, when the fortune of the Allies in the west was most desperate, it was the victory of the Serb at the Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated at the Marne

II—Valievo, December, 1914. One of the most complete of Austrian disasters

reached Valievo, the left penetrated to Uchitza, on the Serbian Morava. Presently Belgrad fell, a birthday present to the aged Francis Joseph, the only conquest of his army in the whole struggle.

In the first week in December the fate of Serbia seemed sealed. A second Belgium, another little state destroyed in the contest between the great, seemed assured. Austrian armies appeared certain to reach Nish, the temporary Serbian capital, to open the Orient Railway to the Bulgarian frontier and persuade Bulgaria, still smarting from her defeat by Serbia, to cast her lot with the two Kaisers and open her territory for the passage of the Turks to the battlelines of western Europe.

In the moment of greatest peril, however, Serbia was saved—partly by her own courage, by her own determination, without which destruction was inescapable; partly by the new advance of the Russians. While the Austrian troops were still before Belgrad, Cossacks once more crossed the Carpathians, swept down into the Hungarian Plain; panic reached the very gates of Budapest, and three army corps were hurriedly recalled from Serbia to defend Hungary. Once more at the critical moment the Austro-German Alliance had to surrender triumph in one field because of deadly peril in another.

No sooner had the three corps been withdrawn than the Serbs again took the offensive. Old King Peter, now stricken in years and infirmities, but retaining something of the fire that earned him his cross of the Legion of Honour as a soldier of France in 1870, rode in front of his troops, mounted on a white charger, and harangued them as their chiefs of remote centuries were accustomed to do. Then followed one of the most complete of Austrian disasters. In a few days the whole force had fled across the frontiers, leaving thousands of prisoners, many cannon, and much material, behind them. Belgrad was retaken; by December 15th Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being; saved until the third—and fatal—attack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

NEW HORIZONS AND NEW GERMAN PROBLEMS

I

NEW YEAR, 1915

The New Year—which was to witness the most brilliant military triumphs of Modern Germany, triumphs rivalling the Napoleonic cycle—opened dismally enough for Berlin. Five months of war and a million casualties had sufficed to complete the destruction of all the initial plans and hopes of Germany. The supreme hope, that of a short war, had gone glimmering and Lord Kitchener's forecast of a three-year war had begun to find converts even in Germany. And the prospect of a long war raised new problems, of which the military, if it was not the most pressing, was by no means the least.

In point of fact, new political considerations were now becoming apparent. There was the question of Austria, a question at once political and military; there was the problem of Italy, destined to become more and more grave as the months passed until the spring should see the House of Savoy again in the field against the House of Hapsburg. There was, too, the similar and only less serious problem of Roumania, which was not to find so speedy a solution as that of Italy, but was destined to prove even more dangerous to German safety. There was the additional necessity to care for Turkish defence, a necessity which would grow with the months and become pressing in the spring, when the Allied fleets knocked at the door of the Dardanelles and Allied armies took root on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Finally, the problem of sea power was beginning to become acute. A world which too eagerly and too completely accepted the British view as to the effect of the British blockade was not completely mistaken in recognizing thus early that the British fleet would steadily and increasingly hamper the domestic economy of Germany and compel

her to employ one expedient after another to meet the shortage incident to the blockade. Only in food did the reckoning prove radically mistaken and even in this department there was discomfort, without immediate or intolerable privation.

The sense of this closing net, the anger at the nation which thus struck the whole German people while it remained removed from the weight of German arms, was to drive the German Government, the naval school of Tirpitz, into a submarine campaign that would involve neutrals, and in the case of the greatest of all neutrals, the United States, produce a situation which after many clashes would at last add the United States to the nations at war with Germany.

The paralysis of the German merchant marine; the closing of the seas to the German flag while British, French, and even Belgian ships still sailed the ocean and brought to French and British ports the munitions and supplies essential to preserve them, while their own factories were still unready and their own industrial system not yet readjusted; the resources of ships and sailors, which permitted the transport of armies; the arrival of colonial troops from Australia, Canada, India, which permitted the nations to redress the balance which was with Germany at the outset, thanks to her superior preparation; these were things that exercised an ever-growing influence upon German thought and German action.

Nor could there be any mistaking the resentment in the whole Fatherland, as it was recognized that, so far as the world was concerned, Germany had become a besieged city, and German explanations and German statements, save for the few fugitive messages sent through the air, were condemned to satisfy German readers alone; while the world, the neutral world to which Germany desired to appeal, found its evidence and drew its conclusions from anti-German sources alone.

II. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

Looking first at the military problem, it was plain on January 1, 1915, that German prospects, without being desperate, were dark. It was true that men, the world over, too promptly began to compare the

posture of Germany in 1915 with that of Napoleon in 1813. The outside world neither understood the enormous accession of faith and confidence the restricted victories of the opening phase had brought to Germans, and the unparalleled magnitude of German effort which was to come, nor could they realize, as the Germans did, how futile were many of the hopes in Allied quarters of the prompt arrival of Kitchener's millions and the limitless flow of Russian masses.

Yet, despite the exaggerations, the fundamental conception of the non-Teutonic world was correct. Germany had failed at the Marne and in her subsequent efforts to reverse the decision of the Marne. Her armies now stood on the defensive in the west and there was no promise that the initiative could be reclaimed. Two months of terrible slaughter before Warsaw had proven as sterile as the murder done in the battles of Flanders. Warsaw stood as Calais and Boulogne stood.

Looking southward to Austria the picture was dismal in the extreme. The defeat of Lemberg had shaken the whole fabric of Hapsburg military life. After Lemberg the efforts of German commanders to rally and reorganize Austrian armies had saved the armies, but it had failed to make them victorious. Temporary Russian retirements in Galicia had again and again been followed by Russian victories, and in the last days of the year a second Serb triumph had revealed the permanent disorder of Austrian forces. The Russian armies were again pressing up and over the Carpathians, and from Budapest came insistent demands that Germany should guard the Magyar marshes against the Slav danger.

Reckoning on the basis of country occupied, it was true that Germany was now fighting in foreign lands, for the most part. The East Prussian invasions had been repulsed, but not until grave injuries had been done to Junker estates. Not less than 8,000 square miles of industrial France, holding in peace times 2,000,000 people, was occupied, as was the bulk of Belgium and some 15,000 square miles of Russian soil. But, to balance this, France clung to a corner of Alsace, Russia to a paring of East Prussia, and Austria had lost in Galicia and Bukowina nearly 35,000 square miles of territory including the oil-fields of Galicia.

If anything else were needed to incline the balance toward the Allied

side, it could be found in the isolation and inevitable extinction of German colonial power. Togo and the Kamerun were both lost, Kiaou-Chau and the islands of the Pacific were gone. The doom of German Southwest Africa had been sealed by the failure of the Boer rebellion, and a Boer General, Louis Botha, was gathering up the troops which would presently conquer it. German East Africa still endured, but not even a German could believe that it would permanently escape the fate of the other colonies.

On the military side Germany had now once more to bend her energies to restore Austria. She had to reckon on the eventual demand of the Turk for guns, and men to man them. The chance of a resumption of the offensive in the west in the spring was already fading, but the failure meant more time for France and Britain, aided by the workshops of America, to restore the balance in numbers and preparation. The story of how Germany met the military problems is one of the most magnificent in military and industrial history. Unfortunately for her, the political problems were beyond her capacity—beyond all human capacity, probably—and, as it turned out, her military successes could only in part postpone the political perils that were now revealed.


III. ITALY

Of all the political problems, that of Italy was the most dangerous. Count Nigra had once said that Italy and Austria, in the nature of things, could only be allies or open enemies. The Triple Alliance had been denounced by Italy in the opening days of the war. With the denunciation of the fact of the Treaty, although the letter endured for some months thereafter, Italian hopes turned again to the Irredenta, and the Italian people, far more promptly than the Crown or the politicians, began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest, of the islands of the Adriatic and the lost Venetian province of Dalmatia, still adorned by some of the most splendid monuments of Ancient Rome.

Such an agitation could have but one consequence unless Austria were prepared to resign Triest and the Trentino, and Austria was not prepared for any such sacrifice. Under the influence of Germany she

tardily, very tardily, consented to certain cessions, but they were too slight to satisfy Italian demand. Bismarck, in refusing to allow his ally of 1866 to acquire Trent, had sown the seeds of later disaster, and almost from the morning of the war it was clear that Italy would eventually enter the alliance against Germany.

Turkish participation merely increased Italian agitation for war,



ITALIA IRREDENTA

As soon as the Triple Alliance was denounced, Italian hopes turned to the Irredenta, and the Italian people began to clamour for the acquisition of the Trentino and Triest

because the alliance of the Turk with the Central Powers, besides reopening the Tripolitan question, assured the latter of supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean, where Italy had great ambitions, all of which ran counter to those of Berlin and Vienna but found ready hearing and small opposition in Allied capitals. It was a desirable thing for Italy that Germany and Austria should be beaten. It would be a fatal thing for many Italian hopes if they won.

Nor was it less essential that Italy should contribute to the defeat of

the Central Powers, if she was to share in the results. There were in Greece and Serbia eager aspirants for the eastern shores of the Adriatic and the islands and shores of Asia Minor. The noise of Allied fleets before the Dardanelles forts presently awoke echoes in Rome that German diplomacy could not silence. The hereditary antipathy to the Austrian and the longing for Triest mounted with the weeks until they reached a point in popular emotion where Prince Bülow grimly conceded that "the street" had won; and Italy, despite the fears of her Sovereign and the opposition of Giolitti, her most influential politician, was plunged into the world strife.

We shall see that the decision came too late to prevent the German victory of the Dunajec, which transformed the whole face of the eastern war for a year. We shall see that Italian hesitations, taken with Allied blunders in the Balkans, combined to clear the way for the great drive through Serbia to Constantinople. But also, at a still more distant time, we shall see Italy sending her troops to Saloniki, as she had sent them to Valona, before she entered the war. We shall see her, at a critical moment, extending her declaration of war to include Germany.

But in January, 1915, the Italian danger was only apparent, it was not yet imminent, and Berlin could believe for many months that Italy would remain neutral. To this end she exerted all her efforts, and it was with an eye to the moral effect in Rome that she prepared the greatest of her victories, the Dunajec, which, unhappily for her, came just too late to check Italy's course, although it did avail to restrict the influence of Italy in the war for nearly a year. Fatally, however, the prospect of a long war was beginning to weigh upon Berlin, for if a swift victory such as those of 1866 and 1870 might have left the neutrals still reconciled to their rôles, a long war held out attractions to their racial and national hopes which could not be mistaken.

IV. ROUMANIA

Not less real than the Italian was the Roumanian danger. Within Austrian and Hungarian frontiers there lived more than 3,250,000 people of Roumanian tongue and race. They were a majority in the great

Hungarian province of Transylvania; the largest group amongst the many races in numbers in Temesvar; a considerable element in Bukowina. All these provinces touched the Roumanian frontier. In every Roumanian heart there had been for many years a desire to achieve the re-union of Roumania, as that of Italy had been achieved in the previous century. Could the Austrian provinces be won, Roumania would become a compact state of nearly 100,000 square miles, as large as the mainland of Italy; if not a Great Power, second only to Spain among the lesser nations of Europe.

Such hopes had seemed impossible of realization until the Second Balkan War first revealed the weakness of Austrian policy and the crumbling of the Hapsburg edifice. Until that time Roumania had, perforce, consented to remain a minor member of the firm of the Triple Alliance, and, as Italy had been drawn to Berlin by the quarrel with France over Tunis, Roumania had been influenced in the same sense by the gross injustice and ingratitude of Russia after the Turkish War. In that conflict Roumanian troops had saved the Russian army at Plevna, but Russia had robbed Roumania of her portion of Bessarabia and flung her a morsel of the Bulgarian Dobrudja as an insufficient recompense.

Ruled by a Hohenzollern, who in the opening days of the World War sought to cast the lot of his country with the head of his House, Roumania had marched with Berlin, Vienna, and Rome—held not a little by the presence of Italy in the partnership, which enlisted the Roumanian tradition of Latin origin—from the era of the Congress of Berlin to the outbreak of the Balkan wars. But when Austria, eager to crush Serbia, had given her support to the creation of a Bulgaria even greater than that which had been erected by the Treaty of San Stefano and abolished by the Congress of Berlin, Roumanian allegiance faltered.

Bulgaria was the rival of Roumania in the Balkans and had openly declared her purpose to reclaim the Dobrudja. Bulgarian plans looked forward to achieving a hegemony in the Balkans comparable to that which Prussia had achieved in Modern Germany. To all such plans Roumania was necessarily hostile, because they both threatened her integrity and menaced her influence. When Austria sacrificed Bukhar-

est for Sofia, Bukharest openly altered her policy; accepted Russian warrant for attacking Bulgaria; and, by her attack in 1913, completely demolished the whole structure of Austrian statecraft. Moreover, the Roumanian soldiers who invaded Bulgaria openly announced that they were taking this route to Transylvania and Bukowina.

Once the breach had been made, the consequences were inevitable. Roumania followed Italy in declaring her neutrality when the war came, despite the desire of the King, whose subsequent death soon removed a Teutonic ally not less potent than Constantine of Greece. When Italian policy began to drift toward the Allies, Roumania tacitly followed. More and more Roumanians looked over the Hungarian boundaries to where, beyond the Transylvanian Alps, millions of their race brothers suffered something approaching intellectual and moral slavery under the Magyar yoke.

When the first Russian victories brought the Slav to the Roumanian boundaries of Bukowina and even across the Carpathians into the Hungarian Plain, Roumanian patriots and politicians listened eagerly to Russian promises, based upon Roumanian participation. Only Russian disaster could abolish or postpone such participation. Had Russian diplomacy been a little less stiff or Roumanian demands a little less grandiose, Roumania might have followed Italy at once. As it was, the Dunajec postponed what it could not prevent. At Bukharest, as at Rome, German diplomacy was to perform miracles, but the ultimate failure was already assured, short of German victory in the war, when 1915 began.


V. AUSTRIA

The military side of the Austrian problem was plain. But the political aspects were not less patent to Berlin. Half of the Austrian population was Slav. In the opening battles Czech, Croat, Serb, and even Polish regiments fought with something less than half-hearted zeal. The Italians from Triest and the Trentino, the Roumanians from Transylvania and Temesvar, easily succumbed to the assault of enemies a degree less hateful to them than the races whose yoke they bore. The vast Russian captures after Lemberg, the Serbian disasters, the later

PICTURES OF TRENCH WARFARE



GERMAN SHELTERS OF SANDBAGS, IN THE DUNES ALONG THE BELGIAN COAST



THE ELABORATION OF TRENCH WARFARE

A typical trench on the western front, braced to prevent caving in, with the usual boardwalk and the numerous telephone and telegraph lines needed in a modern communication system. The shell case, hanging from the cross beam, is struck when a gas attack is discovered, as a warning to all within hearing to put on masks. The inset shows an underground telephone exchange which is part of the system of communication between the front lines and headquarters in the rear.



AN OBSERVATION STATION

These are placed in buildings, trees, shell craters, etc.—wherever the observer can see the effect of his batteries' fire. Telephone communication back to the gun is arranged and the observer then reports as to the range, the movements of his own and the enemy's infantry, etc.



AN UNDERGROUND PASSAGE DUG BY THE AUSTRIANS AT DUBUS, RUSSIA, WITH AN OUTLET IN A CHURCH



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WINTER QUARTERS


These German soldiers have made themselves very snug just behind the front in the Argonne region. The hut in the foreground is a field post office. The "corduroy" paths are reminiscent of pioneer days in America.



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

ANOTHER ASPECT OF LIFE IN THE TRENCHES

These Frenchmen are in the front line of trenches during a brisk bombardment. The shell-hole shows the Germans have got the range. The less venturesome of the pair finds his pipe useful in helping to preserve his sang-froid.



A LIGHT GUN ELABORATELY ENTRENCHED

Note the curtains which are closely drawn when there is danger of aërial observation. These guns are used to cut wire entanglements, destroy parapets, silence enemy artillery, and for barrage fire either with or without gas shells.



BELGIANS ENTRENCHED OUTSIDE ANTWERP

In this final stand of Belgian patriotism against the German invaders there is a strong appeal to American admiration. For a nation whose own history begins at Lexington, the resistance of the weak to the strong, the defense of liberty by the few against the many, at the cost of all that men hold dear, is a moving spectacle.





UNDERGROUND WITH THE BRITISH

(*Above*) King George inspects a trench won from the Germans.
(*Below*) These British Red Cross Officers have "dug themselves in" very comfortably and are just sitting down to dinner. Cave life is not always incompatible with good cheer.



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SHELTERS IN THE ALPS

Galician defeats, were all due in some part to the failure of the subject races of Austria and Hungary.

Yet it was of prime importance to prevent this disintegration from spreading, because every evidence of crumbling was but a new incentive to Roumanian and Italian appetite, and every Austrian disaster had an echo in Bukharest and in Rome which no one could mistake. It was not alone that the crumbling of Austria weakened the Central Alliance directly, but it was also that each new crack, each fissure, in the Austrian unity was a new invitation to other nations to enlist and add their numbers and resources to the enemies of Germany.

Napoleon faced the same problem in 1813, when he lingered in eastern Germany, because he realized that a retreat behind the Rhine would mean that his German allies would, either from desire or necessity, enter the ranks of his foes; as they did, when, at last, after the disaster at Leipzig, he was compelled to retire behind the old frontiers. More than all else this political situation forced itself to German attention in the shaping of the campaigns of 1915. It compelled the abandonment of the west, quite as much as any military consideration. It compelled Germany to allow to Britain the time to begin to get her masses in the field, and it held Germany in the east until February, 1916.

More and more it became clear that, while Germany continued to win victories, she could count on the neutrality of Roumania and the annoying rather than dangerous hostilities of Italy. But only in victory was there safety. On the military side, the Austrian armies would take on new efficiency when a German general and German artillery had won the Dunajec, and the great Russian retreat from the Carpathians to the Beresina began. But once the Russian counter-offensive came, Austrian armies would crumble in a new disaster comparable to that of Lemberg and having more immediately unfavourable consequences.

More and more Austria became a burden, a deadweight upon German military and civil policy. Less and less useful became Austrian military assistance, and greater and greater became the share of Germany in the work of the Alliance. But in addition to this was the posi-

tive peril that grew out of the long-standing enmities Austrian policy had engendered or out of the weaknesses inherent in the heterogeneous nature of Hapsburg populations, weaknesses that at one time contributed to the breakdown of the Austrian army and to the growth of the number of nations at war with Germany.

All this is clearer now than at the moment—yet little was hidden from German eyes—when the Kaiser's Ministers, with the opening of the new year, took up the problems of a long war and were compelled to estimate the assets and liabilities of their new undertaking. These influenced the military situation; they compelled strategy to bow before considerations of state; they forced the Germans to make their main effort in the east; and, even at this early date, they made clear the consequences of immediate or eventual failure either in the east or the west. From the task of destroying France, Germany was now definitely recalled to devote her best skill to the salvage of Austria.

CHAPTER TWELVE

ON THE EAST FRONT TO THE BATTLE OF THE DUNAJEC

I

IN THE CAUCASUS

The first days of January saw a considerable Turkish disaster on the Russian frontier in the Caucasus. Into this difficult region, where campaigning was made the more difficult by the severity of the winter, the Turks had, in obedience to German dictation, sent several of their best corps. The ostensible purpose was to recover the famous fortress of Kars, lost after a gallant defence in the last Russian war. But, in fact, Kars had small value for the Turks. The real purpose of their effort was to compel the Russians to divert troops to this front from the Austrian frontier and thus take off some of the pressure upon their hard-pressed German ally.

For the Turk there were much more pressing services to be performed near at hand. His entrance into the war had cost him the last, shadowy title to his ancient Egyptian estate, and the friendly Khedive had lost his throne. Britain had proclaimed a protectorate and placed an Anglophile ruler on the Khedivial throne, thus completing the work of making good her position in Egypt, recognized by France in the famous and fatal agreement of 1904. To Suez and to Cairo and to the lost African provinces, Tunis and Tripoli, opportunity seemed to beckon the Osmanli along the road that his Arab predecessors of the Caliphate had marched.

That such a venture might have succeeded seemed and seems possible. Britain still lacked the men to defend Egypt; the native troops were at least cold to their Christian masters, if they were not disloyal. Time had not been allowed for the fortification of the shores of the Suez Canal, which, less than a year after, were to face and master a Turkish attack. Could Suez have been reached, and the canal blocked,

the injury to Britain would have been great, although by no means as considerable as German military writers announced a year later, when the road from Berlin to Byzantium had been opened and Germany found a Teutonic purpose to be served by Osmanli effort at Suez.

German control of Turkish military policy was, however, complete, and while the proclamation of the Holy War was still stirring the imagination of the world, even if it fell flat in Islam, beyond the immediate territories of the Turk; while the world was looking for revolts in India and Egypt, in Tripoli and Tunis; while it was expecting Turkish attack at Suez, several Turkish corps were making the difficult advance from Erzerum toward Kars, and the Russian troops, heavily outnumbered, were falling back into the Caucasian marshes, south and east of Batum and Trebizond.

In this difficult country, suffering from insufficient equipment and from the rigours of a terrible winter, the Turks, after brief preliminary successes, met complete disaster. Of three corps, one, with its Turkish and German officers, was captured. Two more, striving to cover the retreat, were heavily beaten, losing flags, guns, and prisoners. Not less than 100,000 Turkish troops were thus eliminated from the battleline, and German prestige suffered its first heavy blow in Constantinople, a blow from which it did not recover until the successful defence of the city a few months later.

From this moment and for more than a year the Caucasus front loses its importance. The subsequent changes in position were not considerable. The Russians did not bring many troops east from the Galician front; the German purpose was not served by the Turkish effort. But when, in the next winter, the Russians were ready to move in this Armenian district, the fall, first of Erzerum and then of Trebizond, to the sword of the Grand Duke Nicholas, gave the world the first hint of the renaissance of Russian military strength, so shaken at the Dunajec and after.

II. LAYING THE ROUMANIAN PERIL

In December and early January Austrian disaster had for the second time led the world to believe that a collapse of the Dual Empire might

presently change the whole face of the conflict. While Russian armies again passed the central and eastern Carpathian passes, other forces swept Bukowina and approached Transylvania. The occupation of the Crownland was a fair invitation to Roumania to join the conflict on the Russian side and receive Bukowina as a bribe and Transylvania as a reward for participation.

For Germany the problem was promptly set to protect Hungary, grown impatient through disaster and anxious because of impending attack from Serbia, from Galicia and Bukowina, and because of the possibility of Roumanian hostility. The resignation of Count Berchtold and the selection of Baron Burian were evidences that, within the empire, Hungarian apprehensions were recognized. The visit of Count Tisza to the Kaiser was a sign that Germany had been warned.

This warning Germany received with all possible attention and acted upon with amazing promptness. Thus in January, while the Russian occupation of Transylvania was being discussed, German troops were brought south and concentrated in lower Hungary. Their purpose, it was duly announced from Vienna and Berlin, was a new invasion of victorious but stricken Serbia. Yet a few weeks later these troops appeared in Transylvania, and moved east, parallel to the Roumanian frontier, as a warning to the Hohenzollern king of this state that, to take Transylvania, he must fight the head of the House of Hohenzollern.

Under the pressure of these troops, Russian armies in Bukowina speedily began to give ground. Like the Shenandoah Valley in our Civil War, Bukowina was becoming a thoroughfare of invasion and a pathway of destruction. Step by step they were driven from before the Borgo and Kirilibaba passes; they were cleared out of the foothills of the Carpathians, and by the middle of February their retreat had halted at the Sereth River, a few miles south and west of Czernowitz and the Russian frontier; more than two thirds of Bukowina had been reconquered, and the Germans had interposed a wall of troops between the Czar and his prospective Roumanian ally.

At the same time there came from Budapest new rumours of Russian disaster, of the suicide of a Russian commander, and the capture of the

General Staff of the defeated army. These rumours were duly denied, but there remained the solid fact that Bukowina had been reconquered; the invitation to Roumania to participate in the war had been abruptly cancelled by German arms, and from Bukharest there came no more reports of the intervention of the Latin state without delay. On the contrary, there were credible reports of the release of vast stores of grain previously purchased by Germany and Austria, temporarily held up by the Roumanian Government, but now permitted to go north. A military campaign waged for obvious political ends had succeeded.

Nor did the quieting of Roumania end the success of German policy. A German loan to Bulgaria again stimulated rumour that Ferdinand and his Bulgarian subjects were contemplating an entrance into the war on the German side, were planning to retake Macedonia, to strike at Serbia and Greece, and, by cutting the Orient Railway, shut off the Slav state from Saloniki and foreign supplies, and, by invading the Valley of the Morava, open a road between Berlin and Constantinople and thus unite the Central European nations. This rumour, however idle at the moment, supplied an interesting forecast of what was to come, and gave Allied diplomacy a warning which it stupidly failed to take.

Finally, from Albania came a fresh incursion into Serbia along the marches of the Drina, directed at Prisrend and the territory still populated by Albanians but ceded to Servia and Montenegro by the Treaty of London. Here was new work for the Serbian army, calculated to keep it occupied, south of the Danube and away from Bosnia, until Germany had dealt with Russian activity in the southeast.

Such, briefly summarized, were the purpose and achievement of German arms in Bukowina. Thus promptly and completely had the Kaiser answered the appeal for help made a few weeks before; thus had he justified the affection and esteem in which he had long been held by the Hungarians, and temporarily silenced the whispers of discontent in Budapest.

III. THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

To answer the Austro-German thrust through Bukowina and over the Carpathians, the Russians chose to strike at East Prussia. Strateg-


ically such a move was advantageous because it meant moving troops a far shorter distance away from Warsaw, which remained the centre of military operations in the whole eastern front. Practically, could East Prussia be overrun, the whole Russian front would be straightened; a great province, a source of food supply to Germany, would be conquered; and, ultimately, the German position between the Bzura and the Nida in Russian Poland would be exposed to attack in the flank and rear.

Thus, while the main Russian and German armies faced each other west of Warsaw on the lines they had taken when Hindenburg's great offensive against the Polish capital had been halted in December, new armies were directed against the German positions north of the Vistula and south of the Niemen, on a front from Tilsit to Johannisberg, while another force moved down the north bank of the Vistula toward Thorn.

Again, as in the case of Tannenberg, the geographical circumstances explain the military operations. Inside the eastern frontier of East Prussia some fifty miles there extends from north to south, between Insterburg and Johannisberg, that intricate tangle of water known as the Masurian Lakes, out of which flows the Angerapp River, which joins the Inster at Insterburg to make the Pregel, a stream that enters the sea at Königsberg. West of this region Samsonoff had suffered his great disaster in September at Tannenberg. To this obstacle the Russians had returned in October after defeating a German invasion of Suwalki Province at the Battle of Augustovo.

For three months Russian and German forces had faced each other in this region with little or no change of position. Now the Russians undertook to turn the Germans out of their strong position behind the Masurian Lakes by attacking from the north and south; that is, by coming in on the flanks. At the outset this move met with apparent success. Coming west on the solid ground between the Niemen and the Angerapp rivers, the Russians approached Tilsit, took Pilkallen, began to talk again of a siege of Königsberg. At the same time, to the south of the Masurian region, between the East Prussian frontier and the Vistula, they made headway toward Thorn.

In the first week in February, however, Hindenburg countered with terrific force. The first sign was a renewal of the German offensive south of the Vistula and along the Bzura-Rawka front. On this line the Germans began a series of desperate assaults, which were announced as a new drive at Warsaw. Petrograd proclaimed the slaughter in these



THE BATTLE OF THE MASURIAN LAKES

Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians. Line *A-B* shows the Russian front before the battle. The *arrows* show the lines of the Russian retreat

fights the greatest in the whole war, and there were circumstantial reports that the Kaiser himself had been shocked by the sacrifice of life in a forlorn undertaking.

By the second week in this month, however, the truth became apparent. The German attacks had been mere screening movements to cover the withdrawal of troops from this front to East Prussia, and

very soon Petrograd began to concede defeat and retreat in East Prussia, while Berlin announced a second Tannenberg and the capture of 40,000 Russians. In any event, it was clear that by the use of automobiles, by again employing the strategic railways along the East Prussian frontier, the Germans had rushed overwhelming forces into East Prussia, beaten the Russian flanking force between the Niemen and the Angerapp and completely redeemed East Prussia, save for a little corner about Lyck.

By February 15th German troops were advancing eastward all along the front from the Vistula to the Niemen, were across the Russian frontier in many places, and were still driving the Russians back toward their fortresses of Kovno, Grodno, Bielostok, and Ostrolenka; that is, behind the Niemen and the Narew. Seven months after the war had broken out German soil was practically free of Russians, and from the Roumanian frontier to the Baltic German troops, with the support of their Austro-Hungarian allies, were advancing. Their success in East Prussia was to tempt them to one more bid for Warsaw, from the north, but this failed, like the others. The road to Warsaw ran neither through East Prussia nor northern Poland.

IV. PRZEMYSL

The disaster of the Masurian Lakes, which divided the attention of the world with the Allied naval operations just beginning before the Dardanelles, was counterbalanced in the following month by the Russian capture of Przemysl on March 22d. Invested for a moment in September, relieved when Hindenburg made his first drive for Warsaw, and promptly surrounded again when the Russians resumed the road to Cracow before the Battle of Lodz, Przemysl had been shut in ever since. Its surrender was one of the most spectacular incidents in the war and it did much, temporarily, to destroy the effect of recent Russian reverses and checks. Since Bazaine had laid down his arms in Metz four decades before, Europe had seen no such capitulation, and Russian estimates placed the number of captives at 130,000.

Before his surrender, the Austrian commander, General Kusmanek,

had destroyed all the forts, blown up the bridges, turned the rifles and cannon into useless junk. But this diminished the material rather than the moral effect of the victory. Actually the last considerable fortress of Galicia, east of the Dunajec and north of the Carpathians, had now fallen. As for the numbers of prisoners, they astonished the whole world and explained a surrender which took the Russians by surprise. Like Metz, Przemysl had fallen to hunger, and, like the Lorraine fortress, it had fallen because it was provisioned to hold a garrison, not a host.

The siege itself had been marked by no considerable military effort. The Russians had merely invested the place and sat down before it. A few brief attacks had demonstrated that it was beyond the resources of their artillery train. Now and again there had been sorties; a desperate effort by Hungarian troops just preceded the surrender. Several attempts on the part of the Germans and Austrians to relieve it had come close to success, but ultimately failed. Time and hunger did the rest.

In the closing days of the siege, cats and dogs had sold for prices recalling the Paris market in 1871. There seems to have been much mismanagement of resources, and the defence shed little lustre on Austrian arms. The last sortie of the Hungarians seemed to the Russians useless sacrifice, for it was promptly and completely checked.

With the fall of Przemysl the Galician campaign entered its final stage. The troops released by the surrender joined the armies that had long been battling in the Carpathians, advancing when opposed only by Austrians, retreating when German reinforcements came up. Each attack after retreat found the passes more strongly fortified, found the task more terrible. Still Russia stuck to it; and with the fall of Przemysl the world looked for the arrival of spring and the Russians together in the Hungarian Plain.

In this it was mistaken. Carpathian hopes, like the expectations aroused by the Allied fleet before the Dardanelles, were soon to be destroyed, and one failure after another was to meet Allied armies and fleets in the whole eastern field. Yet it is worth recalling that the moment when Przemysl fell was the most fortunate moment, from the Allied point of view, since the struggle had opened. Austrian collapse, German

surrender, these were the things that the press of the world outside German and Austrian territories talked of at the very moment when Germany had gotten well forward in the preparation of that tremendous thrust at the Dunajec, which was to usher in a full year of Teutonic victories.

Przemysl is a high-water mark; dead low water in Allied prospects comes something more than a year later, with the disaster and surrender of the British at Kut-el-Amara. It remains, now, briefly to examine the final phases of the great Carpathian battle in which the Russian flood was finally checked, the Russian armies were exhausted and shaken by their terrible efforts and losses, and the failure of Russian munitions brought disaster comparable in modern military history only with that of Napoleon in the Moscow campaign.


V. THE BATTLE OF THE CARPATHIANS

There had been fighting in the Carpathians as early as September, after Lemberg, when the Cossacks crossed the range. There had been new and more serious fighting in October and November, when the Russians came west again and approached Cracow. But it was not until the new year that the Russians definitely abandoned the attack to the west and set their faces toward the south and strove to cross the Carpathians into Hungary. Their attempts to the south on the edge of Roumania, designed to influence Roumanian policy, had met a swift check at German hands, and Bukowina had been cleared of Slavs in January and February. Similar German operations, made in response to Hungarian appeals, had closed the passes immediately to the north of Bukowina, through which the shortest rail line to Lemberg goes.

By March, when the Battle of the Carpathians takes its final form, the Russian effort is concentrated upon the Dukla and Lupkow passes while the Austrians and Germans are now on the north side of the Carpathians from this point south to the frontiers of Roumania.

The passes by which the Russians were now seeking to reach Hungary are the lowest in the range. The Dukla is but 1,500 feet at the crest and opens easily into the headwaters of the affluents of the Hun-

garian Theiss. In this pass, as in several of the others, there had been terrific fighting all through the winter and the casualties had been exceedingly heavy. White uniforms had been adopted to deceive the outposts, every device had been employed to aid the assailant and the defender, alike. And slowly but steadily the Russians had progressed in the Dukla until they were actually at the edge of the Hungarian Plain. But in the other passes the stiffening of German reinforcements had permanently checked the Slav.



THE GALICIAN CAMPAIGN, SEPT, 1914–MAY, 1915
Russia's Carpathian Army literally beat itself to pieces against the barrier that faced it

The opening weeks of April saw the crisis. A stupendous Russian effort gained still more ground at a frightful cost. The world believed that Russia was forcing her way through the passes, when, by the third week in April, Ivanoff's army came to a practical but not an absolute standstill. The cost had been beyond the resources of Russia in men, in guns, above all in ammunition. To the south, Austrian troops, with

German contingents, were actually breaking out in the foothills of the Carpathians on the Galician side, threatening the flank of the Russians in the Dukla and the Lupkow.

Actually the Battle of the Carpathians was over, although it had two more weeks to run. Germany had succeeded at last in erecting a bulwark against Russian floods in Galicia, as she had promptly broken the force of Russian invasion twice in East Prussia. By the third week in April there is something approaching a deadlock along the whole eastern front from the Baltic to the Roumanian frontier. There is, as yet, no sure sign of the Russian halt, but it had come.

Looking backward we may now perceive that Russia had for all the months since November, since the opening of the Battle of Lodz, been bearing an ever-increasing burden of German effort. Her mission to deal with the Austrians had been triumphantly discharged by the victory of Lemberg and its immediate consequences. All German efforts to abolish this Lemberg decision by Polish and East Prussian drives upon Warsaw had failed. Only when Germany had sent her troops into Galicia and Bukowina had Russian advance slowed down. Przemysl, in late March, had been an authentic sign of Russian strength; the attack upon the Carpathian passes had been a final proof of Russian devotion and determination. But Russia had now reached the point where she must have aid, and effective aid, from her western allies. If they were ready to begin, if Anglo-French efforts in Flanders and France recalled German troops from Galicia and Poland, Russia was still capable of useful service.

But if this help did not come, Russia could no longer bear the burden she had been bearing through the months of furious fighting that separated Lemberg and Tannenberg from Przemysl and the Carpathians.

The best of Russia's officers and of her first-line soldiers had found their graves on the fields of victory and defeat in East Prussia, Poland, and Galicia. The Carpathian Army had literally beaten itself to pieces against the barriers that faced it. Russian military achievement had surpassed her own and her enemies' expectation, but no Russian warning, although there had been many, had sufficed to moderate the hopes

and expectations of the western allies of the Slav. They were soon to be undeceived.

It remains, now, to look westward and examine rapidly the progress of events from the German defeat at Ypres to the moment when Russian effort was checked at the summit of the Carpathians and Russia began to lack the strength to continue the work begun at Lemberg and carried forward, to the very great advantage of her western allies, up to the arrival of spring. It is well to remember, too, that at this moment Russia had at last realized, through the failure of the Allied fleets in the Dardanelles, that she was to receive no immediate aid in munitionment or supplies, of which she stood in desperate need, from her western allies.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

IN THE WEST, NOVEMBER, 1914, TO MAY, 1915

I

THE PROBLEM

When the German attack in Flanders ceased and the Germans began to transport some fraction of their main force eastward to relieve Hindenburg in his Lodz venture, to aid him in his later attacks upon Warsaw and finally to prop up the crumbling Austrian armies, they left a field upon which they had missed victory by the narrowest margin. Napoleon was never nearer to winning Waterloo than were the Germans to achieving a complete success about Ypres. Had Russian pressure been one whit less severe, had Austrian collapse been one degree less imminent, it is difficult to believe that the Germans would have missed arriving at Calais and crushing in the whole western flanks of the Allies.

When the German flood at last subsided it left behind it a victorious but well-nigh-annihilated foe in Flanders. To meet the storm the Allies had flung into the gap the most heterogeneous mass of men that Europe had known since the Mohammedan invasion. Asia and Africa, Australia and Canada, were represented by white, by black, and by yellow troops who fought beside the French, the Belgians, and the British. Sailor lads from Brittany marched shoulder to shoulder with the Senegalese; troops from British India held ground within sight of Arabs and Berbers from Algeria and Morocco. Languages, customs, religions of four continents and a score of races were represented in this strange horde.

Actually the Allies had striven, as men strive when there is a break in the dyke, to stop the rapidly growing gap by every conceivable and available resource. Never in military history was there such a jerry-built wall as stretched across the pathway of German floods, wavered and faltered under German attack, and just held at the final moment, when, with the eastern crisis becoming ever more insistent, the

Germans, under the eyes of their emperor, called upon the famous Prussian Guard to deliver the final blow.

And when the wave at last was spent, there stretched from Switzerland to the sea that long line of trenches which henceforth for more than two years was to be the western front. Such an ending to a Franco-German campaign had been foreseen neither in Berlin nor in Paris. That such a condition would endure, not for months but for years, was a thing wholly hidden from German and French High Command in November, 1914.

For the Germans there was the firm belief that a few months of winter campaigning would dispose of the Russians, permit the capture of Warsaw, and that spring would see the return to the west of the troops borrowed from the west for the winter months.

As for the Allies, their forces already began to talk of that happy hour when Kitchener's "Million" would arrive, by Easter at the latest, and the long German lines would be broken, the whole of France delivered, and the decision of the Marne enforced along the Rhine. No one yet foresaw the magnitude of German resources or effort; no one yet foresaw that the heavy artillery, prepared to win field battles and reduce fortresses; the machine guns, which only in the German army had been provided by thousands to obtain victory in the decisive battle in the open field, would give Germany an advantage in trench warfare enabling her to hold her lines, not for weeks or months, but beyond the date of the second anniversary of the war, with wholly insignificant changes.

Actually, the German problem had been posed in the east; it was the problem of disposing of Russia by spring and returning to the west to reopen the Marne verdict in the summer and win the war in the first year. The problem of the Allies was to reorganize their shaken armies, to raise the British forces that could supply the necessary superiority of numbers in the west, and to provide that heavy artillery and ammunition which were utterly lacking and without which the attack, in the new conditions of war, was a mere murder. All this it was imperatively necessary that the Allies should accomplish before Russia was beaten down by the whole weight of German attack—before the victory

THE SLAVS IN THE WORLD WAR



PART OF THE CRACK CAVALRY CORPS FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE CZAR'S OWN HUSSARS

PICTURES OF RUSSIAN AND SERBIAN SOLDIERS



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS



Copyright by Underwood & Underwood

GENERAL RENNENKAMPF



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GENERAL RUSSKY



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GENERAL BRUSILOFF

FOUR RUSSIAN GENERALS

The Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the Czar, is a real soldier and an able soldier. Though a Romanoff his political tendency is toward liberalism. The Czar was probably jealous of him, and after his abdication a plot was launched to offer Grand Duke Nicholas the crown.

General Rennenkampf. After winning Tannenberg from one Russian army under Samsonoff, Hindenburg pursued a second, that of Rennenkampf, from the very gates of Königsberg across his frontier. Later, two German corps under Von Francois were surrounded and Petrograd claimed a victory. But it failed to materialize. The trapped Germans by exertions which the Russians frankly conceded to have been "incredible" found their way out, thanks to the tardiness of Rennenkampf, who went at once into retirement after this fiasco.

Russky and Brusiloff commanded two of the five armies which took part in the great Russian offensive in August and September, 1914. They operated in Galicia, while Rennenkampf and Samsonoff invaded East Prussia.



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BATTERY OF RUSSIAN HOWITZERS ON THE POLISH FRONT



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RUSSIAN SOLDIERS

The Russian muzhik makes a good soldier. To begin with there is an inexhaustible supply of him. He has great endurance, is patient, good-natured, and obedient, but lacks initiative. On the whole he has given a good account of himself in the war. He would have done better had he been equipped and supplied as efficiently as the soldiers of the other races. Moreover, there is good reason for the suspicion that he has sometimes been led to his undoing by traitorous pro-German generals.



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

THE FORMER CZAR'S BODYGUARD OF PICKED COSSACKS RIDING TO THE DEFENCE OF WARSAW



RUSSIANS AND AUSTRIANS

When Russians and Austrians are pitted against each other as man to man in a fair encounter, this is apt the result. The Austrians march to the rear as prisoners. The Austrians have more spirit and dash, but they the stolid strength and steadfastness of the Russian peasants. Moreover, the Russians are racially a unit; whil Austro-Hungarians are of many races, and the Slavic blood in many makes them laggards in war against their kin of the steppes.



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SERBIA IN THE WAR

The raw material of which Serbian soldiers are made.

The finished product.

Gallant little Serbia was finally overcome by the overwhelming strength of her adversaries. But the world will oon forget the splendid succession of victories which preceded her days of disaster. In the First Balkan War efeated the Turks at Kumanovo, at Monastir, and at Adrianople; in the Second Balkan War she shattered the d of Bulgarian invincibility at Bregalnitza; in the opening month of the World War when the fortune of the Allies nost desperate it was the victory of the Serb at Jedar which opened the more prosperous period which culminated e Marne. In the early days of December Belgrad fell, but once again the Serbians rallied. Belgrad was re-; by December 15, 1914, Serbia was free of Austrians, saved for the time being, saved until the third—and fatal tack, the Balkan drive of Mackensen almost a year later. In October, 1918, the Serbian army again showed its e in its marvellous dash to final victory.



Photograph by Underwood & Underwood

SERBIAN TROOPS ON THE MARCH NEAR THE AUSTRIAN BORDER

of Lemberg, which had given the Russians the initiative and the advantage in the east, should have lost its influence.

We have seen that the Germans failed in the east. All their mighty efforts were insufficient to abolish the consequences of the initial Austrian collapse and the early Russian triumphs in time to resume the western campaign in the spring. Not less absolute was the Allied failure in the west. For another year, after the critical spring, Kitchener's million, as an offensive force, was to be a myth. The task set for Britain was beyond the capacity of any nation, untrained to wars of the national sort and lacking the resources in trained men which conscription alone supplies.

Without Britain, France could not free her soil. Almost a million French had been killed, wounded, or captured in the first four months of the war. The industrial districts of France had been seized and were held. France could and did address herself to the task of organizing her national life within a brief time. But such organization was for long beyond the capacity of British Government or people. Months after the need for heavy explosives had been disclosed, the faults of the British military system—its inability to learn—combined to keep the munition works at the task of turning out useless shrapnel.

From political, military, and industrial aspects, the story of the British department of Allied effort, deduction of course being made for the Navy, remains the story of failure, of inability to perceive the character and magnitude of the war, of failure to understand the new horizons, the new conditions, to grasp the fundamental fact that the war could only be won when Britain conscripted her youth and set her maturity to the organized task of munitionment. Under the strain of the first really considerable war in British history, the whole fabric of British Imperial life broke down.

On the military side the British failure was complete in all but defensive operations. The world knew little of the original campaign of Field-Marshal Sir John French. The legend that he had saved the French before the Battle of the Marne and contributed the decisive thrust in this engagement served to deceive and delude the British

themselves. Not even Neuve Chapelle opened their eyes and it required the dismal slaughter at Loos in September, 1915, to demonstrate the need of a new commander-in-chief and of a new system.

Field-Marshal Sir John French's services to his country and to the Allied cause at the Aisne and at Ypres were incontestably great. On the latter field the British army—the old army—died, holding a line whose collapse would have brought ruin to the Allied defence in the west. Not a little of the failure of the British commander must, in fact, be charged to Lord Kitchener. We shall not know until history has cleared the ground how far the commander in the field was blocked, handicapped, finally exhausted by an administration of the War Department, which in such instances as that of heavy explosives starved the army in France because it misunderstood the conditions of the new warfare. Yet in the light of such evidence as exists, the recall of the Field-Marshal seems to have been inevitable and the responsibility for failure in the field in some part his own.

As for the British army, more was asked it than could fairly be asked of any army in the first year of the war. And what it did was a larger portion of the impossible than was then conceivable. It fought with rifles against machine guns—with shrapnel against high explosives; it manufactured its bombs out of jam tins and matched them against the products of prepared machinery. It was often defeated but never conquered; and never—save between Mons and the Marne—greatly disorganized.

In the nature of things this British army was for nearly two years a "forlorn hope"; it could not be compared on the military side with the highly organized German armies or with the French conscript armies; yet, without its contribution, the war would have been irrevocably lost in the first year; and after the first year, its mounting strength and growing efficiency were recognized even by the foe.

During the first two years of the war, this British army never had an equal chance, most of its offensives were sheer sacrifices, made gallantly and willingly, but foredoomed to defeat because equipment was lacking and training was still to be acquired. Political blunders, such

as Antwerp and Gallipoli, added further burdens and led to further disastrous consequences. Many of the blunders were censurable and indefensible; many were the inevitable concomitants of national unpreparedness. Yet the critic who recognizes necessarily the failure, from the military point of view, feels his words unfair, in the presence of the spirit and the devotion of the men who held the line from the first Ypres battle to the coming of the new armies or died unhesitatingly in the opening days of the Somme, a sacrifice to the tuition of a nation which had to learn modern warfare in the most expensive of all schools.

With the weapons they had; with the officers that were available—officers as destitute of training as their men; under the burden of the most powerful attack military history records, both in numbers and in mechanical appliances, the British army hung on; and if the original "contemptible little army" died on the line, its presence there prevented an immediate disaster to the Allied cause and its tenacity insured the coming of the other British armies which were to know victory and regain the offensive.

The close of the period we are now to review was to reveal the fact that the Allies in the west were still unready. A moment was to come when, coincident with the fatal thrust that Mackensen was to deliver against Radko Dimitrieff at the Dunajec, German attacks in Flanders were to disclose the fact that Russia could not be relieved by pressure exerted on Germany's western front and must go from retreat to retreat until the coming of winter found her terribly beaten armies at the Beresina and Dwina.

The military operations in this period are of practically no value, compared to that attaching to the struggles in the east, because they resulted in no tactical or strategic advantage to either side—did, in fact, no more than contribute to revealing the fact that Russia could expect no help in the west, at the precise moment when the temporary success of Russia had compelled Germany to turn all her attention for the summer campaign toward Warsaw and not toward Calais.

II. JOFFRE'S "NIBBLING"

To the operations in the west in the period we are now to examine, and, indeed, for many months thereafter, there was applied the picturesque term of "nibbling." Actually, these operations were local offensives, undertaken in all but one of the more considerable instances by the French, and they were designed to keep as many German troops as possible occupied, to prevent the transfer to the east of any large number of army corps, to strain German resources in men and munition by a double pressure on the eastern and western fronts. Beside these purposes local objectives were insignificant.

The world misunderstood these operations completely. It saw in each activity from Switzerland to the North Sea the evidences of a grandiose attempt to reach the Rhine or the lower Meuse. It did not understand the weakness of the Allies, the difficulties of the British, the inadequate resources of the French—in men as a result of their terrible losses, and in munitions because of German occupation of so much of the industrial portion of France. From November to May the whole outside world waited for the new Allied "drive" in the west, were waiting for it when the German thrust at Ypres crushed in half of the whole salient and won a local success more considerable than any the Allies had achieved in all the months preceding.

The first of these "nibbles" was in some respects the most considerable and successful. In December French forces appeared along the western slopes of the Vosges and beyond the summits in that corner of Alsace to which the French had clung after they had abandoned Mühlhausen in August. They flowed down the valley of the Thur and reoccupied Thann; they approached the village of Cernay, which is the key to Mühlhausen, and, after long and desperate fighting, took the mountain of Hartmannsweilerkopf, from which they could look down into Mühlhausen a scant ten miles away.

But despite local successes in the villages of Steinbach and Anspach, despite a slight advance along the plain toward Altkirch, the larger purpose could not be realized. The French were unable to break the

German line at the point where it left the plain and approached the Vosges. Mühlhausen could not be taken, nor were any of the later efforts more successful. Some little territory was won north of the Thur, some more Alsatian villages were "redeemed," upward of 350 square miles of Alsace was reunited to France, but although each new general who came to the Vosges eagerly undertook, with the limited resources allowed him, to break through to Mühlhausen, the failure was absolute.

Checked in Alsace, the French turned to Champagne and endeavoured to push up the slopes of the hills north of Soissons and beyond the Aisne, where Kluck had held the British in September. Again there was a preliminary success in early January, the gain of several miles. But as promptly came a German counter-thrust and this time the French lost, not alone what they had gained, but the ground turned over to them by the British when Field-Marshal French had gone north in October. Only on the southern bank of the river were the French able to hold. Germany claimed a crushing victory and talked rather obscurely of Gravelotte; the French explained that the floods in the river behind them had made their position indefensible. Neither statement is worth considering. The Germans never tried to advance farther; the French were unable to progress on this front until April, 1917. The local operation promptly lost all importance.

In February the French undertook a still more ambitious operation in Champagne, on the ground which was to see the great and desperate attack in the following September. Over a narrow front and for the possession of insignificant ridges commanding a railroad line vital to German communications, the French and Germans fought for weeks. The battleline rested on the east upon the Argonne and from the western flank the cathedral of Rheims was visible. After casualties not much under 200,000 for the French and German combined—and the French loss was much the heavier—there ensued a new deadlock. The French had gained rather less than a quarter of a mile on a front less than a dozen. But there was never much promise that they would actually penetrate the German lines, and any original hope was promptly extinguished when German reserves arrived.

While this last attack was going forward the British undertook their first, and for the present period their last, offensive, attacking in the district south of Lille. This effort is worth examining in more detail because it disclosed the extent of the weakness of British organization and was the first of that series of failures, extending through Gallipoli and Loos, to Kut-el-Amara, which revealed how little British military training had kept pace with that of continental nations in later years, and how long was to be the task of organizing new British armies.

But in dismissing these early French operations it is well to recall that each of them was designed primarily to aid the Russians and to divert German attention from Galicia and from Poland; the Alsatian attack coincided with the great drive of Hindenburg to the Bzura-Rawka line; the Champagne attack with the opening of the Battle of the Carpathians; and the Soissons fight which just preceded it with the demand of the Hungarians for German aid to repulse the Russian menace in Bukowina and the growing Roumanian threat, due to Russian victories in the Crownland.

In this synchrony of operations east and west it is possible to see what the French were striving to do, not on their own frontier primarily but in the wide field of the continental strife. Nor can one doubt that, while their efforts were not fully successful in this larger field nor of any real consequence locally, they did materially reduce the pressure upon their Slav ally and postpone the day when Germany was able to regain the offensive in the east.

III. NEUVE CHAPELLE

On March 10th at Neuve Chapelle, a few miles southwest of the great city of Lille and just north of the strong German post of La Bassée, which had seen desperate fighting in October and November, the British launched a great attack upon a four-mile front. The immediate objective of the attack was the Aubers ridge, which in military comment is described as the key to the city of Lille itself.

This attack was preceded by the first of those avalanches of artillery bombardment to become familiar thereafter and to be described at once

by the Germans, who gave it the enduring name of drum-fire. Under this storm of fire, delivered from 300 guns concentrated in a narrow area, the German first-line trenches disintegrated, even the second line was shaken, and the British infantry made its first advance with little or no serious opposition, finding the ground strewn with German dead, and capturing scores of men overcome by the noise and shock of the fire.

But beyond the first-line trenches the British came under machine-gun fire from scattered points in which the German second line had not been destroyed. They also suffered severely as a result of the miscalculation of their own guns, but the fatal circumstance was the failure of reserves to arrive.

There was a moment when it seemed as if the road to Lille was open. But the British could not seize the moment, and it passed forever. After two days the Germans were able to repulse all attacks with terrific slaughter. The British had gained a mile on a front of four; the ruins of the village of Neuve Chapelle were in their hands, but the larger success had been lost. British Command had failed to synchronize men with guns, to prepare reserves to follow the first waves of attack. What was to happen at Loos and Gallipoli on a far larger scale had now occurred at Neuve Chapelle.

In this battle, which filled the bulletins at the time but is now hardly more than a forgotten skirmish, the British first tasted the cup of bitterness which the Germans had drunk to the dregs in the Battle of Ypres. Under German artillery and machine-gun fire, the British losses surpassed that of the British contingents who fought with Wellington at Waterloo. The "butcher's bill" had been 13,000 casualties; the gains, a mile of territory, 2,000 German prisoners, and the privilege of burying 3,000 Germans fallen to British guns.

In Allied strategy this blow in Artois had been delivered in strict conjunction with the French offensive far off in Champagne and at the moment when the arrival of German reserves on the latter field disclosed the fact that Germany was weakening her line before the British. In September a similar double thrust was to be undertaken in Champagne and Artois, which would cost the French 120,000 casualties and the

British 60,000. Looking back to it, after the mighty struggles of the later months, Neuve Chapelle seems insignificant. Yet it was the first time that a considerable use was made of massed fire. It forecast exactly the tactics Mackensen was to employ in his great victory in Galicia not many weeks later, and it did come within sight of a considerable triumph that might have restored Lille to France.

In the first blush London celebrated Neuve Chapelle as the "battle bigger than Waterloo"; but the later disclosures changed the whole tone of British comment, and England presently realized that a meaningless local gain had been achieved at a frightful cost, because British troops had fallen under their own guns and British reserves had wholly failed to arrive at the moment when real victory was within easy grasp. Taken with the scandal over the shell supply—which soon developed and revealed that the British High Command was still sending shrapnel in limited quantities to an army that required heavy explosives in enormous quantities and could not get them at all—Neuve Chapelle was a saddening incident to the British people.

IV. THE SECOND BATTLE OF YPRES

In early April the French undertook an interesting campaign to abolish the St. Mihiel salient, the single breach in the yoke of permanent French fortifications from Verdun to Switzerland, which the Germans had been able to make in September. Coming out from Metz and ascending the valley of the little Rupt de Mad, the Germans had actually crossed the Meuse, taken foot on the west bank, and also captured Fort Camp des Romains, above the town of St. Mihiel on the east bank.

The ground held by the Germans was a narrow spearhead thrust straight through the armour of France. Never had the Germans been able to widen the wound or deepen it after the first thrust, but they remained in possession of a portion of the hills of the Meuse and they cut the railroad from Commercy to Verdun. Now the French, coming north out of Toul and south out of Verdun, endeavoured to break this salient along its sides. Some initial success they had at Les Éparges;

they took several hills and a village or two. But then they were stopped. German heavy artillery in Fort Camp des Romains held them up. The local success did not hide the larger failure. A still more ambitious effort in July, and from the Bois-le-Prêtre, above the west of Pont-à-Mousson, similarly failed. Verdun was left in danger and the extent of the danger was to be disclosed in February, 1916.

Finally we come to the last of the battles in the west in the period under examination, the Second Battle of Ypres, which coincided almost exactly with the date at which the world believed that Kitchener's million were to begin their triumphal advance in the west; and it terminated in a local German success at the moment when Mackensen was to regain for Germany the initiative in the east.

The new blow fell on April 22d. It was delivered by relatively small contingents, and it is plain that the Germans had no expectation of anything but a local triumph, the moral effect of which would far surpass the military. Not only did it come in an hour when the news from the east was to fill the world, but the Allied failure at the Dardanelles had dashed the hopes of all the enemies of Germany and a shining Teutonic triumph held out a promise to hold Italy to neutrality. Again, the Allies were already collecting an army to send to the Dardanelles on the most foolish of all ventures and German pressure was conceivably calculated to withhold troops from the Near East.

The German attack was preceded by the first discharge of "poison gas" of the war. Not since the slaughter in Louvain and the bombardment of Rheims had any event made such a noise in the world as this first use of gas as a weapon of destruction. It added instantly to the horrors of conflict and it was in violation of all the restrictions that humanity and international agreement had placed about the conduct of war. It instantly changed the whole temper of the British, who suffered most severely, mainly in the Canadian contingent; it abolished quarter on the western front for many months, and it brought in its train a savagery and brutality that the wars of the Nineteenth Century did not know.

Even in its immediate purpose, this weapon was unsuccessful. It did not give Germany a shining triumph. It did not open a gap in the

Allied defence, it merely brought to horrible death a few thousands of Allied soldiers, and, before many weeks had passed, the Allies had prepared an apparatus protecting their soldiers and had in their turn adopted this hideous method of killing, which subsequently brought as many thousand Germans to terrible agony and frightful death.

In selecting the Ypres front as the point of attack, the Germans had pitched upon the point best known to the outside world in the whole Allied line from Belfort to Nieuport. Here the Germans had attacked in the autumn and by but a shadowy margin failed to get through. Belligerent and neutral nations, watching for the advance of the Kitchener army, still hardly taking shape, saw, instead, what seemed to be a new German drive for Calais and for several days a real German advance. Nor were the military reasons less weighty in determining the point of attack; Ypres was a salient on which the Germans from higher and encircling ground could pour down a converging fire, cutting all the lines of communication.

The original attack fell to the west of Ypres, at the moment when this beautiful city, with some of the most interesting monuments of Flemish art, was melting into dust and ashes under a terrific cannonade. At the point where the French and British lines touched—the French position held largely by native troops—the Germans launched immense clouds of gas. First amazement and then terror followed. The men who had endured artillery fire and faced death with unfaltering courage for many months broke and fled, a gap opened in the Allied front.

This break exposed the flank of the Canadians. They, too, had suffered from the gas, but less severely than their French neighbours. They did not break or immediately retreat. They extended to cover the exposed flank and hung on. No reserves were available for hours, and in these first hours nearly a third of the Canadian contingent died or were wounded and captured on their lines. Presently the crisis passed. Reinforcements arrived, the Belgians extended their aid to the French, the British brought up troops from the south. Ypres was not lost, the dyke between the Germans and Calais still held.

It is worth recalling, too, that for England, the Canadian contingent bore the brunt as the Australian Anzacs were to win equal glory at

Gallipoli. In the history of the British Empire the Second Battle of Ypres may well prove memorable, for Canadian loyalty there gave shining answer to German forecasts of colonial secessions; while in German Southwest Africa, British South Africa was presently to emulate the example of Canada in Flanders and Australia and New Zealand at the Dardanelles.

The Second Battle of Ypres lasted five days; by the third the Germans no longer claimed to be making progress and at points they were presently pressed back, but the whole Ypres salient had to be flattened out. Actually the British gave up more ground than they had surrendered in the First Battle, but solely because of the collapse of the French line to the west, under the poison gas attack. Guns, prisoners, ground, the Germans had taken, but the triumph was local and of no permanent value on the military side.

Yet the lesson of the Second Battle of Ypres was unmistakable, although the world was long in learning it. A swift, heavy blow had disclosed the fact that the Allies were unready. Their previous offensives had disclosed the same weakness. Now it was clear that only by heroic efforts could they check a German attack. They could not break the German lines, they could only with difficulty hold their own. The whole British front had been affected by the attack and new dispositions had to be made.

Before she went east, Germany had undertaken one attack to demonstrate that she need fear no real danger from the Anglo-French quarter. She had established the fact. Not until September would her western lines be threatened and not until July, 1916, would the British be ready to take an effective share in the western offensive operations. The legend of "Kitchener's Million" disappeared in thin air, the hope of the speedy deliverance of France vanished, the first authentic sign of German recovery was now perceived by the world which was to have a second and greater proof in a few hours.

In the major problem, to reorganize, to get forward in time to take the pressure off Russia, France and Britain had failed at the moment when the Russian strength was becoming inadequate for the task on the Russian front.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSION

While the echoes of the guns about Ypres were filling the world, the Austro-German army of Mackensen attacked and almost destroyed the Russian army, commanded by Radko Dimitrieff—the victor of Lule Burgas—which stood behind the Dunajec River, in western Galicia. The immediate consequence of this disaster was the dislocation of the whole Russian front; the eventual result, the retreat from the Carpathians and the Vistula to the Dwina and the Beresina.

These great events do not concern the present narrative, they belong, as I see it, to the second phase of the war, the attack upon Russia. With the Battle of the Dunajec ends that first phase, comprehended in the attack upon France and the consequences of this attack. These consequences, since the attack failed, were the deadlock in the west and the loss to Germany of the initiative in the east and west. To obtain the necessary numbers to deal the colossal blow that should destroy France, Germany had weakened her eastern front and relied upon Austria to hold up Russia. Still relying upon Austria mainly, after the Marne, Germany had elected to endeavour to reopen the decision of the Marne in all the weeks from September to the middle of November.

Compelled at last to go east, while the Battle of Flanders was still unwon and the decision of the Marne stood, Germany had then to labour under the disadvantages which had resulted from the successes won by Russia over Austria and the position gained in Galicia. Not until the Dunajec did Germany finally restore the balance, not until the Dunajec did she escape from the consequences of the Marne campaign, consequences which affected the eastern quite as much as the western field.

Had the Allies been prepared to take the offensive in the west,

when Germany at last turned eastward in November, they would have won the war. Had they been able in the spring, when the German attack at the Dunajec began, to make a similar attack in the west, German disaster would have been immediate. The failure in the autumn enabled Germany to erect those colossal dykes against the Allies in the west which extended from the North Sea to Switzerland. Failure in the spring condemned Russia to bear that terrible burden which almost brought irreparable disaster and real German victory.

In the spring of 1915 it was plain that the advantage belonged to the alliance which could strike the first heavy blow, but the superficial circumstances alike favoured the Allies and seemed to indicate that they would be able to retain the initiative which they had won at the Marne and bring Germany to swift and complete defeat. All this was impossible because Great Britain had been unable to transform herself into a military nation and to do in months what her Allies and enemies had achieved only by long years of patient and universal training. As for France, she lacked the numbers, now, to risk alone the supreme effort, for if it failed, German victory in the west, while Britain was still unprepared, was inevitable.

In this situation there was allowed to Germany a new opportunity, and as it turned out, another year, in which to win the war. If she could dispose of Russia and return to the west before Britain had at last organized her millions and her industries, she might hope for the complete victory that had escaped her in the Marne conflict. But if she failed in the east, if she were compelled to come west with the Russian task incomplete, as she had been compelled to go east while France still stood, then German failure in the second phase would be as patent as it was now in the first.

Only victory in the east, followed by triumph in the west, could permanently abolish the decision of the Marne. Unless it was abolished the time was bound to come when Germany would have to face fresh millions coming from Britain and find herself outnumbered and deprived of all the advantages that superior preparation and organization had given her at the start. This is what did happen, but not until the sum-

mer of 1916. And as it did happen the decision of the Marne stood, and stands, the one great event in the whole World War from August, 1914, to September, 1916.

All that the science, knowledge, skill, genius of two races could mobilize met at the Marne in a struggle in which the fate of one race, at least, was in the balance, and if France fought for life, Germany fought for a world power that could hardly have escaped her had she prevailed. But she did not prevail; everything she hoped to attain escaped her on this field. Afterward she still had numbers, the fruits of her years of preparation remained in her hands, but the moment had escaped her and did not return. Had Napoleon won at Waterloo, his old domination of Europe would not have been regained, but had Germany won at the Marne, William II would have attained an eminence that Napoleon never reached in his most fortunate hour.

At the Marne, France willed to live; in the gravest hour in the history of their race, French commanders and French soldiers alike displayed not merely the courage that was traditional and was equalled by German devotion, but those qualities which have often given France the supremacy in Europe and have never failed to save her when her condition seemed desperate. And by her will to live, France saved Britain, Russia, Europe, from a German domination, which in the German mind was to renew the glories of the Roman Empire.

A second sacrifice and a second agony were to be demanded of the French people at Verdun, but the stakes of that terrible contest were incomparably smaller, and the greatest possible fruit of German victory on the Meuse would have been provinces and indemnities. Nor was there ever a grave danger of this harvest. At the Marne, Germany fought for a World; at Verdun, for a War; and while she fought at Verdun, her statesmen talked of a victorious peace, which if it still indicated great ambitions, no longer disclosed Napoleonic aspirations.

With all its mighty events, with all its noble and splendid pages, the history of the first two years of the great conflict is the history of the Battle of the Marne. We have seen in these chapters how Germany strove to abolish that decision; we shall see in those which describe the

attack upon Russia how she continued to strive to abolish it in tremendous struggles from the Straits of Dover to the Golden Horn, from the Meuse to the Beresina; but after splendid successes, we shall see the continuing failure. Like Marathon, the Marne was a mortal wound; but, unlike Marathon, it did not kill at once.

Mr. Simonds's History of the Progress of the War Will Be Carried Forward in the Succeeding Volumes.

Editor

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I

THE NEW SCIENCE OF WAR

By AN AMERICAN MILITARY EXPERT

MOBILIZATION FOR WAR

The mobilization of a country for war means the putting into effect of all measures necessary to pass from a quiet, peaceful community to a military state in which the strong hand of military power, as exemplified in the chief executive of the State, reaches out to all parts of the whole national fabric—the men, the animals, the industries, the soil itself and all its products. It means the assembling of the military companies, regiments, brigades, divisions, and army corps which form the actual fighting units that enter into the campaign. It means the gathering together of the State's human resources, in and even out of the country, so as to supply them with food, weapons, clothing, transportation, and medicines. It means the supplying of the navies, the building of new ships, the closing of harbours with mines and submarine nets, the patrolling and defence of all frontiers, and measures for the protection of all bridges, railroads, and highways. In other words, it means the putting into actual effect of the million and one things which are necessary to defend the country in case of an attack from an enemy. Every thinking person in the United States must realize something of what this means when he recalls the early months of 1917, when war with Germany at last seemed imminent.

Mobilization does not in itself imply the transportation of all the men and material which are assembled in various places to engage in the war. This is termed concentration: that is, after all the military organizations are assembled and equipped at their home stations, near where the men that compose them reside, they are moved to the frontiers, and wherever they are needed, by rail or ship. Where a nation is bounded by strong antagonists who are thoroughly prepared and ready to take the offensive, the full power of that nation is put into motion at the earliest possible moment in order to prevent complete disaster. In countries of this kind all the departments of the State, when the mobilization is ordered, have been already thoroughly organized and all work together for the complete military efficiency of the country. They have all been trained, long ahead of time, to know exactly what this means. Each military unit, each factory, and all supplies have been assigned their exact places in time of peace, and every man knows what to do when the summons is issued. All the civil functions—courts, police, municipal, State and national

authority—are directed in accordance with the wishes of the military head of the nation, and no project is gone into, either political, commercial, or financial, which will not benefit the military situation and help out the armies and navies that are attempting to gain mastery over the enemy. The whole idea of the mobilization and after this of the concentration of the troops against the enemy is to make all persons in the country work as a team, from the factory workers and the farmers at home to the commander-in-chief handling the armies in the field.

France offers one of the best examples of a well-organized country. This was amply demonstrated in the first part of the present World War. Even the minutest details of French mobilization had been carefully arranged years ahead of time. The army of France consists of three classes.

First let us speak of what is known as the active army—that is, the first line, which contained the younger men who were expected to stand the brunt of the heaviest fighting. This is the part of the army which is kept constantly under arms in time of peace and through which every man in the country, physically able for service, passes to gain his military education; for France, as is the case with all countries in Europe, requires all its citizens to be ready to serve in the army in time of peace so as to prepare them for war.

The next class is called the reserve, and is composed of men just older than those in the active army. Most of these are from twenty-seven to thirty-five years of age, the superior limit being thirty-seven years. They are men with families, with responsible positions in civil life, and of course at their age are more settled in their habits and occupations, and consequently are not so active as the younger men who compose the first line. These men still are able to endure great hardship and even to engage in campaigns, but they are not expected to stand exposure and hard marching to the same extent as the younger men of the active army.

The third class, known as the territorial army, is composed of men over thirty-seven years of age. Many of these are now serving in the field army, as all differences as to classes of troops have now been abolished. The territorials ordinarily are not supposed to serve in a campaign but are used for the protection of railroads, bridges, important factories, works, and stores in the interior of the country near where they reside. They are especially useful for this purpose because they know most of the residents in their part of the country and all of those who are engaged or will be engaged in the military preparations necessary in their especial localities, because these are rehearsed so often in time of peace. In France the same persons who rehearse them in time of peace execute them in time of war.

Mobilization of the active army in France meant merely filling up the ranks to war strength with the men who had left during the previous two years. The active armies in all European countries in time of peace have from one half

to two thirds of their full strength on duty with the colours as compared with their full strength in time of war, so that when the reserves of the active army are called upon, each knows his place in the ranks. Each man, when he leaves the active army in France, at the conclusion of his two or three years of service or course of instruction, is given a little book, in the back of which is pasted a leaf of instructions. This tells him in the minutest detail where he should report in case of mobilization, what railways he should take from his home to get to his regiment or battery, on which day of mobilization he should report, and even the hour of the day on which he should join the colours. Nor were these instructions handed to him in a perfunctory manner; pains were taken to see that he knew and thoroughly realized what they meant so that there could be no doubt of his intelligent action when the call came.

Mobilization of the whole country in France required about sixteen days. This meant putting all parts of the army—active, reserve, and territorial—on a thorough war footing, and organizing all the industries so that they would be in condition to supply the sinews of war. Of course, long before this time had expired, hundreds of trains were speeding to the front, loaded with troops, while other regiments were being formed behind them to fill up the empty cars on their return from carrying up the first contingents.

The general mobilization in France was announced on the afternoon of August 1, 1914, throughout the whole Republic. Before this, although some few military movements had taken place, the people generally had heard only vague rumours of such a procedure. As is usually the case in an ordinary peaceful community, most persons had succeeded in dismissing these disturbing thoughts from their minds, so that when the actual summons came, it burst like a bombshell among this industrious people.

The announcement of the great event was made in various ways in the different localities, in accordance with the custom prevailing in the particular place. In some towns, church bells were tolled; in many, drummers paraded the streets; and in others, trumpets called the people together for the announcement. Usually the police read the notice to the people at the street corners, or, if in the country, at the meeting places, cross roads, or churches. Notices were conspicuously posted at all points of vantage. They were sent out by the civil functionaries particularly charged with this duty. These had been keeping the blanks for years, all ready for the eventful day, and all that they had to do was to fill in the date and send messengers to the various points in their precincts which already had been selected. For some days before the actual notice was posted, word had been quietly passed around, to each one subject to call, to have ready certain articles which he was expected to furnish for himself. This was particularly the case with shoes. As the French troops have always been famous for their marching, the importance of having good shoes for a campaign is probably more highly appreciated in that country

than in any other. Little groups of men had been coming and going at the cobblers' shops for days, while the cobblers worked night and day to finish up their customers' shoes. All preferred, when they first went out, to wear shoes that had been worn a little and walked in, instead of brand-new ones that might hurt their feet for several days and render them incapable of marching. The cobblers themselves soon joined their respective organizations and made ready to repair the shoes of their comrades in much the same way as a blacksmith reshoes the horses in a cavalry regiment.

When the actual mobilization was announced, the men in the first line were required to join their organizations by noon of the next day. Imagine a man in the country, in the interior of France, a farmer or labourer, a banker or a merchant, when he first heard the notice of mobilization on August 1st. The first thing he did, of course, was to look in his precious little book to be sure of his instructions, and to see the hour and the minute on which his train would leave for the headquarters of his regiment. If his book had been lost he reported to the nearest local functionary, who directed him how to proceed, and in addition gave him a printed card with all necessary instructions. The local officials also took charge of all the wives, children, and domestic animals that had to be left behind by the departing soldiers. Arrangements were made at once for their care and subsistence while the soldiers were away. Each district is always prepared to supply everything necessary to families that are unable to earn their own living when the master of the house departs.

On leaving his home, the man, now transformed from his ordinary character into that of a soldier, took with him his two pairs of precious marching shoes, one slightly used and one brand new. He took socks, underwear, tobacco, toilet articles, and the clothes he had on. Everything else needed for his military equipment he would find at the barracks of his company. Upon arrival at the railway station he found all the conductors, engineers, switchmen, firemen, in fact all employees of the railroad, incorporated in the military service. All these had passed automatically under military jurisdiction, put on a uniform, and become part of the army. The town through which he walked on his way to the railway station was now under the strictest police control. Everything was quiet. The strong arm of the law of war and military power could be felt to pervade everything.

The French soldier seldom becomes riotously drunk—as do Americans, Englishmen, and Irishmen—because he seldom drinks whisky or other hard liquor—with one exception. He likes absinthe; but the sale of this intoxicant was prohibited at the first call of mobilization. At the railroad station a large area was fenced in for the exclusive use of soldiers, and lights were provided so that the whole space could be illuminated at night to facilitate the entrainment of the troops. In different corners of this area around the station the men belonging to the various regiments in that particular part of the

country were assembled into little groups, so that those assigned to each regiment could proceed together and not become mixed with other contingents when the cars approached for their accommodation. Here our soldier met many of his old comrades who had served with him during his period with the active army, and the actuality of impending events was brought forcibly to his mind. All thoughts of home and family now were set aside and their place was taken by reflections as to what would happen and what could be done to overcome the obstacles ahead. Within a few minutes the group of men to which he had attached himself passed out to the railway siding where the cars were in readiness. These were ordinary baggage cars, transformed into rough passenger carriages by having benches put into them. Thousands of cars were equipped in this manner as if by magic, because the benches had been ready for years, stored in convenient localities from which they made their appearance at once when mobilization was ordered. The cars in France are small. Each one held only thirty-two men sitting back to back in the centre, while the rest of the space was taken up by their luggage. After a trip of an hour—during which of course the discussion centred upon where their regiment might be going, where the first battles would take place, and whether everything would move as planned—they arrived at the town which was the headquarters of the regiment. Many trains were encountered on the way, all moving north and filled with men, horses, artillery, and supplies; and a few cars already emptied were met, passing back to the south for their second load.

On alighting from the train our soldier marched with his comrades to the barracks of his regiment. Here he quickly found his company which, within the hour, had procured uniforms, arms, knapsacks, and other equipment from the regimental storehouse. This was all new material which had been kept in good condition and added to from day to day in the expectation of just such an event as this. The size of the garments was suitable for each person and the material the best that could be had. Each day for years the *minutiæ* of the arrangements necessary to equip the soldiers had been attended to, and all of these matters had been gone over time and time again before the mobilization, until every detail was considered to be as nearly perfect as it was possible to make it. They had never been tried out in actual war, however, and there were many who had misgivings as to their efficiency. But the mobilization worked out with the utmost perfection. Not a hitch occurred. By the afternoon of the second day the active army was on a thorough war footing at its home stations, and our soldier was completely equipped from head to foot with the uniform and arms of the Republic. The regiments were all ready to entrain and move to the frontier where concentration would take place. It is true that the soldiers still had the red trousers and blue coats worn by the troops for many generations. There were some who contended that the bright colours

were too conspicuous for modern war; that they would form an excellent target to an enemy thousands of yards away. But this feeling was drowned by the sentiment that clung to the old uniform which had seen the troops of the Republic victorious on hundreds of battlefields. Clad in these colours, Napoleon's victorious legions had conquered the world. The most glorious pages of French history were brightened by the old uniform. What would the soldiers think of themselves if their glory was quenched by the dirt-gray uniforms which their principal antagonists, the Germans, had adopted as their campaign equipment? It is hard for people outside of France to understand how strong was the sentiment attaching to these colours. It cost them dear in lives, in the early part of the war, before they consented to change to an inconspicuous garb.

These splendid troops embarked by regiments on their waiting cars, and as each station was passed the number of trains constantly increased. For the army corps to which each regiment belonged was being gathered together. Finally the total number of trains moving forward for this single army corps exceeded one hundred. These carried all the artillery, all the infantry, cavalry, ammunition, and wagons necessary for a body of upward of 45,000 men. In fact, during the first few days of August, there were more than 100,000 cars moving through France, and not a hitch occurred anywhere. When the army corps in its railway trains arrived at its destination and the unloading began, each detail had been worked out as to where the organizations which they bore should go. Platforms had been erected to facilitate the unloading of wagons and animals. It takes even longer to unload trains than to load them; but the operation had been performed many times in manœuvres and was well understood.

There was great fear that the Germans might be enabled to break through the frontier troops by mobilizing and concentrating more rapidly. Then they could get into the interior of France, blow up bridges and other strategic points on the railways, and thus seriously hinder an orderly concentration. The frontier troops, however, stood their ground in excellent fashion and all trains moving to the front averaged eighteen miles an hour. When the French realized that all the active army corps had arrived at their appointed places in such excellent order, a great feeling of confidence pervaded the country. Not only did the army corps arrive promptly, but the great field armies, which consisted of from five to six army corps, or about 250,000 men, were organized without delay. This again added confidence to the whole French army.

It is difficult to realize the amount of preparation necessary to accomplish so orderly a mobilization, and—although each man thought that such an act would cause new, strange, and undreamed-of feelings and occurrences—when the actuality presented itself everything seemed perfectly natural and simple because it had been rehearsed and thought about so many times before. In France each man was made to think, from the time that he was a raw

recruit, that the fate of his country might hang on his action in an emergency. And when the hour came he proceeded to do his duty in a quiet, intelligent manner.

Not only France, but all other countries in Europe, South America, and even Asia are now arranged in a military way so that they can mobilize in an extremely short space of time. All of them use about the same system. They require each man, when he comes of age, either to undergo military training or to hold himself in readiness for such duty. The country is divided into various districts for military purposes and from each one of these districts a certain army unit is raised in time of peace. When war comes each district has its particular functions to perform and no additional orders are necessary in the emergency. The districts in Europe are organized on a basis of what are called army corps. Army corps are little armies in themselves. That is, they have all branches of the military service in them—artillery, cavalry, infantry, engineers, air troops, and supply trains. When on a war footing, they have altogether about 50,000 men in their ranks and as auxiliaries. These are the organizations which enter the campaigns and do the actual fighting, several of them being grouped together into the great aggregations now alone known, technically, as armies.

Now it is these units, these army corps, that are mobilized and filled up to get into the field when war begins. They are called tactical units, because tactics is that part of the military art which pertains to action on the field of battle. When these troops leave home, other military organizations take their places. These are constantly being filled up with recruits to supply the vacancies left by drafts into the active army, which make good the losses that take place in the field. In fact, in the present war, some of the organizations in the German army had to be completely replenished two or three times in the first few months. That is, a battalion which started out with a thousand men had to be supplied with three thousand men during the first months to keep its strength to one thousand at all times. This does not mean that all of the men were killed, but that this number had to be supplied to take the place of sick and wounded, and those who had dropped out from exposure, fatigue, and other causes. Of course many joined and rejoined two or three times. One can easily realize the great perfection that a system must have in order to keep up with these tremendous demands.

The army-corps districts each contain a certain number of able-bodied young men capable of bearing arms. For instance, an army-corps district may have 400,000 able-bodied young men in it between the ages of eighteen and thirty-seven years. In time of peace this district contains one army corps of 50,000 men. It will be seen, then, that these 50,000 men may be replenished eight times in case of necessity, and therefore if the equipment, uniforms, and supplies are on hand, and if the men have previously been trained, additional

army corps can be organized very easily. Now the Germans had about 400,000 able-bodied young men in each of their army-corps districts, and at the beginning of the war they had ready sufficient equipment for turning out, instead of one army corps from each district, four army corps.

Each year recruits were called to the colours and served their allotted time of two or three years according to whether they were with the infantry, cavalry, or artillery. After this they were turned into the reserve. In Germany only about 55 per cent. of the total number of young men available each year were called on for military service, because, among other things, the expense of their maintenance was very great and because they were needed in industrial pursuits. Every one, however, was listed, and many of those who did not pass regularly through the ranks of the army received a certain amount of military training which fitted them for certain work. Every man, be it understood, knew his appointed place when mobilization was ordered. When the call came, therefore, instead of only twenty-five army corps taking the field, which is the number of army-corps districts Germany had, each army corps formed three more in its district, and one hundred army corps were put into the field within a very short time after the war began. This was the surprise that Germany sprung on the Allies. It required 200,000 men for the field organizations out of approximately 400,000 in each army-corps district, and left behind a reserve of 100 per cent. There was, therefore, a total of about ten million able-bodied young men who could be used for active military service. About half of these had been thoroughly trained before the war began and the other half were immediately placed in training. Each year a certain number of youths become of military age in each country and the various nations figure out their campaigns so as to make their annual contingents, as they are called, supply the annual losses. If the annual contingents of youths are not sufficient to cover the losses due to the war, the nation constantly grows weaker, and of course if the losses are great enough will eventually lose in the struggle, mainly through shortage of men. If, however, the campaigns are so conducted that the losses will not exceed materially the annual contingent a nation will never run short of men. Sometimes the nation is able to control this and sometimes it is not. Everything depends upon the expertness with which it handles its troops and upon the pressure which is brought to bear by the enemy.

In the army-corps districts, the boundaries of which are prescribed as definitely as the boundaries of states are established in the United States, every horse and mule is listed and assigned to its place in the military service, be it with the active army, with the depot organizations, or held in reserve for an emergency. All motor transportation suitable for military service receives a small subsidy in time of peace, or is developed in some other way with a view to its use in time of war. The drivers of all motor trucks stay with them when they go into service. They know exactly where to go when mobilization is

ordered. All arms and clothing factories, all producers of foods are assigned their place in the general system. Each army-corps district has its commander, both in peace and in war, designated beforehand. If the active corps have gone to war, the command of the district is left usually to an old general who has commanded troops in this same district when young and in active service. Some of the old generals now serving in Europe in this home service are more than seventy years of age, but they are still bright, alert, and ready to administer their commands.

The army-corps districts are grouped together, for purposes of control and administration, into larger ones called army districts, which correspond to the plan for grouping the army corps for duty in the field. These army districts in turn are handled directly by the supreme military commander of the State, who is always nominally the King, Emperor, or President of the country. Actually they are handled by the Army General Staff.

All military organizations and systems are made as simple as possible because, under the great strain of a rapid mobilization, particularly while such enormous numbers of human beings are moving about from place to place, mistakes are apt to occur which may result in the most serious consequences. The more complicated a system is, the more likely it is that a mistake will be made. And so the greatest simplicity is required throughout. Ordinarily, not more than five different units or duties are prescribed for any one person to handle, because, if more than this number are to be watched by any one individual, some will probably be forgotten, with consequent injury to the rest. Therefore efficient military organization, from the top down, allows to each commander not more than five things to watch or administer. For instance, the general headquarters of any one group of armies will have five armies to watch; each army commander will have five army corps to watch; each army-corps commander has to watch his two divisions of infantry, his artillery, his cavalry, and his special troops; and so on, down. Sometimes this number must be varied according to the circumstances, but it is the average which all attempt to maintain, with the object of keeping the machinery as simple as possible.

All countries use the same general system of mobilization. The greatest precautions are taken to insure the means of transportation, such as railroads, especially junctions. In a well-organized nation, each man on the day appointed knows and goes to his place, and the country by one step transforms itself from a peaceful industrial community into an active military body ready to strike, and strike hard. This is the operation of mobilization, and although tremendously difficult to carry out smoothly, it is only the beginning of war. Think of what it means when the details of a great mobilization have not been worked out in advance—when it is necessary to do these things after war is declared or when war is imminent!

On account of its great expense, its interruption of the ordinary pursuits of

the people, and its very great influence on industry, mobilization is a serious matter, never ordered unless war is practically a certainty.

Even after mobilization is carried out efficiently—that is, when all the stores and men and organizations have been assembled at their home stations—there remains the complicated and difficult process of transporting large military units to the actual place where they are going to fight. This is done by railroads, steamships, or marching, as the case may be. In the United States the distances are so great that if the map of Europe were applied to this country the distance travelled by New York troops to the Mexican border at El Paso would be almost as great as from Petrograd, Russia, to Genoa, Italy, and the distance from the Atlantic to the Pacific Coast is much greater.

Where speed is an important military consideration against an active enemy, transportation is a difficult and complicated process. Railroad schedules have to be made out for each organization and railroad cars have to be distributed so that movements shall not interfere with each other. When it is realized that an army corps of 50,000 men requires from 100 to 125 thirty-car railway trains for its transportation, it may be appreciated how great is the task of military concentration particularly as thirty or more army corps may need to be concentrated at one time on a single front, as was actually done in some countries in Europe. One wrecked culvert, bridge, or tunnel on a main line might completely negative the plans for a whole campaign and bring about defeat.

It is difficult for a person not conversant with military methods to realize how carefully the railway lines of Europe were guarded in August, 1914. Thousands of soldier-laden trains were moving in every country. The safety of these countries depended upon the safe and punctual arrival of the trains at their appointed destinations. Ordinarily the armies of the European countries can be completely mobilized in four or five days. Their concentration by railroads on the frontiers requires from ten days to two weeks more. The whole process, therefore, of turning out the troops and actually putting them in the field requires from two to three weeks. All this time the full military power of the State is developing, and great precautions are taken to guard it from interference. For this reason fortifications and garrisons are maintained at important points near the border so as to protect the troops while they are being carried from their home stations to the frontier. These frontier troops are maintained at war strength, or nearly so, during peace; very much as the regular army is in the United States. They are ready to defend themselves at an hour's notice, and are expected to hold back their opponents for a time, long enough to allow their own armies to assemble and concentrate behind them for the campaign.

On the French and German borders when the war broke out these frontier troops, or covering troops as they are called, met the attacks of each other

wherever it was possible and held each other in play while their armies made ready behind them. Arrangements of this kind are made everywhere, according to locality, both on land and sea. The great masses of troops are assembled in accordance with the plan that has been decided upon for the campaign: that is, whether the armies immediately after concentration shall move into the enemy's country or whether they shall assume the defensive and let him attack first.

Where circumstances permit, countries at war always prefer to attack first and carry on an offensive campaign; for offensive war is what wins. In accordance with what is known of an enemy's dispositions, troops are assembled along the frontiers and concentrated into the larger armies for the actual strokes. As they arrive they are unloaded and marched forward to their respective positions. All the roads over which they are to advance by marching have been selected previously. As each army corps detrains, it forms and begins its march to the front. The campaign then begins in dead earnest. Casualties occur which cause a stream of wounded and incapacitated persons to start flowing from the front to the rear. Not only persons, but horses, motor vehicles, and all sorts of supplies which have been hurt or damaged in the campaign are moved to the rear for medical assistance or repairs. The places of these have to be taken by fresh personnel and material sent up from the home country, so that behind a well-organized army to-day a constant stream of personnel and equipment flows to the rear while another stream of fresh personnel and equipment flows forward by a different channel.

The degree of efficiency of all these plans and arrangements depends primarily on how accurately conditions have been studied and arranged for beforehand in time of peace. Of course the first-line troops of the active armies go into the field before all others, and as soon as these have been marched into the campaign the second-line troops, or those a little older, follow them up. The second-line troops man the frontiers and occupy the fortresses which are maintained as rallying places for the armies in case they are defeated. Forts are placed at vital points such as where a network of great roads comes together, at important crossings of rivers, opposite great passes in mountains, or as bars to easy lines of approach by the enemy. The great entrenched camps are capable of holding several army corps. Their defensive works are made up of embankments, trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, and other obstacles that will help to hold an enemy off for a sufficient length of time to allow the armies to reform behind them and, where reformed, quickly to take the offensive from them. Sometimes the second-line troops are actually put into the field with the first-line armies. This is now the case both in France and Germany, so that the duty of looking after the permanent forts and all the communications within these countries is left to still older men. In fact, in the interior, men up to sixty years of age can be utilized to advantage.

Properly trained officers are very difficult to supply after war has begun, or in fact at any time. Casualties among officers in the present war have been very heavy because, at the beginning, each nation attempted to carry out its purpose in the shortest time possible, and all officers were ordered to expose themselves without reserve. The greatest exertions are now being made to fill their places. In Germany, selected men who have good educations are taken from the different military organizations in the field and sent to military schools, where they receive additional training for several months, to fit them to become officers. They are then sent back to their regiments. In this way the officer material is provided for, although of course these men are not so good officers as those trained before the war. The training received in actual war, however, counts for a great deal. Other countries also have an efficient system for keeping up the supply of officers. England actually maintains schools for officers on the Continent, right behind her armies that are engaged in combat. This brings the practical realities of warfare very close to those who are being instructed.

Each war has the effect of developing many instruments, devices, and supplies which have never been known before, for necessity is the mother of invention. For instance, during the Napoleonic wars, sugar was extracted from beets, as none could be imported during the blockade. During the present war, benzol has been extracted from coal by the Germans, for use instead of gasolene in motor vehicles. It was an incident of warfare. Troops in this war have been able to go from one place to another more quickly than at any time before, because of the unprecedented use of motor vehicles and other mechanical transportation. Electrical means of communication have been so perfected that vastly greater numbers of men can be handled than ever before, while air craft have brought about means of reconnaissance which were unheard of and even undreamed of in former campaigns.

An accurate timing of military movements of all sorts is one of the very important things in war, and the nation has a great advantage that can foresee just what its enemy will do and just what time it will take him to do it. In estimates of time the elements of distance and numbers are very clearly defined factors, to each of which must be assigned a value and a relative efficiency; that is, whether the enemy is organized so as to be better in battle or on the march than one's own troops. Mere numbers in themselves mean very little. What numbers are able to do depends entirely on their efficiency. For instance, a great mob, although it may have a clearly defined purpose, we may say, of destroying a building or of lynching a person confined in a jail, is easily handled by a well-organized group of men perhaps only one twentieth as strong in numbers. In fact, numbers in themselves are dangerous, because a very numerous army is apt to lack cohesion; and, defeated, is not able to escape nearly so easily as a small force under the same circumstances. In war the attacker al-

ways covers the maximum space in as short a time as possible so as to catch his adversary before he is entirely ready to begin. He attempts to gain control of important points in the enemy's country. Such a point, for instance, is New York. An attacker would at once attempt to gain the city of New York, which is the greatest port and railway centre of the East. The defender, on the other hand, strives to maintain unimpaired the means of resistance afforded by his country, and covers the distance as quickly as possible in order to stop the enemy from accomplishing his object.

During mobilization, every detail which will gain time or delay an enemy is of the utmost consequence. This element of time is considered so important by belligerents that they go to any lengths to destroy the enemy's communications, his railroads, tunnels, ships, and roadways. Usually spies are stationed in a prospective enemy's country with this object in view. The mobilization plans of a country going to war must contemplate not only that its troops will be victorious in the field, but also that they may be defeated and that resistance may have to be kept up for a long time, even for a period of years, before it is successful. The longer a country is able to maintain itself and offer resistance, the greater is the hope of ultimately wearing out the enemy and of obtaining assistance from some exterior source.


To-day difficulties in the way of rapid mobilization are perhaps greater than ever before in history, on account of the masses of men to be moved and the intricate and complicated means of moving them. These great masses of men are almost entirely dependent on railroads for their food, ammunition, and stores. With the smaller armies of ancient days, food could be obtained in the immediate vicinity, from the country itself, but these days are long since passed. The huge armies of to-day cannot be provisioned from so small a territory. War to-day must contemplate not only immediate destruction of the hostile army, but more than ever before the cutting off of its means of communication so that the enemy cannot obtain necessary food and munitions.

Mobilization, therefore, signifies preparation in the most efficient manner possible, by every means known to a country for furthering its military objects. It is not enough merely to defeat an enemy. Each defeat must be a link in the chain of his destruction. If a victory uses up the attacker more than it does his enemy, it might under certain circumstances be more costly ultimately than a defeat. The necessity should be apparent, therefore, to all military nations that they must have well-thought-out, consistent programmes, to be followed in case of war. This has always been a difficult matter for States given over to party governments. Such States are ordinarily run by discussion and ruled by speech, with the result that the governments are conducted not necessarily by the greatest administrators but more often by the most fluent talkers. "For he who thinks aright but cannot communicate his thoughts in a telling speech is just as insignificant in a democracy as if he could not think at all." Great men

of action are seldom good orators and good orators are seldom great men of action. Consequently, to carry out a good military mobilization, a nation should be taught to have great confidence in its military leaders and to rely on their judgment, initiative, and ability. This confidence should be continually fostered by educational preparation in time of peace.

MAN-SAVING:

THE WORK OF THE RED CROSS AND ITS ALLIES




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A RED CROSS STEAMER, LADEN WITH NURSES, LEAVING NEW YORK HARBOUR FOR THE THEATRE OF WAR



THE RED CROSS ON THE BATTLEFIELD

An aid station in the trenches (*upper left*) where the wounded first receive a doctor's care and are pre
pared for the journey back to the dressing station. A wounded soldier in the trenches (*upper right*), bandage
and ready to be sent to the aid station. The trip back to the field hospital, first by bearers (*lower left*) the
by horse ambulance (*lower right*)



AN AMBULANCE ON RAILS

One method of transporting the wounded on the French front from field hospital to evacuation hospital. Each of these little cars has room for four stretchers which are hung on springs.



A FIELD HOSPITAL

At field hospitals like these the seriously wounded are cared for until they can be sent to the base hospitals.



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THE PART OF PRIESTS AND NUNS

The priests administered the last rites to the dying, and succoured the wounded after the French stand at the M

Little Belgian children were being taught the alphabet in the schoolroom shown in the lower picture a short before it became a hospital for wounded Germans.



MME. CARREL FLUSHING A WOUND

ne new process of wound-flushing in operation. Mme. Carrel says "no man has yet died from his wounds in our hospital; indeed, the only one we have lost at all died from pneumonia."



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THE CARREL HOSPITAL

An operation at the Carrel Hospital at Compiègne, France. Dr. Carrel's new method of irrigating wounds is very ccessful. Patients are turned out perfectly cured, many of whom without the use of the new system would be life- ng cripples.



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MISS MURIEL THOMPSON, A BRITISH NURSE WHO WAS DECORATED BY KING ALBERT FOR HER BRAVERY UNDER FIRE



SERBIAN RED CROSS NURSE AT WORK IN A HOSPITAL AT BELGRAD



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STRETCHER-BEARERS AT WORK AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE

They show more interest in the photographer and less solicitude for their burden than do the turbaned bystanders.



LOADING A GERMAN RED CROSS TRAIN



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WRECK OF A RED CROSS TRAIN AND THE MARY BRIDGE ACROSS THE MARNE



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RED CROSS NURSES AS STRETCHER-BEARERS



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COMPETENT NURSING HAS PUT THIS LITTLE MAN UPON HIS FEET AGAIN

At the moment he appears to be actually *enjoying* the war.

II

TWO GREAT FRENCHMEN AND THE WORLD WAR

By STÉPHANE LAUZANNE, Editor of the Paris *Matin*

1.—M. DELCASSÉ

In the month of July, 1898, M. Théophile Delcassé, the newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, took possession of the Minister's suite of offices, and installed himself in the famous room at the Quai d'Orsay. His first act was to change the position of the historic table which had once belonged to Vergennes. On this table the Treaty of Versailles between England and France is said to have been signed. It used to stand in the centre of the Minister's room, a little in shadow. M. Delcassé had it placed near the window, full in the light. Talking with an intimate friend on this same day he declared frankly:

"There is much to be done. But first of all we shall adjust all the points of difficulty which exist to-day in the relations between France and England."

The friend supposed him to be joking. These difficulties were many; the problems included Egypt, Siam, the Soudan, Newfoundland, Morocco. One need be dowered with a stout heart to undertake to settle all these.

M. Delcassé did have a stout heart, and, what is even better, perseverance. In 1899 a preliminary agreement was signed establishing the French and English spheres of influence in the Soudan and on the white Nile. But this was only a minor affair. The crucial difficulty was Egypt itself, which France had formerly, and which England then, claimed. How was this to be settled? M. Delcassé considered that the best arrangement would be the one which, once for all, should settle all colonial differences between the two countries. To England, Egypt, that is to say Eastern Africa; to France, Morocco contiguous to Algeria, that is to say Western Africa. All the rest was only what might be called "the trimmings" to make the portion of each equal and complete.

In 1902 his aims were accomplished. A general agreement was signed, and according to the prediction made when he entered upon his duties at the Quai d'Orsay, "all the points of difficulty were adjusted." France and England could shake hands.

M. Delcassé, turning then toward Italy, signed with her some months later an almost identical agreement. He mapped out the spheres of influence of each of the two countries as he had done with England, obtaining from Italy a pledge of non-interference in all matters save those concerning Tripoli.

Moreover, Italy—although continuing her alliance with Germany and Austria—engaged never to become in any way an instrument of aggression in their hands against France. Italy and France were once more sisters and friends, as in the past.

There remained Germany.

M. Delcassé was blamed that he had not turned to Germany as to England and Italy—that he had not treated her as he had the neighbours to the west and south of France. This reproach was entirely undeserved. To begin with, he had only one subject to discuss with Germany—Alsace-Lorraine. But that was the very subject which Germany always refused to discuss. Then, every time M. Delcassé tried to confer with Germany he encountered as an interlocutor one who dodged and dissembled, one who refused to speak clearly and frankly.

The following anecdote in this connection is eminently characteristic:

In 1899, when England was in the midst of the Boer War, the German Foreign Office all at once found an occasion to remark to M. Delcassé that "it was a great pity that France and Germany never sought to come together for a chat."

"The two countries," Germany went on to say, "had every reason for coming to an understanding. United, they would be able to do great things and would be practically masters of the world."

Somewhat surprised at this unlooked-for proffer of friendship, M. Delcassé thought that he had better consult the President of the Republic (then M. Loubet), the President of the Council of Ministers (then M. Waldeck-Rousseau), and his other colleagues. The Council was inclined to suspect either a trap, or an intrigue directed against England. Nevertheless, there was no reason for refusing to discuss matters. It is the custom of France, when addressed, to make a suitable reply.

So M. Delcassé replied to Germany: "You speak of 'getting together!' What do you mean? You say there is good reason why we should understand one another. What is this reason?" These were pointblank questions, at once frank and loyal. But—neither the following day nor the day after that, nor *ever*, has France received any answer. Germany has never once mentioned this advance. She seems unaware of having made it. But to-day, when one studies Germany's diplomatic methods, it is easy to perceive what she had in mind; she was trying to tempt France into vague, mysterious negotiations with no definite object. Then she would go to England with the tale that "France is conspiring with us against you." In a word, her object had been to start a quarrel between France and England.

But, it has been said, M. Delcassé might have talked with Germany upon his own initiative about another subject—Morocco. To this he has always replied that there was no more reason for consulting Germany about Morocco, than for consulting the United States or Austria. Germany had no special interest in Morocco. The Mediterranean Powers were the ones interested there

and there were good reasons for consulting them. But Germany is not a Mediterranean Power, and on several occasions Prince Bismarck himself declared that Germany had no intention of meddling in the Mediterranean question.

Be this as it may, Germany perceived that M. Delcassé was her enemy and determined to get rid of him. In 1904 she managed to do so.

Having recourse to the habit of unmannerly bluster which had many times served her ends, Germany announced in April, 1904, that she would not recognize the French Agreement of Morocco, because there had been no international conference on the subject. The Kaiser embarked for Tangier where he made a noisy speech, and France was startled by the spectre of war. In 1904 she was neither in a moral nor material sense ready for war. She believed in international peace, in the friendship of nations, and in compulsory arbitration. Her arsenals were empty. Moreover, a good many Frenchmen refused to believe that this was a premeditated scheme on the part of Germany to bully and to threaten France. In short, the majority thought it necessary to yield. France yielded. M. Delcassé tendered his resignation and left the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he had been in office for seven years.

To-day, in mentally reviewing this period, one asks which service of M. Delcassé was the greater; that he had, by dint of the magnificent work of seven years, made friends with England and Italy; or that, in the moment of his swift descent from power, he had unveiled the brutal designs of Germany before the whole of Europe.

"Germany," he once said to me, "understands and respects only one thing —*force*. Those who speak of coaxing Germany or of making concessions to her, stupidly deceive themselves. If you are so unlucky as to allow Germany to get hold of even one finger, she will seize your whole hand, then your arm, then your shoulder. Your whole body soon will be in her clutches. There is no need to *provoke* Germany; but when one is face to face with her and sure of one's position, one must be bold and resolute. No weakness!"

And he added:

"Those who have sacrificed me to German bluster have thought that this would settle everything. What a mistake! Germany demands not merely a sacrifice of our pride. She calls for territory and money. She intends to rule and to dominate the world, and is resolved that her interests shall be served before the rights of others are considered."

It is remarkable, recalling to-day these phrases of more than thirteen years ago, to see how exact was the estimate of the man who formulated them, how clear was his vision of the cataclysm about to be let loose upon the world.

France was soon to see who was right and who was wrong. Incident swiftly succeeded incident, at Morocco and elsewhere; the deserters of Casablanca, Agadir, the descent of German dirigibles on French territory.

M. Delcassé, meanwhile, in dignified retirement, set himself to work. He devoted his attention to the navy, wishing to see France take her place among the great naval powers. In 1911 he returned to office as Minister of Marine and remained in that position for two years, labouring incessantly for the replenishment of arsenals, the letting of armour contracts, and the building of the fleet which was destined, when the time came, to join England's navy in the task of assuring to the Allies their supremacy upon the sea.

In 1914, when war was declared, all turned to M. Delcassé. He had foreseen the war. Now that it had come, if France found herself not isolated, but with strong allies, she owed this state of affairs to him. Therefore, when the French Ministry of National Defence was formed on the 2d of September, 1914, M. Delcassé once more took charge of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs and after an absence of ten years, reëntered the office on the Quai d'Orsay where he had signed agreements with England and Russia, and where he had laid the foundations of the alliance which to-day unites all the nations of the Entente.

On resuming his duties at the Foreign Office, his very first act was a masterstroke. During the forty-eight hours following his return to power, he negotiated the famous Agreement of London. It runs thus:

The undersigned, duly designated by their respective Governments, make the following declaration: The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage themselves not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war. The three Governments agree that when the time comes to discuss terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers shall state the conditions of peace without a preliminary agreement with each of the other Allies.

(*Signed*) Paul Cambon
Benckendorff (Comte de)
Edward Grey.

To this document is added the following line:

"*This Declaration will be published to-day.*"

(*Signed*) Delcassé

September 4, 1916.

This is the Constitution of the Allies—the solemn pact which unites them. It is the wall against which all German attempts to weaken or destroy the alliance have thus far spent themselves in vain. If M. Delcassé had accomplished nothing else during his second Ministry, he would still have herein rendered once again a service of incalculable value to his country.

It is still too early to judge his work during the first year of the war. There was one incontestable triumph—Italy's entry on the side of the Allies, on the 23d of May, 1915. There was one unavoidable misfortune—Bulgaria's entry on the side of Germany.

The policy which M. Delcassé followed in the Balkans was very simple, yet one must recognize a certain grandeur in his conception. This policy consisted in lining up the whole group of Balkan States against Germany. To do this it became necessary to appease the irritated Bulgarians and to ask certain sacrifices of the Greeks, the Serbians, and the Roumanians. This was the task which M. Delcassé set himself. He received encouragement from England and above all from Russia, who took it upon herself to guarantee the loyalty of Bulgaria. He had few illusions as to the value and importance which attached to the coöperation of Greece, and to him the great essential seemed to be to reconcile the Serbs and Bulgars, and to revamp a Balkan alliance against the Central Powers. He was mistaken and he failed; but the long train of mistakes which the Balkans have inspired during the last two years largely extenuates the gravity of his error. It is safe to say that any European statesman who should suppose it possible to unite peaceably the four or five races who dwell in the Balkan Peninsula would have made the same mistake. Any European statesman who places much confidence in any Balkan State whatsoever, and who is simple enough to judge this race by the same standards as other European races, would be fooled the same way. There is no people in the world to whom one can more fittingly apply the American expression: "Champagne taste, beer income." Each kingdom in the Balkans has at its disposal resources comparable with those of Switzerland or Colombia; each one, if we are to believe what they tell us, should about equal Austria or Brazil in area and should possess dominion over all the Near East.

Be this as it may, in November, 1915, M. Delcassé quitted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the second time, and once more went into retirement.

Those who care to be just must recognize that he was the one who constructed the bulwark which civilization maintains to-day against the Central Powers. He it was who first perceived the German peril and laboured to raise a breastwork against it; he it was who bound together the group, then scattered, that form the Allies of to-day; he it was who laboured, after having reconciled his country with England, to reconcile England with Russia. And we owe it to him that the 4th of September, 1914, did but cement the union of the Allied Powers, and turned the adversaries of Germany into a block of granite so hard that she has not thus far been able to chisel off a single particle.

Because of this the name of Delcassé will always remain linked with the history of the Triple Alliance and the history of the Allied Powers in this war.

2.—MARÉCHAL JOFFRE

Already a great deal has been written concerning Maréchal Joffre. But much remains to be said before the whole story is told. This is the present writer's excuse for the following sketch.

Joffre deserves the credit of having been probably the only one to foresee the kind of war in which the world is now engaged—a slow-moving war along vast fronts, wherein patience is more serviceable than valour and enthusiasm accomplishes less than painstaking calculation.

Even now I seem to hear Joffre saying:

"Henceforth it will not be commanders-in-chief who win battles, but colonels and even simple captains. . . . The conflict will extend along a front of four or five hundred kilometres, and on so huge a field, the will of a single man cannot take hold. No finite mind can contrive and play tricks upon a checker board so vast. . . . The general will have played his part when he has assembled in the chosen region all the armies which are needed there. It is the colonels and captains who must take the stage as soon as the first shots are fired. They are the ones by whom the issue of the engagement must be decided. The victorious troops will be those who can hang on the longest, who have the best wind, the strongest grip, the most unfaltering faith in their ultimate success."

He spoke these words to me in August, 1912, a few days before going off to direct the grand manœuvres of the French army in Touraine. The *Matin* recorded his words at that time. But I should never have forgotten them in any case. I can still recall how he looked in the dim-lit room of the Higher Council of War at the Invalides; I can still recall the man with the clear blue eyes; I seem still to hear his voice, deliberate and almost soft in tone. Never did eyes see the future more clearly; never did voice utter prophecy more startlingly realized.

A calmer man could not be found in all of our seething, tumultuous France. Self-possession is Joffre's dominant characteristic, and probably it was to this self-possession of his that France owed her safety in the month of September, 1914.

In those days the responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief were overwhelming. If there was little confusion in our souls during those days, we nevertheless suffered keenly. Instead of the expected victory in Alsace came ruinous invasion—the mighty onrush of the German horde advancing on Paris by forced marches. The Government could only call upon the Commander-in-Chief to "Hang on and fight." On the shoulders of Joffre rested the burden of France's fate. Strong though they were, he was forced to stoop; but his soul never yielded. The composure which he owed to his well-regulated manner of life created about him an atmosphere of peace, of quiet confidence.

M. Millerand has related that when he was appointed Minister of War, on September 2, 1914, his first thought was to seek out General Joffre. He found him in a little house at Romilly on the banks of the Marne—self-possessed, quiet, calm, as though the military tragedy then being enacted was but an everyday manœuvre.

General Joffre told the Minister of his plans, speaking with the utmost simplicity and clearness; and M. Millerand says that when he came out of the little house at Romilly, he went on his way reassured and tranquil—greatly impressed by so much *sang-froid*. Self-mastery is in truth the first step toward the conquest of fate. At the solemn hour of the Marne Joffre was master of himself, even as a Roman emperor in the hour of his triumph seemed master of the world.

France is proud of having produced the greatest soldiers of history, but never before has she been able to boast of a soldier so simple. Listen to this order issued on the evening of the 12th of September, 1914, when the victory of the Marne was assured:

"*The battle which has been in progress for five days has ended in victory. Our vigorous recovery of the offensive has won this success. One and all, officers and men, you have responded nobly to my call. Your coun ry owes you much.*"

When one considers that the victory of the Marne is probably the greatest in history, it follows that the hero of the Marne is the greatest victor in history. Is it not then remarkable that this man should announce his success in terms so measured, so unpretending, so restrained?

It makes one think of Fabius, whom the Roman legionaries used to call "*Cunctator*" ("The Delayer"); but Joffre is a greater and better man than was Fabius. He not only possesses the modest simplicity of the greatest Roman generals, but all the good qualities of the French also are his; the infinite capacity for taking pains, the ever-present good sense, the ingrained thrift which made him so extremely careful in his expenditure of blood and soldiers. He has, too, all the sparkle of the French *esprit* and all the Frenchman's good humour.

One day a Paris crowd recognized him as he left the Foreign Office, where he had been taking part in a great Council of War. He and his automobile were surrounded. He was loudly cheered, and as he placed his foot on the step, an anxious voice shouted: "When will the war end?"

General Joffre smilingly looked the crowd over and then turned to his chauffeur:

"You have heard, Martin? When will the war end?"

The whole crowd laughed good-humouredly and cheered him louder than ever. This mischievously jocular answer *was Joffre*, pure and simple.

His soldiers both loved and respected him, and bestowed upon him the homely sobriquet of "Grand-papa. He was also called "Our Joffre" because they felt that he belonged to them and was one of them; because he was all that they wished him to be. But it must not be thought that Joffre won the army's affection by overlooking and tolerating peccadilloes. Always hard upon himself, he showed that he could be equally hard on others. Discipline never

boasted a more inflexible guardian. He had no pity for incapable and unlucky generals, and, in less than a year, sixty-four such went into retirement or were relieved of their commands. Neither would he tolerate misdemeanours on the part of officers or the rank and file. When he learned that, on the battlefield of the Marne, the soldiers were occasionally picking up the pointed helmets of the Prussian dead or other arms and equipment of the enemy, to send as souvenirs and trophies to their families, he formally forbade such practices by an order couched in very severe terms. This order was ever after obeyed, and one could see the soldiers pass without a glance the pointed German helmets which strewed the roads and ditches. Compare this strictness with the easy-going tolerance which permitted German officers to carry off linen and crockery found in occupied houses, and to send them home to Germany in bales and packing-cases!

Moreover, the soldiers knew that their "Grand-papa" was trying in every possible way to save their lives. It was General Joffre himself who in the early days of the war gave the order for discarding the too-visible red trousers and for the substitution of greenish blue ones. He it was who decreed that the officers' red caps, which served so well as targets for German sharpshooters, must be covered; that all decorations, metal buttons, and everything that could serve as something to aim at, must be done away with.

"He will end," said the *poilus*, laughing, "by making each one of us wrap himself in an individual cloud which will make us completely invisible."

What remains to be said? That he formulated orders and rendered decisions which were models of clarity, brevity, and eloquence? . . . The well-known order of the day on the eve of the Battle of the Marne is an excellent example. It began with the famous sentence: "*Cost what it may, the hour for the advance has come: let each man die in his place, rather than fall back.*" This order will always hold a glorious place in the annals of France. It is truly a pity that the public at large, the foreign nations, cannot be familiar with the four or five hundred orders of the day which he composed during the period when he was Commander-in-Chief of the French army. Their prime characteristic is that, as one reads them, one wishes constantly to shout out "*Of course! He is right!*" They were indeed so full of common sense that no one cared to discuss them. It was obviously useless.

On the 24th of December, 1916, the Government of the French Republic, while granting him a well-earned rest, bestowed upon General Joffre the highest possible military honour — one which had been in abeyance for forty-five years. He was appointed Marshal of France. But this recompense is nothing beside the place which the Victor of the Marne will forever hold in the hearts of the French people. There is actually not a cottage throughout all France

which does not contain in some room a portrait of Joffre, not a city is so poor in patriotism that it does not boast a statue of Joffre in one of its public squares. For many centuries there will be no child who does not learn to spell the name of Joffre. For countless generations, he will remain the revered "Grandpapa" who saved the whole French family in its hour of peril.

III

REPORTS OF EYE-WITNESSES AND PERSONAL ADVENTURES

1.—THE GERMAN ENTRY INTO BELGIUM

By ARNO DOSCH-FLEUROT

The day before the German troops entered Brussels, the day they occupied Louvain, on August 19th, three other American correspondents and I went to Louvain from Brussels in a taxicab. Without realizing it, and without being stopped by outposts, we drove directly between the retreating Belgians and the advancing Germans. We were trapped in Louvain, and when the Germans learned of our presence they held us there three days on parole. This gave us time to know and love that charming old university city. Less than a week later two of us returned and saw it burn

In those days in Brussels every day had a character of its own, and this was Wednesday, the day after the Queen and the Court had hurried in the night to Antwerp. The streets, which had been full of people the day before, were nearly deserted. The few pedestrians hurried along silently. Even the civic guards, with their high-domed hats and their cockades, no longer patrolled the streets. Only the Belgian flags hanging from every house front showed that the city was not half empty.

The four in our party, Mr. John T. McCutcheon, Mr. Will Irwin, Mr. Irvin S. Cobb, and I had been trying for two days to get permission to leave the city so we could see some of the fighting between the Germans and the Belgians, and this morning we were on edge with anticipation. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, had been intervening in our behalf, and we also had, besides our passports, impressive documents issued by Mr. Ethelbert Watts, the Consul-General, explaining that we were American citizens. With these we went to the Gendarmerie, a massive old citadel of a building, to secure "*laissez passers.*"

Entering the old Gendarmerie through a small door in a great wooden gate, we passed under a low, deep arch and came upon half a dozen unshaved guards sitting before a long, plain table in the courtyard. Their uniforms gave no evidence of rank, but the manner in which they summoned us before them left no doubt as to their authority. As we stood explaining our need I noticed the courtyard was filled with military wagons, heaps of grains and provisions, and about fifty horses being harnessed before they had finished their morning oats.

From an upper window some one was throwing out bags of grain, which were being hurriedly loaded into wagons.

We were told that no "*laissez passers*" were being issued. "But you might try to see what you can do with these," suggested one of the guards, pointing to our passports.

Two days in Brussels had taught us to take every opportunity at once. So we left in a hurry, but, as only one of us spoke French and that poorly, we decided to stop at the American Legation to get some one to explain to our French taxicab driver what it was that we wanted him to do.

As we turned the corner of the Rue de Trèves we saw the American flag flying before the Legation. This was the first intimation we had that the city was threatened with invasion. But even then we did not expect anything more than a cavalry raid, nor did the people of Brussels.

Our taxicab driver was instructed to take us as far as he could go, and it came near being only half a dozen blocks. There we were stopped by a double row of derailed street cars across the avenue. These were obviously calculated to break the formation of the expected Uhlan raid and were so placed as to make a direct charge impossible. The work had been done by a company of middle-aged citizens in blue smocks drawn in at the belt line by their sword belts. Their costume was that of the revolution of 1830, which made of Belgium an independent kingdom.

These staunch citizens were for not letting us pass at first, but one of them said of the taxicab driver, "Let him get his fare," and that seemed to be a better argument than our passports. So our taxicab was permitted to describe a letter S passing through the barricade and we went on out of the avenue. We now met a good many of these smocked burghers, binding the trees along the avenues into masses of barbed wire, and upsetting carts in the cross lanes. Then, for the next mile or two, we passed many people strolling or reading in the parkways, even nurses with baby carriages. But after we passed the civic guards at the barricades on the edge of the Forest of Soignies we had the road to ourselves as far out as the village of Tervueren, where King Leopold's Congo Museum stands.

We were now well out of the city and still going. There was not even a sentry for two or three miles before we came to the village of Tervueren. There half a dozen people were sitting in front of a café, and they stared dumbly after us as we took the Louvain road. That, too, was empty so far as we could see, except for a Belgian soldier mounted on a bicycle, whom we soon overtook and invited into the taxicab. We hoped to learn the password from him.

About halfway to Louvain, at a point from which you can see a corner of the field of Waterloo, we came upon a dozen refugees with packs on their backs. They stopped only long enough to tell us they were from Tirlemont, the next important town beyond Louvain. "Uhlans!" they cried, as they hurried on

toward Brussels. In their tone was the same terror heard in the voice of settlers on the American frontier when they cried "Indians!"

Within the next half mile the road became blocked with refugees. They were of all kinds and ages, peasants with their household goods in ox-carts, townspeople in carriages, men on horseback, women afoot. I counted eleven small children and one very old woman in a cart. A dignified old peasant grandmother sat in a wagon, on a chair that looked as if it might have been lifted from the chimney corner. There were two red-cheeked girls, with their skirts tucked up, carrying a trunk. They had carried that trunk at least eight miles already.

Those who were wearing leather shoes were mostly footsore. Some carried their shoes in their hands. But those in wooden shoes clicked steadily on. Occasionally, when a spasm of cannonading began beyond Louvain, the whole line started forward at a faster pace. Little children holding to the hands of their parents were shaken into a dog-trot. Oxen were prodded into an ungainly lope. Those with light burdens pressed past those with heavy. But none that I saw deserted his burden. The nearer we drew to Louvain and the louder the cannonading, the more hurried and silent were the refugees. Those who looked at us at all hardly seemed to see us. Only a few stopped and stared after us. They seemed trying to figure out what manner of madmen we were.

In the midst of the refugees we came upon a Belgian soldier still carrying his gun. "Where are the English? Where are the French?" he called out to us, and as we stopped to answer his question, the refugees that dammed up behind repeated the question. "Are the English close?" they asked appealingly. We replied that we did not know but assured them the road to Brussels was open and safe.

We now began to meet soldiers in groups of twos and threes, and from each group came the same questions, "Where are the English? Where are the French?"

We soon came to understand the eagerness of the question. The Belgians had been holding the German advance for nearly three weeks. Liége had fallen four days previously and they had fought every inch of the road as they retreated. Each day they had been expecting to receive the support of the English and the French, and, now that their capital was threatened, they could not believe that their allies were not right behind them.

As a matter of fact the German army first encountered the French army at Namur, twenty-five miles southeast of Brussels, and it was not until two days after the occupation of Brussels that the German advance column which went direct from Brussels to Mons had its first skirmish with the English at Bray: a small town near the French frontier.

At Laefdael, a village four miles from Louvain, we came upon ten thousand

Belgians drawn up in a valley to the north of the road where the Germans advancing from the south could not see them. The right flank of the Belgians lay right along the road, and we could see what the Belgian army was made of. They were a dusty and foot-sore lot, most of them exhausted and asleep on the grass, but those who were awake smiled and waved their hands at us. Of the hundreds of faces I saw in that brave little army there was not one which showed defeat. And, despite their careless attitude, they were in good military order. Scattered among them were the rapid-fire guns drawn by dogs, which had done such astonishingly good work on the retreat from Louvain. To me those patient Belgian dogs, lying on their sides panting in the sun, gave the whole scene a peculiarly pathetic look. It all seemed so small and amateurish against the advancing German army with its half million men and its complete equipment. But, three days later when we came back that way, the wrecked town of Laefdael and the graves on the south side of the road showed that the Belgians and their dog-drawn mitrailleuses gave a good account of themselves that afternoon before they retreated.

A mile from the ramparts of Louvain we were stopped by two English motion-picture men in an automobile, who said it was dangerous to go farther. As we stood talking with them I saw a soldier lift his head in the beet-field beside the road. I looked closer then and saw that the field was full of Belgian soldiers behind every hay-cock and every bush. But the cannonading was still vigorous on the far side of Louvain and we considered it still safe to go a little closer. We also knew that Louvain had been the headquarters of the Belgian army and we thought it was yet. But that morning at ten o'clock King Albert had moved his headquarters to Malines.

Our taxicab driver was frightened by what the motion-picture men told us, and refused to go farther. He did not want to risk his car, he said. So we told him to wait for us there and the four of us set off afoot for Louvain. The road was now crowded with refugees, but we were too intent on pushing forward to the fighting line to pay much attention to them. To the questions "Where are the English? Where are the French?" we merely shook our heads. We could not trust ourselves to answer. We knew now in its fullness what that question meant to them. It was not until we passed the old ramparts, made into a boulevard, that we found our way free of refugees. They had not come through Louvain, but had passed around it on the rampart. The streets, however, were full of people. The quarter from which we entered was the oldest and the poorest, and the narrow streets were at points blocked, but people moved aside courteously to give us passageway. There was no sign of fleeing and that was what gave us courage to go on. We thought these people were in the street merely listening to the cannonading.

We stopped a priest to inquire our way and he turned back fifty yards to take us to a cloister, where, he said, there was a priest who could speak English.

As we entered the low, cool arch so common to Belgian houses we could see the priests at the bottom of their garden among the pear trees and the wall fruit. Among ourselves, we commented that here at least the ravages of war would not be felt. A week later that cloister was a ruin.

The priests came forward to meet us and refused to hear a word of apology until we had rested and drunk a glass of light red wine. To them, we found, the war was in another world, even though the cannonading was now quite loud. After a few minutes we pressed on toward the Grand Place, where we still expected to find the Belgian headquarters. There were now twice as many people in the streets as before. Even the girls and young women, usually kept under cover in Belgium, were standing in the roadway, though when the rest of the people greeted us with their usual courtesy, like convent-bred girls they lowered their eyes. Most of the people took us for English and wished us well. When we said we were Americans, "Vive les Américains" always floated down the road behind us.

We had not gone far down the twisting Rue de Bruxelles, watching for the Gothic façades of the wonderful Hotel de Ville, when an automobile swung in from the north and raced through the street back toward Brussels. The occupants, whom we took to be Brussels newspapermen, cried something after us, but all we could hear was the one word, "danger."

They had hardly gone before eight or ten Belgian soldiers, the first we had seen in the town, came hurrying through an alley from the south and dashed across the Rue de Bruxelles. As they passed there was a stir, but, as soon as they were out of sight, all faces were again turned down the street. No one would have guessed they had just passed.

Twenty paces past the alley a single horseman rode around the corner into the Rue de Bruxelles from a side street. He wore a badly fitting dust-gray uniform and carried a long steel spear. Close behind him came another gray-uniformed man on a bicycle, a carbine slung over the handle-bars. For ten seconds I stood in the middle of the street and stared at them before I realized that they were German soldiers. Then I remembered the Belgians in the alley and stepped into the nearest doorway out of range. There was no shooting, however. The Germans rode unmolested into the next street, scanning the four of us curiously as they passed.

All at once we realized that it was time we tried to get back to our taxicab. The townspeople, also understanding our need to get away, most of them taking us for English, gave us the road. But before we reached the rampart we could see the gray backs and the shining bayonets of an infantry column turning into the Brussels road from the boulevard. Ahead of them were a few straggling refugees from Tirlemont.

Behind the infantry came a company of lancers, one riding ahead, his automatic pistol in his hand, his eyes scanning the houses and the faces, watch-

ing for the first false move. The others rode stolidly on. Next came a bicycle company, then more infantry and cavalry, at the head of each company one man with his pistol drawn. The ranks were thinned in some companies and there were many empty saddles. These were the men who had just forced the retreat of the Belgians, and immediately behind them came their rapid-fire guns and large pieces of artillery. The horses that drew them came trotting along the boulevard, and it was not more than half an hour before we could hear them at Laefdael.

I thought I would never forget the least detail of that first advance on Brussels, but I remember two minor things best. I noticed a lancer staring at my coat and I put up my hand to find that I was still wearing the colours of the Allies—the Belgian, French, English, and Russian. The lancer, however, merely smiled at my discomfiture. As soon as he was gone I removed those colours. A little later the first of the Uhlans appeared. They were recognized at once by the flat tops to their helmets and some one near me hissed. In a moment the muzzle of an automatic travelled across our faces with painful slowness. I could feel the crowd sway and the breath of relief when the Uhlan rode on. For some reason, which I was unable to determine after two weeks in Belgium, the Uhlans had acquired the reputation of butchers. They were, in fact, no more brutal than the rest of the German army. All were bound by inflexible rules. When they were cruel it was because their orders were cruel. If they were barbarous it was because war is barbarous.

The hardest thing to describe about the entry of the Germans into Louvain is the hush that fell over the city. Except for the click of German heels, the clatter of German horses, and the rumble of German artillery you could have heard a sigh twenty feet away anywhere in Louvain. With the whole city at this nervous tension a German military aeroplane of the Taube type swept low overhead, and every face in the city stared at the black imperial crosses on the underside of the great planes, symbols of the German invasion.

As if it were the imperial fancy to give another sign of its power, at this moment the silence was broken by a high, clear flute sound from around the bend in the Rue de Bruxelles, and a large, gray German war automobile raced through the street. Over it, reaching from the ground in the front of the hood to the back of the tonneau, were two long, sharp, scythe-like knives bent convexly. These were merely wirecutters, so the automobile could charge through barbed wire, but they gave the car a sinister air. A general staff officer, evidently bound forward to direct the attack on Laefdael, sat alone in the tonneau, and the only man in the automobile with a rifle was the herald beside the driver, a curious brass instrument to his lips, its four horns announcing shrilly to the countryside that here was a man worth killing. It was a piece of imperial audacity, and Louvain admired that.

We had been led to believe that the Germans were only making a recon-

naissance in force and that before the afternoon was over we would be able to swing to the north and regain the Belgian lines. But the German troops kept coming along the rampart all afternoon, and when the provision trains and cook stoves appeared we began to realize that this was an invasion. Other war automobiles also passed, and late in the afternoon there was a large detachment of infantry. Night was coming on and it occurred to us that we were in a slightly precarious position. We might be taken for spies. For that matter we had been taking the precaution to mingle with the crowd, and the townspeople had helped to shield us from scrutiny. Now it became necessary to report our presence to the police.

When we reached the Grand Place there were half a dozen military automobiles drawn up before the Hotel de Ville, the beauty of which was partly hidden by scaffolding set up for supports. The Rue de la Station, the widest in the city, was also crowded with these automobiles, filled with officers of the distinctively Prussian type. Down a narrow street came another line, similar to that which had passed on the ramparts, and it also took the street which led to Brussels. By six o'clock we had seen about thirty thousand men pass in the direction of Brussels, all with their baggage trains and cooking apparatus. It had also filtered through the town that Louvain had become staff headquarters, and that at three in the afternoon the German general had taken possession of the hotel which King Albert had left at ten in the morning.

We made an attempt to get an interpreter by applying at the School of Languages which faced the Grand Place, but the interpreter did not come until later, and meanwhile we stood among the Louvain people watching the spectacle. While we were intent on the never-ending line of troops coming down the narrow street, a whole infantry division came marching down the Rue de la Station, in parade order, singing "Every Little Movement Has a Meaning All Its Own." This carried far down the line until a regiment broke it with "In the Night." It was plain to see that these troops were fresh and good-humoured. They had had a little skirmish that morning at Diest, just enough to lift their spirits, but had not had the real fighting seen by those who passsed along the ramparts.

Not to be outdone, and at the same time feeling the seriousness of war a little more, a company, which had been at Liége and Tirlemont, coming down the side street, began to sing "Die Wacht am Rhein." The line from Diest in the next lull changed to the patriotic also and sang the inspiring "Deutschland über Alles." After that we heard hardly anything else but that, and late in the evening they were still marching to it.

By this time Louvain was full of soldiers, but our interpreter had found us. The ease with which he picked us out of the crowd showed how conspicuous we were. Every few minutes we were stopped with the gruff

FEEDING THE MEN AND THE GUNS



BAKING FOR THE GERMAN ARMY
This "battery" of ovens is capable of turning out 16,000 loaves of bread a day.

PICTURES OF TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY WORK



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RUSSIAN FIELD KITCHENS

These are field kitchens used by the Russian army. In this case they have been captured by the Germans.



COOKING FOR THE KAISER

His field chef is preparing luncheon near the front.



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A TRAIN-LOAD OF "CANNON-FODDER" IN GALICIA

This picture is typical of the Russian military problem. There are men innumerable, but supplies and equipment are inadequate.





TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES

The upper picture shows ammunition and stores for the front at railhead. From here they are sometimes moved forward (as shown in the lower picture) by a light, narrow-gauge railway.



TRANSPORTATION OF AMMUNITION AND SUPPLIES

After leaving the rails supplies go forward by motors as far as roads and other conditions permit; then comes the turn of the pack-horses; and finally man-power is often needed to cover the rest of the distance to the entrance of the communication trench.



FOOD SUPPLIES ON THE HOOF

Some of the beef which helped the Russians to be red-blooded enough to take a quarter of a million Austrian prisoners after the battle of Lemberg.



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RUSSIANS RETREATING FROM GALICIA BEFORE THE GERMANS

These wagons laden with ammunition and supplies, are to be placed on freight cars. Bags of food may be seen at the right and in the background. The bundles of hay have been collected and placed in position by soldiers who intend to use them as cushions when they perch themselves atop of the loads, for the tedious jolting ride toward Warsaw.



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A SERBIAN CONVOY IN RETREAT

This picture shows why supplies sometimes fail to arrive and disgruntled soldiers must lie down to sleep upon empty stomachs.



THE WORK OF THE PIONEERS

The Germans have hastily put together this bridge across the Vistula, only to have it endangered by great chunk of floating ice from upstream. They are breaking these to allow them to pass on under the bridge.

question, "English?" In consequence it took us some time to make our way to the Place de la Station to the hotel our interpreter had picked for us.

There were half a dozen staff officers in the next hotel and we decided to tell them our troubles. They listened politely for a moment and then they broke out laughing. "Going to war in a taxicab," they laughed, "this is a joke." We were glad they took it that way. What we had heard of the German army had led us to expect quite different treatment. We were told, however, that we had done the wise thing in reporting ourselves.

By this time the town had begun to feel that the invasion of the Germans was not attended by all the atrocities they were supposed to be guilty of. German soldiers had entered the food stores and were buying like any other customers. In fact, Louvain had a rush of business such as it had not had for years. I think Louvain went to bed that night feeling as we did, that, whatever the German invasion might portend, the army was made up of pretty good fellows.

In the morning M. Sabbe, the interpreter, called for us and took us to the barber's, where the German officers waited their turn like the rest of us, and then to breakfast at the best restaurant in Louvain. Its proprietor had drawn its iron blinds and taken down its sign, and, with all their detailed knowledge of the invaded country, the Germans had not discovered it. There our breakfast was cooked by the woman who owned the restaurant, a slight little Flemish woman with the gentle smile and even the parted hair of a Mona Lisa. The usual spiritual quality of her face was also heightened no doubt by the fact that she was soon to have a child.

It was well into the morning before our complacency was disturbed. Two ignorant little men, who looked as if they might be a peasant's stable hands, were led briskly up the street by a squad of soldiers to the staff headquarters. Ten minutes later a large closed van which looked like a city patrol wagon passed down the street and turned to the left upon reaching the station. It was followed by a number of people wearing Red Cross badges. In five more minutes it was followed by a squad of soldiers and in ten minutes more by the Red Cross attendants bearing stiff, undersized bodies wrapped in blankets. This was the first military execution in Louvain. The undersized men had been found guilty of shooting at the soldiers.

Meanwhile we had been ordered to keep to our hotel, our eating place, and the main streets. We were promised that Mr. Whitlock would be informed of our whereabouts, but we were not to return to Brussels. We had learned too much about the movement of the troops.

That second day in Louvain, Thursday, was full of activity. A half-dozen aeroplanes made their headquarters to the right of the station, and to the left was the place of execution. Meanwhile the troops passed constantly in three columns, those from Diest still singing the four favourites of the day before,

occasionally varying with the Austrian national air. Early in the day it struck me that the troops were all blond. They were, in fact, all from points north and east of Berlin, and, though I watched idly while no less than forty thousand passed, I counted only thirteen men who were not decided blonds. I also doubt if there were a dozen whose hair was not clipped close to the scalp.

By noon the relation between the soldiers and the townspeople had become a little strained. About this time there were half a dozen shots on a side street and, after a while, a German officer who had been shot through the leg was carried by on a litter. Behind was the dead body of a Belgian. Evidently the German officer was the better shot. As the day wore on military executions down to the left of the railroad station became more frequent. There were perhaps fifteen. At the staff headquarters of the German army we were told there had been a good deal of sniping from houses, mostly in the outskirts and in small adjoining villages, and the punishment for this was death.

During the day announcements were posted throughout the town, signed by the burgomaster, calling upon the citizens to surrender all their arms at once. A little later he made another announcement ordering all doors and windows to be closed by eight in the evening. In this announcement he said he was speaking in behalf of the military authorities. That night I think all Louvain went to bed with an uncomfortable feeling of impending danger.

But the next morning the town was quiet. The troops were still coming through steadily in three streams. We began to realize that this was the main invading army headed for Paris. On many of the wagons in fact was scrawled, "Direkt nach Paris." That day will live in my memory chiefly on account of the rumble of wagons. The main provision train—with food for 350,000 men for a month—went through Louvain all day long and until far into the night.

Early that morning, however, it was announced that the burgomaster and two other prominent citizens had been held as hostages. The notice was signed by the military commander and stated that the least indication of hostility to the German troops would place all three hostages in a "very dangerous position." We were told at the staff headquarters that this measure had been taken because it seemed impossible otherwise to prevent sniping. I doubt, however, whether that announcement troubled Louvain as much as the one that followed in the afternoon. All houses facing on the Rue de Bruxelles and the Rue de la Station—the route the troops were taking—were placed under special restrictions. All windows were to be closed at eight o'clock in the evening, the curtains drawn, and lights so placed that the shadow of any one approaching the window would be thrown upon the curtain. These lights were to be left burning all night. At the same time the street doors were to be left unlocked.

This order was made to discourage sniping, but it was terrifying to the

women of Louvain. Half a dozen whose acquaintance we had made did not go to bed.

As the word had gone forth that all persons found in a house from which one shot had been fired were being shot, we had taken the precaution during the day to secure the front rooms in our hotel to prevent complications. So we had to pay for our security by sleeping in closed rooms with kerosene lamps. I stood it until three in the morning, then I put out my light and opened the windows.

On the morning of the third day we were told we could return to Brussels, and we found it took an hour or so to say good-bye to the kindly people we had come to know. We left our Mona Lisa hostess with the greatest regret. Besides being the best cook in Louvain, she was a sweet and gentle woman. I remember she made us laugh by trying to tell us in English about the predicament of the mayor. She said he had a "crisis of the nerves." Undoubtedly he had, when any one of 45,000 people could cost him his life.

Then there were our friends the priests, our guide and counsel M. Sabbe, and the tobacco dealer, who had the best brands of Havana cigars and who behind his store had built a little grotto with a fountain which was the delight of his wife and three growing daughters. There were, besides, the pleasant-spoken woman who sold us fresh linen and the buxom pastry cook from whom we got delicious little cakes right out of the oven. Our speaking acquaintance included most of the people who lived on the main streets and they all wished us a safe journey. Those who knew us best expressed the hope that we would return to Louvain in a happier time.

That time did not seem very near, however, after reading the latest notice that was being posted as we left. It was explicit and complete. It said in plain language that every citizen found with a weapon in his possession or in his house would be immediately shot. Every person in a house from which a shot was fired would be shot. And every house from which a shot was fired would be burned.

Four days later I returned to Brussels from the French frontier, to which I had followed the German troops in their march into France, and was met with the news that Louvain was being burned. There were a dozen stories current as to why it was being burned, but none of them was susceptible of proof. I tried to get at the facts, as I realized that the burning of Louvain would go down in history, but I doubt whether it will ever be known just what happened in Louvain immediately before the city was ordered to be destroyed. The details, however, are not really important. Ill-feeling had been growing from the second day. The German troops had become bad-tempered when their comrades were shot by snipers, and the people of the town had in turn grown restive under the rule of the mailed fist. There had been an exchange of shots, perhaps even a conspiracy, and the German troops took the full measure of reprisal.

On the way out of Belgium the next day I passed through Louvain in company with other newspaper correspondents who were trying to get out by way of Holland. We were told that a troop train returning to Germany with wounded and with English prisoners would leave the Gare du Nord in Brussels at eight o'clock in the morning. It finally left about four in the afternoon. In the station we heard the usual tales about Louvain and there was considerable excitement about it among the soldiers. The officers treated it coolly as a reprisal of war, but the excitement brought on by destruction showed in their men. At different times during the day five soldiers told me in a whisper that Brussels would be next, and there was no doubt from their tone they hoped it would be. There was even reason to fear it. For, as we reëntered the station on the way back from a hurried luncheon in the hotel, two rapid-fire guns were being drawn up before the Gare du Nord so that they commanded the two principal streets of Brussels.

The train ran very slowly and did not reach Louvain until nearly evening. Some of the near-by towns were also afire, and at all the stations there were many soldiers. But it was not until we came in sight of Louvain that we realized the extent of the destruction. Some of us had not been able to credit it until we saw with our own eyes. I was prepared to find one or two of the more troublesome quarters destroyed, but the first thing that caught my eye was the roofless church of St. Pierre. Across the Grand Place the Hotel de Ville still stood, but everything in between, a distance of half a mile, and everything for a mile beyond, to the farthest rampart, was burnt. All the handsomest houses in the northern end of the city were bare brick and stone walls. There were a few buildings along the ramparts to the east still standing, but these, too, were burning when our train went on two hours later.

My first inclination, as the train pulled in, was to go through the ruined town, but the train had hardly come to a stop before a soldier, drunk both from excitement and drink, shoved his head into the window and cried with an expressive gesture, "Three cities razed! Three! There will be more!"

He had hardly gone before another shoved in his head and cried "English" in a menacing tone. We called back "Americans," but he did not understand. "Americans from the United States," I said in German. "We are not enemies." "All who cannot speak German well are enemies," he replied, fumbling at his belt. It looked for a second as if we were in for a struggle, but another more intelligent soldier pushed him aside with the explanation, "He's drunk."

I realized by this time it would be extremely dangerous to go down the streets of Louvain in the twilight with my poor command of German. Moreover, the final act of the destruction of Louvain was being staged right in front of us. While it was being played, during a period of more than an hour, the third soldier, who had not been drinking but was much excited, remained

at the window talking to us. As the station was crowded with other excited soldiers we did our best to keep him there.

Meanwhile I could see directly out of the entrance upon the Place de la Station and down the Rue de la Station as far as the wrecked church of St. Pierre. Every house along that stately street was burnt. The homes of all our kindly acquaintances were gone. We had been told that the people had all been warned to leave, but I wondered what had become of the little Flemish woman of the restaurant with childbirth approaching, and the many lone women whose husbands and brothers were in the Belgian army.

About a hundred English prisoners were led across the Place de la Station and, after they had been placed in cars, a long line of citizens of Louvain were brought around in a circle under guard. I could not make out at first what the purpose of this was as my view was temporarily cut off by a cow that was led to the main entrance of the station. But presently a bayonet was run into the neck of the cow, and, as it fell, I could see a group of about fifteen men, in civilian clothes, closely guarded. The long line of Louvain citizens was being led around them.

It was difficult to make out what was going on. I asked the soldier at our window and he said carelessly, "Oh, those are the civilians who returned to-day to shoot us after we had burned half the town. We are going to shoot some of them."

The outer line of civilians kept marching in a circle until they had all passed close to the men in the centre. Then the line opened and the inner group passed out to the right. A group of soldiers followed.

After an interval of only a minute or two, hardly time for absolution, we could hear the rifles of the firing squad. Evidently the careless soldier knew what he was talking about.

"Hear that," he said, as the rifles cracked. "What did I tell you?"

Immediately some one climbed on a gun carriage among the group of citizens standing motionless before the station entrance. I could not hear a word he said, but his expressive gestures showed he was exhorting his fellow townsmen to accept their fate and yield to their conquerors.

While he talked, the butcher in the foreground skinned the cow with professional coolness, and began carving the carcass. It was nearly dark by this time and a number of soldiers came with candles and stood around the animal, the blood of which had spread over the station platform.

IV

HOW BRITAIN DID THE JOB

By IAN HAY (CAPTAIN BEITH), Author of "The First Hundred Thousand"

When, in August, 1914, the war burst upon Europe, it found Great Britain just about as unprepared for war as a country could well be. Assisted by our national habit of taking the benevolent intentions of our neighbours for granted, we had yielded to the assurances of those politicians who held that the best way to keep out of war is to remain unprepared for war. The result was that when the little British regular army—the so-called Expeditionary Force—hurled its contemptible little self across the Channel to the discomfiture of the divine dispositions of the Kaiser, it went alone—nerved to the grimmer determination by Lord Kitchener's explicit assurance that it need expect no reinforcements for at least six months, for the very simple and most convincing reason that there were no reinforcements to send. That little force was probably the best equipped, the best led, and the finest body of troops ever put into the field by Great Britain. They fought the greatest rear-guard action in history, and they fought it, week after week, without once breaking their formation or losing their morale. But—they fought it alone. Their own country could not help them.

However, to be just, the moment the clear call came, there was never any difficulty whatever about getting more men. They enlisted in swarms. The difficulty was, on the spur of the moment, to organize machinery that would handle them—feed them, house them, equip them, and get them into fighting trim. Men stood in the street for days, in a long and most pathetic queue, waiting to enlist; and as most of them had thrown up their jobs in order to do so, they were almost starving before they were taken in. The ordinary recruiting offices, snowed under, delegated a great deal of their work, perforce, to amateur organizations, such as local political clubs. These proceeded to enroll recruits with a zeal which rather lost sight of the fact that the humblest recruit possesses a personality and a stomach of his own. When a man joins the British army, he first of all fills up and signs what is called an attestation paper, and takes the oath. He is then dispatched, with his paper, to the headquarters of his regiment, where he hands over the paper and is duly enrolled. At least, that is what happens in normal times. In the fall of 1914, at any hour of a given day or night, some fifty or a hundred surprisingly cheerful individuals were apt to arrive at regimental headquarters, and announce,

usually in chorus, to the overdriven officers in charge, that they had "come for tae jine the Airmy." They were asked for their attestation papers. These were not always forthcoming. Sometimes they had been treated like the now historic "scrap of paper"; but more often the society which had enrolled the man had held his paper back, with a view to mailing it forward in a bunch with others at some more convenient season. The trouble was that until these papers were forthcoming the men could not be regarded as soldiers, and no public money could be expended upon them. They might neither be fed, nor clothed, nor (officially) housed. This threw a heavy private burden upon the officers, whose slender resources were strained to the uttermost to provide for this officially non-existent multitude. However, ultimately the papers arrived, and all concerned embarked upon the task of finding an owner for each paper. Owing to the paucity of Scottish tribal names, a Scottish battalion was particularly difficult to index; and the task of sorting out the innumerable Campbells and Camerons and Wilsons and Thomsons—not to mention the riotous hordes of "Macs"—was a soul-destroying business. Day after day, night after night, the sifting process went on, with infinite labour and discomfort. So much for the voluntary system, and the shunning of "militarism."

In due course the new battalions were evolved out of chaos, and departed into space to undergo their training. They possessed no uniforms—nothing beyond the civilian clothes they stood up in. Practically no man owned a greatcoat. If he did, he promptly sold it, to save the trouble of carrying it, for Tommy is the most improvident creature in the world.

We had all types. There were miners by the hundred—the finest soldiers in the world for trench fighting, because they handle pick and shovel by instinct, and they appear to prefer residence below ground to residence upon the surface—shipbuilders, farmers, carpenters, shepherds, and members of other and rarer trades. One platoon, for instance, contained a waiter from a restaurant, who was accustomed to parade every morning in the ranks, bright and early, in all the glories of evening dress. The outstanding feature of "K 1," as we called ourselves, was its ability to produce on demand an expert to cope with any possible emergency. If an escape of gas was discovered in the orderly room—literal, not figurative—a plumber was instantly forthcoming to cope with the matter. In fact, it was hardly safe for an officer to pose to his platoon as an expert upon any subject at all, for fear some lifelong expert should uplift his voice in the rear rank and refute his doctrines. And it may be added that in "K 1" no considerations of military etiquette ever prevented him from doing so! I still cherish the recollection of a certain junior officer who devoted twenty minutes to explaining the points of the compass and the elements of map-reading to a man who afterward explained that he was by profession a land-surveyor!

Such was the material we had to handle. It was an army of all the talents —except soldiering. No one who saw Aldershot during the first months of the war will ever forget it. Men wandered about in droves, dressed like nothing on earth. The spirit of discipline was hardly born. Rules and regulations were regarded either as antiquated relics of the age of peace, or else as a form of industrial tyranny. The officer was regarded as a rapacious employer, while the sergeant—or foreman, as he was usually called—was looked upon as a hired bully. If a man felt disinclined to go upon parade, he simply did not go; and he felt both surprised and pained if, on returning from a trifling absence of three days, prepared to forget and forgive upon a monetary basis—say the loss of three days' pay—he found himself under arrest as a deserter. But we can judge these men by no standard but their own. They had joined the army, to a man, at the outbreak of war, in the sure and certain expectation of being forthwith provided with rifle and bayonet, and of being despatched at once to the Front—wherever and whatever that might be—to kill Germans. One cannot blame them for feeling a little disappointed on finding that the path of glory was approached by a stony thoroughfare eight months long, hedged about with unexpected restrictions on the subject of obedience and sobriety. They had to acquire the instincts of a soldier after they had settled down to another way of life. No wonder they found things difficult. Yet, less than a year later, at the opening assault of the great and bloody Battle of Loos, those same men went forward, many of them to certain death, as steadily as the most seasoned veterans.

Such was the Spirit of the British armies, old and new. And it is that spirit which has saved us as a nation, and done most, at terrible personal sacrifice, to redeem us from the evils of unpreparedness.

V

THE RUSSIAN CONQUEST OF GALICIA*

By STANLEY WASHBURN

Had Russia been fighting Austria alone in this war, the whole world would have been ringing for the last two months with the account of vast operations, magnificent strategy, and battles which in size and extent have never before been known in the world's history. But with the coming of the war here, there broke also the great cloud all over Europe, and the details and scope of this remarkable campaign have, as it seems to me, been completely overshadowed by the nearer and better-understood operations in the country of Western Europe, which is much more intimately known to Englishmen and to Americans. While England and the United States were hanging with bated breath on the invasion of Belgium and the subsequent movements in France, the situation in Galicia received scant attention, and barring occasional reports of the capture of towns, the names of which were hardly familiar to us, very little news came from this zone.

It seems, therefore, appropriate to sketch briefly and simply what has been done down here by Russia and how she has done it. With the mere statement that the operations against Austria involved the movement of more than a million of Russian troops against about a million of Austrians and Hungarians, it will be understood that the scale of the campaign was enormous.

At the commencement of the war the invasion began from three different directions, and the Russian troops were formed into three great groups, each composing many army corps, the total aggregating twenty. These movements started from three bases. Brusiloff from the extreme east, with his base on Odessa, crossed the boundary formed by the river Zbrucz (local spelling), with his central corps on the line of the railroad at Wotocczyska, and commenced his march on Lwow (Lemberg), which is the strategic centre of central Galicia. Simultaneously Russky's army started with its innumerable army corps and auxiliary troops, having Kiev for its base. These divisions crossed the frontier with their centre on the line of railroad running from Radziwitow through Brody and Krasne to Lemberg.

The last great group of army corps, commanded by Ewerts, had its base on Brest-Litowsk, and moved south via Lublin to drive out the opposing Austrians in their front, and take the whole in the flank. This, in a very broad and gen-

*Reprinted from "Field Notes from the Russian Front" by the kind permission of the author.

eral way, was the movement planned and the general scheme of strategy, which, it may be said, was carried out to the letter. The greatest weakness of Russia at the start of the hostilities was in her lack of strategic lines of railroad. If one takes a map of Galicia, it will be observed that the Austrian Government has numerous lines which run to the frontier of Russia and then stop. This enabled the Austrians to mass troops almost instantly. The Russians, on the other hand, had few such lines, and the result was that the initial operations were much more difficult than they would otherwise have been. Time, in war, is the chief factor of the whole enterprise. Had Russia had more railheads at the frontier, she would no doubt have swept Eastern Galicia before the Austrians could have concentrated in any great force. But the lack of such facilities enabled the enemy to prepare defences hurriedly at many points, and to contest the Russian advance at every step. The opinion in England and in the United States also seems to have been that the Austrian troops were inferior, and that Russian advances were due largely to the weakness of her enemy. Those who have travelled over the field of operations, and read in the page of abandoned battlefields the tale of stubborn resistance, must change their views about the Austrians, and at the same time admit the remarkable impetuosity and courage of the Russian troops, who, against enormous obstacles, tore their way through a clever and ferocious resistance. The army of Brusiloff was the most distant from the strategic centre aimed at (Lemberg), and hence had the farthest to go, and perhaps in the early days the hardest fighting. The Austrians, with their superior railway facilities, were able to prepare a preliminary line of resistance to this army, along the bluffs and high ground between the forks of the stream known on local maps as Zlota Lipa, and here they made their first stand, a battle which in any other war would have taken columns to describe, but which in this struggle falls into the class of a mere skirmish.

From this point the Austrians fell back on a second line of defence, and one which was, in fact, an extremely strong one. This was the hills and ridges east of the river called Gnila Lipa. By the time this position was reached by the Russians, Brusiloff's left was in touch with Russky's right that had crossed the boundary around Radziwitow. The position now defended by the Austrians extended from the town of Halicz on the Dniester River, which was the Russian southern flank, in a practically unbroken line through the north of Krasne. The battle which was engaged over this extended line lasted for periods, in different parts of the position, of eight to ten days in the south, to nearly two weeks on the Krasne position itself.

The Austrian line was a very strong one and was defended with an intelligence and vigour which for days on end promised to thwart utterly the Russian efforts to break through. Trenches by the mile, with bombproofs, barbed-wire entanglements, and all other devices of modern field fortifications had been

erected to block the advance of the invading troops. Modern field guns, machine guns, and field howitzers were all turned against the Russians, and their losses were undoubtedly very heavy. Some of the details of the general line were contested for eight and nine days, being now taken by one side and now by the other, with each assault and counter-assault leaving the piled-up heaps of the dead and wounded in its wake. All this time Ewerts's numerous army corps were slowly pressing down from their base on Brest Litowsk, driving back heavy forces of the Austrians. But these columns were not determining factors in the first big fight before Lemberg. It was the collapse of the Austrian defence toward the south of the line that broke down the first big Austrian stand on their main line of defences. Heavy masses of them fled via Halicz, blowing up a fine steel bridge in their retreat. But the Russians, in spite of their days of incessant marching and heavy fighting, were not to be denied, and, throwing a pontoon bridge over the river, followed up their victory.

This movement threatened to envelop the whole Austrian right, and rendered the defence still going on around Krasne no longer tenable. Orders were therefore hurriedly given for the abandonment of that hard-fought field. It must be understood, however, in justice to the Austrians, that, even after thirteen days of resisting the Russians, their line in this part of the field was not broken, nor even severely shaken; and their retirement was due to the strategical exigencies created by Brusiloff's enveloping movement on the south. The Austrians then evacuated their base at Lwow (Lemberg), and without offering any further resistance in the city, retired to their newly created and even stronger position extending through Grodek and north to Rawa Ruska. Here, for the first time, all the Russian armies were in touch, as all the Austrians were also. Ewerts and his numerous corps had forced back his antagonists to the line between Rawa Ruska and Bitgoraj. This then presented an enormous front, with all the armies of both sides in touch with each other, and all engaged practically at the same time. It is difficult to form more than the merest approximate estimate of numbers engaged, but it is safe to put the total on both sides as above 2,500,000.

This battle, the details of which are so little known, was without doubt the hardest fought struggle, and on the most gigantic scale that the war had seen up to the time when it took place. Ewerts on the north would not be denied his advance, and his repeated assaults on the Austrians resulted in bending in their left day by day until their line was bent into a right angle, with Rawa Ruska on the northeastern corner. Here for eight days a battle raged which the annals of history certainly cannot up to this time duplicate, for the ferocity and bitterness of attack, and the stubbornness and courage of the defence. The Austrians, let it be said, were in an extremely strong position round this quaint little town, and were prepared to defend themselves to the last ditch, which in

fact they did to the letter. At the extreme corner of the defence, which I suppose one might call the strategic centre of the whole battle—if one place in so huge an amphitheatre can be picked out—they fought for six days with an endurance which was almost incredible.

Here there are no less than eight lines of defence in little more than a mile. Each of these was held to the last minute, and some of them changed hands several times before the Russians came finally over them. Each trench tells its own story of defence. Piles and piles of empty cartridges, accoutrements, and knick-knacks are heaped in every ditch. Right across the field between their positions is written their hurried change of line, with new graves and hundreds of haversacks scattered in between. Then comes another trench with the same signs of patient endurance under shot and shell. The last and strongest position of all before the final collapse is a place to make the blood curdle. By this time the Russians had brought up their heavy field howitzers, and when they finally got the range, they literally destroyed the whole position. One can walk for hundreds of yards stepping from one shell hole into another, each five feet deep and perhaps ten feet across. One can pick up the dirt of the trenches and sift the shrapnel balls out in handfuls. And yet even here the Austrians hung on for a time, as the mute evidence of the field too clearly tells. In every direction from each shell hole are strewn the fragments of blue cloth of the Austrian uniform, torn into shreds and ribbons by the force of the explosive; and all about the field still are bits of arms, a leg in a boot, or some other ghastly token of soldiers, true to discipline, hanging on to a position that was alive with bursting shells.

Beyond this line was the artillery position of the Austrians, and here again we find heaps upon heaps of brass shrapnel shells, with shattered wheels and splinters of caissons in every direction. This last stand finally caved in, and the next field, dotted with dead horses, shows where the remnant of the Austrian artillery took its way. The Austrians never had a chance to make a stand in the town itself, and with its loss came the dissolution of the whole defence along the entire line of battle, and what was really an overhwelming disaster to the cause of the Dual Monarchy. The Austrian army here split in two. While it is an advantage for victorious armies to have separate bases, it is anything but desirable for an army in defeat, for naturally each fragment falls back on its own line of communications. This is what actually happened here at this time. The Hungarian corps on the Austrian right retired through the Carpathian passes, while the Austrians fell back in confusion on Cracow, with the Russians taking Yaroslav on their heels. This, then, was the first great phase of the invasion of Galicia. The Russians at the conclusion of this part of the campaign held Galicia up to the river San and Yaroslav, and had swept everything in this zone before them with the exception of the fortified position of Przemysl, which, as I write, still forms a strong position in the

present Austrian line. So much for the purely military aspect. Let us now turn to the methods of the Russians and the manner of their behaviour while in a conquered country.

The Russians, after six weeks of campaigning, were left in absolute control of the whole of Galicia, up to a line running from the Carpathians on the south, through Przemysl and along the River San to the important town of Yaroslav. If one goes back over this campaign and studies the movements from the start of the war, one cannot but be enormously impressed with the remarkable achievement accomplished by the Russian army in a comparatively short campaign. Starting from widely separated bases, with meagre railway facilities, they manœuvred three giant armies, each composed of many corps and all working in general union, and achieved, without one effective setback, a series of victories of enormous magnitude. They did this in the face of an enemy whom history will show to have been by no means weak. The theory that Austria was a web of factions that would dissolve at the first impact, and the belief that her troops would not fight, have been absolutely disproved; and it serves to magnify the achievements of the soldiers of the Czar, when we accord to the Austro-Hungarian army the credit which is due to its courageous defence and the stubborn resistance put up at every favourable opportunity.

My opinion is that no troops could have made a braver resistance than was offered in many instances by the defeated army. I walked over one position which the Austrians held for a day in a stubble field with no defences whatever save the few-inches-deep pits that each man had dug for himself. For a mile the pathetic evidence of their determination to stick was visible on every hand. An unbroken line of accoutrements and fragments of shells marks the position where they held on absolutely without any shelter. Right in the centre of this hideous zone was a crossing of the roads, and there stands to-day a moss-grown old cross which for a century perhaps has received the reverence of the passing peasant. All through this terrible day the carved figure of the Christ upon the cross looked down upon the dying and wounded. The top of the wooden upright was shattered with a bit of shell, while one arm of the figure of Christ was carried away by a shrapnel fragment. Could anything be more incongruous than this pathetic figure of Him, who came to spread peace and good will among men, looking down to-day on a field sown with mangled corpses? At the very foot of the cross is a newly made grave and a rude wooden sign nailed upon the monument itself: "Here lie the bodies of 121 Austrian warriors and four Russian warriors of the —th regiment."

After the terrible fighting that had gone on for weeks, there followed a period of recuperation and refilling of the wastage of both armies. The Russians engaged the front of Przemysl and took the town of Sambor, and rested for a little. In the meantime the Austrians, encouraged by their German allies, were making frantic efforts to pull themselves together. The fragments of

the army that had escaped through the passes of the Carpathians were taken by rail to Cracow, while the army that went that way was reinforced and stiffened, and the whole reorganized and whipped into shape for further operations. The view that the heart of the Austrian army had been destroyed was now contradicted, for shortly after the 10th of October, 1914, it again showed signs of life. We hear that its left in Cracow joins the German right, and that many German army corps are united with it there. Rumour among us also says that the German Staff is in command of all Austrian operations. In any case, the second phase of the Galician war is now in full blast.

The Austrians began this by a terrific attack on Sambor, which was held by the Russians. Their impetus was so great that for several days it seemed possible that the Russians might be dislodged permanently from their hard-won position on their left flank. Indeed at Lemberg, where the guns could plainly be heard, there were constant rumours of Austrian victories. But their offensive ultimately failed, and the tide of battle gradually ebbed from round Sambor, and the interest shifted to a point which is between Sambor and Przemysl. Here the Austrians concentrated a number of army corps, less than four, and made a heroic effort to break the Russian line, with the idea of taking Lemberg, which was a practicable scheme, entirely dependent on the success of their attack. For a day or so their efforts seemed to be showing results, and a number of the hospitals in Lemberg were ordered to be in readiness for an instant removal. But this also failed, and also the Sambor movement, with a dreadful loss to the Austrians in dead and wounded, besides more than 5,000 prisoners taken by the Russians.

While this action was at its height, the combined Austrians and Germans delivered a stroke against Yaroslav, which the Russians had been holding since the days following the retirement of the Austrians from their Gródek-Rawa Ruska line. The details of this battle are not known to us, and indeed, the action is still under way as I am writing these lines. From what we gather, however, the Germans, after occupying Yaroslav, were driven out by the Russians in a terrible counter-attack, and since then have made no headway whatsoever. In a word, the movements of the Austro-German united armies in this last effort to wrest Galicia from the Russians seem now to have been absolutely futile. For three days we were travelling just in the rear of the Russian line, and during all that time the cannonading was terrible and without intermission. We are too near the operations, both from the point of view of distance and time, to get any real perspective of the general situation; but at the time of writing it seems safe to venture the statement that the Dual Alliance have shot their bolt on this frontier, and that hereafter there will be no serious opportunity for them to regain the territory which they lost in Galicia.

The fortress of Przemysl still holds out and may very well do so until the end

of hostilities. It is strongly defended, and will take a lot of battering before its capture can be effected.

What I have written of the military situation in Galicia is, I believe, approximately a correct outline of the general movements. It is almost impossible to get more than a very general idea of how things have actually happened, except in a very hazy way. The fighting has extended over such an enormous area, the numbers engaged have been so large, and units of command have been so numerous, that nothing like an accurate account can be given until the reports of the various commanders on both sides are to hand and can be digested.

The general fact remains, however, that Russia has in two months handled an army of more than a million men with no serious setbacks, and is to-day occupying the richest and best portion of the fertile province of Galicia.

Written October, 1914.

VI

HOW THE NAVY SAVED ENGLAND*

By WINSTON CHURCHILL

(Former First Lord of the British Admiralty)

London, July 22.—What kind of foe is this "Great Amphibian" which, for the first time in history, Germany has drawn out against her? Many valiant enemies has the Prussian army fought in the last 300 years, on the whole with a balance of good fortune, but here is something new altogether.

Never before have the force and science of Central Europe come into armed conflict with the western island. Far back along the fading paths of history crusading armies moved across the salt water to the fray. The chivalry of Crecy, and the archers of Agincourt who disembarked upon the coast of France; the sea rovers who affronted the power of Philip II on the Spanish Main, and the soldiers who withstood him in the Low Countries; the armies of William III and the Duke of Marlborough, humbling the glory of Louis XIV; the far-ranging ships and stubborn infantry that sustained a great king in one century and warred down a great emperor in the next—all had one birthplace, all were manifestations of one peculiar form of power.

GERMAN RAGE AGAINST ENGLAND

Now at last Prussia—the embodiment of all that land energy could give—must join in unrelenting conflict with the Great Amphibian. It is no small proof of the shrewdness of the Prussian military instinct that they realized at once where the peril lay, and even while the German armies rolled forward to the terrific assault on the French frontier, or drew up to withstand at heavy odds the hosts of the Czar, their hate and rage were concentrated upon the unorganized, black-coated, commerce-absorbed, politics-loving state which could scarcely at the outset put 150,000 men in the field.

Berlin mobs insulting with vulgar fury the departing British Ambassador expressed the same well-founded apprehension as the discerning pen and venomous verse of Lissauer. Let us always labour to deserve these sincere and spontaneous tributes.

The Great Amphibian is a female beast; not clever, but very tough; short-sighted, but very patient; slow and clumsy, but very strong and fierce—strong as her homes in the broad seas. You cannot voyage upon them without see-

*From the *Tribune*. Copyright, 1916—The Tribune Ass'n.

ing her dorsal fins cutting the blue water, and all over the world she has deposited her young. She moves at all times freely about broad and narrow waters, and, when minded, bars their passage to all others.

THE GREAT AMPHIBIAN

If need be she can crawl or even dart ashore first a scaly arm, with sharp claws; then, if time and circumstances warrant, a head, with gleaming teeth, and shoulders that grow broader and broader. Then she can draw out convolution after convolution of muscular body, till one cannot tell where the end of her may be found. Or she can return again to the deep, to strike anew, now here, now there—and no one can guess where the next attack will fall. While she fights her strength waxes. She is invigorated, not exhausted, by effort, and her ancient craft in war is gradually revived in her as the struggle deepens. Only she eats too much, wastes too much, and costs a lot to keep. Withal the Great Amphibian is faithful unto death. She is very hard to get at—in fact, since she first learned to swim, no one has ever caught her.

The true characteristic of all British strategy lies in the use of this amphibious power. Not on the sea alone, but on land and sea together—not the fleet alone, but the army in hand with the fleet. In this lies everything. In this already once in this war decisive victory has perhaps resided.

BRITISH MOBILIZATION

On the afternoon of July 26, 1914, orders were issued to prevent ships of the First Fleet from dispersing, as would otherwise have been done at daylight on the 27th, and to recall such as had started. At midnight the ships of the Second Fleet were ordered to remain at their home ports, in close proximity to the balance of their crews. On the 27th all the naval aircraft were moved to vulnerable points on the east coast, the Second Fleet completed an informal "stand by," telegrams were sent to admirals abroad, and far away at the China station the battleship *Triumph* began to clear for action.

During the 27th and 28th the protecting flotillas along the east coast were raised to their full strength. On the night of the 29th the whole of the First Fleet, with auxiliary cruiser squadrons and flotillas, passed the Strait of Dover and gained their war station in northern waters. On the same day an official "warning telegram" of approaching danger was issued. On the 30th the "precautionary period" began. Naval harbours were cleared and modified examination service was instituted. On the 31st the immediate reserve was mobilized and various reserve cruiser squadrons came into being.

NAVY MADE READY

On August 1st, shortly before midnight, a general mobilization of the navy was ordered and the Third Fleet began to come to a war basis. This step was

approved by the Cabinet on Sunday, the 2d, and made regular by royal proclamation next day. All reservists, however, had responded to the Admiralty summons, and on August 3d, when the ultimatum was sent requiring Germany to evacuate Belgium, the whole process by which the naval power of Great Britain is placed in readiness for war was completed in all respects.

At a great war council held on the afternoon of August 4th, attended by the principal naval and military personages as well as Cabinet ministers directly concerned with the Admiralty, it was agreed to despatch immediately the whole regular army—not four, but six divisions, if necessary—to the Continent and to undertake their transportation and the security of the island in their absence. This considerable undertaking was made good by the Royal Navy.

Once more now, in the march of the centuries, Old England was to stand forth in battle against the mightiest thrones and dominations. Once more, in defence of the liberties of Europe and the common right, must she enter upon a voyage of great toil and hazard, across waters uncharted, toward coasts unknown, guided only by stars. Once more "the far-off line of storm-beaten ships" was to stand between a Continental tyrant and the domination of the world.

It was 11 o'clock at night—12 by German time—when Berlin's answer to the British ultimatum was expected. The windows of the Admiralty were thrown wide open in the warm night air. Under the roof from which Nelson had received his orders was gathered a small group of admirals and captains and a cluster of clerks, pencil in hand, waiting.

Along the Mall, from the direction of Buckingham Palace, the sound of an immense concourse singing "God Save the King" floated in, and on this deep wave broke the chimes of Big Ben. As the first stroke of the hour boomed out, a rustle of movement swept across the room. The war telegram which means "Commence hostilities" was flashed to ships and establishments under the white ensign all over the world.

Aye, commence hostilities at once against Germany; urge them; persevere in them; concentrate upon them; repent not of them; pursue them to the very end.

Certainly Great Britain's entry into the war was workmanlike. Confronted by the greatest military power in the world and by a navy second only to her own, she acted with instant decision. Her great fleet disappeared into the mists at one end of the island, her small army hurried out of the country at the other.

ARMY PLAYS BIG PART

By these extraordinary strokes she might well have appeared to the uninitiated eye to divest herself of her defences, to lay herself open to the greatest perils. Long stretches of her eastern coast, guarded only by unostentatious

flotillas and comparatively untrained territorials, seemed almost to invite attack. Yet both these acts had been carefully conceived in time of peace, and both were in harmony with the highest strategic truth.

The "contemptible little army" reached the western battlefield in time to play what well might be judged a decisive part in the first and most critical of all trials of strength. The "Grand Fleet"—for this name, so honoured by our ancestors, was to be revived on the outbreak of war—from its northern throne has ruled the seas ever since with a completeness of control which even Trafalgar had not secured.

It may well be that history furnishes no more remarkable example of determined adhesion by civil government to sound principles of war as embodied in carefully considered plans without regard to obvious risks and objections. Had all our action been on this level, how many months of danger, how many lives, and what treasure might not have been saved.

BRITISH COMMAND OF THE SEA

From the first hour of war it was evident that command of the sea and all that followed from it rested with Britain. Everywhere German merchant ships scurried to port. Everywhere their cruisers hid themselves. Everywhere their commerce raiders were blocked in neutral or enemy harbours.

But at any moment England's naval strength might be challenged—and if at any moment, then surely the earliest moment was most probable—and even pending battles, the seas were full of dangers about which no experience existed as a guide or measure. At any moment—and if at any moment, then surely while it might delay the departure of an expeditionary force—a raid or descent might be attempted upon our coasts. Nevertheless, the army must go to France, and at once. Submarines? Still it must go. The French African army also must cross seas not yet cleared. Never mind—the bulk would get there.

And then, from all over the world, the Great Amphibian must draw her children, her resources, and her food. Ten thousand keels were carrying on trade and transportation, sailing boldly over every sea, hundreds homeward bound and hundreds outward bound each day, on 1 per cent. war insurance.

THE MENACE TO BRITAIN

The Australian and Canadian armies, the Indian divisions for France, the territorial divisions for India, regular divisions, spread garrisons about the world and a dozen minor enterprises claimed transport and armed convoy. For the enemy's cruisers were still at large and hidden.

Reinforcements and supplies for the army in France flowed in in an ever-widening stream, in spite of the enemy submarine, growing more daring and

more skilful every day. Then, as the Allied armies recoiled on Paris, land communications by Havre were threatened.

"Shift the base to St. Nazaire." It was shifted accordingly. "Get ready to shift further south still." It was got ready accordingly. "Better news—victory on the Marne—the tide has turned—shift it back to Havre." Again it was shifted accordingly.

Meanwhile there was not a moment's interruption to the men and supplies pouring out or the wounded pouring back. And all the time Britain must pen the second greatest naval power in its fortified harbours, guard the island from all attack, or be ready to fight the supreme battle of all history at four hours' notice. She must keep on being ready for years.

ENGLAND THE WORLD'S ARMOURER

The Great Amphibian, going ashore, must transform a large part of her body. Armies of millions must be raised—one, two, three, four millions, or more. She never thought of that before. And, of course, it will take some time, but they will want arms and equipment. She never thought of that before, either—not even at the time she thought of armies.

Never mind. Let us become the world's armourer and arsenal. Transform industries, call out men, call in women. Pity to have overlooked it before. Half a year has been lost—or was it a year—or was it more? But her faithful servants on the sea still execute punctiliously the tasks confided to them. Mistakes can be put right, delays can be retrieved, needless suffering can be avoided, loss can be endured. All sacrifices, even those that seem to have been in vain, can be made fruitful.

Slowly but surely the whole force of the nation and empire and all its dependencies will be organized for war by land and sea; not one scrap will be wilfully neglected. The effort ultimately will reach the potential maximum, both in volume and in quality—unless the war for any reason comes sooner to an end.

VII

THE EYES OF THE ARMY AND NAVY

HOW AIRCRAFT INFLUENCED THE WAR AND HOW WAR INFLUENCED AIRCRAFT

By WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT AND CARL DIENSTBACH

In the Tripolitan War waged by Italy against Turkey in 1911 a few imaginative theorists—so they were called—induced the Italian authorities to send to the front three or four French exhibition machines with which the army had been provided. It was proved at once that scouting could be done more effectively on wings than on horseback. But the Tripolitan campaign was aëronautically one-sided. The Turks had neither airships nor flying machines and no artillery designed for the especial purpose of bringing down airscouts. There could be no fighting in the air. The war proved only the value of the flying scout. It did nothing to develop the airplane or the airship.

The Balkan War that followed was hardly more illuminating. To be sure, airplanes were sent up to reconnoitre, but they were manned by hired foreign flyers—mercenaries with itching palms but no patriotic fervour. There were no combats in the air simply because the flyers avoided each other almost as politely as if they thought it ungentlemanly to trespass on an opponent's zone. It seemed as if a doubt once expressed by H. G. Wells in one of his well-reasoned, imaginative novels, the doubt if the courage of the Twenty-second Century was equal to the test of fighting in the air, was ignominiously confirmed early in the Twentieth.

Hence, Europe entered the great war that began in 1914, realizing that the airplane and the dirigible airship would play a vital part in turning the tide of battle but quite ignorant of the terrible demands that would be made on machines and men in the air. Of all military arms the aëronautic was the least developed because it was the least understood. In the brief space of two frightful years it became necessary not only to evolve an effective system of air tactics but also to invent new types of machines. Even the art of flying had to be learned anew. The air lessons that strategists thought that they had learned from the Tripolitan and Balkan wars were simply thrown overboard.

THE AIRPLANE STRENGTH OF THE GREAT POWERS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

Of all the great European powers, France was the first to appreciate correctly the possible military worth of aircraft. Germany long experimented

with dirigibles. She lost three precious years before she caught up with France. And yet Germany was aëronautically better prepared than any other European power when the first shot was fired. She had some five hundred airplanes against the French eight hundred; but her five hundred were superior in type. Least prepared were Russia and England. Their indifference proved costly during the first year.

We can only guess at the airplane strength of Great Britain in 1914. On paper she had two hundred machines. It is doubtful if there were a hundred in actual commission—so few in fact that they could play no very important part in stemming that overwhelming tide of field-gray Germans that swept through Belgium and France. But for all that the British machines were good, better in fact than those of the French for military scouting.

It was characteristic of Germany that she alone entered the war with a standardized airplane. Her monoplane Taube, or "Dove," of which we heard so much in the early months and her Albatross, Aga, and other biplanes were by far the best military machines in Europe—best because they had given the most uniformly satisfactory account of themselves in long-distance flights. All these machines were standardized tractors; that is, their propellers were mounted in front. To relieve the pilot as much as possible of the nervous and muscular strain of maintaining his balance, the Taube and the Albatross were made automatically stable by shaping the wings like those of a dove and by giving them the contour of a broad arrow-head. They were strong, as strength was conceived in 1914. And they were wonderfully dependable. There were some faster flying machines in the British and French armies, but on the whole, the Taubes and Albatrosses anticipated better than any other type the qualities that the bloody experiences of the war have taught soldiers to demand of wings and motors.

Although the French had the most airplanes at the outbreak of the war it was a very heterogeneous collection. There was nothing comparable with the standardized German equipment—nothing but a motley array of civilian and sporting machines, some very fast and some very slow, some staunch and some daringly flimsy. In the end, this very lack of uniformity aided the French in the process of elimination and invention that preceded the development of final types on all sides. It was much harder for the Germans to scrap their Taubes and Albatrosses simply because they had been standardized.

THE DOVES OF WAR

With their standardized equipment of Taubes, or Doves, the Germans boldly took the initiative in the air from the very first day of the war. It was the Taubes that ushered in the invasion of Belgium, the Taubes that scrutinized the territory before the army that rolled over northern and eastern France, the Taubes that encouraged the Germans to take chances that might

have proved fatal had there been no guiding intelligence in the air. They flew far, far behind the French lines. They soared over Paris long before the German army was pounding at its gates. They were the harbingers of victory in driving the Russians out of East Prussia.

This superiority of the Germans in the early stages was in part due to training. The airplane had been first used by the French in those annual manœuvres in which every European army engaged before the war. Apparently the Germans alone had learned the necessity of long-distance military flights. At all events, there were few long French flights at the outbreak of hostilities—few attempts to fly far into the enemy's country, few attempts to beat off the German Taubes. On the whole, the French undertook only timid short journeys over the German lines. There were even complaints on the German side that French machines were seen so infrequently. It is clear that the bird of battle had as yet neither beak nor talons. It was a mere fledgling. A few rifle and pistol shots were exchanged; but there was no air fighting in any real sense. Whenever a German machine made a menacing feint that suggested a duel the opposing French machine generally retired hastily. Nor were any efforts made to direct artillery fire on either side at first. There was merely reconnoitring, with all the advantage on the German side that followed from the use of the best machines and the best trained scouts.

SURPRISE ATTACKS WERE IMPOSSIBLE

Inexpert as the reconnoitring was on all sides but the German in the early months, it is nevertheless significant that there was no battle that even remotely resembled a surprise attack. The eyes in the air saw everything. Von Hindenburg's operations in Eastern Prussia were sometimes surprisingly sudden. If they constitute an exception it must be attributed to the poor airplane equipment of the Russians—a feeble imitation of the French on a very much reduced scale.

Even in the capture of Antwerp the Taubes proved their worth. The Belgians and British had cunningly masked a few batteries. All the ranges were known to a foot. As the Germans advanced they were met by a deadly artillery fire. Whence did it come? The forts of the first line had long since been reduced to ruins by the Krupp 16-inch howitzers, by 12-inch Skoda mortars, and by 8-inch siege guns. The forts of the second line were too far back to deliver so destructive a fire. The shells evidently came from an ingeniously concealed battery which had to be destroyed before the troops could advance to the Nèthe. Airplanes were sent up with strict orders to note the location of every enemy battery. The batteries were silenced.

That the German avalanche was finally checked at the Marne is due entirely to the flying machine, unskilfully handled though it was by the French.

If the Germans alone had been provided with airplanes or if the French had been as poorly provided with machines as were the Russians, the Battle of the Marne would have resulted in a German victory and in the capture of Paris. The Germans had pushed on too fast and too far. They had overreached themselves. It was glaringly apparent to the French air scouts that the too-hasty German advance could not be adequately supported. Knowing what they did of the precarious German situation, the French stood their ground and at last stemmed the devastating tide.

On the other hand, the Germans, too, profited by the airplane. Without it they would have suffered a crushing defeat at the Marne. Circling high up in the air, a German airman whose name is unfortunately not mentioned in the official reports, saw the movement undertaken by the enemy to turn the German flank. The order was given to draw in the lines—to retreat, in other words. So the airplane at the Marne saved the day both for the French and the Germans.

The Battle of the Marne was followed by long weary months of trench warfare. Both French and Germans buried themselves in the ground. This stagnation was in large measure due to the airman. It was impossible to carry out any important strategic movement without detection. There was ample opportunity now to experiment with new types of aircraft and to evolve an efficient system of air tactics.

THE FRENCH BEGIN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE AIRPLANE

The French were probably the first to realize that a military airplane could be highly serviceable in more than one way. It might be good for scouting, for fire control, or for fighting. Because the aëronautic matériel of the Allies was so varied, so unstandardized, they were soon able to select the most efficient types. They proved to be the high-powered racer of Morane, and the fast small biplanes of Sopwith and of Bristol. The Morane racers became models for new squadrons. They had proved to be good for scouting because they were fast and because the wings, elevated as they were above the pilot, did not obstruct the view of the terrain below. The Taubes, which, like the French Blériots, were monoplanes with wings that impeded observation, were retained for a time by the Germans, but merely because of their staunchness and great radius of action.

In the first air fights that ensued, pistols and rifles were the weapons adopted, now as aërially antiquated as the bow and arrow or the blunderbuss. In spite of their far-sightedness, in spite of their thoroughness, the Germans had not mounted machine guns on their airplanes. The imaginative French had made a few experiments of that kind; but the load-carrying biplanes on which the guns were mounted were much too slow. To the British belongs the credit of having begun real air-fighting—the most daring of all fighting. That

was because their staunch, fast biplanes were best adapted of all flying machines to mount machine guns. The British succeeded in driving the German air-scouts back over their own lines as soon as they appeared. The French soon emulated their allies and became equally proficient.

All subsequent changes in airplane design were dictated by the necessity of engaging in air-duels. The racing machine again served as the prototype of the fighting machine. The French and the English seem to have made that discovery first. They began by strengthening the racer so that it could carry machine guns. So they were the first to appear in the air, much to the consternation of the Germans, with craft that for the time being were invulnerable because of their manœuvring and climbing powers. The Germans had nothing that approximated the racer. Wedded as they were to a standard, they hesitated to make a radical change. At last, however, they discarded their big monoplane Taubes in favour of their equally standardized Albatross biplanes, which, however, gave the pilot an unobstructed view. They first resorted to a very curious expedient—the building of a gigantic machine with two bodies and two motors and propellers and car in the middle. "Fritz" the British promptly called this monstrosity when it appeared. It was so powerfully engined that it proved to be speedier than the French and British scouts; it carried two machine guns so that it might overwhelm resistance by a hail of bullets. But "Fritz" could neither climb nor manœuvre as well as the fighting machines of the Allies. For that reason he was but a passing phase in the evolution of the airplane-destroyer. The huge Sikorskys of Russia—machines with bodies as big as Pullman cars and almost as comfortable—were even less serviceable.

THE GERMAN FOKKERS

The Germans saw that there was nothing for it but to imitate the Allies. They returned to the monoplane—not to the discarded Taube, but to the untried Fokker. Like the French fighting machines, the Fokker was made small and given extraordinarily powerful engines. It could dart about with wasp-like agility. Seated within its beautifully modelled body was a single picked man, who had not only to manipulate the controls but also to work a machine gun. The mounting of that gun was marvellously ingenious. It was fixed in position so that it could fire its six hundred shots a minute only straight ahead between the blades of a propeller spinning at the rate of twelve hundred revolutions a minute. Why did it not tear away the propeller? Because engine and gun were geared together, so that the engine pulled the trigger Only thus was it possible to time the firing of the gun with such absolutely mathematical accuracy that a blade was never struck. The French machine guns were similarly mounted and similarly fired. It is impossible to fix the credit for the invention; French and Germans had worked it out independently before the war

It is evident that in handling such a gun the entire machine must be swung, just as a lancer must wheel his horse in order to lunge with his weapon. There is a reason for this. The fighting Fokkers and Moranes have a speed of well over a hundred miles an hour. When one rushes past the other in that jockeying for position that accompanies a duel in the air, each pilot must reckon with his own speed and that of his opponent—a total of two hundred miles an hour. The difficulty of making a hit at close range—and hits must be so made—may be conceived if a marksman seated at the window of an express train were asked to hit a certain passenger in another train rushing past in the opposite direction. Only by firing head-on at a foe directly in front of him can the fighter hope to score. That great fundamental fact was not learned until air-fighting in high-speed machines began in earnest. It dictated the peculiar mounting of the machine gun and its mechanical operation by the engine. After this lesson was learned and the Moranes and Fokkers had been designed in the light of this knowledge, there were no further marked improvements in fighting machines, except that racing monoplanes were supplanted by racing biplanes in accordance with scientific teaching of to-day.

Over and over again has it been said that this is a war of mechanism and that the old romance of fighting is gone. Men are mowed down or blasted out of existence not by visible foes but by invisible engineers miles distant. Even in rushing a trench there is but scant opportunity for a furious hand-to-hand struggle. The few bewildered shell-shocked creatures that still cower alive beneath a shelter after a bombardment that has lasted for days, are too dazed to struggle. But in the air, it is otherwise. Only in the epics of Homer are deeds recorded that can be fittingly compared with the feats of the air-fighter. In the battles of the Iliad, the personal prowess of a god-like hero wins the day; the fate of an army depends on the courage, strength, and skill of an Agamemnon, Ajax or Achilles. So it is in a modern air battle. The romance of old has not only been revived but intensified a hundred fold. Compared with German and British airmen circling around each other like falcons, but flying higher than any falcon, swooping down upon each other with breathless suddenness, braving simultaneously the perils of the invisible atmospheric mäelstroms and billows and the bursting shrapnel of anti-aircraft artillery, squirting death from a machine gun during a few favourable seconds, how feeble and insignificant seem the rock-hurling, sword-wielding deeds of Homeric heroes!

These warriors of the air are picked men. Upon their personal skill and courage hangs the fate of whole divisions. Consider the battle of the Somme, for example. The French and English had driven the German scouts and fighters from the sky. Command of the air gave them command of the terrain, and so they forced the Germans back yard by yard by means of the most terrific air-controlled artillery fire that either side had endured since the be-

ginning of the war. Boelke, the aërial Achilles of Germany, the most dashing air-fighter that the war has produced, was in his tent—but not sulking. He had been ordered home by the Emperor himself to rest, to impart his skill to other officers, and to superintend the building of new machines. It was felt that only Boelke could regain the mastery of the air. He was summoned back to the Somme with his squadron. He was killed accidentally in a collision with a too-eager follower. But his unmatched prowess saved the Germans from further losses. In a sense, he alone checked the advance of the Allies.

Air-fighting ended the long-distance reconnaissance flights that had preceded the Battle of the Marne. Only long bombing raids were henceforth undertaken—raids in which it was possible to avoid the more dangerous positions of the enemy, to fly swiftly over his lines, to reach the comparatively unprotected country beyond and to drop bombs on the airship sheds of Friedrichshafen and Düsseldorf and the chemical works of Ludwigshafen. Two months before the war it was taken as a matter of course that half the numerous machines entered in an overland endurance contest should come to grief before reaching their destination. In these long bombing expeditions two dozen machines sometimes took part; the missing were brought down by cannon or attacking machines and not by defective parts. Can more telling testimony be offered of the wonderful improvement that has been made in airplane design?

DIRECTING ARTILLERY FIRE FROM THE AIR

With the beginning of trench warfare, the French and German air-scout was assigned to the dangerous task of controlling artillery fire. It is self-evident that he would not be permitted to wireless back the hits and misses of the great guns behind his own lines undisturbed. The enemy sent swift air-fighters after him. To cope with their fast machines, his airplane had to be redesigned. It was not fast enough; it was a poor climber. The Germans promptly built scouting biplanes for fire-control which had the Fokker's characteristic insect-like manœuvring ability. That was not easily done. A Fokker need not stay aloft hours at a time; it need not carry a heavy load of fuel. But a scouting machine which stays up perhaps half a day must be a weight-carrier. The Germans effected a compromise by making the machine as small as they could without limiting its weight-carrying capacity too much. At last they arrived at a really serviceable military type remarkable for its speed, its manœuvring ability and climbing power.

The small modern scouting machine thus evolved by the Germans needs carrying power for its equipment alone. It has wireless instruments both for sending and receiving messages, half a dozen bombs, bomb-aiming apparatus, a stereoscopic camera, and two machine guns—one fixed in position and handled by the pilot as in the Fokker machine, the other mounted on a turn-

table and handled by the observer who swings with it. A scouting machine is expected to make a running fight to the rear, but if it is cut off it must fight bow-on like a Fokker.

It has become a hackneyed phrase that the men who fire the great guns never see the target. Hackneyed as it is, it needs reiteration. It would take a man three hours to walk to the spot where the projectile fired by a twelve-inch Skoda gun buries itself in the ground. Batteries are so ingeniously concealed that opposing gun-crews must content themselves with knowing the general direction of the target. The airplane had to be reinvented not only because it had to attack scouts but because it had to aid the gunners. By 1910 the modern long-bore gun and the howitzer had outstripped the methods of laying it on the target devised by optical-instrument makers and mathematicians. To make the most of the gun, better fire-control was an essential. If the airplane and dirigible had not been invented years ago, they would assuredly have been invented during the progress of the war.

Napoleon's picturesquely blasphemous estimate of the fortunes of battle is still valid. But it needs an addition. Heaven is not only on the side of the heaviest artillery but also on the side of the most efficient fire-controlling airmen. It is true that telephones and telegraphs in the advance trenches are employed to communicate the effect of each shot. But while the telephone and telegraph operators in the trenches may see the sandbags opposite, the crux of the enemy's defence is never revealed to them—the crux represented by the batteries far, far behind the enemy's front. Before the eyes of the man in the air, the whole battleground is spread out. He now has at his command wireless telegraph instruments. As a shot falls he can flash back the word "too short" or "too long." Anything that the eye in the air can see can be destroyed. The airman must be regarded as the miraculous extension of a general's eyes and mind. It lies within his power to annihilate a battery mightier than that of any super-dreadnought.

The tactics of the Somme developed with better handling of the airplane. As the efficiency of fire-control and scouting was increased, artillery became more deadly. Technical improvement in the airplane was mirrored in the tactics adopted by the opposing general staffs. Hence, the decisive importance of artillery in the war must be in a large measure ascribed to the airplane.

The technique of scouting and fire-control bears little resemblance to what it was before the war. Photographs have taken the place of the eye. Automatic airplane cameras had been invented before the war, but no one suspected that they would be used in anything but long scouting expeditions. In the engagements that took place in the region of Arras in April, 1917, no fewer than seventeen hundred photographs were made in a day of the German lines by dozens of flying machines. On both sides along the western front scouting has become as photographic as modern astronomy. The

camera is built into the machine at a spot where the lens can see everything. Stereoscopic pictures are taken and studied in a stereoscope. Indefinite markings on charts of fortifications, trenches, and batteries give place to exact records marvellously rich in detail. Counterfeits (sham batteries and trenches) are easily detected, because counterfeits lack depth.

LEARNING TO FLY ANEW

The art of flying has changed fully as much as the flying machine itself—not in its principles but in the demands made on the pilot. Generals have become ruthless. Before the war, machines were adapted to the pilot; after the Marne, the pilot had to adapt himself to the machine. The astonishing somersaults and tail-first dives of Pégoud and his imitators are now part of the repertoire of every military flyer. They have been elevated to the dignity of tactical evolutions. No matter what the conditions may be, no matter how daring in design an untried machine may be, the flyer *must* rise into the air. He is literally flung into the atmosphere and made to soar without ante-bellum regard for his neck. Military exigencies are more important than lives.

But the enormously increased speed of the new machines is not without its compensation. Ten years ago the man in an airplane was in the unstable position of a tight-rope walker without a pole. Wilbur Wright testified that out of the sixty seconds in a minute a pilot was busily engaged in working his controls for fifty-nine in the unceasing effort to maintain his balance. Orville Wright now comments that a pilot may neglect his balance for a time, even in gusty weather, and still be certain of recovering his equilibrium when necessary. That is an advance so wonderful that only an airman can appreciate it at its full worth—an advance made chiefly by a nice proportioning of surfaces and distribution of weights as a result of laboratory research.

ZEPPELINS AND OTHER DIRIGIBLES

What of the dirigibles in the war? Very little has been heard of them with the exception of the Zeppelins. On paper the Allies were more than a match for the Germans in the number of dirigibles that could be launched. But when the test came, when the outbreak of hostilities taxed all resources to the uttermost, the Germans again proved that they had the upper hand. There is an important meteorological reason for this. The prevailing winds are from the west. Raids in dirigibles are always made against the wind, if possible, so that damaged vessels may drift back to safety. The meteorological advantage was with the Germans as a result.

Only the Zeppelin has earned laurels comparable with those of the airplane. German army officers had objected to the Zeppelin's unwieldiness. They wanted something that could be inflated on the battlefield and that could be transported in two army wagons, and so they advocated the Parseval and

Gross-Basenach collapsible vessels. They soon saw the light. It is significant that both England and Russia were permitted to buy Parsevals in Germany. Austria alone was initiated into Zeppelin mysteries; at least she had announced her intention of adding Zeppelins to her airfleet about a year before the outbreak of the war.

Although the Zeppelin proved itself vastly superior to all other dirigibles its design was no more final than that of the military airplane.

War has made speed so imperative that the Zeppelins have been shorn of all wind-resisting appendages. The car lies close to the hull now; the rudders are simpler than they were; the propellers are no longer mounted on brackets at the side of the hull, but directly on the cars. The smallest modern Zeppelin built before the war was the *Viktoria Luise*, a craft 485 feet long. Her type has disappeared as the Taube airplane disappeared. It was too small and too slow.

Still slower and still smaller were the dirigibles of the Allies. They could not fly as high as the smallest Zeppelin; they were too dependent on favourable weather. That applies with equal force to the German non-rigid Parsevals and the semi-rigid Gross-Basenachs, and explains why they, too, have been heard of only infrequently. They must have been brought down rather too easily if we may judge from the way a Parseval succumbed to Russian artillery fire near Riga in the autumn of 1915.

HOW THE ZEPPELINS PATROL THE NORTH SEA

Except by the English Government itself, the Zeppelin has been generally underestimated, probably because of the indignation aroused by its attacks on English towns. It is even referred to in the press of both sides of the Atlantic as an egregious failure. Count von Zeppelin is popularly supposed to have died of disappointment. One has only to read the speeches made in Parliament in March, 1916, by Churchill, Balfour, Joynson-Hicks and Lord Montagu of Beaulieu to learn how keenly the British authorities regret that England did not build a fleet of Zeppelins ten years ago, how much simpler England's problem would be if the North Sea could be watched by a few giant rigid dirigibles rather than by a large squadron of war vessels, and how effectually the Zeppelins keep the German High Sea Fleet informed of the activities of British battle cruisers and dreadnoughts.

The truth is that the Zeppelin's influence on naval tactics is comparable with the airplane's influence on land tactics. Britannia unquestionably rules the waves of the North Sea; but the Zeppelin also unquestionably rules its atmosphere. England has not been able to cope with the Zeppelin naval scout. Over the waters of the North Sea the Zeppelins are safe. There are no hidden fortifications with powerful anti-aircraft artillery. A warship armed with the necessary guns can be descried afar and avoided. Sea-

planes have proved powerless to thwart the Zeppelin. The largest have not the necessary radius of action. A Zeppelin's movements may be extended for days. Even over the restricted waters of northern Europe a seaplane can stay aloft for only a few hours. The Zeppelin is an independent fighting and scouting craft like any cruiser. A seaplane must be accompanied by a mother ship. It cannot rise from the open sea, unless the water happens to be fairly smooth and the weather favourable. From a ship only a machine smaller than a seaplane can be launched. The hoisting of a seaplane on board of its mother ship is fraught with danger of attack. The operation takes time; the mother ship must come to a full stop; the whole target is excellent. In battle, seaplanes must be left at the mercy of the waves after the fuel supply is exhausted.

A seaplane that rises *after* two fleets are engaged, like the solitary British machine that appeared in the sky during the Skagerrack battle, can hardly render effective service. A Zeppelin which is on duty all the time, if need be, must be reckoned with; it enables a commander to begin the action when he —not the enemy—decides. In a single day a Zeppelin can sweep the whole North Sea without risk to itself. A mother ship with seaplanes would consume several days in the same employment. And what happens when the plane discovers the enemy? It is discovered itself; the presence of a defenceless, near-by mother ship is advertised. If the enemy should have a squadron of fast destroyers, the mother ship must inevitably be captured, which performance seals the fate of the seaplane.

That the Zeppelin is more than a match for the seaplane is admirably demonstrated by the engagement that took place near Terschelling, off the Dutch coast on July 5, 1915. Several mother ships were engaged in hoisting a fleet of seaplanes overboard, when a Zeppelin squadron espied the operation. It came down like an avalanche, dropped bombs on the mother ships and opened fire. The ships steamed away at once. Lieutenant Bird, the pilot of the single plane that had been launched, decided that salvation lay in flight. He rose and fled over Holland, inland. A Zeppelin had wirelessed the news of his escape back to a German base. Airplanes pursued him and pressed him so hotly that he was forced to descend in Holland where he and his machine were interned.

THE ZEPPELINS IN THE NORTH SEA BATTLES

The two battles fought by the Germans and English in the North Sea will go down in history not only because super-dreadnoughts and battle cruisers were under fire for the first time but also because of the part that the Zeppelins played.

Both Admiral Beatty and Admiral Jellicoe have freely conceded the naval value of the Zeppelins in the official reports of the two great battles fought in

the North Sea. There can be no question that the German High Sea Fleet came out into the open only after the Zeppelins had carefully determined the location and strength of the British Grand and Battle-Cruiser Fleets. Thanks to the Zeppelins, the German Admiral knew exactly when the British Grand Fleet might be expected to arrive on the scene of the Skagerrack battle. He retired in the nick of time. The amazingly swift destruction of three fine British battle-cruisers during that historic engagement seems to presuppose a knowledge of contemplated manœuvres that could only have been gained from a height at which everything is revealed. So, too, the shelling of English coast towns by German warships must have been preceded by a careful Zeppelin survey of the Channel and North Sea to discover whether or not the vessels to which the bombardment was entrusted might venture forth.

THE ZEPPELIN AS A BOMB-DROPPER

On land the Zeppelins have been employed like airplanes; in other words, for scouting and bomb-dropping. Airplanes did not at first engage in nocturnal scouting. The Zeppelins, on the other hand, hovered over the enemy night after night from the beginning. Hence, they gave the Germans an enormous advantage at the outset, all the more so because anti-aircraft artillery was still ineffective. They dropped bombs on the fortress of Namur in 1914 and materially assisted in reducing that stronghold.

Like the scouts in airplanes, the commanders of Zeppelins had much to learn. Even in the most realistically planned peace manœuvres, dirigibles are not fired upon with real shells. Only war can teach a man how low he may dare to navigate. Because they lacked experience, the Zeppelin commanders risked the enemy's fire too carelessly. Crude as the first anti-aircraft artillery was, several Zeppelins were destroyed even in the beginning.

The problem of arming the Zeppelin against airplanes has not been satisfactorily solved. It carries one or two machine guns on top of its huge envelope and several within its cars. Although a Zeppelin is a wonderfully steady platform, guns can hardly be expected to fire with great precision when shaken by near-by engines. The guns on top of the huge envelope, admirably located as they are, are not affected by vibration, but they lack shelter and cannot be served comfortably. Perhaps the Zeppelin that was destroyed over London by Lieutenant Robinson, an intrepid boy in a British airplane, met its awful fate because its guns were unfortunately mounted. That a vessel larger than most ocean steamers should not have been able to beat off an airplane speaks strongly in favour of that supposition.

How the Zeppelins are used over land is well illustrated by the attack made on the night of August 11-12, 1915, on Bielostok, an important military railway junction. The craft flew at a height of only 8,000 feet without being hit once by the Russian artillery. When Bielostok was reached, the vessel

rose to 10,000 feet. Far below, the city and the railway station could be distinctly seen, brightly illuminated. Thirty bombs were dropped, one after another. Explosions of ammunition followed, so terrific that they were felt in the Zeppelin itself. The junction was wiped out.

As a bomb-dropper, the Zeppelin is more successful than the airplane. Its sighting instruments are not only more elaborate and accurate, but manipulated in ease and comfort. When it is considered that in dropping a bomb an error of an inch may be multiplied into a hundred yards at the ground, the ability of the Zeppelin to sight its target carefully gives it an enormous advantage over the airplane. Moreover, the heavy bombs carried by an airplane must of necessity be few in number; light bombs, however numerous, are easily deflected by the wind. The bombs of a Zeppelin weigh 150 pounds each. A Zeppelin carries a load of sixty such bombs—ten times as many as an airplane; if it does not hit the mark at the first trial, it can make attempt after attempt. Hence, we find Zeppelins assisting the siege guns and howitzers in reducing the fortresses of Belgium.

HITTING THE MARK FROM A HEIGHT OF TWO MILES

It is certain that far more is seen from any aircraft at night than is commonly supposed. Lights may be extinguished or covered; but no amount of darkening ever erases the contour of a terrain viewed from a great height. Water always appears light; massed buildings, forests and parks, darker. On the whole, suppression of details may even assist a bomb-dropper; the general character of a country becomes plainer, the landscape more recognizable. One of the writers vividly remembers the bewildering mass of details visible during a daylight trip in a Zeppelin; landscapes were so confused that it was difficult at first to distinguish one from another.

Although a darkened territory may actually assist the commander of a Zeppelin in determining his whereabouts, he can drop bombs successfully only if he has a very clearly defined mark. The blast furnaces of English industrial districts, unmistakable glowing spots that could not be extinguished if iron was to be smelted continuously, must have been splendid marks for the Zeppelins. There are stories enough to that effect. Anti-aircraft batteries have been silenced, so it is claimed by the Germans, simply by aiming at their flashes. Firing destroyers are said to have been sunk and searchlights extinguished. Much larger, blurred targets, on the other hand, were missed. In spite of countless misses, the Germans claim to have done enormous damage to factories, stores, ships, and railways as well as "deplorable harm to non-combatants."

The question of the ethics of bomb-dropping and of reprisals in kind is at once raised. We are concerned here only with the task of gauging the military value of aircraft. Bomb-dropping for moral effect is probably a failure. It

may be questioned whether the bombs dropped on English towns by the Germans or by the English on German cities were directed at anything but military objects such as are found in any large city. When bombs are dropped on a town, fortified or unfortified, it is always a foregone conclusion that innocent people will be killed. When the Germans violated the principles of international law by torpedoing a hospital ship and the British in April, 1917 retaliated by sending a so-called "punitive expedition" to drop bombs, also in violation of international law, on the little university town of Freiburg-im-Breisgau, a curious situation arose: There were more important, more readily accessible fortified places than Freiburg; but Freiburg was selected because it was unfortified and because the expedition was punitive. Although the killing of non-combatants was the object of the expedition, the bombs were dropped only on the principal buildings; it was expected that non-combatants would be incidentally killed and the object of the expedition thus attained. The larger the city the more likely is it to contain buildings of military importance. Hence, an aërial attack on undefended Munich would have been more justified than an attack on an undefended small university town. But only a Zeppelin could reach Munich with a load of bombs from one of the Allies' aircraft bases.

THE CONVERTIBLE AIRPLANE—A BRILLIANT ENGLISH INVENTION

Germany's effort to blockade the British Isles with submarines drove home to England her need of dirigibles. To detect a submarine's periscope from afar requires a steadier platform than that of a seaplane. England had neither the time nor the experience to build vessels comparable with Zeppelins. She hit upon an entirely new type of craft, the "convertible airplane"—a veritable stroke of genius. Despite its name, the convertible airplane has no supporting wings; like any other dirigible, it depends entirely upon gas to ascend. Until the "convertible" came, it had always been accepted as a matter of course that the cars of dirigibles should be as roomy as the pilot houses of steamships. Some unknown English genius, noting that airplane bodies could be turned out quickly and cheaply, hit upon the brilliant idea of using them as cars for gas envelopes. Thus, the so-called "convertible airplane" was created. They were much slower than the Zeppelins, but their speed of forty-five miles an hour gave them at least a fair measure of that velocity which is all-important in dirigibles. Moreover, their large number made up for what speed they lacked; they could be built very rapidly. At one stroke, almost, England was placed in possession of a craft not so air-worthy, so fast, or so formidable as the far huger Zeppelin, but well adapted for patrol duty in fair weather. These small convertibles and the Zeppelins are the only dirigibles that have met the later exigencies of the war.

For lack of dirigibles comparable with the Zeppelins in radius of action

and bomb-carrying capacity, the Allies have experimented with mammoth airplanes. The ordinary machine is hardly suitable for very long flights. Its quarters are too cramped, its fuel-capacity too small. At the very outbreak of the war, England bought the *America*, built by Curtiss for a trans-Atlantic flight—a biplane leviathan with cabin accommodation for five. She was engaged in naval scouting before she was destroyed in a storm. Many *Americas* have since been built for England to compensate as far as possible for her lack of Zeppelins.

Huge two-motored machines also have been built by the Allies for bombing raids. The Germans have built but one such craft. Evidently the Zeppelins meet all bombing requirements.

AIRCRAFT MADE THE WAR MORE SCIENTIFIC

If we were to crystallize the influence of aircraft upon warfare in a single dictum, this is the conclusion at which we would arrive: The use of aircraft has made warfare more than ever an exact science. To fight a battle, a general must have a plan of action, but before he can formulate that plan, he must know something of his enemy's strength and movements. He must have facts. From the days of ancient Greece down to the Twentieth Century, he gathered them bloodily by sending on troops of cavalry or by a reconnaissance in force. Even then, he could make only more or less shrewd guesses. To force an enemy into an untenable position has always been the object of a general. To do that he must have the most precise information. With the introduction of aircraft into war, he was given the means of collecting that information rapidly and abundantly. But, paradoxically enough, it is harder to win a battle now than it was in Napoleon's day, simply because the enemy, too, gathers his information from the air. The obstacles to be overcome have been multiplied enormously. It is singular that the great generals of history have been, for the most part, engineers. The use of aircraft has made it more than ever essential that the strategist should be an engineer—that he should understand not only how to handle men but that he should be a highly trained physicist as well.

VIII

FLYING MACHINES AND THE WAR

*An Interview with ORVILLE WRIGHT: By FRED C. KELLY

"The greatest use of the airplane to date has been as a tremendously big factor of modern warfare. But—— The greatest use of the airplane eventually will be to prevent war.

"Some day there will be neither war nor rumours of war, and the reason may be flying machines.

"It sounds paradoxical. We are building airplanes to use in time of war, and will continue to use them for war. We think of war and we think of airplanes. Later on, perhaps, we shall think of airplanes in connection with the wisdom of keeping out of war.

"The airplane will prevent war by making it too expensive, too slow, too difficult, too long drawn out—in brief, by making the cost prohibitive."

The man who makes these statements about the airplane is Orville Wright, one of the brothers who invented it.

"Did you ever stop to think," inquires Wright, "that there is a very definite reason why the present war in Europe has dragged along nearly three years with neither side gaining much advantage over the other? The reason, as I figure it out, is airplanes. In consequence of the scouting work done by the flying machines, each side knows exactly what the opposing forces are doing.

"There is little chance for one army to take another by surprise. Napoleon won his wars by massing his troops at unexpected places. The airplane has made that impossible. It has equalized information. Each side has such complete knowledge of the other's movements that both sides are obliged to crawl into trenches and fight by means of slow, tedious routine rather than by quick, spectacular dashes.

"My impression is that before the present war started the army experts expected it to be a matter of a few weeks or, at the most, a few months. But it has run into years. Now a nation that may be willing to undertake a war lasting a few months may well hesitate about engaging in one that will occupy years. The daily cost of a great war is of course stupendous. When this cost runs on for years the total is likely to be so great that the side which wins nevertheless loses. War will become prohibitively expensive. And the scouting

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work in flying machines will be the predominating factor, as it seems to me, in bringing this about. I like to think so anyhow."

"What, in your opinion, has the present war demonstrated regarding the relative advantages of airplanes and Zeppelin airships?" the inventor was asked.

"The aeroplane seems to have been of the more practical use," replied Wright. "In the first place, dirigible airships of the Zeppelin type are so expensive to build, costing somewhere around half a million dollars each, that it is distinctly disadvantageous to the nation operating them to have one destroyed. The financial risk every time your Zeppelin is shot at is too great. But what is more important is the fact that the Zeppelin is so large that it furnishes an excellent target unless it sails considerably higher than is comparatively safe for an airplane. And when the Zeppelin is at a safe height it is too far above the ground for your scout to make accurate observations, though, it is true, photography is now of great assistance in this direction. Similarly, when the Zeppelin is used for dropping bombs, it must be too high for the bomb thrower to show much accuracy."

"You think that the use of flying machines for scouting purposes will be of considerably more importance than their use as a means of attack?" was another question.

"That has been decidedly true so far," replied Wright. "About all that has been accomplished by either side from bomb dropping has been to kill a few non-combatants, and that will have no bearing on the result of the war.

"English newspapers have long talked of the danger of Zeppelin attacks or airplane attacks, but it was all for a purpose, because they did not believe the country was sufficiently prepared for war and sought to arouse the people and the War Department to action by means of the airship bogy."

"Has the war use of the airplane been up to the expectations you and your brother formed at the time of its invention?"

"Yes, beyond our expectations. About the first thing we thought of after we found that we could fly was its possibilities for scouting purposes, but we had little idea that the year 1917 would see so many thousands of airplanes in army use.

"Aside from the use of the machines for war purposes the war has given a great boost to aviation generally. It has led more men to learn to fly, and with a higher degree of skill than ever before. It has wakened people to aviation possibilities."

IX

LANGUAGE OF THE BIG GUNS*

By HUDSON MAXIM, Inventor of Smokeless Powder

In the present war, the big guns, both on land and sea, have told their own story, and they have commanded conviction of their usefulness in proportion to the loudness of their voice.

Following the introduction of armour-plate by Ericsson's *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, armourplate was answered by increasing the size of guns and projectiles. Brown prismatic powder was developed to slow the burning and lessen the initial pressure, thereby securing a better maintenance of pressure behind the projectile in its passage along the bore of the gun.

Guns weighing more than a hundred tons were built in England for the use of brown prismatic powder, but it was found that, after firing a few rounds, the guns drooped at the muzzle under the shock of discharge, and lost their accuracy.

The invention and development of smokeless gunpowder, mainly during the ten years between 1887 and 1897, resulted in radical improvements in guns of all calibres.

Only about 44 per cent. of the products of combustion of the old black powder and the brown prismatic powder were gaseous. The balance, about 56 per cent., were solid matter, and produced smoke. It will be seen, at a glance, that smokeless powder, whose products of combustion are entirely gaseous, possesses enormous ballistic advantages, quite independent of its smokelessness. Less than half the products of combustion of the old smoke-producing powders being gaseous, much energy was absorbed from the gases, to heat and vaporize the solid products constituting the smoke. Additional heat was consumed by the work of expelling the smoke from the gun.

The products of combustion of smokeless powder are not only practically all gaseous, but also they are much hotter than the products of combustion of the old, smoky, black powder. Owing to this fact, smokeless powder may be considered about four times as powerful as the old black powder.

When a projectile is thrown from a gun, although it is not heated appreciably, yet heat-energy represented by its velocity is absorbed from the expanding gases of the powder charge. When a 12-inch projectile weighing a thousand pounds is thrown from one of our long naval guns, it has a striking energy, fifty feet from the muzzle, of about 50,000 foot-tons—that is to say, it

*From "Defenceless America."

strikes with a force equal to that of 50,000 tons falling from a height of one foot, or one ton falling from a height of 50,000 feet. As the 12-inch naval gun weighs about 50 tons, the energy absorbed from the gases in the shape of velocity of the projectile is sufficient to lift a thousand 12-inch guns to a height of one foot.

As a projectile weighs half a ton, the force of the blow is about the same as though the projectile were to be dropped from a height of twenty miles, with no deduction for the resistance of the atmosphere.

When the projectile is stopped, a quantity of heat is re-developed exactly equal to that absorbed from the powder gases in giving the projectile its high velocity; and the quantity of heat absorbed from the powder gases in throwing a thousand-pound projectile from our big naval guns is sufficient to melt 750 pounds of cast iron, which is enough to heat the projectile white hot.

Obviously, when the projectile strikes armourplate, either the plate or the projectile must yield, for the reason that the projectile brings to bear upon a 12-inch plate an energy sufficient to fuse a hole right through it, and this is substantially what it does. The hard and toughened steel of the plate is heated and softened by the force of impact, and, although the projectile may be cold after it has passed through, it actually does fuse a hole through the plate, the metal flowing like wax from its path.

The introduction of smokeless cannon-powder was followed by a recession from guns of great weight and calibre, to guns of smaller weight and smaller calibre, the aim being to make up for the greater smashing power of huge projectiles, thrown at a lower velocity, with projectiles of smaller size, thrown at much greater velocity and having a greater power of penetration of armour-plate, which was constantly being made thicker and tougher and harder in order to resist the impact of armour-piercing projectiles.

As armour-plate continued to increase in thickness and in powers of resistance, guns of bigger and bigger calibre had to be made, capable of withstanding the enormous pressure necessary to throw projectiles of sufficient size and at sufficiently high velocity to penetrate any armourplate that could be opposed to them.

With every improvement in armourplate, the gun and the projectile have been improved and enlarged, until now no armourplate carried by any ship can withstand the naval guns of largest calibre. In its race with armour-plate, the gun has thus far been the winner.

Thus we see that the sufficiency of armourplate must, other things being equal, inevitably depend upon insufficiency in range and penetrating power of the gun to which it is opposed. An unarmoured vessel, with guns capable of penetrating the armourplate of an opponent having shorter-range guns, needs only to have superior speed in order to choose a position out of

range of the armourclad's guns, and, atmospheric conditions being favourable, to destroy it without itself being exposed to any danger whatsoever.

But there are other conditions which prevent the gun, however long its range and however great its power of penetration, from being a complete defence in the absence of armoured protection. These conditions are—the limit of vision due to the rotundity of the earth, even in clear weather; the limitation of vision, at much nearer distances, in thick or hazy weather; and, of course, the greatly increased difficulty of hitting at extreme ranges. Also, it is necessary to be able to observe, from the fighting-tops, where trial shots strike, in order to get the correct range, and lay the guns exactly upon the target.

In the recent North Sea fight, firing began at more than 17,000 yards, or about ten miles; 12-inch and 13-inch shells from the British ships struck the *Bluecher* before more than the upper works of the *Bluecher* could be seen from the decks of the British ships. Only by the fire-control officers, a hundred feet above the decks, could her whole hull be seen. When the first huge shells came plunging down out of the sky upon the *Bluecher*, her gunners could not see the ships from which they came.

To-day, the long-range, high-power naval gun, charged with smokeless powder, and throwing a projectile made of tempered steel inconceivably tough and hard, and charged with high explosive, is the most powerful dynamic instrument ever produced by man. A 12-inch naval gun throws a projectile weighing half a ton, at a velocity nearly three times the speed of sound. A charge of 375 pounds of smokeless powder, strong as dynamite, is employed for the projectile's propulsion.

Believing that the advantages of projectiles of great size, carrying a very large bursting charge, could be better illustrated by a gun of extraordinary calibre, I designed a cannon having a calibre of twenty-four inches, but having a weight of only 43 tons, the weight and length of the gun being the same as the British 12-inch 43-ton gun. This gun was designed to throw a semi-armour-piercing projectile weighing 1,700 pounds, and carrying an explosive charge of 1,000 pounds, the total weight of the projectile being 2,700 pounds. While the projectile was not designed to pierce heavy armour, it was capable of penetrating the decks and sides of light-armoured cruisers and deep into earth or concrete for the destruction of forts. It was a veritable aërial torpedo. By means of the special form of multi-perforated smokeless powder designed for this gun, the huge projectile could be thrown to a distance of nine miles with the gun at maximum elevation, and still with a comparatively low chamber pressure.

The projectile was provided with a safety delay-action detonating fuse, designed to explode it after having penetrated the object struck, thereby securing the maximum destructive effects.

It is reported that the Germans have made a huge howitzer weighing 45

tons, having a calibre of $23\frac{1}{2}$ inches, which also is capable of throwing a projectile weighing more than a ton to a distance of nine miles.

If Uncle Sam would listen with an understanding mind to the language of the big guns now speaking on land and sea, he would immediately build a large number of huge howitzers. He would build a large number of good roads, capable of standing the tread of these howitzers. He would build as well a goodly number of battle-cruisers, as big and as fast as any afloat in foreign seas, and armed with guns ranging as far as the guns of any foreign power.

APPENDIX

THE EARLY FRENCH OFFENSIVE

By FRANK H. SIMONDS

In the third week of August, 1914, a French army crossed the frontier of Alsace-Lorraine and entered the Promised Land, toward which all Frenchmen had looked in hope and sadness for forty-four years. The long-forgotten communiqués of that early period of the war reported success after success, until at last it was announced that the victorious French army had reached Saarburg and Morhange, and were astride the Strassburg-Metz railroad. And then Berlin took up the cry, and France and the world learned of a great German victory and of the defeat and rout of the invading army. Even Paris conceded that the retreat had begun and the "army of liberation" was crowding back beyond the frontier and far within French territory.

Then the curtain of the censorship fell and the world turned to the westward to watch the terrible battle for Paris. In the agony and glory of the Marne the struggle along the Moselle was forgotten; the Battle of Nancy, of Lorraine, was fought and won in the darkness, and when the safety of Paris was assured the world looked toward the Aisne, and then toward Flanders. So it came about that one of the greatest battles of the whole war, one of the most important of the French victories, the suceess that made the Marne possible, the rally and stand of the French armies about Nancy, escaped the fame it earned. Only in legend, in the romance of the Kaiser with his cavalry waiting on the hills to enter the Lorraine capital, did the battle live.

When I went to France one of the hopes I had cherished was that I might be permitted to visit this battlefield, to see the ground on which a great battle had been fought, that was still unknown country, in the main, for those who have written on the war. The Lorraine field was the field on which France and Germany had planned for a generation to fight. Had the Germans respected the neutrality of Belgium, it is by Nancy, by the gap between the Vosges and the hills of the Meuse, that they must have broken into France. The Marne was a battlefield which was reached by chance and fought over by hazard, but every foot of the Lorraine country had been studied for the fight long years in advance. Here war followed the natural course, followed the plans of the general staff prepared years in advance. Indeed I had treasured over years a plan of the Battle of Nancy, contained in a French book written long ago, which might serve as the basis for a history of what happened, as it was written as a prophecy of what was to come.

When the Great General Staff was pleased to grant my request to see the battlefield of Nancy I was advised to travel by train to that town accompanied by an officer from the General Staff, and informed that I should there meet an officer of the garrison, who would conduct me to all points of interest and explain in detail the various phases of the conflict. Thus it fell out, and I have to thank Commandant Leroux for the courtesy and consideration which made this excursion successful.

In peace time one goes from Paris to Nancy in five hours, and the distance is about that from New York to Boston, by Springfield. In war all is different, and the time almost doubled. Yet there are compensations. Think of the New York-Boston trip as bringing you beyond New Haven to the exact rear of battle, of battle but fifteen miles away, with the guns booming in the distance and the airplanes and balloons in full view. Think also of this same trip, which from Hartford to Worcester follows the line of a battle not yet two years old, a battle that has left its traces in ruined villages, in shattered houses. On either side of the railroad track the graves descend to meet the embankments; you can mark the advance and the retreat by the crosses which fill the fields. The gardens that touch the railroad and extend to the rear of houses in the little towns are filled with graves. Each enclosure has been fought for at the point of the bayonet, and every garden wall recalls the Château of Hougoumont, at Waterloo.

All this was two years ago, but there is to-day, also. East of Bar-le-Duc the main line is cut by German shell fire now. From Fort Camp des Romains above St. Mihiel German guns sweep the railroad near Commercy, and one has to turn south by a long detour, as if one went to Boston by Fitchburg, travel south through the country of Jeanne d'Arc and return by Toul, whose forts look out upon the invaded land. Thus one comes to Nancy by night, and only by night, for twenty miles beyond there are Germans and a German cannon, which not so long ago sent a shell into the town and removed a whole city block beside the railroad station. It is the sight of this ruin as you enter the town which reminds you that you are at the front, but there are other reminders.

As we ate our dinner in the café, facing the beautiful Place Stanislas, we were disturbed by a strange and curious drumming sound. Going out into the square, we saw an airplane, or rather its lights, red and green, like those of a ship. It was the first of several, the night patrol, rising slowly and steadily and then sweeping off in a wide curve toward the enemy's line. They were the sentries of the air which were to guard us while we slept, for men do sentry-go in the air as well as on the earth about the capital of Lorraine. Then the searchlights on the hills began to play, sweeping the horizon toward that same mysterious region where beyond the darkness there is war.

The next morning I woke with the sense of Fourth of July. Bang! Bang!

Bang! Such a barking of cannon crackers I had never heard. Still drowsy, I pushed open the French windows and looked down on the square. There I beheld a hundred or more men, women, and children, their eyes fixed on something in the air above and behind the hotel. Still the incessant barking of guns with the occasional boom of something more impressive. With difficulty I grasped the fact. I was in the midst of a Taube raid. Somewhere over my head, invisible to me because of the wall of my hotel, a German airplane was flying, and all the anti-aircraft guns were shooting at it. Was it carrying bombs? Should I presently see or feel the destruction following the descent of these?

But the Taube turned away, the guns fired less and less frequently, the people in the streets drifted away, the children to school, the men to work, the women to wait. It was just a detail in their lives, as familiar as the incoming steamer to the commuters on the North River ferryboat. Some portion of war has been the day's history of Nancy for nearly two years now. The children do not carry gas masks to school with them as they do at Pont-à-Mousson, a dozen miles to the north, but women and children have been killed by German shells, by bombs brought by Zeppelins and by airplanes. There is always excitement of sorts in the district of Nancy.

After a breakfast broken by the return of the airplanes we had seen departing the night before for the patrol, we entered our cars and set out for the front, for the near front, for the lines a few miles behind the present trenches, where Nancy was saved but two years ago. Our route lay north along the valley of the Meurthe, a smiling broad valley, marching north and south and meeting in a few miles that of the Moselle coming east. It was easy to believe that one was riding through the valley of the Susquehanna, with spring and peace in the air. Toward the east a wall of hills shut out the view. This was the shoulder of the Grand-Couronne, the wall against which German violence burst and broke in September, 1914.

Presently we came to a long stretch of road walled in on the river side by brown canvas, exactly the sort of thing that is used at foot-ball games to shut out the non-paying public. But it had another purpose here. We were within the vision of the Germans, across the river, on the heights behind the forest, which outlined itself at the skyline; there were the Kaiser's troops and that forest was the Bois-le-Prêtre, the familiar incident in so many communiqués since the war began. Thanks to the canvas, it was possible for the French to move troops along this road without inviting German shells. Yet it was impossible to derive any large feeling of security from a canvas wall, which alone interposed between you and German heavy artillery.

We passed through several villages and each was crowded with troops; cavalry, infantry, all the branches represented; it was still early and the soldiers were just beginning their day's work; war is so completely a business here-

Transport wagons marched along the roads, companies of soldiers filed by. Interspersed with the soldiers were civilians, the women and children, for none of the villages are evacuated. Not even the occasional boom of a gun far off could give to this thing the character of real war. It recalled the days of my soldiering in the militia camp at Framingham in Massachusetts. It was simply impossible to believe that it was real. Even the faces of the soldiers were smiling. There was no such sense of terribleness, of strain and weariness as I later found about Verdun. The Lorraine front is now inactive, tranquil; it has been quiet so long that men have forgotten all the carnage and horror of the earlier time.

We turned out of the valley and climbed abruptly up the hillside. In a moment we came into the centre of a tiny village and looked into a row of houses, whose roofs had been swept off by shell fire. Here and there a whole house was gone; next door the house was undisturbed and the women and children looked out of the doors. The village was St. Geneviève, and we were at what had been the extreme front of the French in August, and against this hill burst the flood of German invasion. Leaving the car we walked out of the village, and at the end of the street a sign warned the wayfarer not to enter the fields, for which we were bound: "War—do not trespass." This was the burden of the warning.

Once beyond this sign we came out suddenly upon an open plateau, upon trenches. Northward the slope descended to a valley at our feet. It was cut and seamed by trenches, and beyond the trenches stood the posts that carried the barbed-wire entanglements. Here and there, amidst the trenches, there were graves. I went down to the barbed-wire entanglements and examined them curiously. They at least were real. Once thousands of men had come up out of the little woods a quarter of a mile below; they had come on in that famous massed attack, they had come on in the face of machine gun and "seventy-fives." They had just reached the wires, which marked high water. In the woods below, the Bois-de-Facq, in the fields by the river, 4,000 Germans had been buried.

Looking out from the trenches the whole country unfolded. Northward the little village of Atton slept under the steep slope of Côte-de-Mousson, a round pinnacle crowned with an ancient château. From the hill the German artillery had swept the ground where I stood. Below the hill to the west was Pont-à-Mousson, the city of 150 bombardments, which the Germans took when they came south, and lost later. Above it was the Bois-le-Prêtre, in which guns were now booming occasionally. Far to the north was another hill, just visible, and its slope toward us was cut and seamed with yellow slashes: Those were the French trenches, then of the second or third line; beyond there was still another hill, it was slightly blurred in the haze, but it was not over five miles away, and it was occupied by the Germans. From the slope above

me on a clear day it is possible to see Metz, so near are French and German lines to the old frontier.

Straight across the river to the west of us was another wood, with a glorious name, the Forest of the Advance Guard. It swept to the south of us. In that wood the Germans had also planted their guns on the day of battle. They had swept the trenches where I stood from three sides. Plainly it had been a warm corner. But the French had held on. Their commander had received a verbal order to retreat. He insisted that it should be put in writing, and this took time. The order came. It had to be obeyed, but he obeyed slowly. Reluctantly the men left the trenches they had held so long. They slipped southward along the road by which we had come. But suddenly their rear guards discovered that the Germans were also retreating. So the French came back and the line of St. Geneviève was held, the northern door to Nancy was not forced.

Looking down again it was not difficult to reconstitute that German assault, made at night. The thing was so simple the civilian could grasp it. A road ran through the valley and along it the Germans had formed; the slope they had to advance up was gentle, far more gradual than that of San Juan. They had been picked troops selected for a forlorn hope, and they had come back four times. The next morning the whole forest had been filled with dead and dying. Not less than a division—20,000 men—had made the terrible venture. Now there was a strange sense of emptiness in the country; war had come and gone, left its graves, its trenches, its barbed-wire entanglements; but these were all disappearing already. On this beautiful spring morning it was impossible to feel the reality of what happened here, what was happening now, in some measure, five miles or more to the north. Nature is certainly the greatest of all pacifists; she will not permit the signs of war to endure nor the mind to believe that war itself has existed and exists.

From St. Geneviève we went to the Grand Mont d'Amance, the most famous point in all the Lorraine front, the southeast corner of the Grand-Couronne, as St. Geneviève is the northern. Here, from a hill some 1,300 feet high, one looks eastward into the Promised Land of France—into German Lorraine. In the early days of August the great French invasion, resting one flank upon this hill, the other upon the distant Vosges, had stepped over the frontier. One could trace its route to the distant hills among which it had found disaster. In these hills the Germans had hidden their heavy guns, and the French, coming under their fire without warning, unsupported by heavy artillery, which was lacking to them, had broken. Then the German invasion had rolled back. You could follow the route. In the foreground the little Seille River could be discerned; it marked the old frontier. Across this had come the defeated troops. They had swarmed down the low, bare hills; they had crossed and vanished in the woods just at my feet; these woods were the

Forest of Champenoux. Into this forest the Germans had followed by the thousand, they were astride the main road to Nancy, which rolled white and straight at my feet. But in the woods the French rallied. For days there was fought in this stretch of trees one of the most terrible of battles.

As I stood on the Grand Mont I faced almost due east. In front of me and to the south extended the forest. Exactly at my feet the forest reached up the hill and there was a little cluster of buildings about a fountain. All was in ruins, and here, exactly here, was the high-water mark of the German advance. They had occupied the ruins for a few moments and then had been driven out. Elsewhere they had never emerged from the woods; they had approached the western shore, but the French had met them with machine guns and "seventy-fives." The brown woods at my feet were nothing but a vast cemetery; thousands of French and German soldiers slept there.

In their turn the Germans had gone back. Now, in the same woods, a French battery was shelling the Germans on the other side of the Seille. Under the glass I studied the little villages unfolding as on a map; they were all destroyed, but it was impossible to recognize this. Some were French, some German; you could follow the line, but there were no trenches; behind them French shells were bursting occasionally and black smoke rose just above the ground. Thousands of men faced each other less than four miles from where I stood, but all that there was to be detected were the shell bursts; otherwise one saw a pleasant country, rolling hills, mostly without woods, bare in the spring which had not yet come to turn them green. In the foreground ran that arbitrary line Bismarck had drawn between Frenchmen forty-six years before—the frontier—but of natural separation there was none. He had cut off a part of France, that was all, and one looked upon what had been and was still a bleeding wound.

I asked the French commandant about the various descriptions made by those who have written about the war. They have described the German attack as mounting the slope of the Grand Mont where we stood. He took me to the edge and pointed down. It was a cliff almost as steep as the Palisades. "*C'est une blague*," he smiled. "Just a story." The Germans had not charged here, but in the forest below, where the Nancy road passed through and enters the valley of the Amezeule. They had not tried to carry but to turn the Grand Mont. More than 200,000 men had fought for days in the valley below. I asked him about the legend of the Kaiser sitting on a hill, waiting in white uniform with his famous escort, waiting until the road was clear for his triumphal entrance into the capital of Lorraine. He laughed. I might choose my hill; if the Emperor had done this thing the hill was "over there," but had he? They are hard on legends at the front, and the tales that delight Paris die easily on the frontiers of war.

But since I had asked so much about the fighting my commandant promised

to take me in the afternoon to the point where the struggle had been fiercest, still farther to the south, where all the hills break down and there is a natural gateway from Germany into France, the beginning of the famous Charmes Gap, through which the German road to Paris from the east ran, and still runs. Leaving Nancy behind us, and ascending the Meurthe Valley on the eastern bank, turning out of it before Saint Nicholas du Port, we came presently to the most completely war-swept fields that I have ever seen. On a perfectly level plain the little town of Haraucourt stands in sombre ruins. Its houses are nothing but ashes and rubble. Go out of the village toward the east and you enter fields pockmarked by shell fire. For several miles you can walk from shell hole to shell hole. The whole country is a patchwork of these shell holes. At every few rods a new line of old trenches approaches the road and wanders away again. Barbed-wire entanglements run up and down the gently sloping hillsides.

Presently we came out upon a perfectly level field. It was simply torn by shell fire. Old half-filled trenches wandered aimlessly about, and beyond, under a gentle slope, the little village of Corbessaux stood in ruins. The commandant called my attention to a bit of woods in front.

"The Germans had their machine guns there," said he. "We didn't know it, and a French brigade charged across this field. It started at 8:15, and at 8:30 it had lost more than 3,000 out of 6,000. Then the Germans came out of the woods in their turn, and our artillery, back at Haraucourt, caught them and they lost 3,500 men in a quarter of an hour. Along the roadside were innumerable graves. We looked at one. It was marked: "Here 196 French." Twenty feet distant was another; it was marked: "Here 196 Germans." In the field where we stood I was told some 10,000 men are buried. They were buried hurriedly, and even now, when it rains, arms and legs are exposed.

Two years had passed, almost two years, since this field had been fought for. The Germans had taken it. They had approached Haraucourt, but had not passed it. This was the centre and the most vital point in the Lorraine battle. What Foch's troops had done about La Fère Champenoise, those of Castelnau had done here. The German wave had been broken, but at what cost? And now, after so many months, the desolation of war remained. But yet it was not to endure. Beside the very graves an old peasant was ploughing, guiding his plough and his horses carefully among the tombs. Four miles away more trenches faced each other and the battle went on audibly, but behind this line, in this very field where so many had died, life was beginning.

Later we drove south, passing within the lines the Germans had held in their great advance; we travelled through Lunéville, which they had taken and left unharmed, save as shell fire had wrecked an eastern suburb. We visited Gerbéviller, where in an excess of rage the Germans had burned every structure in the town. I have never seen such a headquarters of desolation. Every-

thing that had a shape, that had a semblance of beauty or of use, lies in complete ruin, detached houses, a château, the blocks in the village, all in ashes. Save for Sermaize, Gerbéviller is the most completely wrecked town in France.

You enter the village over a little bridge across the tiny Mortagne. Here some French soldiers made a stand and held off the German advance for some hours. There was no other battle at Gerbéviller, but for this defence the town died. Never was death so complete. Incendiary material was placed in every house, and all that thoroughness could do to make the destruction complete was done. Gerbéviller is dead, a few women and children live amidst its ashes, there is a wooden barrack by the bridge with a post-office and the inevitable postcards, but only on postcards, picture postcards, does the town live. It will be a place of pilgrimage when peace comes.

From Gerbéviller we went by Bayon to the Plateau of Saffais, the ridge between the Meurthe and the Moselle, where the defeated army of Castelnau made its last and successful stand. The French line came south from St. Geneviève, where we had been in the morning, through the Grand Mont, across the plain by Haraucourt and Corbessaux, then crossed the Meurthe by Dombasle and stood on the heights from Rosières south. Having taken Lunèville, the Germans attempted to cross the Meurthe coming out of the Forest of Vitrimont.

Standing on the Plateau of Saffais and facing east, the whole country unfolded again, as it did at the Grand Mont. The face of the plateau is seamed with trenches. They follow the slopes, and the village of Saffais stands out like a promontory. On this ridge the French had massed three hundred cannon. Their army had come back in ruins, and to steady it they had been compelled to draw troops from Alsace. Mühlhausen was sacrificed to save Nancy. Behind these crests on which we stood, a beaten army, almost routed, had in three days found itself and returned to the charge.

In the shadow of the dusk I looked across the Meurthe into the brown mass of the Forest of Vitrimont. Through this had come the victorious Germans. They had debouched from the wood; they had approached the river, hidden under the slope, but, swept by the hell of this artillery storm, they had broken. But few had lived to pass the river, none had mounted the slopes. There were almost no graves along these trenches. Afterward the Germans had in turn yielded to pressure from the south and gone back. Before the Battle of the Marne began the German wave of invasion had been stopped here in the last days of August. A second terrific drive, coincident with the Marne, had likewise failed. Then the Germans had gone back to the frontier. The old boundary line of Bismarck is now in many instances an actual line of fire, and nowhere on this front are the Germans more than three or four miles within French territory.

If you should look at the map of the wholly imaginary Battle of Nancy,

drawn by Colonel Boucher to illustrate his book, published before 1910, a book describing the problem of the defence of the eastern frontier, you will find the lines on which the French stood at Saffais indicated exactly. Colonel Boucher had not dreamed this battle, but for a generation the French General Staff had planned it. Here they had expected to meet the German thrust. When the Germans decided to go by Belgium they had in turn taken the offensive, but, having failed, they had fought their long-planned battle.

Out of all the region of war, of war to-day and war yesterday, one goes back to Nancy, to its busy streets, its crowds of people returning from their day's work. War is less than fifteen miles away, but Nancy is as calm as London is nervous. Its bakers still make macaroons; even Taube raids do not excuse the children from punctual attendance at school. Nancy is calm with the calmness of all France, but with just a touch of something more than calmness, which forty-six years of living by an open frontier brings. Twenty-one months ago it was the gauge of battle, and half a million men fought for it; a new German drive may approach it at any time. Out toward the old frontier there is still a German gun, hidden in the Forest of Bézange, which has turned one block to ashes and may fire again at any hour. Zeppelins have come and gone, leaving dead women and children behind them, but Nancy goes on with to-day.

And to-morrow? In the hearts of all the people of this beautiful city there is a single and a simple faith. Nancy turns her face toward the ancient frontier, she looks hopefully out upon the shell-swept Grand-Couronne and beyond to the Promised Land. And the people say to you if you ask them about war and about peace, as one of them said to me: "Peace will come, but not until we have our ancient frontier, not until we have Metz and Strasbourg. We have waited a long time, is it not so?"

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